

# A Companion to Juan Luis Vives

VISIT...

LANZAROTE  
*Caliente*.COM

# Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition

A series of handbooks and reference works  
on the intellectual and religious life of Europe,  
500–1700

VOLUME 12

# A Companion to Juan Luis Vives

*Edited by*  
Charles Fantazzi



BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON

2008

Cover design by Celine Ostendorf.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A companion to Juan Luis Vives / edited by Charles Fantazzi.

p. cm. — (Brill's companions to the Christian tradition, ISSN 1871-6377 ; 12)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-90-04-16854-1 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Vives, Juan Luis, 1492–1540.  
2. Philosophers—Spain. I. Fantazzi, Charles. II. Title. III. Series.

B785.V64C66 2008

196'.1—dc22

2008022861

ISSN 1871-6377

ISBN 978 90 04 16854 1

Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,

IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA.  
Fees are subject to change.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

## CONTENTS

|                                                                                                                 |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| List of Contributors .....                                                                                      | vii |
| Introduction .....                                                                                              | 1   |
| <i>Charles Fantazzi</i>                                                                                         |     |
| Juan Luis Vives. Works and Days .....                                                                           | 15  |
| <i>Enrique González González</i>                                                                                |     |
| Vives and the <i>emarginati</i> .....                                                                           | 65  |
| <i>Charles Fantazzi</i>                                                                                         |     |
| The Social and Political Thought of Juan Luis Vives:<br>Concord and Counsel in the Christian Commonwealth ..... | 113 |
| <i>Catherine Curtis</i>                                                                                         |     |
| The <i>De disciplinis</i> as a Model of a Humanistic Text .....                                                 | 177 |
| <i>Valerio Del Nero</i>                                                                                         |     |
| Vives's Contributions to Rhetoric and Dialectic .....                                                           | 227 |
| <i>Peter Mack</i>                                                                                               |     |
| A Philosophical Treatise on the Soul: <i>De anima et vita</i><br>in the Context of Vives's Opus .....           | 277 |
| <i>Valerio Del Nero</i>                                                                                         |     |
| Author, Adversary, and Reader: A View of the <i>De veritate</i><br><i>fidei Christianae</i> .....               | 315 |
| <i>Edward V. George</i>                                                                                         |     |
| Fame and Oblivion .....                                                                                         | 359 |
| <i>Enrique González González</i>                                                                                |     |
| Select Bibliography .....                                                                                       | 415 |
| Index .....                                                                                                     | 423 |



## LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

CATHERINE CURTIS, BA, University of New South Wales, Ph.D. Cambridge, is an Honorary Associate of the Department of History at the University of Sydney. Her recent publications focus on Tudor humanism, the diplomat Richard Pace, the methodology of Quentin Skinner and the persona of the early modern philosopher. She is currently writing a monograph on Thomas More for the forthcoming *Cambridge Companion to Thomas More*.

VALERIO DEL NERO, *laurea* in philosophy and *dottorato di ricerca* from the University of Florence, professor of history and philosophy in the Liceo Scientifico Statale “Piero Gobetti” in Florence. Works include *Linguaggio e filosofia in Vives: l'organizzazione del sapere nel De disciplinis* (1991) and numerous articles on Vives in Italian journals. He is currently writing on the relations between education and philosophy in the age of humanism and the early modern period.

CHARLES FANTAZZI, BA and MA, Catholic University of America, Ph.D., Comparative Literature, Harvard University (1964), presently Thomas Harriot Distinguished Professor of Humanities, East Carolina University. General editor, *Selected Works of J.L. Vives*, Brill Publishers. Editor and translator of various works in the *Collected Works of Erasmus*, University of Toronto Press. Editor and translator of Angelo Poliziano, *Silvae*, Harvard University Press (2004).

EDWARD V. GEORGE, Ph.D., Classics, University of Wisconsin, Professor Emeritus of Classics, Texas Tech University. Author of Vives's *Somnium et vigilia in Somnium Scipionis*, Vives's *Declamationes Sullanae* (I), numerous articles on Vives's rhetoric and studies of Luisa Sigea. Former President of the American Association for Neo-Latin Studies and Chair of Humanities Texas, state agency of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Collaborator with high school teachers of Spanish to develop programs linking the teaching of Latin and Spanish.

ENRIQUE GONZÁLEZ GONZÁLEZ, doctorate in history, University of Valencia, 1991, professor and researcher, Universidad Nacional



Autónoma de México. Vives publications: *Joan Lluís Vives. De la Escolástica al Humanismo* (1987), *Vives. Edicions Princeps* (1992), *Los diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1539–1994)* (1992), *Una república de lectores. Difusión y recepción de la obra de Juan Luis Vives* (2007). Numerous articles on the colonial university of Mexico and Hispanic universities of the modern period.

PETER MACK, BA, St Peter's College, Oxford (1976), Ph.D. Warburg Institute (1983), Professor of English and Comparative Literature, University of Warwick. Author of *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic* (1993), *Elizabethan Rhetoric* (2002). Currently completing *Shakespeare, Montaigne and Rhetorical Reading*; editor of *Rhetorica*, 1998–2002.

## INTRODUCTION

Charles Fantazzi

From having been one of the leading lights of the sixteenth century, hailed as one of the triumvirs of the *res publica litterarum* together with Erasmus and Budé by the Jesuit scholar Andreas Schott in his *Hispaniae Bibliotheca* (1608), Vives was almost completely forgotten by the second half of the seventeenth century. His memory was suddenly revived during the nineteenth century in Germany, where he was rediscovered by German writers on pedagogy and empirical psychology. From there his fame spread once again to many countries of Europe and even across the ocean to America to some degree through the translation of parts of Karl von Raumer's *Geschichte der Pädagogik*, in which Vives figures prominently. These translations appeared in *The American Journal of Education* published by the renowned American educationalist at Columbia University, Henry Barnard. Another professor of education, Foster Watson, of the University of Wales, influenced by the vogue for Vives in Germany, also became interested in the Spanish humanist's writings and indeed became a zealous apostle in the dissemination of his works, some of which he translated into English. Watson's efforts had little effect in England but they did attract the attention of the *Institut d'estudis catalans* in Barcelona, which invited him to give a talk there entitled "The Spanish element in Luis Vives", published immediately afterwards in Catalan and Spanish. Spaniards eager to modernize the culture of the peninsula joined with him in propagating the fame of Vives, always emphasizing his role as an educator.

In North America new interest in Vives was aroused by a Spanish expatriate, Carlos Noreña, a professor of philosophy at the University of California in Santa Cruz, who in 1970 published a book about his fellow countryman, whom he wished to deliver from the misrepresentations of his thought perpetrated by much Spanish scholarship. He was able to make use of more recent studies and documents, like Allen's edition of Erasmus' correspondence, Henry de Vocht's edition of the correspondence between Vives and Frans van Cranevelt, and the newly published inquisitorial trials against Vives's family. Noreña's vision of Vives is that of a man not tied to any one country or ideology, a man

tormented by doubt and uncertainty. He chose to write the book in English since there was such a dearth of writing about him in that language and a Spanish version appeared in 1978. In recent years critical editions and translations of Vives have begun to appear in English, especially those in the series, *Selected Works of J.L. Vives*, published by Brill, which now number eight volumes. But, paradoxically, the name of Vives is still not to be found in general books on humanism, such as *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism*, edited by Jill Kraye of the Warburg Institute (Cambridge, 1996) or Charles Nauert's *The Culture of Renaissance Europe* (second edition, Cambridge, 2006). In one recent study, at least, *The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe*, edited by Anthony Godman and Angus MacKay (London, 1990), he is accorded his due importance by James K. Cameron of the University of Edinburgh in his chapter on humanism in the Low Countries. He quotes the judgement of the Spanish humanist made by the great Belgian scholar, Henry de Vocht, in the *Biographie nationale de Belgique*, who describes Vives as the most representative embodiment of the humanism of the first half of the sixteenth century.

It has been Vives's fate to be eclipsed both in life and in death by the lustre of the name of Erasmus. Bolgar in the *The Classical Heritage and Its Beneficiaries* justly observes that Erasmus is one of the leading figures in the history of education, but again there is no mention of Vives. In many ways, as in his awareness of the importance of the vernacular languages in education, his concern for the education of women, and the vast scope of the *De disciplinis*, Vives is more forward-looking than his illustrious master and influenced later educators like Sturm in Germany, Mulcaster and Ascham in England, Comenius in Bohemia. While education was always a primary concern in Vives's life and writings, he was not simply a theoretician of the subject, but one who practised the art of teaching both as a free-lance lecturer in Paris and Louvain, a university lecturer at Oxford, and tutor to eminent personages like the young Guillaume de Croy, Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of Spain, and later in life to the Spanish noblewoman, Doña Mencía de Mendoza. As a student in Paris Vives produced an impressive series of writings, *praelectiones* (introductory lectures) to his courses on the most disparate texts, both classical and humanistic, among which were the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, followed shortly by Filelfo's *Convivia mediolanensia*, and Cicero's *De legibus*, which stands out from all the other pieces in style and erudition. Other compositions were more original in inspiration, such as the *Aedes legum*, a representation of law as a temple guarded

by a cantankerous concierge who lectures the narrator in a strange, archaic Latin. Vives frequently manifests his interest in law and tells us in a passage of his *Commentary on Saint Augustine's City of God* that his maternal uncle, Enric March, who had studied in Bologna, instructed him in Justinian's *Institutiones* when he was a boy.

A typical example of these early writings is an essay on the origins of philosophy, *De initiis, sectis et laudibus philosophiae* of 1518, which takes its inspiration from Diogenes Laertius's *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*. In his usual free style of adaptation Vives departs immediately from his model to talk about the Hebrew prophets, Egyptian seers, Druids, Brahmins, gymnosophists and Persian magi, mixing fact with fiction and myth. In the humanist manner he embellishes his tale with poetry, at one point quoting some apposite lines from Ovid's *Fasti*:

Felices animae, quibus haec cognoscere primum  
Inque domos superas scandere cura fuit.

(O happy souls who first took pains to learn  
these things and scale the heavenly heights)  
(*Fasti* 1.297–98)

In his creative account Vives draws not only on the usual learned sources of antiquity, but cites more obscure ones as well, such as Celsus, Flavius Josephus, Eusebius, Justinus, Boethius on music, Philostratus, demonstrating his precocious learning. In the end he makes of philosophy an encyclopedic discipline, "*rerum et humanarum et divinarum cognitio*" (the comprehension of things human and divine). Vives also showed a special talent in the composition of declamations in the style of the school exercises of the early Roman empire. One set of these dealing with the dictator Sulla, dedicated to the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, brother of Charles V, was preceded by a very laudatory preface of Erasmus. Thomas More also expressed his admiration for these works and invited Vives to write a response to a speech contained in the pseudo-Quintilian corpus entitled the "*Paries palmatus*", or "The Handprint on the Wall", which was a defense of a blind youth accused of murdering his father. More asked Vives to compose a speech in defense of the mother-in-law for the instruction and entertainment of his children, and perhaps also to put Vives to the test. He complied, but instead of writing a full-scale speech merely wrote notes and sketches for the argument, demonstrating his skill both as an orator and a pedagogue. To give proof of his knowledge of Greek, while at the same time subtly conveying a political message, Vives translated the *Nicocles*

*de monarchia* and the *Aeropagitica* of Isocrates for Cardinal Wolsey during his sojourn in England.

The culmination of this early period was his virulent attack against the logicians of Paris, the *In pseudodialecticos*, which attracted the attention and encomia of both More and Erasmus. This exhibition of his formidable talents instigated Erasmus to commission him to undertake a very difficult task, a commentary on Augustine's *City of God*, to contribute to his own edition of Augustine's complete works. It is one of the first examples of a humanist commentary on a patristic work and despite Erasmus's carping criticism would have great influence in the sixteenth century and beyond. Vives did not usually engage in the art of textual criticism and emendation, as did the Italian humanists, since his bent was philosophical rather than philological. For the commentary on Augustine, however, Erasmus lent him a manuscript from Cologne, another was supplied by Marcus Laurinus from the chapter house of St. Donatian and a third was obtained from the Carmelites in Bruges, which Vives collated to establish the text. Froben published it separately in 1522 at great expense, but in the edition of the complete works of Augustine in 1529, Vives's notes and preliminary material were removed and his name barely mentioned at the end of the preface. This was a great rebuff to the young humanist but rather than lay down his pen he immediately embarked upon some of his most famous writings.

These are some of the stages in the development of Vives's humanist career which prepared him for his later more important writings, which will be the subject of this *Companion to Vives*. Even in these early works, however, Vives manifests a spirit of originality and independence that will characterize him as a mature writer and scholar. The earliest manifestation of this is his break with scholastic philosophy in the *In pseudodialecticos*. Beneath all the exaggerated ridicule of the Paris logicians are certain educational principles which Vives thinks were being disregarded in this form of training. He argues that too much time was spent on hair-splitting argumentation in an artificial language, insisting on the humanist definition of logic as an art which is not to be learned for its own sake but as a support to the other arts and to serve as their handmaid, as it were. Vives pitilessly portrays this breed of scholars when they have grown old and have left the protective cover of the classroom, reduced to silence in the presence of learned men. This forceful attack on the established curriculum is certainly a very daring move for a neophyte in the world of learning. Twelve years later, with

much greater confidence, he will give full expression to his revolutionary ideas on education in his magnum opus, *De disciplinis*.

In the dedication of that work to King John III of Portugal Vives announces his intention of purging the arts of impious doubts and infusing pagan darkness with the light of the Christian religion. This moral purpose for the pursuit of learning is a constant motif in Vives's writing, early and late. He forewarns the reader that in order to accomplish this goal he will be obliged to challenge the opinions of many of the approved authors, especially Aristotle, which prompts him to confess to his temerity: "*Confidentiam ipse meam damno*." He pleads that no one accuse him of ingratitude, asserting that it is much more beneficial to the study of letters to be critical rather than merely to acquiesce in authority. Nature is always unchanging (*Natura eadem est semper sui similis*), he says. She is not so worn out with child-bearing that she cannot bring forth things similar to what she produced in the past. In fact, she is even stronger and more energetic than before. So many avenues of learning have opened up to us from the experience of previous centuries that if we emulate the ancient writers and make similar use of our talents, we can make better observations about life and nature than they. He cites to his purpose a line of Seneca: "*Qui ante nos ista moverunt, non domini nostri, sed duces sunt*." (Those who originated these things are not our masters, but our guides, Seneca, *Epistulae morales*, 33.11). More than a dedication this is a bold manifesto. From his earliest years Vives exemplifies Horace's famous dictum: "*Nullius iurare addictus in verba magistri*." He stands in awe of no one, living or dead, in his pursuit of the truth. The object of this *Companion to Vives* is to follow him in this quest in readings and interpretations of some of his most famous works. Vives is a difficult writer. His style is sometimes contorted and, to use an anachronism, betrays a certain baroque quality. Yet whatever he touches has a spark of originality and inventiveness. As Peter Mack comments at the end of his contribution, "Vives is well-read and perceptive. It's always a pleasure to turn to his thoughtful, intelligent prose." It is hoped that in these essays we may familiarize the reader with the scope of Vives's major writings and demonstrate his enormous impact on European civilization.

For the life and afterlife of Juan Luis Vives there is no one at the present moment to rival Enrique González González of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, where he is a member of an *équipe* investigating the history of universities, both colonial and European.

He has scoured libraries and archives throughout Europe and North America in his study of Vives and has made extraordinary finds in his searches, including the only surviving copy of a collection of early works of Vives published in Lyons in 1514. In his account of Vives's life González discards the stereotyped version that began with the eighteenth-century *Vita Vivis* of the Valencian scholar Gregorio Mayans, which is filled with misinformation and erroneous concepts. He also rectifies views about the *Judeo-converso* origins of Vives's family with rich documentation taken from the inquisitorial trials of members of his family. Drawing on his own previous investigations, he reports the social, economic and political conditions of Valencia at that time and describes the courses offered at the *studio general* of Valencia, which Vives attended, thus providing a more accurate account of Vives's formative years there. He also discusses dispassionately the thorny question of the relations between the social groups or castes in the city under the rule of Ferdinand of Aragon as a determining factor in Vives's life. As he so ably demonstrated in his innovative study, *Joan Lluís Vives. De la escolástica al humanismo*, González rectifies earlier accounts of Vives's stay in Paris and his gradual assimilation of the ideals of humanism. The next phase of his career takes the young humanist to the Low Countries, where he gained entrance to the court of the future emperor Charles V in Brussels and made the acquaintance of Erasmus, a very important moment in his life, which would have great repercussions. His fortunes changed drastically when his patron and pupil, Guillaume de Croy, died suddenly in a hunting accident. The next twenty years, 1520 to 1540, were filled with adversities but, as González remarks, were nonetheless the most productive of his short-lived career. Since so little is known about the later years of Vives's life, he reviews critically what has been written recently and fills it in with some illuminating facts uncovered very recently in Spanish archives by Valentín Moreno Gallego, among others. In closing he gives his personal impression of Vives the man and the writer.

In a second chapter on "Fame and Oblivion" González traces Vives's varying vicissitudes through the ages, a parabola that extends from the sixteenth century, when he was the most read humanist after Erasmus, to the nadir of his literary fortunes in the second half of the seventeenth century, to his gradual return to favor. The procedure is chronological, beginning with the earliest published works, which immediately drew the attention of the learned world, including Erasmus, More and Budé. González gives a vivid account of the troubles

that plagued the collaboration with Erasmus in the publication of his *Commentary on St. Augustine's City of God*. He then passes to the publishing success of Vives's treatise on the education of women and a short pious work entitled *Introductio ad sapientiam*, which was often printed with four short works on the education of children. He documents minutely the geographical diffusion of this work from country to country, as he does with all of Vives's works, and the diverse effects it had in each region of Europe with people of different religious affiliations. In the matter of confessional divisions it is interesting to follow who printed what and for what reasons. After this concise synthesis González describes the various kinds of reception accorded to Vives's works. He identifies three different types of readers: those who assimilated his writings and did not hesitate to cite him favorably; those, difficult to identify, who made use of his work but made no mention of his name; and those who read his works and cited them with scorn and condemnation. Among the first group are to be mentioned writers on pedagogy and psychology in Germany during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who saw in him an exemplification of their own ideas and theories. In Spain interest in Vives was revived somewhat later and spawned a huge number of books and articles about him. This latter production González accounts of little worth, inspired as it was by the excesses of ultra-nationalism. He has much more regard for Belgian scholars, primarily Henry de Vocht (1878–1962) and his successors at the University of Louvain. The narrative concludes with the chronicling of recent scholarly interest in Vives manifested in critical editions and annotated translations of his works into various languages.

In the chapter, "Vives and the *emarginati*", I have undertaken to write about three works of Vives that were concerned with social issues, *De institutione feminae Christianae*, *De officio mariti*, and *De subventionem pauperum*. The first work is dedicated to Queen Catherine of Aragon for the edification of her daughter, Princess Mary. Vives was aware that he was embarking on a controversial subject and hedged himself in with numerous defenses, anticipating that many readers would find his words unduly harsh and severe, but he maintains that compared to the fathers of the church his admonitions were too indulgent. The treatise is divided into three books, one for each stage in a woman's life: young unmarried woman, wife, widow. With regard to the first category he shows almost a fanatic obsession with the virtue of chastity. At one point he actually engages in a paternal tête-à-tête with an imaginary young woman, whom he advises sternly and even menacingly on the subject.



His ideal woman is a kind of angelic creature who will model herself after the Blessed Virgin herself. In the second book Vives departs from the traditional teaching of the church, declaring that marriage was instituted not so much for the production of offspring as for community of life and indissoluble companionship. In this he anticipates the Reformed Church, especially the Calvinists, who exalted holy wedlock, emphasizing its companionate aspect. Vives makes constant reference to the words of Genesis, "They shall be two in one flesh." This is the one all-sufficient law of marriage. Speaking of the procreation of offspring, he says that this is a matter of choice. Even the more liberal Erasmus in his treatise on marriage, written a few years later, says that there can be no true marriage between sterile spouses. In his second treatise, *De officio mariti*, Vives rectifies this view somewhat but still gives greatest importance to community of life (*vitalis societas*). As he describes the qualities of married life in more detail, however, the woman is cast more as a slave than a companion. Great emphasis is laid on the superiority of the male partner, who is invested almost with a sacred character, taking the place of Christ himself in the governing of the household. The *De institutione* was generally regarded as the most authoritative statement on this subject throughout the sixteenth century and there were fifty editions of it in vernacular translations through the centuries.

The *De subventionem pauperum* was written at the request of Louis of Flanders, lord of Praet, grand bailiff of the cities of Ghent and Bruges and Charles V's ambassador to England. It was during one of his sojourns there that Vives received the invitation to write on this crucial social question. The tract was dedicated to the burgomasters and senate of the city of Bruges, which Vives considered to be as much his native city as Valencia. Like many other cities at the time Bruges was struggling with the problem of a great influx of foreigners into the city, most of them poor and destitute. The new mercantile, wage-based society was unable to assimilate them. Vives proposes some stringent measures, both for the rich and the poor. He says bluntly in his dedication that it is the duty of administrators of a city to see to it that all the citizens help one another, that the stronger come to the defense of the weaker. He uses the simile of the father of a wealthy household who should not allow anyone in his house to go hungry or be reduced to nakedness and rags. The first book is a general history of mankind and its miseries beginning with Adam's transgression and the consequent turmoil and lust for power that invaded the world. He attempts to show that it is a natural thing to do good and gives

two principal reasons that prevent us from doing so: either because we do not think we will be of benefit to others or because we think it will interfere with our own interests. This leads to some trenchant observations about human vice and hypocrisy, with advice both for the rich and the poor. The culminating lesson of this first book is that everything we have comes from Nature, by which he means God, and is not meant for one's sole use. Each person is merely the dispenser of what has been given to him. Whoever does not share with the poor whatever is left over from his natural needs is a thief. The second book contains Vives's practical plans for dealing with the problem of poverty, which are strikingly modern. He zealously preaches a gospel of work, calls for a census of the poor to be executed by two senators together with a scribe, prescribes drastic measures for professional beggars and vagrants. His progressive ideas were not accepted in many quarters and a series of theological discussions ensued soon after his death, which are briefly discussed at the end of the essay.

In her essay on Vives's political writings Cathy Curtis calls attention to the strong influence exercised on the Valencian humanist by the diplomatic milieu of the English humanists with whom he had contact during his frequent visits to England. She focuses especially on the orations delivered by Richard Pace and Cuthbert Tunstall in St. Paul's Cathedral at the time of the Treaty of Universal Peace signed by England and France in October 1518. She sees these orations as important sources for many of the main ideas underlying Vives's political writings. Vives himself was able to express himself more freely since he was not formally attached to any court at the time of writing his political tracts. Interestingly, she signals a long passage in Vives's *De anima et vita*, published in 1538 but probably composed much earlier, which counsels moderation of the passions as essential for a successful civic life, a notion also found in the English writers.

After discussing the substance of the orations Curtis proceeds to an acute analysis of some of Vives's major political texts, the letter to Pope Adrian VI, the two letters to Henry VIII and the satirical dialogue, *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*. In addition to Vives's letters she discusses letters exchanged between Cardinal Wolsey and various diplomatic representatives on the continent, such as Richard Sampson in Madrid and John Clerk in Rome, which reveal the similarity of views on war and peace between Vives and diplomats at the English court. In her reading of the longer work, *De concordia et discordia*, addressed to Charles V, she detects once again the influence of the orations and also of

Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor pacis*. The last piece she discusses is the *De pacificatione*, addressed to Alfonso Manrique, Archbishop of Seville and Grand Inquisitor. In a very stimulating conclusion the author briefly considers how later writers posed the same questions of peace and *parrhesia*, the Athenian trait of outspokenness, which she attributes to Vives. She chooses four figures: a courtier (Sir Thomas Elyot), a king (James I), a controversial European intellectual (Thomas Hobbes) and an Oxford cleric (Robert Burton).

Valerio Del Nero began his studies of Vives under the direction of the renowned Italian scholar of the Renaissance, Eugenio Garin, in Florence. He has elucidated various texts of the Spanish philosopher over the years, especially the huge philosophical and theoretical treatise, *De disciplinis*, a comprehensive critical and systematic review of universal learning and of the state of the academic disciplines of the time. It was an ambitious task Vives set himself to do, nothing less than to enumerate the causes for the corruption of the arts, a term which he uses in a very broad sense, and to propose remedies. The scope of the work is enormous, including the *res naturae*, as Vives calls them, such as geography, astronomy, agriculture, medicine, even oceanography, as well as the more traditional studies. He does not exclude the mechanical arts either, advising that children should visit the workshops of artisans. In contrast to Erasmus he is aware of the increasing importance of the vernacular languages and the necessity of learning them well. In his alert and thorough analysis Del Nero traces the web of intertextual allusions in the work, echoes of Valla, Erasmus, and Agricola, in particular, and the eclectic use of the ancient writers, not only the more famous among them, but minor writers as well. He explains that Vives's primary goal is the moral education of the individual from a fundamentally Christian point of view although he makes abundant use of philosophical and educational ideas of the classical authors. Del Nero elaborates the multiple connotations of Vives's specialized vocabulary, words like *ars* and *disciplina*, and his concept of *enkuklios paideia*. He considers at some length an interesting facet of Vives's perception of the master-pupil relationship and his analysis of the multiple types of intelligence and intellectual capacity. Vives insists on the responsibility of the instructor to discover the abilities and aptitudes of each student and adapt his teaching, as far as possible, to each one. This is a subject to which he will return in the *De anima et vita*.

This work, which is also a specialty of Del Nero, is the subject of his next chapter. It has many affinities with the *De disciplinis* and was prob-

ably written simultaneously with it, although published some years later. Once again Del Nero's approach is intertextual with frequent reference to other relevant texts of Vives, especially those which the author regards as functioning as a kind of philosophical "laboratory" for the later work. He resolves from the start not to be tempted to treat the work, as has been done too frequently in the past, solely as a work prefiguring Descartes and Spinoza. He considers it rather on its own merits, as laying the foundations of all educational reform through a knowledge and examination of human nature. In a famous phrase towards the beginning of the book Vives announces that it is not important for us to know what the soul is, but that it is very important to know what are its operations and manifestations. He wished to avoid the endless disputes on the nature of the soul that were raging among philosophers of his day. Yet while pretending not to know what the soul is, he does specify its essential characteristics at the end of the first book.

Vives saves for the second book the description of the functions of the soul, especially the three fundamental functions of will, intelligence, and memory. In the explanation of Vives's ideas Del Nero makes useful reference to earlier works like the *De prima philosophia*, which forms part of the *De disciplinis*. Vives often explains difficult concepts through homely similes and examples and even personal anecdotes. In the discussion of memory, for example, he recounts that every time he saw a certain house in Brussels opposite the royal palace, he was immediately reminded of his friend Idiaqueus, who lived there, and of the pleasant conversations they would engage in, but the reverse was not true. The third book on the emotions and passions (Vives uses the terms *affectus* or *affectiones*) of the soul has always attracted the attention of readers of this treatise. Vives mentions at the very beginning that the subject was not sufficiently explored by the ancient writers and that he will try to investigate it more thoroughly, challenging the ancients, as it were, which he does frequently. Vives's analysis of the various emotions makes very absorbing reading and Del Nero guides us through it with great insight, introducing many comparisons with contemporary thinkers to aid in placing the work in a proper perspective.

At the beginning of his essay, *Vives's Contributions to Rhetoric and Dialectic*, Peter Mack points out that Vives published eleven works concerned with rhetoric and dialectic, constituting about a sixth of his total oeuvre, a significant fact in itself that has somehow been overlooked in previous summations of Vives's work. He undertakes to survey them all and to detect the relations among them as well as to examine them in the

context of their later reception. He is the first, to my knowledge, to single out and discuss the various segments on rhetoric and dialectic that are scattered through the *De disciplinis*. Professor Mack also ties these writings to other works of Vives, a practice which Professor Kristeller in James Murphy's collection, *Renaissance Eloquence*, strongly recommended for any study of rhetorical writing. Mack's findings lead to the conclusion that Vives's various writings on rhetoric and dialectic are to be considered not merely a series of (often critical) contributions to particular parts of the existing syllabus but as an integral, organized account of the art of thinking and composition. He then proceeds to analyse typical examples from the works under examination. In so doing he illustrates the innovative reflections and practical advice that Vives includes in his theories and instructions. To this analysis Mack adds his own rich knowledge of other Renaissance writers on rhetoric, chiefly Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola. In the end Mack maintains that Vives made a greater contribution to rhetoric than to dialectic. His books and essays on rhetoric did not replace the standard manuals because they were too revolutionary in character and depended on the prior knowledge of the established textbooks though he did achieve great success with his manual on letter-writing and his school dialogues, the *Linguae Latinae exercitatio*.

Vives intimates towards the end of the *De disciplinis* that he intended to write on the discipline of theology, but the closest he came to it is the posthumous *De veritate fidei Christianae*. Edward George points out in his essay, *Author, Adversary, and Reader*, that it can hardly be called a theological work as such for as Vives tells the reader from the start, he will rely more on reason than divine revelation, in this way desiring to establish some common ground with pagans, Jews and Muslims. In the first book he generalizes about various fundamental aspects of the faith, such as the nature of God and man, the universe, divine providence, and the immortality of the soul. The second book occupies itself more with revealed truth, but the heart of the treatise is a dialogue between a Christian and a Jew in the third book, and a Christian and a Muslim in the fourth. These are the main focus of George's treatment. He points out that Vives purposely avoids the fierce dissensions that were dividing Christianity at that historical moment, turning his attention to other faiths. George has had long experience with Vives's rhetoric and is therefore well qualified to analyse the structure and dynamics of the imaginary dialogues that Vives stages. Although pretending to fairness in the discussion, Vives manages to include a barrage of insults

against the Jewish debater and allows him only twelve percent of the lines in the dialogue. He ridicules the Jew's literal understanding of Scripture and his erroneous concept of the Messiah. It is a very one-sided contest.

Not so the debate with the Muslim, whom Vives dignifies with a proper name, Alfaquinus, which means "jurist" or "leader". The atmosphere is more friendly and the initial exchanges are marked by a greater politeness in imitation perhaps of the highly stylized form of address used in Arabic. George explains that Vives felt that he could not allow this kind of courtesy to the Jew for it would rouse suspicion against himself because of his *converso* background. The Christian inveigles the Muslim to engage in open dispute with him on religious issues even though this is forbidden in Islamic law. Vives shows quite an amazing familiarity with Muslim books and doctrine other than the Qur'an, such as the *Doctrina Mahumet*, translated from Arabic by Herman of Dalmatia, a 12th century priest who spent some time in Spain. Book Five is an outright apology for the Christian faith, with an unapologetic reliance on revelation. He argues that for a Christian there is no clash between faith and reason. Towards the end of the book he turns to a meditation on death, no doubt conscious of his own approaching death, as George remarks. Strangely, here he reverts often to classical sources and recommends Cicero's *De senectute* to his readers. The last part of this meditation is quite beautiful, but full of uncertainties about life after death. In the very last chapter he affirms his reliance on the goodness of God and closes with a prayer to Jesus to open the eyes of the blind.

Exigencies of space did not permit the inclusion of a chapter on a very popular work of Vives, his *Linguae Latinae Exercitatio*. Its rather incredibly successful printing history was traced by Enrique González González and Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez in *Los diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1539–1994)* Valencia, 1999. They succeeded in locating and describing no less than 601 editions and translations of the work, which appeared in more than 80 different cities during four centuries. At certain periods, owing especially to its less polemical character, it outdid even Erasmus' *Colloquies* in popularity.

Summing up, it is hoped that this *Companion* will help to introduce Juan Luis Vives to a wider reading public in the English-speaking world. I think it will become quickly apparent that he is an author who has been unjustly neglected, but who fully deserves our attention. I wish to

express my sincere gratitude to my collaborators in this volume for their splendid cooperation at all times. As always in my studies and editions of Vives, I wish to acknowledge the help, advice and encouragement of my fellow members of the editorial committee of the Selected Works of Vives: Jeanine De Landtsheer, Marcus de Schepper, Edward George and Jef Janssens. I am most grateful to Chris Heesaakers, who read the entire manuscript with great care and made valuable corrections and suggestions. I am also most beholden to Gera van Bedaf for her efficient, cordial and expeditious supervision of the typescript.

JUAN LUIS VIVES  
WORKS AND DAYS\*

Enrique González González

The humanist Juan Luis Vives (Valencia, Spain, 1492/93—Bruges, Belgium, 1540) died before reaching the age of fifty. Nevertheless, he was able to write a copious body of works which found interested readers in all of Europe and even the European possessions of America and Asia. Without a doubt, as a result of his renown biographers and bibliographers rose up who sought to record facts about his life and especially to make an inventory of his writings. In this task two Spaniards stood out, the Sevillian Nicolás Antonio, in the corresponding chapter of his *Bibliotheca Hispana* (Rome, 1672) and the Valencian, Gregorio Mayans in his *Vita Vivis*, published at the beginning of his edition of the *Opera omnia* of Vives (Valencia, 1782–1790). Mayans devised a chronology of the life and works of his fellow countryman which later scholars of the 19th and 20th centuries accepted almost without objection.

Now, beginning in the last three decades of the past century, numerous studies and documents have shed new light on the formative years of the humanist, a period which we could situate between his birth and the year 1520. This period of time comprises his childhood and adolescence in his native city, his academic peregrinations to the Universities of Paris and Louvain, and coincides with the appearance of his first writings. To such an extent has our information been recently enhanced that it has been necessary to formulate a general revision of the biographical framework developed by Mayans and his followers. The first part of my essay proposes to reconsider the initial years of his life and works.

The mature years of the humanist can be circumscribed to the two decades from the year 1521 to his death in 1540. This period opens with the publication of the learned Commentary on St. Augustine's *City of God*, and it corresponds to the years in which his most outstanding works were produced. It is then that his writings begin to be published

---

\* Translated into English by Alexandre Coroleu and Charles Fantazzi.



and read in numerous cities but, paradoxically, we know very little about his life in this twenty-year period. In recent years no new documents have been published, and little can be added to the biography written by Carlos G. Noreña in 1970. For that reason, in the final part of the present essay I limit myself to reviewing, sometimes critically, the principal studies and sources that have supplied us with information about the later years of Vives, and I give a brief survey of his principal activities, giving an account also of his writings during that period.

*From Homeland to Court: The Early Years (1492/3–1520)*

Until recently the childhood and early years of Juan Luis Vives were described following the script written long ago, in 1782, by Gregorio Mayans in his *Vita Vvis*.<sup>1</sup> Over a century later, in his famous monograph of 1903, Adolfo Bonilla introduced minor changes to Mayans' account without, however, fundamentally challenging it.<sup>2</sup> According to this outline, become classic by force of repetition,<sup>3</sup> Vives was born in Valencia in 1492 to a noble, or at least well-to-do family. From 1507 to 1509 he studied at the newly-founded local university, a period which was followed by a sojourn in Paris from 1509 to 1512. At the University of Paris he studied under the guidance of Jan Dullaert and Gaspar Lax, champions of the most "decadent" forms of scholasticism. In 1512 Vives settled in the Low Countries *for a time*, first in Bruges, before moving to Louvain at an uncertain date. In Louvain, after making the acquaintance of a group of young followers of Erasmus, he converted to humanism. In Lent of 1514 (still according to the traditional account) Vives travelled to Paris, where he published his first writings under the title *Iesu Christi Triumphus* before returning to Louvain. New minor works were published in 1518, in particular, the *In pseudodialecticos*, a diatribe in which Vives regretted the "lost" years he spent in Paris learning sophisms. Vives's settling of scores with his

---

<sup>1</sup> It prefaces the *Opera omnia*, Valencia, 1782–1790, 8 vols. This 220-page *Vita*, with its own page numbering system, constitutes a patchwork of information and critical assessments drawn from countless scholars.

<sup>2</sup> Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, *Luis Vives y la filosofía del Renacimiento* (Madrid, 1903). Bonilla's study includes biographical and analytical chapters.

<sup>3</sup> Significantly, the article on Vives in the *Encyclopedia of the Renaissance*, edited by Paul F. Grendler (New York, 1999), 6 vols, still adheres to this traditional point of view (Vol. 6, pp. 281–83).

University definitively marked the end of his formative years, to give way to the mature Vives. In the end, a clear and simple biographical outline, without chiaroscuros, despite some gaps.

This image of Vives began to crack in the 1960s, when the proceedings of the inquisitorial prosecution against the humanist's "Jewish" family were published,<sup>4</sup> which demolished the belief in his noble origins. Even more, this dramatic news shook to its foundations the whole conceptual framework on which lives of Vives were being written, especially in Spain. Six years later the monograph *Juan Luis Vives* (The Hague, 1970), written in English, was published by Carlos G. Noreña, which questioned many of the traditional prejudices that had surrounded the figure of Vives. The author emphasized, (and at times perhaps over-emphasized) the importance of Vives's *Judeo-converso* origin.<sup>5</sup> Despite the important novelty of this approach, Noreña reiterated in great part the old Mayans-Bonilla line with regard to Vives's early years. This relative traditionalism was due to at least two circumstances. First, his work was published before new documents and data on Vives were uncovered and before an impressive wave of new studies on the Valencian humanist appeared. In the second place, precisely during the 1970s, innovative studies like those of Elizabeth J. Ashworth contributed to a reassessment of late-scholastic logic.<sup>6</sup> From then on it was no longer legitimate to despise Vives's Parisian teachers simply as "barbarians", as everyone had done, including Noreña. For many reasons the study of the young humanist's transition from scholasticism to humanism requires a more subtle rethinking of the question.

Due credit must, however, be paid to Noreña, who thoroughly studied the *Judeo-converso* origin of Vives's family and the tragic fate of his parents and other close relatives at the hands of the Inquisition. More recent scholarship has nonetheless resulted in a better understanding of those tragic events,<sup>7</sup> as well as the social, political and cultural life

---

<sup>4</sup> *Procesos inquisitoriales contra la familia judía de Juan Luis Vives, I. Proceso contra Blanquina March, madre del humanista*, eds. Miguel de la Pinta Llorente y José María de Palacio y de Palacio (Madrid, 1964).

<sup>5</sup> I have dealt with this in a book written with Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Una república de lectores. Difusión y recepción de la obra de Juan Luis Vives* (Mexico City, 2007).

<sup>6</sup> Above all Elizabeth J. Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period* (Dordrecht and Boston, 1974).

<sup>7</sup> See Manuel Ardit, *La Inquisició al País Valencià* (Valencia, 1970); Jordi Ventura, *Inquisició espanyola i cultura renaixentista al País Valencià* (Valencia, 1987). Angelina García, in *Els Vives: una família de jueus valencians* (Valencia, 1987) traces Vives's genealogy to his Jewish ancestors, albeit at times in a rather confused manner. Indispensable is Ricardo

at the end of the fifteenth-century in Valencia.<sup>8</sup> In particular, new information has arisen concerning the grammar schools of the fifteenth century<sup>9</sup> and the university, which opened its doors in 1502.<sup>10</sup> Noreña was also unable to draw on a series of important new studies on the University of Paris in the first half of the sixteenth century, and on the complex running of the Parisian colleges.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, his book was published before some of Vives's early writings were unearthed which broadened the Vives canon.<sup>12</sup> Likewise, after the publication of Noreña's monograph new letters by Vives were uncovered.<sup>13</sup> If all this were not enough, the dates of Vives's *editiones principes* are now better known, which has led to a reconsideration of the traditional chronology both

---

García Cárcel, *Orígenes de la Inquisición española. El tribunal de Valencia, 1478–1530* (Barcelona, 1976); idem, "La familia de Luis Vives y la Inquisición," in J.L. Vives, *Opera omnia* (Valencia, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 489–519. Stephen Haliczer, *Inquisición y sociedad en el reino de Valencia (1478–1834)* (Valencia, 1993) is also worth reading, even though he does not deal with Vives's family.

<sup>8</sup> See Albert Hauf's outstanding studies, in particular, *D'Eiximenis a Sor Isabel de Villena. Aportació a l'estudi de la nostra cultura medieval* (Valencia, 1990); also his "Estudio preliminar" to José Pou y Martí, *Visionarios, Beguinos y Fratricelos catalanes (siglos XII–XV)* (Alicante, 1966), pp. 7–112. A synthesis is still lacking. See *infra* notes 17 and 18.

<sup>9</sup> José María Cruselles Gómez, "Sociedad y cultura literaria en la Valencia del Cuatrocientos," in *Un Valenciano Universal. Joan Lluís Vives*, eds. Antonio Mestre and Pablo Pérez García (Valencia, 1993), pp. 131–55; "El maestro Antoni Tristany y la supuesta primera escuela de Joan Lluís Vives," in *Estudis* 21 (1995), 7–22. *Escuela y sociedad en la Valencia Bajomedieval* (Valencia, 1997); Joan Salvadó Recasens, "Joan Parteni Tovar, mestre de Vives a la Universitat de València," *Studia Philologica Valentina* 1 (1996), 125–43.

<sup>10</sup> *Historia de la Universidad de Valencia*, coord. Mariano Peset (Valencia, 1999), 3 vols., with ample bibliography. On the earliest lecturers at Valencia see Enrique González González, "Lectores públicos y privados en la Universidad de Valencia, 1492–1520," in *Aulas y Saberes. VI Congreso Internacional de Historia de las Universidades Hispánicas* (Valencia, 2003), pp. 463–78.

<sup>11</sup> For example, James Farge, *Orthodoxy and Reform in Early Reformation France. The Faculty of Theology of Paris, 1500–1543* (Leiden, 1985), and Marie-Madeleine Compère, "Les collègues de l'Université de Paris au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle: Structure institutionnelle et fonctions éducatives," in *I collegi universitari in Europa tra il XIV e il XVIII secolo*, eds. Domenico Maffei and Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Milan, 1991), pp. 101–18.

<sup>12</sup> Marcus De Schepper, "April in Paris (1514): J.L. Vives editing B. Guarinus. A new Vives 'Princeps', a new early Vives letter and the first poem in praise of Vives," in *Myricae. Essays on Neo-Latin Literature in Memory of J. IJsewijn*, eds. Dirk Sacré & Gilbert Tournoy (Louvain, 2000), pp. 195–205.

<sup>13</sup> "Litterae ad Craneveldium Balduinianae. A Preliminary Edition," eds. Jozef IJsewijn, Gilbert Tournoy, Dirk Sacré, Line IJsewijn-Jacobs, Michiel Verweij & Monique Mund-Dopchie. 1. Letters 1–30 (March 1520–February 1521), in *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 41 (1992), 1–85; 2. Letters 31–55 (February 1521–May 1521) *HL* 42 (1993), 2–51; 3. Letters 56–85 (May–October 1521) *HL* 43 (1994), 15–68. 4. Letters 86–116 (November 1521–June 1522; April 1523; November 1528) *HL* 44 (1995), 1–78.

regarding his early years and the dating of several of his writings.<sup>14</sup> Last but not least, the fact that we now have critical editions of almost all Vives's early writings at our disposal allows us a subtler approach to his intellectual formation.<sup>15</sup> In the light of so much new information today it is possible, and indeed unavoidable today to propose a new image of the young Vives.

*Vives's Valencian heritage. An open question*

Vives lived in Valencia for the first 16 or 17 years of his life, that is, a third of his not very long life. Information at our disposal allows us to conclude that during this period he studied grammar and possibly dialectic, but did not receive a noteworthy education in the humanities or in scholasticism. He would have received such an ordinary education in any other city, in and outside Spain. On the other hand, the social, political and religious circumstances of Vives's Valencian years would unequivocally link the future humanist to his beginnings. At least two of these factors must be taken into account: first of all, the fact that he was born in a distinctly urban milieu and that he belonged, so to speak, to a middle bourgeoisie. Therefore he did not come from a rural community or from the nobility. We must also bear in mind that Vives belonged to the social minority of the *Judeo-conversos* or "*marranos*", an urban group which traditionally enjoyed close economic and social relations with the local nobility, but which was cruelly decimated with the arrival of the Inquisition in 1484. In this way the entire family of the future humanist was eliminated or ruined, and he decided to go into exile, which made up the last two-thirds of his life.

Both circumstances left an obvious—albeit at times hidden—imprint on Vives's work. Hence the importance of investigating the meaning of those years passed in that country with which he always maintained ties, but to which he never returned. In that same regard the concrete question of the scholastic formation received by the future humanist is related to a more general problem: what family, religious and scholas-

---

<sup>14</sup> Enrique González González, Salvador Albiñana, Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Vives: Edicions Princeps* (Valencia, 1992) (henceforth cited as *Edicions*). Enrique González González and Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Los diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1539–1994)* (Valencia, 1999).

<sup>15</sup> For the most recent bibliography on the subject I refer the reader to my *Una república de lectores*, in particular to chapter V, 4, "Perspectivas de los años recientes", pp. 358–93.

tic formation did the young son of *Judeo-conversos* receive in bourgeois Valencia, in that climate of a strong municipal life together with a harsh persecution of his caste on the part of the ruling monarchs.

Valencia, Vives's homeland, was the capital of one of the patrimonial states of the Crown of Aragon since the time the port-city was rescued from the Moors after a long campaign (1233–1245),<sup>16</sup> which was more of a negotiated occupation than a true military conquest. The fact that it was won by an alliance of Aragonese and Catalan forces resulted in the twin linguistic geography of the new kingdom, with the predominance of Castilian in the interior and Catalan or Valencian on the coast. Born in the coastal area, Vives did not have Castilian as his mother tongue, as he himself pointed out and as is confirmed by the inquisitorial documents against his family.

Three social groups or “castes” coexisted in this new kingdom, which, despite sporadic clashes and sometimes brutal violence, lived together in relative harmony until the end of the fifteenth century. The largest group was made up of *moriscos*, who as a result of the conquest succeeded in preserving their religion and part of their habits and customs without liberating themselves from a servile condition. Relegated to agricultural tasks, they were a docile, compact and hard-working group, although unyielding to the conquerors' way of life. The second caste, the most powerful, was made up of the so-called old Christians (*cristianos viejos*). Very small in number, even at the time of Vives's birth, they hardly constituted “a ruling urban superstructure”.<sup>17</sup> Far from being a homogeneous group, it nurtured fierce internal dissensions. The third group was even smaller and more complex, urban like the previous one and linked to it by strong economic interests: that of the Jews and the *conversos* or “new” Christians, a community with great internal differences, but with a certain degree of economic power within its highest ranks.

After the marriage of the Aragonese king Ferdinand *el Católico* (who reigned from 1477 to 1516) to Isabella, Queen of Castile, Valencia remained exclusively under his authority. Ferdinand was renowned for his increasing interventionism in the life of the municipality and the

---

<sup>16</sup> A general description of life in Valencia at the time can be read in Ernest Belenguier Cebrià, *València en la crisi del segle XV* (Barcelona, 1976), although some of his arguments have been subsequently revised. See also Ricardo García Cárcel's indispensable contributions.

<sup>17</sup> Joan Fuster, *Poetas, Moriscos y Curas*, trans. Josep Palacios (Madrid, 1969), p. 109, who refers to *Historia social y económica de España y América*, ed. Jaime Vicens Vives (Barcelona, 1957), vol. 2, p. 61. See also Joan Fuster, *Obras completas* (Barcelona, 1968), vol. 1.

kingdom. His constant demands for loans led to grave and permanent financial problems for the local elite, which controlled both the municipal institutions and those of the realm. At any rate, at the turn of the sixteenth century the city retained a certain degree of splendor, and an active urban life fostered by ultramarine trade and the activity of the guilds. Together with Seville, Valencia was the most populous city in the Iberian Peninsula. It enjoyed a rich cultural life animated by literary gatherings (“*tertulias*”) and literary contests,<sup>18</sup> printing (active since 1474) and, after 1502, the University.

Beneath this relative prosperity, however, lay many social tensions. On the one side there were conflicts between an increasingly exclusive nobility and the middle and lower classes, which were gradually excluded from any effective role in the government of the city. The oligarchy, besides controlling political power, enjoyed royal concessions for the collecting of taxes as well as of the revenue accruing from the constant loans to the monarch. They also managed to their advantage such an essential administration as that of the grain market. All this led to serious social conflict which resulted in violent social uprisings such as the so-called *Germanías* insurrection between 1519 and 1520, when Vives was already settled in the Low Countries.<sup>19</sup>

Yet the most severe internal turmoil was caused by conflict between the so-called old Christians and the heterogeneous group composed of Jews and their baptized descendants, the so-called “new” Christians. During the Middle Ages Castilian and Aragonese Jews enjoyed royal protection and privileges, in particular the right to gather in *aljamas*, a sort of municipality without its own territory, which provided religious services, literary education, the administration of justice, and tax collection and economic services to the monarch. This ruling was partly discriminatory but was also determined by the customs of solidarity, hygiene, dietary requirements, etc. of the group.<sup>20</sup>

Despite royal protection, Christians periodically rioted against Jews. In 1391 the explosion of fury spread to the main cities in Castile and Aragon, resulting in arson, looting and murder. This date marked a point

---

<sup>18</sup> Indispensable in this regard is Antoni Ferrando Francés, *Els certàmens poètics del segle XIV al XIX* (Valencia, 1983).

<sup>19</sup> Ricardo García Cárcel, *Las Germanías de Valencia*. Prólogo Manuel Sanchis Guarner (Barcelona, 1975).

<sup>20</sup> Yitzhak Baer's classic study, *Historia de los judíos en la España cristiana*, translated from Hebrew by José Luis Lacave (Barcelona, 1981), 2 vols., includes an up-to-date bibliography to the year 1981.

of no return, first because the *aljamas* were depleted or disappeared, a fact which from then on destroyed any possibility of a normal life like the one they had led up to that time. Under the new circumstances the study of the sacred language became more problematic. Moreover, the group suffered a massive bloodletting since thousands of Jews were forced to be baptized, which they did either to escape death or persecution. This was the origin of the *converso* problem. It is still today a matter of debate to what extent these forced conversions resulted in a sincere adoption of the new faith, or whether it was simply an opportunist and desperate gesture, and consequently the “new Christians” would have remained true to their original faith.

Until very recently for a large number of historians the vast majority of the *conversos* adopted the Christian faith only to avoid death, but as Cecil Roth remarks: “In race, in belief, and largely in practice, they remained as they were before the conversion. They were Jews in all but name, and Christians in nothing but form.”<sup>21</sup> Conversely, scholars such as Benzion Netanyahu, drawing on contemporary Hebrew sources, provide ample evidence that, in and outside Spain, the Jews looked upon the *conversos* as pagans because of the rapidity with which they turned their back on their own faith. Moreover, he maintains that these documents show the irreversible process of Christianization of the *conversos* throughout the fifteenth century. By 1500 there were only isolated pockets of crypto-Judaism remaining. These clandestine groups were constantly narrowing in scope and weakening in the intensity of their Jewish devotion, as their practice of Judaism was limited to the performance of *certain* Jewish rites only. While crypto-Judaism was thus dwindling, the process of assimilation, both social and religious, was advancing without let up...<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Cecil Roth, *A History of the Marranos* (London-Philadelphia, 1932), see especially p. 19. There is a Spanish translation with the significant title: *Los judíos secretos. Historia de los marranos* (Madrid, 1979). The bibliography on the subject is endless: Ellis Rivkin, “How Jewish were the New Christians?” *Hispania Judaica* 1 (1980), 101–15, divides scholars on the subject into two sides: “conventional” historians, best represented by Roth, Henry Charles Lea, Yitzhak Baer, Henry Kamen, Haim Beinart, Isaiah S. Révah, etc., who accept that those persecuted by the Inquisition continued to practise Judaism; and revisionists such as Benzion Netanyahu, Antonio José Saraiva, and Rivkin himself among others. See also *Les Juifs d’Espagne: histoire d’une diaspora 1492–1992*, ed. Henri Méchoulan, Mayenna, 1992; *Spain and the Jews. The Sephardi Experience, 1492 and After*, ed. Elie Kedourie (London, 1992).

<sup>22</sup> Benzion Netanyahu, *The Marranos of Spain. From the Late XIVth to the Early XVIIth Century, according to Contemporary Hebrew Sources* (New York, 1966), p. 75.

From this Netanyahu concluded that when the Inquisition treated the *marranos* as clandestine heretics, “it was operating with a fiction”, which he attributed to political reasons and racial hatred, rather than to religious fervor (pp. 2–3).

Between historians who unreservedly believe that the great majority of *conversos* continued to practise Judaism, and those who hold the opposite view, a third group has argued for a rapid process of assimilation on the part of the *conversos*, corresponding to the decadence undergone by Jewish communities themselves throughout the fifteenth century. According to them, as the fifteenth century progressed, crypto-Judaism became a sporadic phenomenon, restricted to residual forms of the old culture, more often than not of a social rather than religious nature.

As the process of assimilation of the new group advanced, many old Christians, in particular, peasants and members of the urban elites—the nobility was more tolerant—regarded new Christians with growing hostility, accusing them of harboring their old faith in secret. The *conversos*, who no longer enjoyed the status of Jews, were not regarded as authentic Christians either. By the end of the fifteenth century, *los Reyes Católicos* adopted a series of measures designed to resolve the issue of this group, which was unassimilated and presumably transgressive. Jews who continued to observe their faith were forced to be baptized or to go into exile (1492). The *conversos*, on their part, were placed under the supervision of an *ad hoc* court, the Inquisition, introduced in Castile in 1482 and a year later in Aragon. This was their way of getting rid of “false” Christians.

The court was authorized to proceed through summary indictments, i.e., they had validity even though a normal trial had not taken place. The identity of the informers was kept secret. The defendant was not informed of the charges against him nor could he choose a counsel for the defense, who was instead imposed by the inquisitors. In these conditions, as contemporaries complained, the defendant was totally defenseless before the decision of the judge. He could send entire families to the stake without full proof, merely on the basis of strong suspicion.<sup>23</sup> Shortly after the trial began, the court confiscated the defendant’s property. If the defendant was found guilty, his possessions

---

<sup>23</sup> A study of inquisitorial procedure can be found in Antonio Pérez Martín, “La doctrina jurídica y el proceso inquisitorial,” in *Perfiles jurídicos de la Inquisición española*, ed. José Antonio Escudero (Madrid, 1989), pp. 279–322.



were used to pay for the court expenses, and what remained passed to the king's treasury. This financial dependence forced judges to find defendants guilty if they wanted to be paid. Of Inquisitors it was noted by a contemporary: "If they do not burn, they do not eat."<sup>24</sup>

As a result, rather than being prepared to give an impartial "discernment of conscience", that tribunal was an instrument used to confiscate property and destroy families and entire communities. At least this is what can be gathered from the statistics. García Cárcel has found prosecutions against 2,354 individuals in the Valencia tribunal between 1,484 and 1,530, 91% of them against defendants accused of judaizing. We have records of a total of 1,997 sentences against *conversos*. Only 12 persons (0.6%) were found innocent, 909 (45%) were burned at the stake, physically or in effigy, which also entailed confiscation of property. The remaining 1,076 fed the coffers of the court with fines of various magnitude.<sup>25</sup> Thus the mechanisms of exclusion and persecution were extended to the entire community inasmuch as all of its members were potentially suspect and could with extreme facility be found guilty of crypto-Judaism.<sup>26</sup>

Given the fact that intermarriage was traditionally very high within the *converso* minority, conviction against an individual necessarily affected the rest of the community as well.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, any individual could undergo more than one trial, in life or reputation, with resulting frequent preventive confiscations of possessions and consequent losses, plus the difficulties in recovering them after each trial, if it did not result in death. If it did, family members were forced to recover whatever they could at public auction. To make matters worse, defendants usually denounced accomplices, even when they were not required to do so. Such declarations, contradictory at times, were archived, even for more

---

<sup>24</sup> The play on words in Spanish: "Si no queman, no comen" cannot be reproduced in English. Enrique González González, "Vives: un humanista judeoconverso en el exilio de Flandes," in *The expulsion of the Jews and their emigration to the Southern Low Countries (15th–16th C.)*, eds. Luc Duqueker and Werner Verbeke (Leuven, 1998), pp. 35–81.

<sup>25</sup> Ricardo García Cárcel, *Orígenes de la Inquisición española. El tribunal de Valencia* (Barcelona, 1976), p. 170.

<sup>26</sup> Erasmus himself was guilty of this same attitude, for he constantly expressed contempt for the court of the future Charles V, overrun by *marranos*. See the letter to Willibald Pirckheimer of 2 November 1517 in *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, eds. Percy S. Allen, Helen M. Allen and Heathcote W. Garrod (Oxford, 1906–1957), 12 vols., ep. 694. All future references to this work in the *Companion to Vives* will be given as Allen plus number of epistle.

<sup>27</sup> See García Cárcel, *Orígenes*, pp. 168–69.

than twenty years, in the expectation of mounting a trial some time later. Far from avoiding persecution, Vives's family was entirely decimated by the Inquisition, a slow process which Joan Lluís helplessly witnessed, first in Valencia and subsequently in exile in the Low Countries.

Lluís Vives and Blanca March, Vives's parents, born in Valencia and members of the *converso* caste, were married in 1492. Joan Lluís, the first-born child, was born in that same year, or more likely, a year later. He was the eldest of five children, three girls and another boy, who died around the time of the final trial of his father in December 1522. Both families were merchants by tradition and enjoyed a degree of social status. As with most local *conversos*, the Vives and March families had been living in Valencia as Christians for over a century, since their ancestors were baptized as a result of the pogroms of 1391. As a matter of fact, the decree of expulsion issued in 1492 would hardly have had any practical effect on the capital of the kingdom.<sup>28</sup> The introduction of the Inquisition into Valencia in 1484 signalled the beginning of persecutions which would culminate with the death of Lluís Vives in 1524, and with the disinterment and burning of Blanca's bones in front of the cathedral in 1530. It is rather difficult to trace the tribulations of both parents at the hands of the Inquisition, given the fragmentary nature of the documentation.

Any attempt, however, to write a spiritual biography of Lluís Vives and Blanca March must take into account these fragments, collected to "prove" that they were guilty of heresy. If with due reservation we can extract something from them, we must have recourse to the only real pieces of testimony, even though they were elicited through fear: a declaration of innocence of 1487, and the self-incrimination of the still unmarried Blanca March of 1491, in the hope that she would be pardoned. Whereas in the former, dictated when she was only fourteen years of age, she declared herself innocent of any forbidden practices and was able to recite the creed, in her confession of 1491 she stated that, "at about the age of nine years" (1480–81), she and her sister were ordered by their mother to observe the fast of the pardon, which they did for two years. Later their mother warned them—she continues— "that we should not fast anymore because the Inquisition had come to Valencia [...] and from the time the Reverend Gualbes came as inquisitor

---

<sup>28</sup> García Cárcel, *Orígenes*, p. 73.

[...] I resolved to live and die as a Christian.” Asked whether she was aware that fasting and the other practices were Jewish rites, “She said no, because she thought everybody did it.” She also recalled how her mother one day was reading a book in Hebrew, which she and her sister got hold of, “but we did not understand anything because it was written in Hebrew”.<sup>29</sup>

Notwithstanding the literal veracity of Blanca’s plea of guilty, her testimony points to conclusions similar to those reached by Netanyahu.<sup>30</sup> Even if we suppose that the *conversos* had found it relatively easy to judaize before the arrival of the Inquisition in Valencia, their Jewish devotion was weakening from one generation to another. While Vives’s grandmother could still read Hebrew, his mother and aunt had no knowledge of the sacred language. Moreover, if they still performed Jewish practices, these were kept to a minimum: Blanca did not declare herself guilty of observing the Sabbath, but of fasting twice once a year after a certain age and when there was little danger. The arrival of the Inquisition—a proof of its dissuasive efficiency—would have further inhibited those residual practices, and with the pragmatism imposed by fear it was decided to opt exclusively for Christian practices, at least formally, and the children knew Christian prayers. If young persons, above all those brought up before the arrival of the Inquisition, were initiated in certain rites, they were not necessarily aware of their illicit nature.

This lack of criteria for licit and illicit practices among children would be a further dangerous deterrent to their initiation in Jewish rites. In 1529 Blanca was accused of having stated around 1500 that the Messiah had not yet come. Her defender pointed out the implausibility of the accusation: at the time her husband was in prison, and besides “The said Holy Office was in such turmoil that any *converso* was so terrified that he would not dare to speak of anything contrary to the Christian faith.” If parents and children were accusing each other, he argued,

---

<sup>29</sup> “edat de nou anys poch mes o menys...que no fíesem mes lo dit dejuni por quant era venguda ja la Inquisitió en Valencia [...] e del temps que vench lo Reverent micer Gualbes per Inquisidor [...] tinch intenció de viure e de morir com a tan solita cristiana...dix que no, per quant pensava que tot lo mon ho fechia axi...” Pinta Llorente, *Procesos*, pp. 40–44.

<sup>30</sup> See note 22 above.

why would someone confide serious matters to third parties who were not even close family?<sup>31</sup>

If we admit such premises, it is difficult to believe that Vives, born in the most decisive years of the Inquisition in Valencia and with his immediate family in permanent danger of prison, exile and the stake, was initiated in the secrets of the proscribed faith, whether out of caution or sincere Christian piety on the part of his parents. Blanca's defender and the witnesses for the defense agreed in describing her as "a most kind and virtuous woman, who seldom left her house except to attend Mass, and to *please her husband*, seldom spoke to people".<sup>32</sup> In this respect, statements from Blanca's defense agree with Vives's testimony about his own family, which he described as one of great conjugal harmony, based on the constant willingness of the spouse to please her husband.<sup>33</sup> Only against this background of silence and fear can we fully understand an anecdote recounted by Vives, according to which his mother hardly ever smiled at him or showed him any affection, to such an extent that he thought that she did not love him. On one occasion he absented himself from home and Blanca became very ill with sorrow. But upon her son's return she showed such indifference that he imagined that she had not suffered by his absence. He remarks that as a boy there was no one he avoided more than his mother.<sup>34</sup> In the face of the ever-present danger of being denounced the only wise attitude was silence concerning one's feelings and conscience.

Valencia was the capital of a kingdom, but since the king did not reside in the city, courtly life and culture did not play an important role in the city, at least during Vives's time. It was also an episcopal see even though its incumbents had not resided there since the first half of the

---

<sup>31</sup> "lo dit Sanct Ofici stava en tanta fervor, que qualsevol convers stava tan atemorysat que no gosava parlar de les coses que fossen contra la fe." Pinta, *Procesos*, pp. 73–74.

<sup>32</sup> "dona molt gentil, la qual exia molt poch de casa per sa honestat, e *per complaure al diyt son maryt*, molt poch conversava ab algú, sino en anar los dies dels dumenges e festes a myssa." Pinta, *Procesos*, pp. 73–78, my italics. See my *Joan Lluís Vives. De la escolástica al humanismo* (Valencia, 1987) for an interpretation of these documents, which I now revise, pp. 95–103 (henceforth *Joan Lluís Vives*).

<sup>33</sup> *De institutione feminae christianae*, 2, p. 65. We can now read the textual variants to Vives's passage about his parents' harmonious relation, introduced in the 1524 but absent from the 1538 edition, in the critical edition of Charles Fantazzi and Constant Matheeußen, published in *Selected Works of J.L. Vives* nos 6–7 (Leiden, 1996–1998), vol. 2, p. 64.

<sup>34</sup> *De institutione*, 2, p. 169.

fifteenth century. For this reason the ecclesiastical court was almost non-existent. In these circumstances, the promotion of local culture was in the hands of the local magistrates, who were instrumental in the foundation of the University in 1502 and in the development of printing, already present in 1474, and were responsible for further cultural initiatives such as poetic contests and literary circles.

Studies on reading in fifteenth and sixteenth-century Valencia,<sup>35</sup> on books printed during the fifteenth century,<sup>36</sup> and our knowledge of the early years of the university allow us to conclude that humanism was barely emerging in Valencia during Vives's time. It is true that inventories from fifteenth-century private libraries include some classical and Renaissance authors, otherwise underrepresented in Valencian printing,<sup>37</sup> but the rigorous study of Latin and interest in literary education based on classical authors and philological studies were conspicuous by their absence. Joan Roís de Corella's prose compositions with classical pretensions, for example, besides being written in the vernacular, are the best proof of how far humanism was from Valencia in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.<sup>38</sup> At the same time, lack of a local university throughout the whole Middle Ages precluded the creation of a solid academic tradition conducive to disciplines favored by scholasticism, such as dialectic, natural philosophy and theology. Books on these disciplines were indeed very rarely printed in Valencia at the time. Not even the foundation of the *estudi general* in 1502 effected any improvement during its first years.

In that atmosphere the urban nobility was instrumental in the diffusion through the printing press of legal, political, literary and religious writings, even books on leisurely activities, such as a manual on the

---

<sup>35</sup> Philippe Berger, "La lecture à Valencia de 1474 à 1504," *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 11 (1975), 99–118, and his *Libro y lectura en la Valencia del Renacimiento* (Valencia, 1987), 2 vols.

<sup>36</sup> Francisco Vindel, *El arte tipográfico en España en el siglo XV* (Madrid, 1945–1953), 9 vols. (Volume 3 includes a census of incunables published in Valencia, Mallorca and Murcia). See also *Joan Lluís Vives*, pp. 114–20.

<sup>37</sup> Fuster, in *Poetas*, refers to Mercader's library, among whose 200 books classical authors like Quintilian, Plautus, Cicero, Virgil, Suetonius, Martial, Ovid, Juvenal, Pliny and Sallust, as well as patristic literature and legal and scholastic books, could be found. For his part, the poet Jaume Roig speaks "...de cent novelles / e Facecies, / filosofies del gran Plató / Tuli, Cató, / Dant, poesies, / e tragedies" in *Espill o Llibre de les dones*, ed. Marina Gustà (Barcelona, 1978), p. 62.

<sup>38</sup> As an example, the *Historia de Jason y Medea* takes the form of a warning letter from Medea "a les dones...per dar-los exemple d'honestament vivre," in Joan Roís de Corella, *Obra profana*, preliminar de Jordi Carbonell (Valencia, 1983), pp. 181–201.

game of chess. Juridical and political texts, such as the laws of the kingdom or Francesc Eximenis's *Regiment de la cosa publica*, undoubtedly read by Vives, advised their readers on how to conduct themselves in public and private life. To these one may add Jaume de Erla's booklet on the education of boys "to serve God and honor the world",<sup>39</sup> and the advice in the pseudo-Bernard treatise, *De regimine domus*, on the proper way to administer family wealth.

This urban elite also promoted the dissemination of books inspired by the *devotio moderna*. Miquel Pérez, "*honrat ciutadà*", (honorable citizen) was commissioned to produce a translation of the *De contemptu mundi* (more commonly known as the *Imitation of Christ*) to make it available to the common people, for it was not fair that the book should only be read by the clergy and the nobility.<sup>40</sup> And even though Jaume del Bosch, knight of the military Order of Montesa, deputy of the realm and Lord of Honda, knew Latin, he commissioned a Catalan version of Juan Padilla's *Vita Christi* from the knight and theologian Roís de Corella out of charity for his neighbor. Likewise, this group stood out for its copious literary output in the vernacular. Significantly, one of the prose texts by Corella not published at the time is entitled *Parlament o col·lació que s'esdevenç en casa de Berenguer Mercader entre alguns homes d'estat de la ciutat de València [...]*<sup>41</sup> "*Homes d'estat*", that is, men of rank, but also in the modern political sense of the term, statesmen.

Bearing this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the initiative of founding a new university came from the city itself. To this end the Borgia Pope, Alexander VI, issued a bull in 1500, which was ratified by King Ferdinand II in 1502, when academic courses began.<sup>42</sup> Its consolidation was a very gradual process and for some time the teaching continued in great part the traditional curriculum taught in grammar and arts schools.<sup>43</sup> Alongside the three major faculties of theology, law and medicine, many professors of grammar and philosophy met in *cambres* or classrooms purposely arranged, where they taught the

<sup>39</sup> "al servey de deu com ha honor del mon." According to the notice in Palau 80546 the book contained 23 pages. I do not know if a copy survives.

<sup>40</sup> José Ribelles Comín, *Bibliografía de la lengua valenciana* (Madrid, 1915–1943), 3 vols., s.v. Pérez, Miguel, vol. 1, pp. 461–78.

<sup>41</sup> Roís de Corella, *Obra profana*, pp. 138–66.

<sup>42</sup> The important studies of Mariano Peset have provided that university with a recent rich bibliography: *Historia de la Universidad de Valencia*, coord. Mariano Peset (Valencia, 1999), 3 vols.

<sup>43</sup> See the studies of Cruselles Gómez cited above.

younger students in return for a voluntary donation. Vives recalled having been taught by one of these *cambrers*, the grammarian Daniel Sisó. A single copy of his *Grammaticale compendium* survives, a Zaragoza incunabulum of 1490. In it he already mentioned Nebrija, although only together with other grammarians. Another “*camerista*” was Jeroni Amiguët, who adapted Stefano Fieschi’s *Sinonimia* to teach Latin in Valencia with the aid of the vernacular. Amiguët complemented it with a manual of letter-writing entitled *Elegantiae* (1502).<sup>44</sup> There is a tradition that Vives was a pupil of Amiguët, and that he voiced criticism about Nebrija’s new grammar. We have no means of verifying the improbable veracity of this anecdote. There is no doubt, however, that Amiguët’s manual constitutes direct evidence of how grammar was taught at Valencia at the time of Vives, who would later write his own manual on letter-writing.

Other arts of grammar were then published that were inimical to the cultivation of the classical authors, but of logic we hardly know of a single textbook. Vives remained silent about his possible study of dialectic in Valencia. The only salaried lecturer in logic in the city until 1514 was Jaume Esteve, who already taught it before the university was founded. In 1493 he persuaded the bookseller Miquel Albert to print Joan Boix’s logic under the title *Tractatus conceptuum et signorum, perutilis et introductorius ad nominalium doctrinam*, of which he had 60 copies at his disposal. In the colophon he subjected his work to the correction the Masters of Arts of the University of Paris. The influence of the Parisian nominalists could not be more explicit.<sup>45</sup>

Vives also recalled another university professor, the Sevillian, Juan Partenio Tovar, reader of poetry. He seems to have represented, at least in principle, a new tendency in the teaching of Latin. Unfortunately, the volume he published in 1503 together with his pupil Onofre Capella and the poet from Tarragona, Bernard Torrens, is lost. Only part of the title is preserved: *Torrentis tarraconensis de conceptu virginis panegyri*, with some annotations.<sup>46</sup> The portrait Vives has left to us of his teacher, still a very young man, would confirm this impression because he has him

<sup>44</sup> *Edicions*, nos. 3 and 4.

<sup>45</sup> An exemplar, without frontispiece, exists in the Biblioteca Colombina of Seville, 1185.5.12. Jordán Gallego Salvadores, “La facultad de artes de la universidad de Valencia desde 1500 hasta 1525,” *Escritos del Vedat* 10 (1980), 215–58; pp. 228–29.

<sup>46</sup> See Frederick J. Norton, *A descriptive catalogue of printing in Spain and Portugal 1501–1520* (Cambridge, 1978), nos. 1221–22, who believes these are two separate volumes, both published by Costilla. Indispensable: Joan Salvadó Recasens, “Joan

discuss ancient historians in his youthful *Ovatio Mariae Virginis*, remarking in the typically hyperbolic eulogies of the time that he was gifted with “*singulari quadam et plane romana eloquentia*”.<sup>47</sup> Partenio was appointed professor of poetry in 1503, and held this chair until his death at the end of courses in 1512–1513. He must have been highly regarded by the Valencian authorities for his initial salary of 25 pounds had already been increased to 50 in 1510, and to 75 towards the end of his academic career.<sup>48</sup>

To sum up this section succinctly, the most important aspect of Vives's education in Valencia was not so much the academic rigor of his studies or whether they were focused on scholasticism or humanism, as it was the social, political and cultural climate in which they were imparted. Similarly, his years in Valencia were far from being solely a period of anecdotal interest or of little relevance to his intellectual formation. One of the most distinctive characteristics of his social thought, a “municipalism” of a frankly secular stamp, would prove to be the principal legacy of his formation in Valencia. Laicism and “municipalism” feature prominently in his *De subventionem pauperum* (1526) and *De concordia et discordia* (1529). In this regard, the Inquisition was a court which depended directly on the king, unconnected to the municipal authorities. Even though Vives may have criticized its procedures, he never for a moment condemned the behaviour of the juries and counsellors of the city of Valencia, with whom he had good relations all through his life. In 1509, at the age of 16 or 17, Vives left Valencia forever and, as did so many other students, headed for the University of Paris.

### *Paris: Between Scolastism and the Humanities*

As stated above, until very recently the chronology established by Mayans in his *Vita Vivis* of 1782 was universally accepted by later scholars. According to Mayans, Vives lived in Paris from 1509 to 1512,

---

Parteni Tovar, mestre de Vives a l'Universitat de València,” *Studia Philologica Valentina* 1 (1996), pp. 125–43.

<sup>47</sup> The two versions of the text published in 1514 and 1519 can be read in the critical edition of the *Ovatio* in Juan Luis Vives, *Early Writings* 2 (Leiden, 1991), pp. 75 and 93.

<sup>48</sup> Enrique González González, “Lectores públicos y privados en la Universidad de Valencia, 1492–1520,” in *Aulas y Saberes. VI Congreso Internacional de Historia de las Universidades Hispánicas* (Valencia, 2003), pp. 463–67; p. 474.



learning “sophisms” from the scholastic philosophers, Jan Dullaert and Gaspar Lax. At the end of these three years he travelled to the Low Countries, where he remained for the rest of his life. Vives’s stay in Paris would therefore be limited to studying with some scholastic teachers without any publishing activity. Mayans’s thesis began to be challenged after the discovery of several Paris and Lyons imprints containing writings of Vives which demonstrate that he taught extracurricular courses on classical and Renaissance authors at Paris and collaborated with local printers. Given that these volumes were printed in 1514, it was concluded that Vives resided in Paris at least until the summer of that year, that he began his writing career in that city, and there entered into contact with humanism.<sup>49</sup>

Though lacking academic documents, we know from Vives himself that he was already in Paris around 1509.<sup>50</sup> He arrived in the city at the age of 16 or 17, four or five years over the minimum age required to begin a degree in Arts and after completing some sort of university education in his home-town. This is not to say that this was an exceptional case, but it did place Vives, so to speak, at a higher academic level than his younger peers. Moreover, bearing in mind that the *regentes artium* were often students in one of the higher faculties, they were often close to the students in age. As Vives himself explained, he studied with two well-known teachers, the Fleming Jan Dullaert (ca. 1487–1514) and the Aragonese Gaspar Lax (1487–1560), who were only five years older than him.

In the university city students sought accommodation in any of the almost fifty colleges connected to the University. Many of them in addition to lodgings offered classes in quarters fitted out as classrooms. It was always believed that Vives studied at the Collège de Montaigu because Dullaert and Lax had taught there. However, their period of teaching in the college did not correspond in time with Vives’s stay

---

<sup>49</sup> See my “Juan Luis Vives y la transición a la filosofía moderna. Un replanteamiento del problema,” tesis de licenciatura en filosofía, Mexico City, UNAM, 1984, and *Joan Lluís Vives* (1987). My proposal was accepted by Jozef IJsewijn in “Vives’s Jugendwerke neu datiert,” in *Wolfenbütteler Renaissance Mitteilungen* 2 (1987), 58–59 and by other Vives scholars. See also Charles Fantazzi, “Vives’s Parisian Years,” in *Humanism and Creativity in the Renaissance*, eds. Christopher Celenza and Kenneth Gouwens (Leiden, 2006), pp. 745–70.

<sup>50</sup> As noted by Mayans (*Vivis Vita*, p. 25), in a letter of 1529 Vives described a coughing epidemic *annos ab hinc circiter viginti in Gallia, ubi tum ipse eram* (preface to *Sacrum diurnum de sudore Jesu Christi*, *Edicions*, no. 45), which shows that Vives was already in Paris in 1509.

there. Dullaert had in fact already moved to the college of Beauvais by the time Vives arrived in Paris. Lax for his part was at Montaigne only after November 1512, when Vives had already been living in Paris for at least three years.<sup>51</sup> All evidence points to the fact that Vives stayed at the Collège de Lisieux, where Juan Dolz, a pupil of the young Lax, began a three-year degree in arts in the autumn of 1509. At the end of each academic year Dolz published his teaching notes. The prefatory and final pages of some of these notes feature the names of several Spanish students, two of whom were evoked by Vives in his early writings: the Aragonese Juan Fort, or Fuertes, and the Valencian Francesc Cristóbal. It is worth noting that both Cristóbal and Fort also attended the lectures of Dullaert and Lax. As a matter of fact, after students had enrolled with a particular teacher to stay with him for the whole course, they were still free to attend other lecturers of their choice in other colleges. This means that enrolment in a particular college was less important than the availability of teaching staff and the freedom to attend any lectures or courses.<sup>52</sup>

As Masters of Arts, every three years Dullaert, Lax and Dolz began a full course in their respective colleges at the end of which students obtained their bachelor's degree. As with most universities, students at Paris first studied grammar, employing Donatus' manual or the so-called *Catholicon*. Even though Vives mentioned nothing about his grammar teachers, years later, in his *Dialogues*, he poked fun at such teaching methods. Immediately after the study of grammar students began their course in Arts properly so-called. For three years, the same teacher reviewed Aristotle's works, in particular his *Logic*, but also gave attention to the philosopher's writings on natural philosophy and ethics. The teacher began with an *expositio* of the text to be studied and then proceeded to examine the text through so-called *quaestiones*, whose purpose was to elucidate various books of Aristotle, but also the brief treatises or *Summulae* of the medieval logician, Peter of Spain, which dealt with the "*proprietates terminorum*" as constitutive parts of any statement. It was no passive learning of logic. By means of *disputationes* students learned to support their points of view and to invalidate the arguments of their rivals. These logical skills, learned in the *minor* Faculty

---

<sup>51</sup> What follows is a summary of chapter four of my *Joan Lluís Vives*, to which I refer the reader for a more detailed analysis and the corresponding critical documentation.

<sup>52</sup> *Joan Lluís Vives*, pp. 134–38.

of Arts, were then applied to the *major* Faculties of theology, law and medicine. There the dialectical method was applied to the resolution of concrete questions related to specific disciplines.<sup>53</sup> As with so many other humanists, Vives criticized what he regarded as excessive attention to logic to the detriment of the humanities. In 1519, after he had settled in Louvain, he broke definitively with these methods in a letter addressed to his former colleague Juan Fort, in which he branded those logicians as “pseudodialecticians”.

It was customary to announce on the cover of the teaching notes published by Parisian lecturers whether these were *expositiones*, *quaestiones*, or both, regarding a particular book by Aristotle or commentators such as Porphyry or Peter of Spain. Thus books by Dullaert include *Tractatus terminorum* (1525), *Questiones [...] in libros Predicabilium Porphyrii* (1521 and 1526), *Questiones [...] in libros Predicamentorum Aristotelis* (1523), and *Questiones super duos libros Peri hermenias Aristotelis una cum ipsius textu eiusque clarissima expositione* (1510, 1515, 1519, and Salamanca, 1517). Lax, more concise, published a *Tractatus terminorum* (ca. 1507, and ca. 1512), a *Tractatus exponibilium propositionum* (1507, 1511, 1512), and other treatises on *Insolubilia* (1508, 1511, 1512), *Obligationes* (1512), *Impositiones* (1513) *Proportiones* (1515) and others. For his part, Dolz, whose formal course in arts Vives would have attended, published his *Termini cum principiis necnon pluribus aliis ipsius dialectices difficultatibus* (ca. 1510). After concluding his lessons of the following year, he prepared a volume entitled *Syllogismi* in 1511, and published his *Disceptationes super primum tractatum summularum, cum nonnullis suorum terminorum intellectionibus* in 1513.<sup>54</sup> Whereas Dullaert and Lax’s texts enjoyed substantial circulation, Dolz’s volumes were printed only once and were subjected to severe criticism by the Valencian Joan de Salaya, or Celaya, himself a pupil of Lax.

Some colleges confined themselves to offering instruction in the different subjects which made up the curriculum for the degree in Arts, others also employed occasional lectures by teachers who taught classical authors such as Cicero or Suetonius. At times these lectures dealt with a modern writer, almost always a humanist. On their part, printers and booksellers, who had set up shop in the city by the dozens, vied with one

<sup>53</sup> See Elizabeth. J. Ashworth, *Language and Logic*, passim.

<sup>54</sup> The best catalogue of sixteenth-century printing in Paris is *Inventaire chronologique des éditions parisiennes du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle... d’après les manuscrits de Philippe Renouard*, ed. Brigitte Moreau, vol. I, 1501–1510 (Paris, 1972); vol. II, 1511–1520 (Paris, 1977). Some of the editions cited in *Joan Lluís Vives*, pp. 153–58, went unnoticed by Moreau.

another to attract teachers and students to the still young art of printing. In this way besides the lectures given as part of public courses, many examples of private lectures arrived at the press. They were printed, in their entirety or in short summaries, on unbound sheets called *praelectiones*.<sup>55</sup> According to Moreau's catalogue,<sup>56</sup> between 1509 and 1514 a total of 1,421 items were published in Paris, with an average of 237 items per year. Of these, 286 were text-books employed in the ordinary courses of grammar, arts, law or medicine. Together with these were printed texts employed in special courses, such as those offered by the poet Fausto Andrelini (ca. 1462–1518), the Hellenist Girolamo Aleandro (1480–1542), the jurist Nicole Bérault (ca. 1470–ca. 1545), and Vives himself. Texts of Cicero, Virgil and other Latin authors were read as part of these courses as well as in the grammar courses. Lectures were also given in the very popular Neo-Latin poets. All of this increased significantly the number of books related to teaching.

Vives enthusiastically devoted himself to scholasticism—if we are to believe Erasmus. Even though he regularly attended courses in Arts, it seems that he did not even obtain the bachelor degree. Rather, it is evident that he showed an increasing interest in the lessons offered by several non-curricular lecturers, and towards the end of his Parisian sojourn, Vives joined their ranks. But not all of Vives's time was spent studying. As he gradually began a slow transition to humanism, he also visited inns, public baths and ball games, some of which are evoked in his writings.

Around 1512 Vives struck up a friendship with one of those lecturers, the above-mentioned Nicole Bérault, who published *praelectiones* to his free courses on Quintilian, Suetonius, Cicero's *De legibus*, the Pandects *De origine iuris*, Poliziano's *Rusticus*, and published Francesco Filelfo's *Convivia Mediolaniensia* as well as Pliny's letters among other works.<sup>57</sup> Proof of Bérault's influence on Vives is the inclusion of the former in his dialogue *Sapiens*. It also seems that Bérault was Vives's mentor towards the end of his Parisian sojourn. Not only did both men work in close partnership with the printer Thomas Kees but Vives also began to lecture and publish *praelectiones* on some of the authors previously taught or published by Bérault, such as Cicero's *De legibus* or Filelfo's

<sup>55</sup> See chapter four of my *Joan Lluís Vives*.

<sup>56</sup> Moreau, *Inventaire*, vols. I and II.

<sup>57</sup> On Bérault see *Joan Lluís Vives*, pp. 159–65, which includes bibliography.

*Colloquia*. Undoubtedly, therefore, Bérault and several common friends like the poet Jean Salmon Macrin were instrumental in persuading Vives to take his first uncertain steps in the field of humanism, although he never abandoned his esteem for his teachers, Dullaert and Lax.

Vives's output in those years constitutes a most valuable instrument to study this process of transition from scholasticism to humanism, which began in Paris and not in the Low Countries, as Mayans and those who followed him maintained. His extant Parisian writings were published in five different printings, and they can all be dated to 1514: four prefatory letters and nine short pieces. Of the latter, five are *praelectiones*, two are in the form of a colloquy, another is a dialogue, and the last is a short oratorical piece.

1. Prefatory letter to pseudo-Higinius, *Poeticon astronomicum*, 31 March 1514, printed by Thomas Kees for Jean Lambert.<sup>58</sup>

2. Prefatory letter to Battista Guarino's *De modo et ordine docendi et discendi*, printed, seemingly, by Thomas Kees for Jean Lambert. Vives addressed his undated letter to Pasquier Lambert, the bookseller's son, who himself dedicated a poem to Vives. The colophon is dated 17 April 1514.<sup>59</sup>

3. *Vita Ioannis Dullardi*, an undated letter to the Valencian, Francesc Cristóbal, included in a book printed by Thomas Kees for Gilles de Gourmont, with a colophon dated 30 May 1514. It is a reprint of the *Expositio* by the recently deceased Dullaert of Aristotle's *Primum metheororum*.<sup>60</sup>

4. A collection of three oratorical pieces, preceded by a dedicatory letter to Bernardo de Mesa, ambassador of the king of Aragon. The volume came off the press of Thomas Kees in the month of June for Jean Lambert. It must be dated to 1514, since Mesa was only appointed ambassador to Paris in that particular year. Moreover, the letter was reprinted in Lyons in October 1514; the date was ratified by Vives in his own edition of the letter in 1519.<sup>61</sup> The book is entitled *Opuscula duo*, but in reality it contains three texts:

<sup>58</sup> *Edicions*, no. 1. There are critical editions of most of the Parisian writings in volumes 1 and 2 of *Early Writings*.

<sup>59</sup> De Schepper, "April in Paris".

<sup>60</sup> *Edicions*, no. 2.

<sup>61</sup> See *Edicions*, nos. 3, 4 and 7.

- a) the colloquy *Christi Iesu triumphus*,
- b) the colloquy *Virginis dei parentis ovatio*,
- c) the declamation *Clypei Christi descriptio*.

5. A collection of *Opera*, known only by its probable re-edition in Lyons by Guillaume Huyon, issued from the press on 19 October 1514.<sup>62</sup> It included:

- a) the three above-mentioned opuscula, including the letter to Mesa, with textual variants in the author's hand, who included these variants in the definitive edition, published in Louvain in 1519,<sup>63</sup>
- b) the dialogue entitled *Sapiens*,
- c) five *praelectiones*:
  - i) to the *Christi Iesu Triumphus*, entitled *Veritas fucata*,
  - ii) to the *Sapiens*,
  - iii) to Filelfo's *Convivia*,
  - iv) to Cicero's *De legibus*,
  - v) to book four of *Ad Herennium*.

In the Paris prior to the controversial publication of Erasmus's *Novum instrumentum* and the scandal of Luther's theses, scholastics and humanists lived side by side with no great tensions. It is hardly surprising that the names of the logicians Dullaert and Lax—the subject of exaggerated encomia—occur in harmony with the names of the humanist Bérault in Vives's Parisian writings when he was midway between both movements. It is certain that the letters, dialogues and declamations were genres beloved of humanists, and that Vives sought to express himself in a Latin worthy of a "Roman citizen". Nevertheless, these writings still reveal an obsessive desire to Christianize to the letter the classical world, whose "otherness" was still not very clear to Vives.

In fact, in the *Christi Iesu Triumphus*, his first creative piece, Vives begins by enumerating the conditions required to grant someone a military triumph in ancient Rome, as contained in Aulus Gellius,<sup>64</sup> and proceeds to apply them step by step to Christ's life and resurrection, concluding that he deserved the triumphal crown. Yet, since Christ and Mary were

---

<sup>62</sup> *Edicions*, no. 4.

<sup>63</sup> *Edicions*, no. 7.

<sup>64</sup> Aulus Gellius, *Noctes atticae* 5. 6.

inseparable concepts in late-medieval religion, the author judged that she too fulfilled the conditions prescribed by Gellius to merit an ovation, thus the second work. Once both texts had been written, Vives found inspiration in Virgil's description of Aeneas' shield for a description of Christ's shield (*Clypei Christi descriptio*). This amounts to a rather abusive use of the simile and a narrow vision of antiquity. Trained as a philosopher and lover of the naked truth, he did not yet understand the subtleties of poetic artifice. The main theme of Vives's *Veritas fucata* is the manner in which poets daub truth with make-up, befouling and deforming its pristine beauty. The literary forms employed by Vives may be new, but the new spirit is not yet fully there.

On the other hand, these writings reflect a disenchantment with the university world. In these texts he complains more than once that his listeners do not pay, going as far as to say that you would need the help of a thief to extract money from their pockets. In the dialogue *Sapiens* he goes even further. In the narrative setting Vives, Lax and Bérault decide to examine the "*regentes*" of the various disciplines to seek a wise man among them. Needless to say, they do not find him, least of all in the professor of logic. The masters *in artes*, in reality, *magistri inertes*, according to Vives, do not teach dialectic but divination. On this subject Vives warned the academic authorities of the University of Paris, so removed from wisdom, that if they did not correct themselves, he would publicly denounce all their vanities in a longer speech (*longiore sermone*). He says that he would pursue this fight to the finish or die in the attempt because—and this phrase only acquired its full meaning in his invective, *In pseudodialecticis* (1519) and above all in his treatise *De disciplinis* (1531)—he had come to the conclusion that "satirists have rendered much more service to mankind than panegyrists" (*mihi de humana vita multo plus benemeriti Satyrici videntur quam Panegyrici*).

The wise man in the dialogue *Sapiens* is only to be found (following the commonplace employed in so many medieval fables) in a hermit, who lives far from the noise of the world. Disenchanted by his teaching experiences at Paris, Vives proposed the hackneyed withdrawal from the world, after the example of hermits, and to surrender oneself to the cultivation of divine wisdom in solitude. Once again, however, thanks to his contacts with Bérault Vives turned enthusiastically to the study of Quintilian and Cicero and allowed himself to be seduced by the call to civic duty, the royal road of humanism. The revaluation of man's social role, present for the first time in the *praelectio* to Cicero's *De legibus*, must have profoundly altered Vives's perspective, not only in philosophy but concerning his life's ambitions.

Indeed, Vives seems to present himself—in the dedicatory letter to *Christi triumphus* addressed to the Aragonese ambassador, and at the end of the *Ovatio Virginis*—as someone who is well aware of what a good preceptor of princes should teach: the triumphs of Christ and Mary instead of those of Caesar. Did he feel prepared to make the leap to a position as preceptor at the court of a prince, or at least as preceptor to the children of a noble family, rather than continue the ungrateful task of teaching students for a petty sum of money, which they were reluctant to pay? In any case, Vives definitively abandoned Paris in the autumn of 1514 and headed for the Low Countries. And very soon he would see himself in the court of the young Prince Charles, the future Charles V.

*The Low Countries: Study and the Court*

In a few passages Vives hinted that his personal contacts with Flanders began in 1512.<sup>65</sup> Well aware that a group of Valencian merchants, mostly of *converso* origin, lived in Bruges, he knew that it would not be difficult for him to find some relatives there, such as the family of Bernard Valldaura, whose daughter Margarita Vives married in 1524. He may well have visited them during his holidays in 1512 and perhaps again in the following year. His visit to Bruges in the autumn of 1514 is well documented. During this same period we lose track of him in Paris beginning with the summer of the same year.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps disappointed by the meager prospects that awaited him as a private lecturer, he chose to change residence and career.

After much discussion, it is now possible to declare with certainty that Vives moved from Bruges to Louvain at the end of 1514.<sup>67</sup> The

---

<sup>65</sup> In his dedication of *De subventionem pauperum* (*Edicions*, no. 27), addressed to the municipal authorities of Bruges, Vives stated that he had lived in the city for 14 years, although not continuously (*etsi non continenter*). Two years earlier, in 1524, Vives revealed to his friend, Frans van Cranevelt, in a private letter, that his acquaintance with the Valldaura family went back to 1512, de Vocht (1929), p. 274; IJsewijn (1977), p. 82. Both testimonies can be confirmed if we accept 1512 as the date of Vives's earliest contact with Bruges.

<sup>66</sup> See Émile van den Bussche, *Éclaircissements et rectifications biographiques sur Vivès* (Bruges, 1871), p. 13, where he pointed out that Vives had been a witness in two trials in Bruges in November and December 1514. Unfortunately, he only refers to "unbound papers".

<sup>67</sup> Enrique González González, "The encounter of Luis Vives (1492/3–1540) and Hadrianus Barlandus (1486–1538) in Louvain, 1514?–1515," *Lias* 30/2 (2003), 177–212.



reasons for his decision are not known. In the new university city he enjoyed the patronage of a young nobleman of Bruges, Jacobus de la Potterie, who had enrolled for courses at the university in February 1514. He was a student of Hadrianus Barlandus (1486–1538), professor in the Faculty of Arts since 1509 and assiduous editor of texts for the renewal of the teaching of grammar, which were printed by Dirk Martens.<sup>68</sup> Barlandus and Vives quickly became friends and, shortly after his arrival in Louvain, Vives gave private lessons, as he had done in Paris, though supplementing his income with contributions from de la Potterie.

A conspicuous member of the incipient humanist circle in Louvain, Barlandus shared the patronage of de la Potterie with Vives and introduced him to some of his colleagues, such as Martin Dorp. He also made it possible for Vives to benefit from the generosity of other patrons of letters, such as the nobleman, George Halewijn, Lord of Comines, and since 1515 chamberlain at the court of Prince Charles.<sup>69</sup> In a book dedicated by Barlandus to Halewijn, Vives added a prefatory letter to the reader in praise of his new friend. It was included at the end of *Hadriani Barlandi versuum ex poetarum principe Vergilio proverbialium collectanea: rursus ab eodem recognita atque aucta*,<sup>70</sup> published by Gilles de Gourmont in Paris, without date, but which can be dated to the early months of 1515.

Vives's letter is full of praise for Barlandus, the compiler of Virgilian proverbial verses, and it contains praise of Potterius bordering on adulation. Since it was written a few months after his departure from Paris, the short lapse of time passed there does not permit us to speak of great progress in his humanistic formation. Nonetheless, some novelties can be noted. In the *Christi triumphus* and *Ovatio Virginis* Vives had dismissed Homer as an insane old man (*insanus senex*) through the mouth of his scholastic teacher, Gaspar Lax, and in the *Veritas fucata*, a veritable anti-poetic manifesto, he accused poets of disguising and corrupting truth with make-up. In the Louvain letter, on the contrary, he dismisses

<sup>68</sup> Étienne Daxhelet, *Adrien Barlandus humaniste belge, 1486–1538* (Louvain, 1938) continues to be a fundamental source.

<sup>69</sup> José Martínez Millán, *La corte de Carlos V* (Madrid, 2000), 5 vols, vol. V, p. 11. The contact between Vives and Halewijn, initiated through Barlandus, continued throughout the nobleman's life, but only two letters from Vives to Halewijn are extant. See Constant Matheeußen, "Vives's two letters to George Halewin. Themes and Dates," *Lias* 3 (1976), 79–83.

<sup>70</sup> *Edicions*, no. 6; Daxhelet, *Adrien Barlandus*, pp. 41–42.

all those who describe Virgil and similarly Homer as authors lacking in genius and learning. Rather, he acknowledges the philosophical value of poetry, and affirms that Virgil could be labelled a master of life. He encourages Barlandus to defend Virgil against his critics. Still a naive newcomer fresh from the scholastic world dominated by Lax and Dullaert, Vives seems to be reacting against the antipoetic prejudices of his old masters, who fanatically refused to accept any truth other than that derived from syllogistic argument. He was beginning to approach poets with new eyes. Vives's letter is important for another reason. It contains the first mention of a personage who would very quickly become a figure of great importance in his life: Erasmus. He mentions him only as a grammarian and the compiler of the *Adagia*.

For about four years, until 1519, Vives withdrew from publishing. During this four-year period he was introduced to the court of Brussels, where, around 1517, he secured an enviable position. In January 1515, the young Charles of Habsburg, born in 1500, came of age, which allowed him to form his own court. In it Guillaume de Croy, Lord of Chièvres and in his role as grand chamberlain, became a most powerful figure,<sup>71</sup> master of the young prince's will, according to contemporaries.

Directly in front of the prince's house stood the Grand Council, one of whose members was Adrian of Utrecht (1459–1523), dean of the Faculty of theology and also of the collegiate church of St Peter, and chancellor of the University of Louvain. Appointed as tutor of the prince in 1507, he divided his time between Mechelen (where Charles resided before his coming of age), and Brussels, while also attending to the affairs of the University. In October 1515 he was sent to Aragon as Charles's ambassador with a view to taking up the government of the kingdom shortly after Ferdinand's death. In 1516 he was appointed bishop of Tortosa, cardinal in the following year, and pope in 1522. In *De disciplinis* Vives mentioned having seen him taking part in the *quodlibetica* discussions in the Faculty of theology, and in 1519 praised him as a model preceptor of princes. In a letter sent to the new pope,<sup>72</sup> the humanist observed that before writing to him as Roman pontiff, he had done so when he was dean at Louvain and later when he was bishop

---

<sup>71</sup> See the excellent analysis of *La corte de Carlos V* in Martínez Millán's above-mentioned book, in particular, vol. 1, pp. 115–40.

<sup>72</sup> *Edicions*, no. 29.

of Tortosa. In other words, Vives must have maintained contact with him since the time when both were together at the University. Yet, if Adrian abandoned Charles's court in October 1515, Vives must have made his acquaintance before that date. Moreover, if correspondence between the two men continued in the following years, it was due to the personal interchange between them already in Louvain and/or Brussels, a relation of superior to inferior. Did Adrian take the young Valencian humanist into his service and introduce him to the court? A humanist with excellent Latin credentials, with knowledge of French and Spanish and not unfamiliar with Dutch, Vives had good possibilities in the French-speaking Flemish court, at the time overrun with Castilian and Aragonese courtiers, just at the time when the whole entourage was waiting for the moment to leave for Castile.

At the court of prince Charles Vives also met Juan de Lanuza, the Aragonese ambassador. On behalf of his king Lanuza promised prebends in Aragon to the dean of Louvain, and bestowed annual pensions on the leading courtiers, including the all-powerful Lord of Chièvres.<sup>73</sup> In addition, he maintained close relations with Princess Margaret, Charles' aunt and regent of the Low Countries until their independence. In his commentaries on *De civitate Dei* Vives narrated an anecdote recounted by Lanuza to the princess, and took this opportunity to praise the ambassador.<sup>74</sup> Bearing in mind that Ferdinand died in February 1516, Vives's reference to the ambassador seems to indicate that the Spaniard was already present at the court before that date. In any case we know that in November 1516 Vives was already "resident and member of the royal court" for at that time he received a commission from the city of Valencia.<sup>75</sup> All these indications lead us to assume that Vives may have been at the court of Brussels possibly as early as the first half of 1515, and certainly in the second half of 1516, when he was already holding some position.

In fact, it was also at the end of that year that Vives met Erasmus at the court. Even though Erasmus was then at the pinnacle of his fame as grammarian and theologian, criticisms of his recently published *Novum*

<sup>73</sup> Martínez Millán, *La corte*, vol. 1, pp. 120 ff.

<sup>74</sup> Vives, *Commentaria ad libros De civitate Dei D. Aurelii Augustini*, 12. 25.

<sup>75</sup> The letter was published by Bonilla in his *Luis Vives*, Appendix IX, pp. 733–34. Written in Latin, the letter was addressed to Vives in *curia regia residenti, eiusque curiali*.

*Testamentum* were already being heard.<sup>76</sup> The Rotterdamer made a deep impression on the young Valencian, who from that time on declared himself his disciple. Initially, Erasmus entertained a strong antipathy towards his young admirer.<sup>77</sup> Very soon, however, he spoke of him in generously laudatory terms and in 1520 he charged him with the preparation of a new annotated edition of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*. With the passage of time, always suspicious of conspiracies against him, Erasmus again distanced himself from the Valencian and there are indications that he prevented the publication of Vives's work in Basel. Without renouncing his own opinions and points of view, Vives remained faithful to him.

As noted above, Vives began to show sympathy for humanism during his days in Paris and it was reinforced through his friendship with Barlandus and his friends. Nonetheless, it was from Erasmus that he took his basic philosophy, best encapsulated in the formula *pietas erudita*, the intimate union of intense study and profound religious feeling. From him would come also pacificism, anti-dogmatism, the call to an inner spirituality with its consequent lack of sympathy for the blind faith of the multitude and the formalism of ecclesiastical rules. Clearly, Vives was more of a philosopher than a theologian and a philologist. Yet, neither differences of character, style, interests or personal frictions stifled his profound Erasmism. His readers associated him with Erasmus from early on. Vives, who was well aware that he was under the scrutiny of the Inquisition, as a member of a persecuted caste, was always very cautious not to express his religious and political ideas in public.

In March 1517, during Lent, through Vives's own statement, we know that he was occupied in Cambrai writing Latin speeches for the peace negotiations between Spain and France which would culminate in the so-called Peace of Cambrai, signed on 11 March 1517. Before leaving for Spain to take possession of his new kingdom, Charles wanted to leave his affairs with the other princes in a peaceful state. We do not know in whose service Vives was in his capacity as Latin secretary at

---

<sup>76</sup> As recalled by Erasmus in his *Apologia* against Edward Lee, *Apologia qua respondit duabus inactivis Eduardi Lei, Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami* IX-4 (Amsterdam, 2003), p. 26.

<sup>77</sup> In a letter of 8 March 1517 Erasmus remarks: "Si Vives crebro fuit apud te, facile coniectabis quid ego passus sim Bruxellae, cui cotidie cum tot saluatoribus Hispanis fuerit res, praetor Italos et Germanos." Allen, Ep. 545: 15-17. In the next edition of the letters, the *Epistolae ad diversos* of 1521, he substituted the fictitious name "Pollio" for that of Vives.

Cambrai. Lord Chièvres had a nephew of the same name, Guillaume de Croy, who in 1516, at eighteen years of age, was installed as bishop of Cambrai. During the prelate's stay in his city, Vives dedicated to him a meditation on one of the penitential psalms.<sup>78</sup> We do not know exactly when but, doubtless already in 1517, the Valencian became Latin tutor of the young prelate. In April of that same year de Croy was installed as cardinal, and in November of that year was designated archbishop of Toledo, the richest ecclesiastical position in Christianity after the papacy. In 1517 Charles and his court left for Spain, but the young cardinal by order of his uncle remained in the Low Countries under the supervision of a tutor.<sup>79</sup> He moved to Louvain to complete his literary formation before taking up his ecclesiastical benefices. From that moment on Vives was always at de Croy's side, accompanying him to Paris in the spring of 1519, a journey in which he made the acquaintance of the most famous humanist of his time, Guillaume Budé. From Louvain, supported by the cardinal's prestige, Vives wrote to officials of the court as well as University dignitaries. Thanks to the protection of de Croy his works returned to the presses, beginning in 1519.

The fifteen *Opuscula varia*,<sup>80</sup> published in Louvain around April 1519, mark Vives's settling of accounts with his former university and a great step forward. The volume included five writings previously published in Paris and Lyons, with important revisions: *Christi triumphus*, *Ovatio Virginis* and *Clypei Christi descriptio*, as well as *Veritas fucata* and the *Praelectio in Leges Ciceronis*. It may be inferred that, if the remaining texts written in Paris were not reprinted in the 1519 edition, it is because Vives had already consigned them to oblivion, judging them immature. A historical tract, *De tempore quo natus est Christus*, framed the previous ones. Other writings, of a more or less allegorical nature, which were included in the volume were: *Genethliacon Iesu Christi*, *Aedes legum*, and the *Fabula de homine*, inspired by Pico.<sup>81</sup> He also included a *praelectio* to Virgil's *Georgics*,

<sup>78</sup> A convincing chronology is proposed by IJsewijn in "Vives in 1512–1517", pp. 91–92.

<sup>79</sup> The document whereby the young de Croy was granted a small court, an "Estat", by his uncle was signed in Middelburg on 18 July 1517. It was edited by Georges Dansaert, *Guillaume de Croy Chièvres dit le sage. 1458–1521* (Paris, s. d.), pp. 271–72.

<sup>80</sup> *Edicions*, no. 7. Critical editions of these short works are to be found in *Early Writings* 1 and 2, edited by Constant Matheeußen, Charles Fantazzi, Edward V. George, Jozef IJsewijn and Angela Fritsen, vols. 1 and 5 of the *Selected Works of J.L. Vives* (Leiden, 1987 and 1991).

<sup>81</sup> Charles Fantazzi, "La *Fabula de homine* como parodia de la Oración de Pico de la Mirandola," in *La Universitat de València i l'Humanisme: Studia Humanitatis i renovació cultural a Europa i al Nou Món* (Valencia, 2003), pp. 79–88.

proof of Vives's new approach to poetry. The *Anima senis, praelectio* to Cicero's *De senectute*, is written in the form of a monologue in which the soul of an old man appears to the author and describes itself. A similar rhetorical feature is employed by Vives in his *Pompeius fugiens*, a declamation put in the mouth of the Roman general, inspired by Lucan's *Pharsalia*. The collection opened with a letter to Cardinal de Croy, as a preface to the *Meditationes in septem psalmos poenitentiae*. Unlike ascetic treatises commonly written as commentaries on the psalms, Vives glossed them, exhibiting a great display of his declamatory skills. The compilation also includes two philosophical texts, *De initiis, sectis et laudibus philosophiae*, a historical outline of the discipline and not a systematic study, as his scholastic masters produced. The work was well received even as late as the eighteenth century. The volume ended with the *In pseudodialecticos*, a virulent invective against the scholastics of Paris and their treatment of logic. The volume which marked Vives's publishing comeback was, therefore, a miscellaneous collection, in which the Spaniard took stock of his new and old intellectual and literary interests. With it Vives took a definitive step towards humanism.

In 1520 Vives published two series of declamations. The first, *Somnium et vigilia in Somnium Ciceronis*,<sup>82</sup> included a commentary on Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, which was divided into two parts. In the first part, entitled "A Dream upon a Dream," the author travels to the realm of dreams, where he finds all the scholastic philosophers embracing chimeras and disappearing into them. The second piece, the *Vigilia in Somnium*, is a serious *oratio* in which Vives discussed the philosophical implications of the Ciceronian work. Almost at the same time he published the *Declamationes Sullanae*,<sup>83</sup> a collection of five oratorical pieces in which Vives advocated the use of eloquence as an alternative to the dialectic employed by the university *sophists*. On the opening page a letter of Erasmus contained a generous eulogy of the young humanist. He praised him for abandoning the field of the sophists and entering the field of those who cultivated the more peaceful Muses. He described him as being witty and possessing a retentive memory, as well as being gifted with an eloquence which matched his erudition and philosophical profundity.

---

<sup>82</sup> *Edicions*, no. 11. Published in Antwerp by Jean Thibault, it was riddled with so many misprints that Erasmus had it reprinted in Basel in 1521 (*Edicions*, no. 12). See Edward V. George's critical edition in *The Dream of Scipio* (Greenwood, SC, 1989).

<sup>83</sup> *Edicions*, no. 14. The first two were edited by George as part of the *Selected Works of J.L. Vives*, vol. 2 (Leiden, 1989).

In 1519 Charles left Spain to compete successfully for the imperial crown. The court returned to the Low Countries, and Vives was again able to meet old friends and make new acquaintances, such as Thomas More, on the occasion of Henry VIII's visit to the emperor in 1520.<sup>84</sup> The encounter marked the beginning of a long-lasting friendship between both men, which would only be interrupted by More's death in 1538, even though correspondence between Vives and More is no longer extant. By then Vives was praised by the most famous humanists of the time, not only by Erasmus, as we have seen, but also by Budé and More. In the epistolary collections of both men the name of Vives appeared often as one of their correspondents. If all that were not enough, in 1520, Prince Ferdinand, brother to Charles V and future emperor, sought to appoint Erasmus as his preceptor.<sup>85</sup> When Erasmus declined the position, Vives was mentioned as one of the candidates but cardinal de Croy refused to let him go. Amidst such felicitous omens for the twenty-eight-year-old Vives, and in the most unexpected manner, Cardinal de Croy died in January 1521 in a hunting accident, and Vives was left without a protector. From then on, his personal life was subject to uncertainties and dramatic situations of diverse character. Paradoxical as it may seem, it was in these final years of his life that Vives undertook his most important work, that for which he is in the end best remembered.

*Writing in the Midst of Adversity: The Later Years (1521–1540)*

The later years of Juan Luis Vives can roughly be dated from 1521 until his death in 1540. The promising young man, whose declamations and invectives had been praised by Erasmus, Thomas More and Guillaume Budé, soon became the prolific author of an encyclopedic range of philosophical and critical works, schoolbooks, and texts which display a deep interest in the social, political and religious conflicts of his time.

Two parallel circumstances stand out in the last two decades of Vives's rather brief life. Adversities of every kind made these years

---

<sup>84</sup> "Litterae ad Craneveldium Balduinianae," see note 13. The "Alorus" of letter 15, p. 46, is in reality Morus, as the late Prof. IJsewijn informed me in a letter of 4 March 1993.

<sup>85</sup> Allen, cp. 1082.

uncertain and often sorrowful and they prevented him from living a secure and serene life. In contrast to this lack of outward and, no doubt, also interior tranquillity, in the final years of his life Vives succeeded in publishing, almost year by year, the numerous treatises and manuals which won him justified renown in all of Europe and also on the other side of the Atlantic. To my mind, especially in recent years, there has been a tendency to pay excessive attention to Vives's personal adversities, which at times goes to the extreme of forgetting the writer, a writer who reveals serenity in most of his works, and even joy and humor, and who often reflected on his profession, manifesting his contentment in practicing it.

In the last thirty years of the twentieth century a large number of studies and new documents relating to Vives's early years were published, which made it necessary to revise what biographers had written about his early life.<sup>86</sup> By contrast, very few new details concerning Vives's later years have come to light. No original manuscripts or unknown printed works have been discovered although some titles have been ascribed to him with insufficient proof while others are obviously foreign to his pen.<sup>87</sup> Even the highly important collection of letters by Vives found in the 1990s is restricted to the period 1521–1523.<sup>88</sup> Some new letters have, however, been discovered, and his stay in Breda is now better documented. It is undeniable, on the other hand, that the last few decades have witnessed important developments in critical editions and the study of some of his later writings, but this does not necessarily lead to a better knowledge of Vives's biography.

Beyond the shadow of a doubt the edition in 1964 of the inquisitorial proceedings against Vives's family marks a watershed in the studies of Vives's origins and social background, something which in turn sheds new light on the interpretation of different aspects of Vives's work. As early as 1970, in his *Juan Luis Vives*, Carlos G. Noreña, made extensive use of all this information, as did almost all later scholars of Vives.<sup>89</sup> By and large, the main details relating to Vives's biography during his later years, first sketched in the eighteenth century, have become more

<sup>86</sup> For new bibliography on Vives see part one of this essay.

<sup>87</sup> *Edicions*, nos. 49–52.

<sup>88</sup> "Litterae ad Craneveldium Balduiniana," see note 13 for full bibliographical details.

<sup>89</sup> (The Hague, 1970), hereafter cited as Noreña, followed by page number. Spanish edition (Madrid, 1978).



defined and abundant, but the general picture has remained unchanged. For the most part, the dates assigned to Vives's later works by his biographers two centuries ago are still in force, although today we have a better knowledge of the *editiones principes*.<sup>90</sup> It is plain that, at present, the necessary materials are lacking to assay a structural revaluation of his life and works during this period. It is, however, very important to revise the emphasis traditionally placed on several aspects and events of Vives's final years.

In the following pages I present a very summary account of the main sources and studies at our disposal for the understanding of the later years of the Valencian humanist and a review of his writings of that period, linking them, as far as possible, to the events of his life that accompanied his resurgence.

### *Sources and Studies*

The main source for Vives's biography remains to a great extent the writer's own work. The external documents that mention him are so scarce and unsystematic that they do not allow us of themselves to provide a consistent picture of his life. Scholars have, therefore, had to resort to the copious autobiographical references scattered in his writings, most notably in his prefaces.

A preliminary biographical outline, which was widely disseminated throughout Europe, can already be found in Nicolás Antonio's *Bibliotheca Hispana* (Rome, 1672).<sup>91</sup> Like a good author of a dictionary, Antonio did not devote much space—and had no reason to do so—to an in-depth study of the Valencian humanist, one among the thousands of writers documented in the *Bibliotheca Hispana*. He limited himself to gathering information from various sources in order to provide a general framework, which was undoubtedly successful. By contrast, Gregorio Mayans y Siscar's *Vita Vivis* (Valencia, 1782)<sup>92</sup> presented a coherent and well-informed scheme. As editor of Vives's *Opera omnia*, Mayans had

---

<sup>90</sup> See *Edicions*. Scholars who in the study of Vives base their research on the collected works (*Opera omnia*, Basel, 1555, and *Opera omnia*, Valencia, 1782–1789) use the date given in the dedicatory letter, but are unaware of the date and place of publication of the first edition. This has led to notable inaccuracies and disagreements among biographers of Vives.

<sup>91</sup> *Edicions*, no. 82.

<sup>92</sup> The text bears its own pagination and precedes the *Opera omnia*; *Edicions*, no. 48.

first-hand and thorough knowledge of the writings of his countryman. Moreover, owing to his exceptional learning, he accumulated such a mass of biographical and bibliographical notes and critical references that no one even tried to equal him for more than a century. Written in Latin, the *Vita* could be read in and outside of Spain. Nevertheless, despite the richness and variety of his information, the author followed the scholarly conventions of the time, mixing valuable and precise information with long digressions, which the modern reader would find tedious. Nonetheless, Mayans's 220-page *Vita* remains canonical, particularly as regards Vives's later years.

It was necessary to wait for more than a century for a study capable of superseding Mayans, which it confirmed in many respects. I allude to Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín's *Luis Vives y la filosofía del Renacimiento*, published in Madrid in 1903. This book enriched its predecessor and model thanks to new documents as evidence. For one thing, Bonilla knew how to take advantage of the correspondence between Vives and Erasmus (a matter which Mayans could not broach because of censorship), as well as a collection of previously unpublished letters written by a group of Spanish humanists, which Bonilla himself published in 1901.<sup>93</sup> He also drew on studies by two nineteenth-century Belgian scholars, Namèche and van den Bussche, who had collected information on Vives's sojourn in the Low Countries.<sup>94</sup> Bonilla set out to place Vives in the general context of his own time and created a historical, literary and philosophical fresco around him. The superabundance of material, based on an extremely rich critical documentation, makes Bonilla's book both dated and irreplaceable. With each step he offers suggestive information and new leads. But in what concerned Vives's life it followed Mayans's chronology too closely. It is, therefore, not surprising that, for the best part of the twentieth century, Bonilla's monograph should have remained an indispensable reference book. As a matter of fact, the only biography available in English for a good number of

<sup>93</sup> "Clarorum Hispaniensium epistolae ineditae," *Revue Hispanique* 8 (1901), 181–308.

<sup>94</sup> Alexandre-Joseph Namèche, *Mémoire sur la vie et les écrits de Jean-Louis Vivès. Mémoires couronnés par l'Académie Royale des sciences et belles lettres de Bruxelles* (Brussels, 1841); Émile van den Bussche, *Jean-Luis Vivès. Éclaircissements et rectifications biographiques. Notes sur son séjour à Bruges. Ses œuvres* (Bruges, 1871); idem, «Luis Vivès, célèbre philosophe du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle (Notes biographiques),» *La Flandre* 8 (1876), 291–328.

years, that of Foster Watson,<sup>95</sup> owes almost all its information to Bonilla, for whom he expresses his admiration and recognition.

The next great step forward is owed to Henry de Vocht, whose studies and documents, published between 1928 and 1934,<sup>96</sup> contributed substantially to our understanding of Vives's life, especially his later years. De Vocht unearthed, edited and annotated some forty private letters from Vives to his close friend, the juriconsult, Frans van Cranevelt, all of them written between 1521 and 1528. Since they were not intended for publication, these letters give us an insight into Vives which cannot be found in his printed works. De Vocht also wrote a series of studies on Vives which are a model of erudition and rigorous scholarship. Of singular interest is an essay documenting his years in England, which is still of much use to scholars.<sup>97</sup>

Almost half a century later Miguel de la Pinta Llorente and José María de Palacio published the proceedings of the inquisitorial trials against Vives's "Jewish" family.<sup>98</sup> This document sufficed to demolish most works on Vives undertaken in Spain between the 1920s and 1960s, which were based on the purely patriotic exaltation of Vives's presumed "*hispanidad*", of which the Valencian humanist was supposedly the best exponent. At the same time it allowed for a new reading of many passages of his printed works, in particular, his letters to Cranevelt.

Carlos G. Noreña's memorable *Juan Luis Vives*, first published in English in 1970, merits an attentive analysis. To begin with, Noreña made use of all the studies and sources mentioned thus far, as well as Allen's critical edition of Erasmus's correspondence, whose notes to the letters exchanged between the two scholars are highly illuminating. Noreña's monograph demonstrated that he was very familiar with what was written about the subject of his biography. He was also *au courant* of studies on Renaissance humanism promoted by Paul Oskar Kristeller in the United States. Moreover, Noreña was the first to offer sharp criticism of the excessively ideological interpretation of Vives's

<sup>95</sup> *Luis Vives. El gran valenciano* (Oxford, 1922).

<sup>96</sup> Henry de Vocht, *Litterae virorum eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium 1522–1528* (Louvain, 1928); (*Humanistica Lovaniensia* 1). *Monumenta Humanistica Lovaniensia* (Louvain, 1934) (*Humanistica Lovaniensia* 4).

<sup>97</sup> "Vives and his Visits to England," in *Monumenta Humanistica Lovaniensia*, pp. 1–60.

<sup>98</sup> *Procesos inquisitoriales contra la familia judía de Juan Luis Vives. I. Proceso contra Blanquina March, madre del humanista*, eds. Miguel de la Pinta Llorente y José María de Palacio y de Palacio (Madrid, 1964).

thought perpetrated by scholars in Franco Spain. Of still greater interest, he presented Vives in a novel way, as a personage deeply immersed in the conflicts of his time, who endured the chilling drama of his family, a person filled with doubts and opinions bordering on heterodoxy, who cultivated dangerous friendships and possessed great independence of mind. All of this made Noreña's depiction of Vives a far cry from the paragon of judiciousness, equilibrium, and "healthy" religiosity commonly ascribed to him by conservative Spanish critics. In view of these qualities, shortly after its publication, Noreña's work replaced Bonilla's and Foster Watson's dated monographs.

Despite such undeniable merits it is worth making some observations, especially as regards his treatment of Vives's later years. Given that he accomplished a study of such importance relying on Mayans's *Opera omnia* without consulting the *editiones principes* of Vives's works (there were no critical editions available at the time), Noreña falls into some inaccuracies derived from his sources. He assumes, for example, that Vives already quoted Erasmus in Paris in 1514 (p. 125), but this reference is a mistake for 1519, which he took from Mayans. Noreña often feels compelled to undervalue the figure of Erasmus in order to extol that of Vives, which leads to a very tendentious reading of the correspondence between the two humanists. If Vives praises Erasmus, his attitude is dismissed by Noreña as "uncritical" (p. 128), but if Erasmus criticizes Vives, he magnifies the reproach (see pp. 134ff.). At the same time, Noreña tends to give a rather literal reading of Vives's correspondence and takes at face value many contemporary rhetorical conventions employed by Vives, such as the false modesty topos.

To my mind, however, Noreña's most grave shortcoming is that in his reading of the inquisitorial prosecutions and the letters to Cranevelt he was too influenced by the perspectives of Américo Castro, a circumstance which led him to draw an *a priori* bitter picture of the *Judeo-español* Vives.<sup>99</sup> For Noreña, as for his intellectual mentor, Vives's thought is representative of "an integral part of the Spanish Jewish tradition" (p. 8). Consequently, Vives is depicted as a clear example of a "somber

<sup>99</sup> Although Noreña was able to read Castro in Spanish, at least part of his work was also available in English from the 1950s. Noreña lists him in the acknowledgments (p. xiii) and refers to *The Structure of Spanish History* (Princeton, 1954), a text which was widely disseminated among North-American Hispanists. For his part, in *A Vives Bibliography* (Lewiston, 1990) Noreña acknowledged that the book he had published twenty years earlier had been "much influenced by Américo Castro", who was a friend of his, and by the impression made on him by Pinta Llorente's *Procesos inquisitoriales* (p. xvii).

tradition", common to thinkers so distant in time and so heterogeneous as the medieval rabbi Sem Tob, Fernando de Rojas, author of the late fifteenth-century *La Celestina*, as well as the *alumbrados*, a diversified group of sixteenth-century Spanish heterodox figures, known by this common name. In all of them the author perceives a vision of life tinged with "bitter scepticism" (p. 22 and chap. 4).

Unfortunately Noreña neglects a fundamental and obvious issue. It is not the same thing to be a Christian as it is to be a Jew, even in those cases in which the person who has been baptized is racially a descendant of Jews. Both Vives and his parents and grandparents were Christian. His great-grandparents had converted at the beginning of the fifteenth century, thus ceasing to be Jews and becoming *conversos* or *marranos*, a decision which had important religious, juridical and social consequences. Rather than analysing what his situation as a marginal and marginalised Christian implied for Vives's life and thought, Noreña limits himself to describing Vives and his family as Jews, without ever explaining in what sense he employs the term. If Noreña is certain that all, or at least some of them practiced crypto-judaism, he should have analysed and proved such a grave assertion rather than taking it for granted and maintaining an unjustified ambiguity on this question throughout his essay. Without any arguments or proofs he includes the humanist solely by reason of his ethnic roots in an alleged Judaeo-Hispanic tradition, whose defining traits were supposedly scepticism, bitterness and pessimism. By attributing characteristics to Vives merely because of his family background, Noreña assigns more relevance to the racial origin than to the process of the intellectual formation of the thinker, or to his biographical avatars. The supposed scepticism, bitterness and pessimism of the Jew, Vives, highlighted throughout the book at the slightest opportunity,<sup>100</sup> would therefore not be qualities derived from the humanist's life and thought, but rather the consequence of an a priori racial determinism. This was, at least, the conclusion drawn by some readers of Noreña, such as Emilio Hidalgo-Serna, for whom "Vives's Jewish origin determined his life and work."<sup>101</sup> Based on these premises, Vives the *Jew* becomes a sort of misanthropic humanist.

<sup>100</sup> See, for example, pp. 21, 22, 62, 64, 71, 91, 94, 104, 116...

<sup>101</sup> "Estudio introductorio. La elocución y *El arte retórica* de Vives," in Juan Luis Vives, *El arte retórica. De ratione dicendi* (Barcelona, 1998).

Despite its numerous gaps, Vives's biography is the result of a long process which dates back to Nicolás Antonio—or better still, to Mayans—and reaches down to our own time. Whereas Vives's formative years had to be fully revised, details of his later life have been enriched by successive biographers, but never fully questioned, once they were defined with sufficient consistency by Mayans. Nevertheless, it is essential to cast a sceptical eye on the supposed Judaeo-Hispanic tradition to which Vives's work, thought and even his life were alleged to belong. More often than not, these are points of view which lead to colorful, but shaky conclusions.

### *The Maturity of the Writer*

At the end of 1520 everything seemed promising for the barely twenty-eight year-old Juan Luis Vives. His latest publications, the *Opuscula varia* (Louvain, 1519), the *Declamationes Syllanae* and the *Somnium et vigilia* based on Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* (both published in Antwerp in 1520)<sup>102</sup> had been highly praised by Erasmus and Thomas More, as attested in subsequent editions of Erasmus's correspondence. The no less famous Guillaume Budé also included Vives among his correspondents.<sup>103</sup> Vives's future also seemed secure since the time he had become a protégé of the young Cardinal Guillaume De Croy, archbishop of Toledo, who was also a nephew of the Lord of Chièvres, the most influential courtier at the court of Charles V. Although Ferdinand himself, Charles's brother and future emperor, sought to attract Vives to his own court as preceptor, the cardinal succeeded in retaining him. That same year, Erasmus, at the pinnacle of his fame, invited Vives to take part in the project of a critical edition of Augustine. Vives would be responsible for the edition and annotation of the *De civitate Dei*, a work rich in classical and mythological references, beyond all other of Augustine's writings.<sup>104</sup> On his return from Spain, the newly crowned emperor Charles held court once again in Brussels, where Vives would have had access to highly influential people.

<sup>102</sup> *Edicions*, nos. 7, 14 and 11–12.

<sup>103</sup> See the last chapter in this volume, and *Edicions*, nos. 60 and 61.

<sup>104</sup> The best informed account of the last two decades of Vives's life is still Noreña, with the above-mentioned caveats. On the *affaire* of Vives's edition, see Allen's introduction to ep. 1309.

Amidst such felicitous omens, and most unexpectedly, Cardinal Croy died in January 1521 as a result of a hunting accident, and Vives was left at sea. To make matters worse, a year later Vives's father was imprisoned by the Inquisition in Valencia. He was only released in 1524 to be hanged and burned at the stake. A process then ensued against the memory of Vives's mother, whose remains were unearthed and burned in front of the cathedral in 1528. Meanwhile Luther's protest, which began in 1517, spread dissension and turmoil across Europe, leading Christendom into a sort of civil war in addition to the wars among princes and the Turkish threat. Writers exposed themselves to great risk simply by daring to express their views. Not even silence was a guarantee of safety. Vives reported to Erasmus: "These are difficult times. We can neither keep silent nor speak up without risk to ourselves."<sup>105</sup>

Vives was not even mentioned in Cardinal de Croy's will, written *in articulo mortis*. He had to resign himself for the time being to a life as preceptor of young boys in Louvain. There he joined the household of Robert de Croy (1506–1556), brother of the deceased Cardinal and bishop of Cambrai,<sup>106</sup> who was a student at the time. But the new patron had little to offer Vives. He lacked the prestige of a cardinal's hat and, possibly because of his age, did not have his brother's connections at court. Worse still, the death of Robert's uncle, the all-powerful Lord of Chièvres, in 1521, left the young prelate without his chief protector. Moreover, the early 1520s witnessed a tense divide within the University of Louvain, above all within the influential faculty of theology, between supporters and enemies of Erasmus.<sup>107</sup> Will it or not, in the background to the debate, of course, was Luther. By supporting Erasmus, Vives laid himself open to constant criticism and attacks.

Vives did not resign himself to the tedious life of a schoolteacher,<sup>108</sup> and as soon as he was able, he sought a position at the English court.

---

<sup>105</sup> Allen, ep. 2932, 10 May, 1534: "Tempora habemus difficilia, in quibus nec loqui nec tacere possumus absque periculo."

<sup>106</sup> *Contemporaries of Erasmus*, eds. Peter G. Bietenholz and Thomas B. Deutscher (Toronto, 1986–1987) 3 volumes, *sub voce*.

<sup>107</sup> These difficult years are best illustrated by Erasmus's letters from the period 1519 to 1523, with Allen's annotations, as well as the above-mentioned texts by Henry de Vocht.

<sup>108</sup> It is worth recalling Vives's words to Erasmus in a letter written at the time: "*Me tenet tantum scholarum taedium, ut quidvis facturus sim citius quam ad has redire sordes et inter pueros versari.*" (I am so bored with the tedium of the classroom that I would do anything sooner than return to that lowly condition and spend my life among boys) Louvain, 15 August 1522, Allen, ep. 1306.

As early as 1520 he enjoyed the friendship of Thomas More, whose political career was on the rise. Bishop Bernardo Mesa, an old acquaintance of Vives, was Spanish ambassador in London.<sup>109</sup> By 1521 Vives was already benefitting from a small pension from Queen Catherine of Aragon, Charles V's aunt. As soon as his edition and commentary of Augustine's *De civitate Dei* was completed in July 1522, he dedicated it to Henry VIII. More than a theological treatise, Augustine's work was seen as an encyclopedia of the gods and institutions of ancient Rome. Many passages in the *De civitate Dei* demanded annotation in order to be understood. Augustine's text had been commented on, albeit in a limited manner, by medieval scholars, whom Vives severely criticizes. By collating several manuscripts, Vives corrected the text of the *De civitate Dei* and added copious annotations in accordance with the methods of humanistic philology.

In April of 1523 he presented a manuscript copy of the *De institutione feminae Christianae* to Queen Catherine, although it did not appear until the following year.<sup>110</sup> In 1523, date of Vives's first certain visit to England, the alliance between Charles V and Henry VIII was at its firmest. Initially, Vives held a professorship at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, but he soon succeeded in relinquishing these thankless duties and established himself at the royal court, even though he continued to spend long periods in Bruges. As he himself acknowledged, he sought to enjoy the company of the royal domestic staff (*famulicio regio*).<sup>111</sup> During the first three years, Vives's prospects in England seemed favorable. Yet, as early as 1526, he began to feel ill at ease because of England's new policy towards France and he glimpsed the first signs of the divorce between Henry and Catherine. After five sojourns in England, he finally left the island in 1528, after weeks of house arrest. Later that year he joined the team of legal advisers sent to Catherine by the Governess of the Low Countries, Margaret of Austria, but it was a very brief stay which in the end proved to be his last.

The years spent between Bruges and England, which allowed him to absent himself definitively from the universities, were a period in which Vives showed great interest in the educational, social and political problems of his time. Among these interests were the role of the

---

<sup>109</sup> Vives dedicated his *Iesu Christi triumphus* to Bishop Mesa, both in the Paris edition of 1514 and the Louvain edition of 1519, *Edicions*, nos. 3 and 7.

<sup>110</sup> *Edicions*, no. 21.

<sup>111</sup> Quoted by de Vocht in "Vives and his visits", p. 8, note.



family in the education of their sons and daughters, the best method of study for boys and girls, and the role the woman should play within the family structure, despite her subjection to the husband. Vives's *De institutione feminae Christianae* (1524), supplemented by the *De officio mariti* (1529),<sup>112</sup> are the writings in which he reflected most on the instruction of the laity and their place in society. The *Introductio ad sapientiam* (1524)<sup>113</sup> and its companion, the *Satellitium animae*, were schooltexts aimed at the moral training of young children. The first edition of the *Introductio*, and many consecutive ones, also included two letters on the teaching of grammar to boys and girls: moral and literary training had to go hand in hand.

He was also obsessed by poverty, war, the urgent need to resolve differences between Catholics and Protestants by means of a council, and the Turkish threat to Europe. In his *De subventionem pauperum* (1526)<sup>114</sup> he made the proposal that cities should eradicate begging and, instead, provide education and work for the poor. A distinctive feature of all the works published by Vives during those years is his call for peace among Christian princes and Christians in general, since he regarded concord as the only basis for truly humane co-existence. His view of a utopian society ruled through the harmony of its citizens was expounded in the voluminous *De concordia et discordia in humano genere* (1529).<sup>115</sup> Important issues and arguments related to European politics were in turn discussed in *De Europae dissidiis et republica* (1526).<sup>116</sup> Rather than opting for one particular kingdom, he was concerned with Christendom as a whole, to which he gave the name Europe.

In practice, unfortunately for Vives and other pacifists, the reality was totally different. War across Europe was widespread, the advance of the Turk as well as the religious divide among Christians was growing, and cities were overwhelmed by refugees fleeing hunger and war and involving themselves in petty crime. Shortly after peace was agreed upon among the great powers in 1529, they took up arms against each other again everywhere. In Münster the Anabaptists, the most radical group within Protestantism, proclaimed community of possessions as a principle, which gave rise to turmoil and ferocious repression. Among

---

<sup>112</sup> *Edicions*, no. 30.

<sup>113</sup> *Edicions*, no. 23.

<sup>114</sup> *Edicions*, nos. 27 and 28.

<sup>115</sup> *Edicions*, no. 32.

<sup>116</sup> *Edicions*, no. 29.

many thinkers optimism and hopes of a new Golden Age were replaced by disappointment and bitterness. This sombre climate permeates Vives's *De communione rerum* (1535).<sup>117</sup>

After leaving England for good, Vives settled in Bruges where, in 1524, he married Margarita Valldaura, a *conversa* and most probably a relative of his. These are the least known years in Vives's life, in which he witnessed the persecution of his Erasmian friends in Spain, the deposition and death of Queen Catherine, and the execution of Thomas More and Bishop John Fisher. He also learned of the death of his admired friend, Erasmus, in 1536. Finally, his own health, which had never been good, took a turn for the worse: he suffered from gout and kidney problems.

By contrast, it was during these years that his writings enjoyed their widest dissemination in Europe by way of numerous reprints in dozens of cities.<sup>118</sup> More importantly, in the last twelve years of his life, after his move to Bruges, the Valencian humanist wrote the treatises which contributed most to his renown as a man of wisdom for at least a century. First and foremost, in 1531 he published the *De disciplinis*, an encyclopedic work in which he criticized the teaching methods then in vogue in university faculties, and made new proposals for the advancement of learning. Only theology, for reasons of prudence, escaped his systematic scrutiny. It has been claimed that in this work Vives presented a general synopsis of Western culture up to his time. One of the specific aims of the treatise was to provide readers with a systematic guide to the most important books in every science and academic discipline. We know that his advice was followed by many readers, but objections to the criteria employed by Vives were not lacking.

As a supplement to the *De disciplinis*, Vives also published the *De ratione dicendi* (1533),<sup>119</sup> a wide-ranging reflection on the meaning and nature of language and the best way to employ it in order to persuade an audience. To the same field of research belongs his *De anima et vita* (1538),<sup>120</sup> a study of human thought and passions, not from an ontological point of view, but based on the observation of the operations of the mind. From the same period is also the *De conscribendis epistolis* (1534), which enjoyed a broad circulation in the German-speaking world from the

---

<sup>117</sup> *Edicions*, no. 33.

<sup>118</sup> See the last chapter in this volume.

<sup>119</sup> *Edicions*, no. 35.

<sup>120</sup> *Edicions*, no. 36.

mid-sixteenth century, and also achieved a high reputation in Italy at the end of the century.<sup>121</sup>

In the years when the social, political and religious situation in Europe was at its most desperate juncture, and as his friends were gradually departing from the scene, Vives also devoted his time to religious writings. Adversity may have increased a piety inherent in most of his work. In this respect Vives joined forces with the so-called Northern humanism, a movement influenced by the *devotio moderna* and, above all, by Erasmus's work. From the outset, Vives, who had made Erasmus's acquaintance in Brussels at the end of 1516,<sup>122</sup> showed a deep admiration for Erasmus and referred to him as his master as well as friend. Initially, Erasmus nurtured a lively dislike for his young admirer, who belonged to the *converso* caste. Subsequently, however, he accorded him enthusiastic praise, and in 1520 he commissioned Vives—the only time he did so—to produce an annotated edition of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, as mentioned above.

Vives's thought is heavily indebted to Erasmus, best encapsulated in the formula *pietas erudita*, the intimate union of intense study and profound religious feeling. It was not a rigid and closed doctrinaire body of religious truth. Whereas Erasmus, first and foremost, was a theologian who devoted himself passionately to philological studies and editorial work, Vives, as was often acknowledged by Erasmus,<sup>123</sup> was more inclined towards philosophy, but this did not imply any contradiction. Both shared love of the classics, pacifism, the call to a simple and inner form of spirituality, and entertained little sympathy for the blind faith of the multitude and the formalism of ecclesiastical rules. Both of them wrote on Christian marriage and political issues; both wrote school texts on letter-writing and methods of prayer. Despite differences in personality, style, intellectual interests and personal frictions, which should not be confused with ideological conflicts, Vives's profound Erasmism never faltered. It was therefore no coincidence that, from the very beginning of his career, Vives was associated by his readers with Erasmus.

<sup>121</sup> *Edicions*, no. 37.

<sup>122</sup> As recalled by Erasmus in his *Apologia* against Edward Lee, Antwerp, Hillen, 1520. See above "From Homeland to Court," n. 34.

<sup>123</sup> Among other places, in the prefatory letter to the *Somnium Scipionis*. A facsimile edition of the letter is included in *Edicions*, no. 13, p. 126.

Except in his early writings, well aware that he was under observation by the Inquisition, Vives was very cautious in openly expressing his religious ideas or discussing controversial issues. Moreover, he showed great independence of judgment without this becoming an obstacle to forming friendships. He was a friend of Protestants such as Simon Grynaeus and his Basel-based printer Johannes Oporinus. By the same token, the series of theological texts and treatises on piety written by Vives towards the end of his life are an excellent way to explore the affinities and differences between master and disciple, although much work remains to be done on this subject.

The year 1529 witnessed the publication of an occasional piece by Vives, the *Sacrum diurnum de sudore Jesu Christi*.<sup>124</sup> It was a liturgical office of rogations against the plague followed by a sermon, written at the request of the ecclesiastical authorities in Bruges, even though Vives was a married layman. In his sermon Vives compared the plague which at the time lashed England and the Low Countries with the sweat endured by Christ on the Mount of Olives and with the manner in which the rich appropriated the sweat of the poor. But undoubtedly Vives felt much more at ease with writings which emphasized personal interior prayer. To this body of texts belongs a handbook of private prayers devised by Vives for the common man under the title of *Ad animi excitationem in Deum* (1535).<sup>125</sup> Although it was a rather thick volume, it was small enough to be carried around in one's pocket. Rather than restricting the practice of praying to the four walls of a church, Vives's treatise sought to sanctify all the actions undertaken throughout the day. Vives's little book won high repute both in Catholic and Reformist circles.

After pursuing all fields of worldly knowledge, Vives devoted his last days to the study of the relation between God and man. Out of this came his *De veritate fidei Christianae*.<sup>126</sup> Published by Oporinus in Basel in 1543 at the request of his widow and Vives's great friend, the jurist, Frans van Cranevelt, this posthumous text sought to increase concord between Catholics and Protestants.

Vives's withdrawal into the private sphere did not signify radical isolation. Whenever the Imperial Court stopped in the Low Countries, Vives always made a point of visiting it, hoping to meet old acquaintances or

---

<sup>124</sup> *Edicions*, no. 45.

<sup>125</sup> *Edicions*, no. 44.

<sup>126</sup> *Edicions*, no. 46.

to seek favor. A letter of July 1522 to Erasmus illustrates Vives's ability to move within powerful circles.<sup>127</sup> From Basel, Erasmus's sent his loyal messenger Hilaire Berthof to dispatch a group of letters addressed to several courtiers at Bruges. Two letters had, however, to be delivered to their addressees personally by Vives. One was destined for the imperial chancellor, Mercurino Gattinara, who, on seeing Vives, was glad to see that he brought a letter from Erasmus and opened it immediately. The second letter was addressed to Cardinal Girolamo Aleandro, the formidable papal legate, with whom Erasmus had had some differences. Vives reported both men's reactions on receiving the letters, suggested what Erasmus might reply, and also reported rumors he had heard. It is plain that Vives was well known within court circles and possessed sufficient *savoir faire* to be given such delicate missions by Erasmus, who preferred not to leave everything in Berthof's hands. Vives felt clearly at ease in these waters. Rather than continuing to state, as most biographers do, that Vives was a good-natured individual and even somewhat ingenuous, it is time to examine attentively Vives's political leanings as well as his long-time activities as courtier and adviser in the Low Countries and England.<sup>128</sup> In short, it is essential to understand the ideas conveyed by Vives in his political treatises as well as his political involvement.

It was precisely during Charles V's stay in Bruges in 1530 that Vives was granted a pension worth 60,000 *maravedís*. It was perhaps a modest amount but it was paid without interruption until Vives's death in 1540.<sup>129</sup> Vives had dedicated his *De concordia et discordia* of 1529 to the Emperor. The granting of the pension led the Spaniard to address to him a series of letters, now lost or still unlocated, in which he advised the Emperor on various questions in his role as counsellor. A letter of 25 May 1539 was removed from a folder in the Simancas Archive. In this lost letter, after conveying his condolences on the death of the Empress and sending Charles a copy of his recently published dialogues, Vives seems to have made some suggestions concerning the education

<sup>127</sup> Ep. 1281, dated 20 May 1522.

<sup>128</sup> Noreña likes to call Vives "humble", 107, "suffering", 113, "temperate", 128, "tender-hearted", 103, while denying him any sense of humor, 120.

<sup>129</sup> Although a letter from Vives to Juan de Vergara informs us of the pension received by Vives (see Noreña, p. 110), full details of the amount and the manner in which it was paid were not well known until recently. I am grateful to Valentín Moreno Gallego for sharing pertinent information from the archive of Simancas which confirm these disbursements. See his *La recepción hispana de Juan Luis Vives* (Valencia, 2006), in particular chapter IV, p. 151.

of young Prince Philip, to whom the *Dialogues* had been dedicated. The Emperor's response is preserved, but it was only published in 1998. In his reply Charles V excused Vives "for not having written him for some time" and acknowledged his "letters, good learning and interest in matters related to the education of Prince Philip".<sup>130</sup> Rather than simply being the beneficiary of the Emperor's generosity, Vives obviously felt compelled to return Charles's favor with advisory letters. We already know of various letters sent to Henry VIII, and now, thanks to these recent studies, we see that he did the same with the Emperor.<sup>131</sup>

There is an article by Jan Karel Steppe, published in 1969 but unnoticed by Vives's biographers, which is fundamental for understanding the relations between Vives and Mencía de Mendoza (1508–1554) and also sheds light on Vives's final years. Towards the middle of 1537 Vives lived in the Brabantine castle of Breda, in the Low Countries. There he enjoyed the protection of the Valencian aristocrat, Doña Mencía de Mendoza, Marchioness of Cenete and wife of Henri III, Count of Nassau, who had married twice before. Holder of one of the richest states in the Crown of Aragon, as a very young woman Mencía was ordered to marry Count Henri, by that time an old man, but still an influential advisor to the emperor. Without any children to look after, Mencía withdrew to Breda, where she divided her time between study, collecting paintings and caring for her elderly and gouty husband.<sup>132</sup> A devotee of letters and enthusiastic admirer of Erasmus, she granted Vives a pension as early as 1535. Determined to appoint him as her own Latin preceptor, Mencía offered him to come to live at the castle. The Spanish humanist was forced to act, once again, as a private tutor, though now under the most favorable conditions, which allowed him to devote most of his time to study. While in Breda Vives wrote a

---

<sup>130</sup> Charles's reply, on 26 June 1539, was first published by José Luis Gonzalo Sánchez Melero, "Felipe II y la bibliofilia del Renacimiento en España," in *Pliegos de bibliofilia* 1 (1998), 15–28; facsimile on p. 17. I am again grateful to Valentín Moreno for drawing my attention to the text and procuring for me a facsimile copy of the manuscript.

<sup>131</sup> "Vives and his Visits", p. 23ff.

<sup>132</sup> On Vives's stay in Breda see Jan Karel Steppe, "Les relations de Mencía de Mendoza avec Jean-Louis Vivès," in *Scrinium Erasmianum* 2 (1969), pp. 485–506, based on unknown and highly interesting material. A study not consulted by Noreña is Simon A. Vosters, "De geestelijke achtergronden van Mencía de Mendoza Vrouwe van Breda," in *Jaarboek van de Geschied- en Oudheidkundige Kring van Stad en Land van Breda, De Oranjeboom* (1961), 76–78; idem, *Mencía de Mendoza. Vrouwe van Breda en Onderkoningin van Valencia* (Delft, 1987).

commentary on Virgil's *Georgics* (1539) at Mencía's initiative.<sup>133</sup> Moreover, the twenty-five dialogues entitled *Linguae latinae exercitatio*<sup>134</sup> were partly written as a supplement to his Latin lessons. From the outset Vives's booklet enjoyed a wide circulation, which continued for over three centuries. At least 600 editions of the text have been recorded, without including those which have left no trace.<sup>135</sup>

Unfortunately for the preceptor, Count Nassau died in 1538. While the Marchioness was entangled in thorny legal discussions with the sons of her deceased husband to determine the distribution of the estate, Vives was paid a visit by the Toledo-born humanist Francisco Cervantes de Salazar, who would later reprint Vives's *Dialogues* with commentary in Mexico in 1554 together with several documents such as the *Compendiosa Ludouici Vuis vita*. The latter includes the only written physical description of Vives that survives. He is described as being of average height, more tall than short, of cheerful countenance and possessed of an innate *gravitas*.<sup>136</sup> To Cervantes de Salazar Vives did not appear somber and embittered. Once the disagreements were resolved, Doña Mencía decided to return to Spain, where she married the Duke of Calabria, Viceroy of Valencia. Vives returned to Bruges for the last time, where he died some months later of gout and kidney problems on 6 May 1540.

It has become a commonplace to say that Vives's later years were marked by bitterness and financial difficulties. Without denying his endless financial troubles, perhaps this image needs to be revised. As an example, Vives was granted pensions by the King and Queen of England, respectively, from 1521 to 1528. In addition to that the pension awarded to him by Charles V was paid from 1531 until his death in 1540. From 1535 on Vives was further supported by the Marchioness

<sup>133</sup> Signed in Breda, 1537, but printed in Basel in 1539, *Edicions*, no. 43.

<sup>134</sup> Dated Breda, 1538, which has led to confusion, since they were published in Basel in 1539. *Edicions*, no. 38.

<sup>135</sup> Enrique González González y Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Los diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1539–1994)* (Valencia, 1999).

<sup>136</sup> As is well known, all the portraits known to us are posthumous and derive from Philippe Galle's engraving. Vives was described as: *statura mediocri et quae ad proceram magis quam ad breuem accederet. Vultu hilari cum innata quadam gravitate*, f. a<sup>3</sup>. On this edition, see *Fortuna*, no. 372. The letter was published by Joaquín García Icazbalceta in *México en 1554. Tres diálogos latinos que Francisco Cervantes de Salazar escribió en México en dicho año* (Mexico City, 1874), frequently reprinted. On Cervantes de Salazar's journey to Breda, I have written an essay soon to be published, "En pos del oficio. El humanista Francisco Cervantes de Salazar (ca. 1518–1575)."

of Cenete, who continued to support Vives's widow after his death. As regards occasional patrons, Vives's decision to dedicate the *De disciplinis* to the King of Portugal in 1531 was duly rewarded, something which gave rise to rumors within humanistic circles. Other dedicatees of Vives's work included the Duke of Gandía, known for his opulence, and of whom Vives often spoke with esteem. The wealthy Duke of Béjar, to whom *De anima et vita* was dedicated and the recipient of several letters, would also have probably favored Vives.<sup>137</sup> Moreover, it is well known that Oporinus, Vives's last printer, was most generous towards writers and workers under his protection, and it was he or his collaborator, Simon Grynaeus, who commissioned (and must have paid for) the preface to the Latin edition of Aristotle's complete works in 1538, with the title *De Aristotelis operibus censura*.<sup>138</sup> Vives could also rely on patrons in the influential world of royal secretaries, and doubtless enjoyed financial assistance from less conspicuous supporters. Furthermore, Vives and his closest relatives were engaged in mercantile activities, although it is not yet known to what extent and with what success.

On the other hand, it is worth remembering that countless humanists, such as the Aragonese Lorenzo Palmireno (1524–1579) or the Venetian Orazio Toscanella (who was active in the second half of the sixteenth century), both readers of Vives, for lack of means were forced to call upon support from patrons in order to publish their own work, and undoubtedly many of their manuscripts have been lost. Conversely, Vives, at a time when writers had to pay for the publication of their own texts, was able to publish all his writings, more often than not with the most prestigious printers. As attested by his own correspondence, Vives usually lamented the poor quality or the parsimony of some of his printers, but never complained about lack of funds to publish his works.

As regards the alleged bitterness of Vives's final years, it is worth making a few considerations, while awaiting a more thorough study. The fact is that precisely this period, usually accounted as the most pessimistic of his life, his final retirement in Bruges and Breda, was at the same time his most prolific. None of the writings from this period reveal any sense of bitterness. Although *De concordia et discordia* (1529)

---

<sup>137</sup> See Augustin Redondo, "La bibliothèque de Don Francisco de Zúñiga Guzmán y Sotomayor, troisième Duc de Béjar (1500?–1544)," *Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos* 3 (1967), 147–96.

<sup>138</sup> *Edicions*, no. 42.



and *De communione rerum* (1535) convey grief for the deplorable state of mankind, they propose concord as a solution to the world's evils. As he confessed to his old friend Budé in a letter in which he alludes to the *De communione rerum*, he decided to write this text in view of the miserable conditions of his own time. Unable to propose remedies for so many evils, he finds comfort and consolation in describing them.<sup>139</sup> In the *De disciplinis* there is certainly some satire, but underlying the satire is Vives's serene confidence in the progressive advancement of human knowledge. In Vives's refined analysis of the soul's passions, one discovers the serene and vivid spirit of an introspective and subtle writer who in the end finds pleasure in intellectual pursuits. Moreover, the festive and at times even mischievous tone of his dialogues reveals someone with a fine sense of humor. In them he shows himself well acquainted with a number of tasteful dishes and exquisite wines. The long years Vives spent suffering from gout leads us to suspect that his comments on food and drink were not only from hearsay.

Personal and collective adversities did not succeed in suffocating Vives the writer. He was able to elaborate an ambitious and systematic program of writings, which had already been conceived during his Parisian sojourn; he had the satisfaction of seeing them published by the most prestigious printers of his time, and he came to know of his wide acceptance among a great range of readers. The writer triumphed. Like Thomas More, Vives was an individual who believed in the legitimacy of honest pleasures, and friendship in particular. He was a connoisseur of food and drink and enjoyed painting, neither an ascetic nor a killjoy, in short, a man of the Renaissance.

---

<sup>139</sup> *Accipies [...] librum De concordia scriptum a me proxima aestate, dum me horum temporum miseret, et quantum remedium tot malis adferre nequeo propter imbecilitatem virium, chartis saltem animum meum testor, in quo uno me consolor, ac utcumque quiesco.* Mayans, *Opera omnia*, vol. 7, p. 218. Noreña quotes the passage in order, once again, to show how *tormented* Vives's mind was, rather than noting the feeling of well-being writing brought to the writer, p. 116.

## VIVES AND THE *EMARGINATI*

Charles Fantazzi

It may seem strange at first to group together a work on the education of women and one on the relief of the poor under the rubric of the *emarginati* (I prefer this Italian word to the less expressive English “marginal” or “marginalized”), but to Vives’s way of thinking there was a strong similarity between the underprivileged status of women in his time, solely because of their sex, and the condition of the poor, because of their economic status. In the latter case Vives devised a practical system for dealing with the situation, which was to be implemented by the civil authorities, while for the amelioration of women’s lot he provided, as he says in his preface to Queen Catherine of Aragon, a set of practical rules of life. As a *converso* who had left his native country never to return, Vives was obviously sensitive to the plight of those who like himself found themselves on the fringes of society.

### I. De institutione feminae Christianae

The *De institutione feminae Christianae*, while remaining fundamentally traditionalist, contains some attitudes about the status of women that are surprisingly liberal for the time. The very fact that he addresses the book to a female audience is unusual in itself, as is his strong assertion that in intellectual capacity the woman is the full equal of the man, and often even surpasses him. It is true that Thomas More had said this before him, especially in the letter to William Gonnell,<sup>1</sup> a tutor in his household, but Vives expresses it more forcefully and more unambiguously. Likewise, he insists, when women have received the proper education and training, they have the same capacity for acquiring virtue as men do. Echoing the sentiments of the Roman Stoic philosopher,

---

<sup>1</sup> *St. Thomas More: Selected Letters*, ed. Elizabeth Frances Rogers (New Haven, 1967), pp. 103–07.

Musonius Rufus,<sup>2</sup> although he nowhere mentions him directly, Vives states that things that have to do with virtue ought to be taught to male and female alike. He emphatically dispels the inveterate prejudice against the *femina docta*: “Learned women are suspect to many, as if the mental ability acquired through learning increased their natural wickedness, and as if men should not also be suspect for the same reason if subtle learning is added to a perverse mind.”<sup>3</sup> This is outspoken language for the early sixteenth century.

In his views on marriage in the second book of *De institutione* and in the *De officio mariti*, a sequel written six years later, Vives grants the woman a more emancipated role by assigning greater importance to the companionate aspect and mutual love of the marital relationship, contrary to the church’s teaching that the primary goal of marriage is the production of offspring. At the same time he exalts the authority of the husband in exaggerated terms, but this was an incontrovertible *idée reçue* of the time. Even a century later Swift would mock the generalized conservative views, which were still in fashion, of those who argued that

the great end of marriage is propagation, that consequently the principal business of a wife is to breed children... that she is to obey all the lawful commands of her husband, and visit and be visited by no persons whom he disapproves... that a humour of reading books, except those of devotion and housewifery, is apt to turn a woman’s brain.<sup>4</sup>

It was not until 14 July 1976 that in Vives’s adopted country of Belgium women could celebrate the obliteration of the last vestiges of male dominance in new marriage legislation which stipulated that the male is no longer the head of the family and that power is shared equally between the spouses.

Vives’s treatise on the relief of the poor is a landmark in the history of social welfare. By the late fifteenth century social and economic changes had reduced a great segment of the population to the state of poverty. As the urban proletariat increased in numbers more and more, there were many people living at the subsistence level, barely able and often

---

<sup>2</sup> Cora Lutz, “Musonius Rufus: the Roman Socrates,” *Yale Classical Studies* 10 (1947), 3–147.

<sup>3</sup> Juan Luis Vives, *The Education of a Christian Woman*, trans. Charles Fantazzi (Chicago, 2000), pp. 63–64. All references to the English translation will be to this edition.

<sup>4</sup> “Of the Education of Ladies,” in *Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. Herbert Davies, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1939), p. 226.

unable to provide for themselves and their families. The old system of random almsgiving was no longer sufficient to sustain these masses of the indigent. At one time this act of mercy was looked upon as an opportunity for personal sanctification, but by the 1520s Protestants in the various Reform movements contended that good works could not affect salvation. In one German city after another ordinances were issued establishing secular welfare systems. The first was the imperial city of Nuremberg, where the ordinance was promulgated on 24 July 1522. Strasbourg followed in 1523. In 1525 the city of Ypres in Flanders issued its decree and in little more than six months' time Vives had published his treatise. Some of Vives's measures correspond with these municipal ordinances but his document is a much more extensive treatment of the whole subject. A few years later the mendicant orders of Ypres challenged this new dispensation, in response to which the city legislature drew up a *Forma subventionis pauperum*<sup>5</sup> in 1531, which shows the strong influence of Vives's treatise. It was submitted to the faculty of theology of the Sorbonne for their approval. The response was positive, with certain emendations. Almost immediately after this the Emperor Charles V issued an edict for all the cities of the empire, which incorporated many of the features of the Ypres document.

The distinguishing feature of Vives's work is the ideological and spiritual discussion of the question contained in the first book, which has often been neglected in scholarly writing on the treatise. Here he exhibits his usual command of classical, juridical and scriptural sources to support his universal principles: that the earth gives of its bounty to all, that we merely return a debt we owe to the poor, that to possess superfluous goods is in reality to possess the goods of others. Besides these religious and philosophical approaches Vives may well have been influenced by Talmudic precepts concerning duties to the poor and also by a strong tradition of municipalization existing in his native city of Valencia.<sup>6</sup>

Vives's flourishing career took a sudden and unexpected turn for the worse at the death of his young pupil and patron, Guillaume de

<sup>5</sup> The text, translated into English by William Marshall in 1535, is contained in Frank Reynier Salter, *Some Early Tracts on Poor Relief* (London, 1926), pp. 32–79.

<sup>6</sup> Enrique González González, *Joan Lluís Vives. De la escolástica al humanismo* (Valencia, 1987), p. 123. Cf. also Pablo Pérez García, "Municipalización hospitalaria y reforma de la beneficencia en *De subventionis pauperum*: una nota valenciana al programa vivesiano sobre la organización de la asistencia pública" *Saitabi* Volume extra (1996), 115–39.

Croy in 1521. He sank into deep depression and took refuge with his relatives in Bruges, where he remained for more than six weeks. He had already accepted from Erasmus the huge task of writing a commentary on Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, but obviously could not have made much progress on it during these months. With frequent urgings from Erasmus he managed to finish the work by July of 1522, but the magnitude of the task had left him physically and mentally exhausted. Yet three days after laying aside the Augustine he tells Erasmus that he has begun a new book,<sup>7</sup> which must have been the *De institutione feminae Christianae*. It was finished by 5 April 1523, Easter Sunday, as the date of the prefatory letter clearly indicates, but apparently because of difficulties encountered with the financier and bookseller, Franz Birckmann, the book would not appear until January of the following year.<sup>8</sup> On 10 May Vives informs both his close friend, Frans van Cranevelt, councilor of Mechelen, and Erasmus in two separate letters of his decision to set sail for Spain via England. In the letter to Cranevelt he gives voice to dark premonitions about his future. At any rate, it seems certain that he never did return to Spain, no doubt for fear of the Inquisition, but his trip to England turned out to be very auspicious indeed. He was given glad welcome by Cardinal Wolsey, who offered him a readership at Corpus Christi College, where he effected many important innovations in the curriculum.<sup>9</sup>

In a letter to Cranevelt on 11 November 1523 Vives expresses his great satisfaction with his reception by the king and queen. In October the English monarchs paid an unprecedented visit to him at Oxford and invited him to spend the Christmas holidays at Windsor Castle. Vives's relations with Queen Catherine were especially cordial. He was well aware of the exceptional upbringing of Catherine by her mother, Queen Isabella the Catholic, who wished her children to be educated in the new humanist learning, especially the knowledge of Latin. Through the instrumentality of her husband, King Fernando II of Aragon, she summoned to the court two brothers, Antonio and Alessandro Geraldini, to tutor her children. Alessandro wrote a peda-

<sup>7</sup> Ep. 1303, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, ed. James K. McConica (Toronto, 1974–), vol. 9, p. 162. (Hereafter to be cited as CWE and number of epistle.)

<sup>8</sup> The presentation copy for Queen Catherine is in the Bodleian Library, Bodl. Arch. B. e. 30. Cf. James Carley, *The Books of Henry VIII* (London, 2004), p. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. G.B. Duncan, "Public Lectures and Professional Chairs," in *History of the University of Oxford*, 3 (Oxford, 1986), p. 338.

gogical treatise, *De eruditione nobilium puellarum*, which unfortunately is no longer extant, but perhaps Vives knew of it. The Castilian queen was very much interested in education and was herself, of course, a most learned woman, as both Erasmus and Vives testified.

At Catherine's behest Vives wrote the *De ratione studii puerilis*, a brief manual outlining a course of study to be followed by Princess Mary. The manual is composed of two letters, one for the princess and another for Charles Mountjoy, son of William Mountjoy, the queen's chamberlain. In writing this practical outline, Vives was no doubt tacitly aware that Mary, sole heir to the throne, might someday be destined to rule. Therefore, the books he counsels for her study are much more oriented to government than those recommended for a young girl's education in *De institutione*. Besides the more customary readings in Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch he lists the political dialogues of Plato, More's *Utopia*, and Erasmus' *Education of a Christian Prince*. To these he adds the Scriptures and the church fathers and also the popular *Distichs of Cato*, the *Mimes* of Publilius, and the *Sentences of the Seven Sages* collected by Erasmus. For Princess Mary's spiritual guidance he recommends the epistles of Jerome and the early Christian poets, Prudentius, Juvenius, Paulinus of Nola, Arator, and Prosper of Aquitaine. All told, the *De ratione studii puerilis* is a fine, innovative program of studies, which Vives was able to put together in a very short time. It is purely instructional without any attention given to the instilling of moral principles, as in *De institutione*. At about the same time, Vives published a collection of mottoes and devices entitled the *Satellitium animi* to serve as a 'mystical guard' over the princess. The metaphor is significant, another manifestation of Vives's constant solicitude for the protection of the weaker sex. This pamphlet was followed by yet another instructional book, the *Introductio ad sapientiam*, which was often published with the other two works and attained immense popularity, with more than one hundred editions in Latin and other languages appearing before 1600.

After a long silence, which made Vives wonder about their scholarly friendship, Erasmus wrote him a brief letter from Basel on 29 May 1527. In frank response to Vives's having asked him for his opinion of his most recent writings, Erasmus writes:

Your writings have my enthusiastic approval, especially what you have written about marriage. But you strive after extemporaneity, which in your case, to be sure, is more successful than the most minute care exercised by most writers. If, however, you would be willing to restrain your enthusiasm and adapt yourself more to the opinion of the reader,

for whom the play is being performed, then certain elements would be a little more flexible.<sup>10</sup>

Erasmus then goes on to talk more specifically and more bluntly about Vives's views on marriage. He accuses him of being too hard on women, adding somewhat maliciously that he hopes he is more gentle with his own wife. Vives's graphic description of the malady of his father-in-law and the saintly devotion of his mother-in-law, Clara Cervent, in caring for him also elicits Erasmus' criticism, and he concludes with the accusation that Vives writes too much about his own family.

Vives did not take kindly to the proffered criticism. In his reply of 20 July 1527, he reverts once again to his excuse about being worn out from his work on the Augustine commentary. He makes a spirited defense of his treatment of women in the book and answers all of Erasmus' critiques, especially those concerning marriage, which is the subject of the second book. Some of these statements are tinged with the traditional deprecation concerning women, as the following:

What is more ungovernable than a woman? If you relax the reins the least bit, there will be no limit or control. In the same speech Cato will support both me and the Lex Oppia.<sup>11</sup> I did not mention those things by way of example or hyperbole, but because I think that is the way they should live; and doubtless they will if they keep two things in mind: that they are Christians and that each of them forms one person with her husband.<sup>12</sup>

Despite all these protests Vives did hearken to Erasmus' advice in the revision of the book in 1538, omitting an extended eulogy of the marital concord that existed between his mother and father.

It is quite remarkable—one might even say disingenuous—that in his letter to Vives Erasmus gives no intimation that he had in the meantime published his own treatise on marriage, the *Institutio christiani matrimonii*,

<sup>10</sup> "Tua mihi valide probantur, maxime quae de matrimonio. Sed affectas extemporalitatem, quae tibi sane felicior est quam multis exactissima cura. Si tamen eum impetum velles moderari magisque servire iudicio lectoris cui agitur fabula, quaedam essent molliora.", Allen, ep. 1830.

<sup>11</sup> A sumptuary law, especially with regard to women's dress, which was passed in 215 B.C. but repealed in 195 B.C. despite the protests of Cato. Livy 34. 1–8.

<sup>12</sup> "Quid muliere effrenius? Si paulum modo habenas remittas, ibi vero nullus erit modus aut moderatio. Sed patrocina bitur eadem oratione Cato et mihi et legi Oppiae. Neque illa sunt mihi vel exempli caussa vel rei augendae dicta, sed quod eum ad modum existimem illis vivendum; et indubie facient, si duarum rerum meminerint, Christianas esse ac eundem hominem unamquamque ipsarum et suum maritum esse." Allen, ep. 1847.

also dedicated to Queen Catherine, in August of 1526. Actually, he had begun it two years earlier, as we learn from a letter of his to Thomas Lupset dated 4 October 1525,<sup>13</sup> in which he confides that he was prevailed upon by a person of high rank [Lord Mountjoy] to write on the preservation of marriage. Erasmus comments that Vives had already done so in the “Virgin, Wife and Widow” (a rather flippant way of referring to the book, it would seem) and wonders why the queen was looking for something more. One is led to believe that she may have been dissatisfied with the treatise written by her compatriot, and wished something more forceful concerning the sacrament of marriage. At any rate, Erasmus’ work is quite a different kind of book than that of Vives, although it does incorporate many ideas found in *De institutione*. It is a highly technical discussion, notable for its impressive grasp of both Roman marriage law and Gratian’s *Decretum*, together with the voluminous commentaries of the medieval Schoolmen, especially in the discussion of the eighteen impediments to marriage. In his general attitude towards women Erasmus shows himself in agreement with the usual prejudices of his age although he does counsel mutual respect and toleration. In speaking of the care of the household he repeats many of the precepts contained in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Economics* and Xenophon’s *Oeconomica*. He is more interested in the legal aspects of marriage and the reform of the laws of marriage. On this account he roused the ire of church authorities, resulting in the proscription of the entire work in the Tridentine Council of 1564. Vives steered clear of these contentious issues, especially concerning the sacramental character of marriage.

In his courtly preface to Queen Catherine introducing his work Vives asserts categorically that his subject has not been treated by the great writers of the past despite its great importance. “What is so necessary,” he asks, “as the spiritual formation of those who are our inseparable companions in every condition of life?”<sup>14</sup> At this point, in the 1538 revision of the work,<sup>15</sup> he cites Aristotle’s *Politics* to the effect

<sup>13</sup> Ep. 1624, CWE, vol. 11, p. 308.

<sup>14</sup> Vives, *The Education of a Christian Woman*, p. 45.

<sup>15</sup> In subsequent discussions of both *De institutione* and *De officio mariti* reference will often be made to the revised editions printed in 1538 by an association of publishers in Basel, including the Hellenist, Joannes Oporinus, Balthasar Lazius, and Thomas Platter, with the financial backing of Robert Winter. In the case of *De institutione*, in particular, Vives took the opportunity to subject his writing to a thorough revision, in style and content, which amounted to a substantial rewriting of the treatise. It is very



that nations which do not provide for the education of women deprive themselves of a great source of their prosperity. And, he adds, if this can be said with good reason of nations, it can be said all the more justly of the individual household. He distinguishes his treatment from what the church fathers had to say on the subject. They preached a certain mode of life and exhorted the readers to virtue while he claims to provide a practical guide for living, with the maximum of brevity. As it turns out, however, there is a strong tone of moral persuasion in his instructions as well, and as far as brevity is concerned, Vives's rhetorical penchant gets the better of him and often leads him into lengthy elaborations. Vives explains to the queen that in contrast to men, for whose moral instruction many lengthy tomes would be required, few precepts are needed for women. A woman's sole care is chastity, and when that has been sufficiently elucidated, her education is complete. He excoriates all those who would seek to corrupt by their scurrilous writings this one good that women possess. The chief offender is Ovid, who reduced depravity to rules and precepts.

The treatise is divided into three books: on the young unmarried woman, the wife and the widow. In this Vives follows the plan of composition of his predecessor, the Franciscan friar, Francesc Eiximenis (c. 1340–1409), save that the latter concerned himself more with the life of nuns, which is by far the longest section of his *Lo llibre de les dones* (The Book on Women), written in Catalan. Vives surely knew of this book of his fellow Valencian, who reached the peak of his literary career during his years in Valencia from 1382 to 1408. His works were well known there, although the first edition of this tract did not appear until 1495 in Barcelona. It seems that Vives purposely set out to produce a modern version of the classic Valencian work, introducing what he considered to be new and more enlightened attitudes toward women. Vives makes greater use of the classical authors, reflecting his humanist training, while Eiximenis is more dependent on medieval authorities. In some cases Vives repeats passages from the Franciscan friar that he in turn had taken from a still earlier work, the *De eruditione*

---

pertinent to our interpretation of Vives's thought on the subject of women to take these changes into account as Vives's final version. These authorial changes are all recorded in the critical editions of the work: J.L. Vives, *De institutione feminae Christianae, Liber primus*, eds. Charles Fantazzi and Constant Matheeußen (Leiden, 1996); *Liber secundus & Liber tertius*, eds. Charles Fantazzi and Constant Matheeußen (Leiden, 1998); J.L. Vives, *De officio mariti* ed. Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 2006).

*filiorum nobilium* of Vincent of Beauvais, written for Queen Margarida, the Catalan wife of King Louis IX of France. The last nine chapters of this work, which concern the education of girls, impart very rigorous teachings on the preservation of a young girl's virtue. All three writers cite a long passage from Cyprian's *De habitu virginum*, Jerome's letter to Demetrias, identical axioms from Terence and Ovid's *Remedia amoris*, and a rather vehement harangue against female adornment from the prophet Isaiah (Isa. 3:16–26), proof that Vives was directly influenced by Eiximenis.

Like Vives, Eiximenis proclaims that God raised up certain women, both pagan and Christian, to be models of evangelical perfection in the same way as he did with men. He exalts the nature of women, saying that when God created woman, he endowed her with goodness of nature, fortune, and grace. Vives's rationale for the importance of the universal education of women has a precedent in Eiximenis, as illustrated in this excerpt from the Franciscan writer: "*Que tota dona sabés letra, car deys que havia major occasion de esser devota e de ocupar si metexa e de informar-se en tot bé.*"<sup>16</sup> (All women should be literate, for in that way they will have more opportunity to be devout and to occupy themselves and inform themselves of all that is good.)

In the opening chapter on the childhood of the young girl, Vives is much indebted to Quintilian, the pseudo-Plutarch's "Education of Children" and a passage from Aulus Gellius, who reports a speech of the Greek orator Favorinus on the subject of breast-feeding, which all these authors agree should be at the mother's breast. This will engender filial devotion in the daughter towards her mother from these early years. As a young child she must be carefully guarded and all her playtime must be spent in the company of girls of her own age under the surveillance of her mother or nurse or a good woman of mature years. In the revised edition Vives reinforces his ancient authorities with a very apt passage from Tacitus' *Dialogue on Orators*, not a very well-known work, but one with which Vives would have been familiar because of his interest in oratory and declamation. The Roman historian here eulogizes the pristine virtues of ancient matrons like Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, and the mothers of Julius and Augustus Caesar, who

---

<sup>16</sup> Francesc Eiximenis, *Lo llibre de les dones*, ed. Frank Naccaro, rev. Curt Wittlin (Barcelona, 1981). It is interesting to note that a Spanish adaptation by an anonymous Franciscan friar was published in 1542, which contains many additions obviously derived from Vives.

presided over the upbringing of their male children. “How much more care,” asks Vives, “do we think was exercised in the case of girls?”<sup>17</sup> In her early education the young maiden shall combine the skill of reading with other more practical learning having to do with the care and management of the household. Vives quotes Jerome’s letters to various Roman noblewomen to bolster his arguments here and gives multiple examples of famous women who occupied themselves with the working of wool and flax from antiquity to the present, culminating with the four daughters of Queen Isabella, “la Católica”.

In the fourth chapter Vives radically revises and expands his earlier views on the instruction of young girls. In both versions he begins by making this important statement of his views: “It is evident to me that the instruction of a young girl requires much more care than is commonly believed.”<sup>18</sup> In the original version he merely says that some girls are not suited to receive an education, just as is the case with some boys, while others who have the aptitude to study should be allowed and encouraged to do so. He acknowledges that the *femina docta* is suspect to many and that a clever but dishonest woman who would use her learning for an evil purpose should not be given the opportunity to study. In the new version he inserts a pessimistic account of the natural proclivity of the human body toward evil as a result of the cruel wound inflicted on us by the devil, and how we are surrounded by evil words and evil deeds on every side. In the face of all this evil we need a counterbalance on the side of good. Therefore we must pass on the knowledge of good to girls as well as to boys in order to protect ourselves from the constant onslaught of evil.

In this new version he refutes the inveterate prejudice against the learned woman, sprung from the conviction that the acquisition of knowledge by a woman increased her natural wickedness, as if men of evil disposition were not just as prone as women to misuse their intelligence. This may seem to be the most self-evident of truths to the modern mind but it was not so in Vives’s day, especially when expressed in such strong terms. Knowledge is the greatest safeguard for chastity, just as ignorance is the cause for the loss of chastity. He goes as far as to say that in looking back at past ages we would not

---

<sup>17</sup> Vives, *The Education of a Christian Woman*, p. 56. (“quantam erga feminas adhibitam diligentiam existimamus?”) *De institutione*, eds. Fantazzi-Matheussen, p. 16.

<sup>18</sup> *The Education of a Christian Woman*, p. 63. (“In puella instituenda longe plus video adhibendum operae quam vulgus hominum credat.”) *De inst.* p. 26.

find any learned woman who was unchaste. The learning he proposes has no regard for gender but is directed to the whole human race. Vives insists, with a note of sarcasm, on his convictions in this regard: "These are the rules of life and moral principles that I recommend for the education of women. If knowledge of these is harmful, I do not see how ignorance of them will be beneficial."<sup>19</sup> He continues with a barrage of rhetorical questions culminating in this ardent championship of women's right to learning:

When she is assailed by vice, to which she has grown accustomed, what protection will be afforded by moral rectitude, which she never came to know? If we agree with the opinion that she should not be taught, why do we take her to hear sacred homilies? Why do we ourselves teach, correct and admonish her of better things? We might as well relegate her to the countryside, if I may say so, and weaken and suppress whatever natural ability she may have—in a word, turn human beings into brute beasts, since they will be so far removed from learning.<sup>20</sup>

In proof of his thesis Vives reviews the lives of famous learned women. Unlike other lists of famous women, like Boccaccio's *De claris mulieribus*,<sup>21</sup> Vives's catalogue consists solely of learned and virtuous women, such as Cleobulina, daughter of Cleobulus, one of the seven sages of antiquity, who spent all her life dedicated to literature and wisdom while remaining a virgin, or the poetesses Corinna of Tanagra and Erinna of Telos, or Hortensia, daughter of the famous orator and a great speaker in her own right. To these he adds a roster of female saints and exemplary women of his own time, including Doña Mencía de Mendoza, wife of Henry III, Count of Nassau, who would give him hospitality in his later years; Ángela Zabata, a promising young woman of his own city, and the daughters of Thomas More. These latter he regards as outstanding examples of women whose chastity was enhanced by their learning, owing to the enlightened educational ideals of their

---

<sup>19</sup> *The Education of a Christian Woman*, p. 64. (*Cuiusmodi sunt, ut loquar de femina, praecepta vitae et exempla probitatis; quorum si peritia damnosa est, non video quomodo futura sit ignorantia utilis.*) *De inst.* p. 26.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*. ("Cum ergo a vitio invadetur cui assuevit, quod erit praesidium ab honestate, quam nullo modo novit? Quod si ista placet sententia, cur ad sacras contiones adducimus, cur docemus ipsi, castigamus, admonemus meliorum? Praestabit (credo) rus seponere et ingenium, si quod habent, debilitare ac opprimere, denique beluas efficere ex hominibus, ita enim longius aberunt a doctrina.") *De inst.* p. 28.

<sup>21</sup> Giovanni Boccaccio, *Famous Women*, ed. and trans. Virginia Brown (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).

father. Vives contends that the study of literature is conducive to the preservation of chastity in that it occupies a person's whole attention, lifts the mind to the contemplation of beautiful things and rids it of lowly thoughts. As for the kind of literature in which she should be versed, Vives counsels, in a general manner, the study of wisdom, which teaches the best and holiest way of life. Wisdom and uprightness of character (*probitas*), that is all a woman needs, although her principal concern remains the preservation of chastity.

Vives does not condemn eloquence in the female sex, citing again the example of Cornelia and Hortensia, save to specify that this skill would be more useful for a man engaged in public duties. Yet even to make this concession to the woman is quite extraordinary in the context of the times. The woman is to dedicate herself entirely to the study of that part of philosophy which is aimed at the formation of good morals. But such studies are to be for her own spiritual improvement, or at most for the benefit of her children and sisters in the Lord, for it is not fitting that a woman be in charge of schools. At this point Vives conforms, disappointingly, to the prejudices of the age, which did not allow women to have dealings with or speak to men, which would detract from their proper modesty and decorum. He takes refuge here in some of the more uncompromising teachings of St. Paul about women being silent in church and submissive to their husbands. He does make allowance, however, for women who are not capable of learning letters to be instructed by their husbands or learned women of their own age.

In chapter five of this first book Vives provides a very interesting list of books which are not to be read by women, chiefly the chivalric romances written in the vernacular languages. He shows a remarkable acquaintance with this literature, citing books in Spanish, Catalan, French and Flemish, and admits that he has read some of them himself. Among these pestiferous books are the famous *Amadis de Gaula*, *Tirant lo Blanch*, *La Celestina*, the *Cárcel de amor* by Diego de San Pedro, the most important Spanish novel of courtly love, *Lancelot du lac*, and many other less known tales. Vives's indignation is almost humorous as he speaks of Venus' secret files that are useful for persuading the woman if she shows some resistance. He complains that these authors might have just as well written books on whoring. Also condemned are the Greek and Latin authors of elegiac love poetry, and here he even quotes Ovid against himself from the *Remedia amoris*, where the Roman poet prohibits the reading of such poets as Callimachus, Anacreon

and the Roman elegiac poets, though admitting that his own poems emit a similar ring (of course one should not take Ovid too seriously in this recantation). Vives advises that such books should be wrenched by force from their hands. As an antidote he recommends the Gospels of the Lord, the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles of Paul, the fathers of the church, Plato, Cicero and Seneca. And if she likes poetry, the young woman should read the early Christian poets, such as Prudentius and Paulinus of Nola. He recommends also that on feast days young women should read the gospel and epistle of that day at home and even a commentary, if they have one.

The following chapter, "On Virginity," was subjected to a complete revision, with the result that it bears little resemblance to the first published version. It is obvious that Vives struggled over the proper approach to this topic. In the original version he suddenly abandons his more discursive style for a personal and paternalistic tête-à-tête between the narrator and a young woman. He chooses to begin with Augustine's *De sancta virginitate*, which puts great emphasis on 2 Cor. 11:2: "I feel a divine jealousy for you [the church of Corinth] for I promised you in marriage to one husband, to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ." Vives adds to this passage Psalm 14, verse 44: "All the glory of the king's daughter is within," which he will use as the text for his sermon:

Do not be elated because you are inviolate in body if you have surrendered in mind, or because no man has touched your body, if many men have inflicted blows on your mind. What good is it if your body is clean if you carry about with you a mind that is defiled with a foul and horrible stain? Your mind has dried up, scorched by love for a man.<sup>22</sup>

This is strong, frightening stuff, redolent almost of fanaticism, but it is indicative of his real thoughts. The mystical dialogue with the Lord goes on at great length in the same dramatic and reproachful tone.

With its mixture of scriptural quotations and declamatory rhetoric the style of this passage is quite strange, in some respects resembling Augustine's own emotional style (Vives had just completed his commentary on the *City of God*), but diverging perceptibly in sentiment

---

<sup>22</sup> "Ne efferas te, virgo, quod corpore sis integro, si animo es fracto, non quod corpus nullus attigerit vir, si animum multi viri percusserunt. Quid prodest esse mundum cum animum mentemque labe tætra horrendaque infectam geras? Exaruit animus tuus, o virgo, calore virili adustus." *De inst.*, Appendix, p. 210.

from the essay on virginity, which he claims as his source. There the emphasis is on the humility of a virgin, that she not be puffed up by her virtue, whereas Vives seems to exalt this state in almost rhapsodic tones. Vives obviously changed his mind about this histrionic scene and completely eliminated it in the final version, where he concentrates instead on a definition of virginity, derived from Augustine and Ambrose, as “integrity of the mind which extends also to the body.” (“*integritatem mentis, quae etiam in corpus dimanet.*”)<sup>23</sup> He states that this way of life, free of sexual urges, is more similar to that of the angels, and is situated almost entirely in the mind. He transfers the previous dialogue into a rational discourse, explaining that those who preserve the body intact, but whose mind is defiled, have no right to claim the name of virginity. They are the foolish virgins of the gospel, who perhaps may appear to be virgins in the eyes of men, who see with the eyes of the flesh, but not in the sight of God, who is a spirit and sees with the eyes of the spirit. As often, Vives here resorts to a pagan writer, in this instance, Seneca the Elder, who declared in one of his speeches that a woman is unchaste who even without engaging in an illicit sexual act has desired it.<sup>24</sup> From the concept of virginity of the mind Vives reverts once again to the eulogy of chastity as the one virtue that suffices for all the others in a woman. It is her one prized possession, which must be safeguarded most strenuously. He ends the chapter with the sobering example of Lucretia, quoting a forceful passage from a pseudo-Quintilian declamation: “Burying the sword in her entrails, she exacted the penalty imposed by necessity so that a chaste soul would be separated as quickly as possible from a polluted body.”<sup>25</sup> Vives was strongly attracted to the declamatory style, as is evidenced in his *Sullan Declamations*, and he obviously makes use of it often in this treatise as well, as illustrated here.

In succeeding chapters Vives prescribes a series of ascetic measures that must be taken to ensure the preservation of chastity. Fasting, cleanliness, even regulated hours of sleep are counseled as well as the avoidance of luxurious attire. A modest external appearance reflects interior modesty and integrity. To support his affirmations, especially

<sup>23</sup> *De inst.* p. 52.

<sup>24</sup> Seneca Rhetor, *Controversiae* 6. 8.

<sup>25</sup> *The Education of a Christian Woman*, pp. 85–86. (“*condito in viscera sua ferro, poenam necessitatis exegit, ut quamprimum pudicus animus a polluto corpore separaretur.*”) *Declamationes XIX maiores Quintiliano falso adscriptae*, ed. L. Hakanson (Stuttgart, 1982), 3. 11.

in his denunciation of the use of cosmetics, he draws on an arsenal of passages from the Scriptures, the church fathers, and classical writers. He goes to great lengths to instill the love of chastity in his readers, usurping a narration of terrible tales from Jerome's *Against Jovinian*, which relate the torments of pagan women who preferred to sacrifice their lives rather than their chastity. Vives also dedicates a chapter to cautioning the young maiden on the dangers of falling in love, a predicament that may befall her from some unguarded associations with men. He warns her of the excesses to which this madness may drive her, greater than those suffered by the male lover. In his solicitude for her safety Vives manages to include some shrewd psychological advice for the young woman to help her avoid these pitfalls. He also suggests some interesting remedies for those who have already fallen into the snares of love. As an antidote to the incursions of passion, Vives advocates an attitude of mind and hierarchy of the affections that are nothing less than angelic, in imitation of the Blessed Virgin herself and the saints. In this state of innocence the young girl must leave the choice of a spouse to her parents.

Toward the end of this book Vives suddenly lapses into a rhetorical outburst that is blatantly misogynistic in nature. He says that he used to think that the mating of Pasiphae with a bull was a fairy tale, but now he thinks it is a plausible fact since he has seen women who would mate with men whose nature is little removed from that of brute beasts. He quotes to his purpose verses from a notorious antifeminist poet, Pere Torroella, who compares some women to she-wolves in their choice of partner. Like them they choose the most foul-smelling males that follow after them: "*De natura de lobas son / ciertamente 'n escoger*."<sup>26</sup> Before concluding this first book Vives imparts to the young woman one last word of caution about her behavior with would-be suitors. She must not give even a sign of her desire for marriage or that she loves a young man and wishes to marry him for he will suspect that she will have done the same with others and may do so after marriage as well. He warns her that many a young woman after surrendering herself to a man whom she intended to marry has been left deluded and scorned after her lover had satisfied his lust. At this point Vives dovetails the first book into the second by praising that true and genuine love which

---

<sup>26</sup> Pere Torroella, *Maldezir de mugeres*, 3. 1–2.



forms one soul out of two persons: "Let a holy and happy concord exist between them, the sweet condiment of love."<sup>27</sup>

In the 1524 version of his treatise Vives included a general introduction to the institution of marriage in the opening chapter of Book II, which he suppressed in his revision. Perhaps he thought it superfluous, but he may also have excised it in response to criticism. In no other part of the book is he more pro-feminist. He quotes several ancient writers, including the supposed misogynist Euripides, who praise the incomparable blessings of a happy marriage. The greatest sages of antiquity, he avers, were all married, surely because they saw that there was nothing more in accordance with nature than the union of man and woman. He ends his encomium with the affirmation that marriage is a sacred thing which God instituted in Paradise, when mankind was still pure and undefiled, and later sanctioned in his miracle at the wedding feast of Cana. In the last sentence, however, he checks himself and returns to his original proposal of instructing the virtuous woman.

Marriage was instituted, according to Vives, not so much for the production of offspring as for community of life and indissoluble companionship (*coniugium non tam ad prolem sufficiendam institutum est quam ad communionem quandam vitae et indissociabilem societatem*).<sup>28</sup> His view is in sharp contrast with the teachings of the church fathers, who consistently cite procreation alone as the primary goal of marriage. As in the first book he had insisted on chastity as the only lesson to be learned, so here he gives as the first and perhaps only law of marriage the verse from St. Matthew's Gospel: "They shall be two in one flesh."<sup>29</sup> This is the hinge of marriage, the bond of a most sacred fellowship (*cardo est coniugii, vinculum sanctissimae societatis*). If a woman will keep this principle before her mind, she will be happy in her marriage. The two most important virtues are chastity (in the case of the married woman the more proper term is *pudicitia*, which Vives uses here) and great love for her husband (*amor in virum summus*). The first quality she brings from her father's house, the second she assumes when she crosses the threshold of her husband's house, leaving all else behind. Vives expatiates on the meaning of another Pauline teaching: "A woman does not have power over her own body, but the husband does." (1 Cor. 7:4). This was inter-

<sup>27</sup> *The Education of a Christian Woman*, p. 172. ("Sed sancta sit inter illos et felix concordia, dulcissimum matrimonii condimentum.") *De inst.*, p. 208.

<sup>28</sup> *De inst.*, vol. 2, p. 2.

<sup>29</sup> Genesis 2:24.

preted by the fathers to mean that a woman does not have the right over her own body even when it comes to the virtue of continence. How much right will she have, therefore, when it is a question of the vice of unchastity? This leads to a vehement diatribe against the evils of adultery with multiple examples from pagan antiquity.

In a chapter on how a wife should behave towards her husband Vives begins with two verses from Homer, words of the faithful Andromache to Hector, which he renders into appropriate Latin hexameters, loosely translated: "Father and mother art thou / Brother and well-beloved spouse." (*Iliad* 6. 429–30) He then regales the reader with hyperbolic examples of wifely devotion derived from myth, Greek and Roman history, even the exploits of the legendary Fernán González, who secured the independence of Castile from León through the heroism of his wife, Doña Sancha. He translates literally from the Greek of Plutarch the famous story of Camma, told also by Castiglione in *The Courtier*. He also relates in graphic details the heroic devotion of his own mother-in-law, Clara Cervent, in caring for her husband, afflicted with a foul disease, to whom she had fraudulently been married. Although this example was meant as a tale of edification, it will probably inspire a sense of absolute revulsion in the modern reader. Vives is obsessive in his insistence on obedience and respect toward the husband, whose commands, he says, should be regarded as the law of God. He must command, she must serve, if mankind is to survive. Staying at her husband's bedside is the equivalent of making the rounds of the great churches (the custom of making pilgrimages to the Roman basilicas)! The chapter ends with a lengthy quotation from the pseudo-Aristotelian *Economics* reinforcing the authority of the husband. The passage begins: "The virtuous woman should esteem that the customary mode of behavior of her husband is the law of her life, imposed by God through the bond of marriage and community of life,"<sup>30</sup> words made to order for Vives's preachments.

On the subject of marital concord Vives offers some good advice, although still laying chief responsibility upon the wife. As usual, he draws examples both from antiquity and from more recent times. Among the ancient writers Aristotle provides him with a very useful comparison of male and female in the *History of Animals*:

---

<sup>30</sup> *The Education of a Christian Woman*, pp. 208–09. Aristotle, *Economics* 3. 1, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton, 1984), p. 2146.

Since males are more spirited and more fierce, they are also more simple and less cunning, endowed with a more noble spirit. Females, on the contrary, are more malicious and more inclined to suspicion and plotting... The male is quicker to be reconciled than the woman, and it is also true that among men those who have more feminine feelings and are less high-born retain the memory of offenses longer.<sup>31</sup>

He mentions also the tiny shrine on the Palatine dedicated to the goddess Viriplaca, who helped wives win back their husband's favor after an estrangement. As is clear from her name, it was the man who had to be appeased by his wife, not vice versa. Right or wrong, it was the woman who had to take the initiative in conciliation, according to Vives. The best guarantee of concord is the wife's love for her husband. To show his impartiality towards both sexes Vives has recourse to a rather unusual but very relevant source here, a passage from a speech of Catiline to his followers in Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*: "If husband and wife love each other mutually, they will want and not want the same things, which in the last analysis is staunch friendship."<sup>32</sup> At this point he gives the example of his own parents, saying that he never saw his mother, Blanca, in fifteen years of marriage arguing with his father or entertaining views contrary to his. In the first edition he elaborates on this, recounting how it was a proverbial saying within the family that when his mother wished to signify that she believed something she would say: "It is as if Luis Vives had said it," or when she wanted something, she would say: "It is as if Luis Vives wanted it." This example of her total compliance with her husband's wishes and other examples were suppressed in the second edition. He also omitted the word *sanctissima* referring to his mother and his confident affirmation that she was already enjoying the reward of her blameless life in heaven. It is clear from these omissions that Vives heeded Erasmus's criticism about mentioning his family excessively.

From recent history Vives gives the example of Maria, Duchess of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold. Through his marriage to her Maximilian became the ruler of the Burgundian Netherlands, but the Flemish had little respect for the simple and meek character of Maximilian and referred all matters pertaining to their governance

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *The History of Animals* 9. 1 in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 948.

<sup>32</sup> *The Education of a Christian Woman*, p. 212. ("Si ament se mutuo vir et uxor, idem volent, idem nolent, quae demum firma amicitia est.") Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* 20. 4.

to Maria. Yet, Vives says, she never decided anything without consulting her husband. In that way Maria added much to his authority and enhanced his power. Vives also essays the delicate matter of the more intimate relations between husband and wife. He rules first of all that there should be no quarreling in the marriage-bed, for that is the place best suited for reconciliation and should therefore not become the scene of hostility. He emphasizes once again the modesty and propriety of the wife and how she should guard with the most utter secrecy whatever is said or done in the bedroom. He offers some advice for the husband as well, especially that he should not defile the marriage bed by acts of lust.

Separate chapters treat of the vice of jealousy and the proper adornment for the married woman. On the latter theme Vives enlists the support of the church fathers: Ambrose, Cyprian, John Chrysostom and Tertullian, with the last two, notorious for their severity, added in the revised edition. Vives next takes up the matter of behavior in public and in the home. Concerning the married woman's public demeanor, he counsels great discretion and reserve. It is not good for a woman to be too well known or talked about. She should give no sign of arrogance, disdain or affected manners, nor should she be easily swayed by worldly esteem. He ridicules women for their seeking the place of honor at table or their requiring that people give way to them on the street or their desire to be addressed as "Lady". In a most condescending manner Vives deigns, as it were, to let women in on men's secrets, although he admits that he is not sure that men will appreciate his doing so. He confides to them that they are laughed at and made fun of by the male population for these affectations. The surest road to honor, he counsels, is virtue, which is content with itself and does not have to seek out honor. The woman's place is in the home, where her skill in governing the household constitutes one of the greatest blessings of marital bliss.

Vives also has explicit instructions for the woman's comportment with servants. She will gain respect from them through mildness rather than severity, and must continually set them good example. Another duty of the mistress of the household is to look after the health of its inhabitants, for which reason she should be familiar with remedies for everyday illnesses. As a release from all these domestic cares she should retire daily, if possible, to some secluded part of the house to meditate on more transcendental matters and devote herself to prayer.

The last part of this section is a beautiful commentary on the famous passage from the Book of Proverbs about the good woman (Proverbs 31:13–31).

The chapter on the care of children begins with a consolation to those who cannot bear children. They have cause to rejoice because they have been exempted from an incredible burden. Paradoxically, the discussion almost turns into a vilification of childbearing and all its attendant woes. The world is already over-populated, Vives postulates, and besides children are for the most part ungrateful to their parents for all their troubles and in return for kindness show harshness and surliness. He even apostrophizes a putative childless woman in these terms: “O ungrateful woman, that you do not recognize how great a benefit you have received from God in not having borne children or having lost them before they brought you grief!”<sup>33</sup> From that unexpected preamble Vives passes to the early nurture of children, which should be at their mother’s breast since it is most fitting that we be nourished from the same source from which we were created. In the early years, the influence of the mother is crucial. The child’s first sense perceptions and first mental conceptions are acquired from what it hears or sees from the mother. Therefore much more depends on the mother in the formation of the children’s character than one would think. Echoing Quintilian, Vives emphasizes the importance of the mother for the proper teaching of the native language. It is the mother, too, who instills love of virtue and hatred of vice, and it is to her that children look for example. She must instruct her daughters also in the skills proper to their sex: how to work wool and flax, to spin, to weave, to sew and to learn how to administer domestic affairs. At the same time Vives counsels rigor and discipline, as he had received from his own mother. Vives dedicates the remaining chapters of the second book of *De institutione* to the instruction of twice-married women and stepmothers, the behavior to be observed with relatives and in-laws, and the elderly woman’s preparations for receiving her final reward. These chapters contain much practical wisdom.

In the third book, which deals with the state of widowhood, Vives does not relax his stern precepts, beginning with the way a woman should mourn her dead husband: not too much and not too little.

---

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 267. (“*O ingrata mulier, quae non agnoscis quantum a Deo acceperis beneficium quod vel non pepereris vel filios ante maerorem amiseris!*”) *De inst.*, 2, p. 152.

He declares: "There are some women who rejoice at their husband's death as if they had shaken off some cruel yoke, as if liberated from the fetters of a despot, almost exulting in a new-found freedom."<sup>34</sup> He expresses pity for such women, for they are not free but are like a ship without a rudder, at the mercy of the winds. A woman bereft of her husband is, in the true sense of the Latin word, *vidua*, "destitute" or "abandoned". Then there are those who cannot put an end to their tears and mourning. They are no less guilty. A woman should mourn her dead husband with true affection, not with ostentatious cries of grief, beating of the breast and dashing herself upon the ground. From his store of knowledge of Roman law Vives cites the laws of the Twelve Tables and decrees of the Senate, which set limits upon the expression of mourning. Similarly, at the funeral itself a certain decorum is to be observed, but Vives is averse to pompous ceremonies, especially if they involve the defrauding of creditors in order to defray the expenses. He exhorts the widow to keep the memory of her husband alive, since the soul does not migrate into another life in such a way that it completely renounces all earthly things. Here Vives makes an interesting observation which seems to contain some element of superstition, viz., that souls are sometimes overheard by the living and know many of our actions and events either through the privilege of their beatitude or through the intermediacy of angels, who frequently communicate between them and us. Vives warns about the excessive indulgence of widows toward their children, which gave rise to a proverbial expression about "a widow's child", used of young men who are badly brought up and lead morally depraved lives.<sup>35</sup> He advises that she confide their upbringing to a virtuous and sensible man. The preservation of chastity is still uppermost in Vives's mind and he even advocates that the widow have some elderly woman live with her and that she confide in the advice of a man of good sense and proven reliability. She should rarely be seen in public and should avoid even the company of priests and monks.

Vives has some salutary advice for the widow on how to manage her practical affairs and, in particular, how to deal with judges and lawyers when she must defend herself in court. He advises that her case will

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 301. (*Sunt quae maritos ablatos gaudeant tamque triste excusserint iugum et ceu nodo ac dominatu solutae nactaeque libertatem prope exsultent.*) *De inst.*, 2, p. 204.

<sup>35</sup> This proverb is also found in Eiximenis: "*Mas les viudes solen mal nudrir lus enfants en tant que enfant mal nudrit es apellat 'nodrit de viuda' comunament.*" Eiximenis, *Lo llibre de les dones*, p. 153.

be stronger when they see that she is impeded and inhibited by her modesty from giving convincing arguments herself. On the subject of second marriages, he recognizes that it would be heretical to forbid them altogether, but he shows his sympathy for the more rigid standards of Saint Jerome, citing a long passage from his rather uncompromising letter to Furia. If she wishes to remarry, the widow should not do so immediately after her husband's death and should consult her relatives concerning the choice of a spouse. He also has some advice about what type of man she should marry. In a final, sober admonition, added in the revised version, Vives counsels that this second marriage should be celebrated quietly, almost in secret, with no fuss or dancing, in order to avoid scandal.

## II. De officio mariti

Encouraged by the favorable reception accorded to *De institutione*, Vives embarked on a second treatise solely on marriage entitled *De officio mariti* (On the Duties of the Husband). He wrote it at the request of various friends, including Álvaro de Castro, probably a fellow *converso*, with whom he had shared lodgings in London in the latter part of 1524. He began work on it the following year and probably finished it quickly for it bears the marks of hasty composition. The book begins with a kind of anthropological history going back to man's creation and gradual evolution. From the beginning God set man off from the rest of creation to live in society and community of life, and joined the first pair in legitimate marriage not only to produce offspring but also to share their lives together, a characterization of true matrimony that Vives also gave at the beginning of *De institutione*. He insists here that one person should belong to one person, as is declared by nature and divine law. In an apparent refutation of Muslim marriage laws, which would have been familiar to him from his youth in Valencia, Vives heavily emphasizes the Genesis account in which God gave one Adam to one Eve, and as he was about to destroy the world gave one wife to each man who entered the ark. Adam himself is made to prophesy that the two will be one person (Gen. 2:24). This was then reinforced by Christ himself (Matt. 19:5), saying that when the marriage is consummated they are no longer two persons but one, thus making it clear that marriage is not meant for three or four, but for two. Vives

wryly comments that such multiple unions would not be conducive to peace and tranquility within the family.

At the end of this first chapter of *De officio* he cites the more negative warning issued by Paul that it is better to marry than to burn (1 Cor. 7:9). Using an analogy taken from nature, he explains that as an herb or leguminous plant may serve as food and sustenance for some but for others constitutes a medicine, so marriage becomes a remedy for the incontinent and for those who cannot resist lust. But he ends with this formal definition of marriage: "Marriage is the legitimate union of one man and one woman to live together and share everything in common for all their life."<sup>36</sup> It is interesting to compare this definition with that of Erasmus in his *The Institution of Christian Matrimony*, which is very legalistic in tone: "A lawful and perpetual union between a man and a woman, entered into for the purpose of begetting offspring and involving an indivisible partnership of life and property."<sup>37</sup>

The second chapter concerns the all-important matter of choosing a wife since, Vives repeats from *De institutione*, she is destined to be a man's inseparable companion for life. In the course of the discussion Vives harks back to the traditional Aristotelian doctrine about the natural inferiority of the female of the species as a defective or mutilated male. He emphasizes her emotional weakness but is quick to add that this quality is not confined to the woman but can be found in many men who have a feminine character. Nor are all women possessed of this characteristic, as Vives proceeds to illustrate with the usual roster of heroines from antiquity and with an extended eulogy of Catherine of Aragon, of whom he claims that what Valerius Maximus said of Lucretia could be more truly applied to her: "By an error of nature a more manly soul was allotted to a female body."<sup>38</sup> Vives indulges his bent for psychology, explaining various female characteristics and how some of them may be turned to good purpose by the husband. He lays great emphasis on the importance of piety in the woman, which is not immediately evident but reveals itself through her pious conversations. In concluding this chapter he warns men about trying to exercise

<sup>36</sup> "Coniugium esse unius viri et unius feminae ad convictus communionemque vitae totius legitimam coniunctionem." J.L. Vives, *De officio mariti*, ed. Fantazzi (Leiden, 2006), p. 28.

<sup>37</sup> "Legitima perpetuaeque viri ac mulieris studio gignendae sobolis initia coniunctio vitae ac fortunarum omnium individuum societatem adducens." *Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami opera omnia*, 11 vols. ed. J. Leclerc (Leiden, 1703–06), 5: 617D.

<sup>38</sup> *De officio mariti*, p. 43. Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta memorabilia* 6. 1. 1.



control and dominion over their wives since in the end they will drive out whatever love their wives had for them. The body can be compelled, not the soul. On the contrary Vives considers marriage to be the highest form of friendship, surpassing any other type of affection.

The subject of the next chapter is the sacredness of the institution of marriage, sanctified by God himself in the role of the ancient *pronubus*,<sup>39</sup> who presided over the marriage ceremony. Thus it is that the sexual act is chaste, the marriage bed unstained and the offspring pure. Vives lays great emphasis on Ephesians 5:32, that marriage is a symbol of that great mystery by which Christ is united to the church by an indissoluble bond. This analogy of Paul is certainly a daring extension of the Adam and Eve story and Vives capitalizes on it, saying that the husband must conduct himself towards his wife as Christ does toward his church. He returns to an earlier verse of the same chapter of Ephesians (5:23), which he considers to be the guiding principle in marriage: "As Christ is the head of the church, so a husband is the head of his wife." In this role of proxy, as it were, the husband must love his wife as he does his own body, and the life, virtue and reputation of his wife shall be dearer to him than his own life. Vives insists on this devotion to one's wife, whoever she may be, without regard for beauty, lineage, wealth or health, or how much love she feels for her spouse. Such sentiments are not to be found in *De institutione*.

After this long disquisition on the Pauline doctrine Vives turns to ancient pagan authorities, citing the counsel of Plutarch in his essay on marriage that at the beginning of wedlock every offense should be avoided lest "the still tender and soft cohesion should come apart through the slightest impact."<sup>40</sup> He also cites with approval from Cato's speech against the repeal of the Oppian Law in Livy, which emphasizes that women were to be under the control of parents, brothers or husbands. Vives makes a fine philological distinction between the words *comparati*, from the verb *comparare*, "to treat a person as the equal of another", and *pares*, "equal in power and prestige", to describe the marriage pair as comparably but not altogether equal, aptly citing a verse from Martial that man and woman can only be equal when the woman is unequal.<sup>41</sup> *Amor* suffices for the husband, but *amor ac veneratio*

<sup>39</sup> Vives fashions his own word, *pronubator*, to remove the pagan connotation.

<sup>40</sup> ("ne tenera adhuc et mollis conglutinatio quamlibet levi impactione diffingatur.") *De officio mariti*, p. 105. Plutarch, *Coniugalium praecepta*, *Moralia* 138F.

<sup>41</sup> Martial, *Epigrams* 8.12.3–4.

are necessary for the woman. It must be true love, not merely external signs of affection. Here Vives refers to a passage in Cicero (*De amicitia* 20), that there is nothing more lovable than virtue, which is seen only through the eyes of the soul. It must be said for Vives that despite his insistence on the authority of the husband, he requires also of him a sincere and unreserved love for his spouse. Fulfilling his role as teacher, Vives gives instruction on the manner of treating women of different character: a rebellious wife must be appeased with love and governed with authority; with a submissive and virtuous wife gentleness must be used, but at all times the prudent husband must remember that he has been placed over the woman as a guardian. The chapter ends with some brief observations on how to conduct yourself with your wife's relatives and gives the sage advice of not depending too much on their maleficent beneficence (*malefico beneficio*).

Vives now includes a chapter on the instruction of the woman, in which he recapitulates things he had said in *De institutione*. He defends once again the equal intelligence of women and men and their right to be instructed in good letters, since education is conducive to virtue in both sexes. A woman must first learn true piety, joined with the virtue of chastity, which engenders self-respect. As in *De institutione* Vives counsels that women should not concern themselves with abstruse questions of theology nor should they read books of poetry and fiction. However, they should have access to the same salutary teachings as the male, and if we deprive them of learning, it is our fault if they do not make moral progress. Vives constantly stresses the duty of the husband to instruct his wife as a father instructs his children. He cites in his support not only Paul but Socrates from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and Seneca, who regretted the fact that his mother had not been given the opportunity by his father to further her studies. Rather than give a list of forbidden books as he did in the previous work, he recommends reading the *Facta et dicta memorabilia* of Valerius Maximus and Plutarch's work on the education of children (now considered spurious), but also more recent writers like Paolo Vergerio and Francesco Filelfo, as suitable reading. The husband will further these readings with his own edifying conversation, even injecting a little humor into his stories, but nothing risqué. This leads to a long, exaggerated discussion of chastity and periodical abstinence from carnal relations within marriage. He insists on the Pauline doctrine (1 Cor. 7:4) that the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does, and vice versa. He concedes that sensual pleasure in marriage should be shared by both

partners, in accordance with nature and reason, as an alleviation of their labors and preoccupations. On the other hand he counsels that Christian spouses should set aside certain days to observe sexual abstinence and dedicate themselves to more fervent prayer. In the revised edition he adds two passages from the African bishop, Fulgentius, a disciple of Augustine, on the fulfillment of the conjugal debt in such a way that the flesh should not become the slave of lust and that with God's help they may rise above the level of marital fragility.<sup>42</sup> In the conclusion of this chapter Vives maintains that zeal for the education of his wife will redound to the benefit of the husband, for it will result in a well-managed household, the good education of the children and a more tranquil existence.

The remaining chapters are much more brief than these opening ones and seem to be very loosely organized. In a chapter on the home Vives returns once more to the predominant theme of the book, the absolute mastery of the husband in the home, more than that of a king in his kingdom! Vives would allow a woman to leave the home but rarely, and then only to specified places and accompanied by women of good repute. Even in church her piety, not her frequent attendance should be noteworthy. The chapter on external matters also begins on a somber note, that in society and company we contaminate each other, just as contagion spreads among animals. For this reason one must be careful in choosing the city and neighborhood in which to live. The husband must also be vigilant about those who enter the house. Groups of young men should not be allowed into the house for they bring dancing, games, carousing and other things harmful to your fortunes. Nor should the husband praise his wife to others, which will only rouse suspicion and ridicule. This semi-cloistered condition of the woman seems more reminiscent of Jewish rather than of Christian tradition.

As in *De institutione* Vives includes a chapter of considerable length on female adornment, cautioning that excessive care in personal adornment is more fitting for a mistress than a wife. It also leads her to neglect household tasks and creates rivalry within the community since wives with less financial resources resort to every means in order not to be outdone in luxury. The remedy for this vice is that the husband assert his authority over his wife and accustom her to serve and minister to him and to be his helper and co-worker, not an idle mistress of the

---

<sup>42</sup> Fulgentius, *Epistulae* 1.149, *Patrologia latina* 65:139.

household. Vives is aware that the female sex has a natural inclination towards adornment, but it must be regulated. Simple, dignified adornment bespeaks a holy and unspoiled discipline within the house. In general, Vives's advice in this matter is more practical and restrained than in *De institutione*, where he relied more on scriptural and patristic teachings, quoting at length from such harsh critics of female adornment as John Chrysostom and Tertullian.

Vives then touches on the delicate matter of the reprehension and punishment of the wife. He mentions that there are three types of failings that occur in marriage and three types of punishment suitable for them. The first and greatest is adultery, in which case the husband is entitled to repudiate his wife, in accordance with Christ's command in the gospel. He does not detail the other two at all, saying vaguely that there are those that are less grievous and others that lie between the two. Minor failings must be overlooked in order to maintain peace and harmony within the family. Corrections must not be given forcefully but judiciously and without show of emotion. In the revised edition he adds many more exhortations to leniency, recommending that the husband should not expect too much of his wife but rather regard any improvement in her conduct as gain, and continue to use patience and forbearance in his dealings with her. He goes as far as to express this sentiment of compassion for a woman's lot: "And in their whole life what else do they do but serve us; their fathers when they are young women, their husbands when they are married, their children when they are mothers?"<sup>43</sup> This must be regarded as a rather extraordinary admission on the part of a male writer of this period, in my opinion.

In a chapter on the progression and growth of a marriage Vives refutes the widespread opinion that love cools during the course of wedded life. Long years of living together strengthen mutual affection, in his opinion. The harmony existing between master and mistress brings more order and respect in the managing of the household. Such conduct spreads its influence beyond the walls of the house and inspires the respect of one's fellow citizens. It is an observed fact, also, that the good dispositions and habits of the parents are passed on to their children, and peace and serenity reign in such a home. The concluding chapter is devoted to the treatment of one's wife in her advanced years,

---

<sup>43</sup> "*Universa autem vita quid aliud quam serviunt nobis, sive virgines parentibus, sive nuptae maritis, sive liberis matres.*" *De officio mariti*, p. 203.

at greater length than he had done in *De institutione*. The wife should now be treated as an equal and should participate more and more in family decisions. Vives anticipates for the elderly spouse a foretaste of heavenly existence when there will no longer be distinction between the sexes. If the wife should die before her husband, his love will live on and he will continue to contribute to the well-being of her relatives; if he should precede her in death, he will leave sufficient funds to provide for her and for the children. In the revised version Vives adds a final paragraph in which he advises the husband not to bid his wife to persevere in the state of widowhood and retain his name, but should leave it to her discretion to decide what will be best suited to her honor and peace of mind. This is very different from the harsh admonishments at the end of *De institutione*.

First to appear of the numerous translations of the *De institutione* into the vernacular languages was a Castilian version published in Valencia in 1528, *Instrucción de la muger cristiana*. The translator was a certain Juan Justiniano or Giovanni Giustiniano, who served at the court of Don Fernando of Aragon, viceroy of Valencia.<sup>44</sup> In the dedicatory preface to Doña Germana de Foix, second wife of Fernando, he says that he wishes to make this excellent reading (*lectura tan buena*) available in Spain since even foreign lands have already been able to enjoy it. The translator alerts the reader that he has taken the liberty of adding things not contained in the original Latin. Indeed, in many ways the *Instrucción* may be regarded as an original work, adapted to Spanish readers. Justiniano feels free to insert bits of proverbial wisdom, local stories from various places, both in Spain and elsewhere, and scores of additional references, exhibiting his considerable learning. At the same time he omits many passages which perhaps he thought were too severe. It is significant that he omits a long passage from the chapter on *De concordia coniugum* in which Vives speaks of the perfect concord that existed between his mother and father. The Catalan scholar, Joan Fuster, is of the opinion that Vives may well have instructed his Spanish translator by letter to omit this passage because of the recent auto-da-fé

---

<sup>44</sup> In a recent article further proof has been adduced for the identification of a Juan Justiniano (1495–1555), born in Crete, as the author of this first translation of Vives's work. He also translated the eighth book of the *Aeneid* and two comedies of Terence into Spanish, and there is evidence that he had begun a translation of Vives's posthumous *De veritate fidei Christianae*. Cf. Helena Rausell Guillot-Antonio González Alba, "Juan Justiniano, un Cretense en la Valencia de Carlos V," *Calamus renascens* 3 (2002), 255–72.

of his father at the hands of the Holy Office on 6 September 1524.<sup>45</sup> In support of this conjecture I should like to add the fact that at one point in the narrative Justiniano oddly seems to speak in the person of Vives himself, saying: "We have already treated the subject of alms in the *De subventionem pauperum*,"<sup>46</sup> a work which Vives wrote several years after the *De institutione*. In another passage, in which Vives pays homage to his mother, Justiniano adds additional expressions of love and affection: "*besando mil veces aquellas santas manos que fueron tan rigurosas o no, sino tan piadosas en castigarme y hacer que fuese hombre.*" (kissing a thousand times those blessed hands which were so rigorous, or rather so compassionate in punishing me so that I could be a man).<sup>47</sup> It seems very strange that the translator would have ventured to add these very personal sentiments on his own. Another addition of particular significance is a list of books for Spanish readers added to those of Vives to replace the lascivious readings he had just condemned. This 1528 version, reissued many times, is an important stage in the history of Vives's text since it obviously gained great popularity in its more palatable Spanish adaptation.

It is altogether fitting that the English translation of Vives's treatise should have proceeded from the household of Sir Thomas More. It may be reasonably conjectured that Vives must have discussed the problem of women's education at More's estate in Chelsea, where he was a frequent guest. More himself had begun a version of the treatise when he learned from Richard Hyrde, who had recently entered his services as a tutor, that he had completed his own translation. The translator reserves great praise for the book, saying in the preface:

And surely for the plantynge and nurysshynge of good vertues in everye kynde of women, virgins, wyves, and wydowes, I verily believe there was never any treatise made, either furnished with more goodly counsayles, or sette out with more effectuell reasons, or garnysshed with more substantiall authoritees, or stored more plentuously of convenient examples, nor all these thynges together more goodly treated and hendeled, than maister Vives hath done in his boke.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Joan Fuster, *Llibres i problemes del Renaixement* (Valencia, 1989), p. 29.

<sup>46</sup> *Instrucción de la muger cristiana*, ed. Elizabeth Teresa Howe (Madrid, 1995), p. 241.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331.

<sup>48</sup> *The Instruction of a Christen Woman*, eds. Virginia Walcott Beauchamp, Elizabeth H. Hageman and Margaret Mikesell (Champaign, IL, 2002), p. 5.

He does justice to the original, translating the difficult Latin of Vives into a clear and vigorous English, which he submitted to More's inspection for approval and correction. Some of Vives's more severe strictures against female adornment in the first book are omitted, and the long diatribe of Isaiah condemning this practice is abbreviated. At other times Hyrde adds a phrase or two for the sake of rhythm or clarity and, like the Castilian translator Justiniano, makes additions and deletions to the list of romances forbidden by Vives. The *Instruction* went far in propagating Vives's educational ideas in England, becoming the most popular conduct book for women during the Tudor period and beyond. Nine known editions of *The Instruction of a Christen Woman*, most of them from the printer, Thomas Berthelet, and his successors, were published in the sixteenth century, with slight revisions to please each age. There were three translations of *De institutione* into French, of which twenty-five editions appeared between 1542 and 1587. German, Italian and Dutch translations (the latter based on Pierre de Changy's French version) followed.

### III. De subventionem pauperum

The *De subventionem pauperum* was written for a certain time and for a certain place. When Vives testifies to his close ties to the city of Bruges, which he says he regards as his second native city, he is not simply using a figure of speech. The work can only be understood in the context of Bruges and its government since it was written specifically to remedy the problem of poverty which was then afflicting that city as it had so many others at the time. Vives tells us that he undertook this work as the result of conversations he had on the subject with the *grand-bailli* (*hoog-baljuw* in Dutch) of Bruges, Lodewijk van Praet, ambassador of Charles V in England, whom Vives must have had the occasion to meet frequently during his stay in England in the years 1523–1525.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, he dedicates his tract to the two *consules* and the *senatores* of Bruges, as he designates these officials in Latin. These technical terms refer to the complex system of municipal government of the city. Besides the citizens of the city itself there were those who were subject to the

---

<sup>49</sup> Vives had already written at his request and dedicated to him the *De consultatione*, a treatise on diplomacy and the art of negotiation.

provosts and canons of the Church of Saint Donatian and those who were dependents of the territory around Bruges, known as the *Franc de Bruges* (*Brugse Vrije* in Dutch). In principle those belonging to religious orders were not even to be considered as citizens, a fact which is of no little importance for a correct interpretation of Vives's practical guidelines in the treatise. He strongly advocates the involvement of the city in the finances of hospitals but refrains from making any such recommendation regarding wealth belonging to the church. When it comes to the church institutions he confines himself merely to giving advice, while on the contrary he calls for strict sanctions regarding the mismanagement of public funds.

Bruges formed part of the territory of the Counts of Flanders, which in Vives's time was under the rule of the Burgundian-Habsburg families. The representative of the prince in the city was the *baljuw* (bailiff), as he is called in documents going back to the twelfth century. He could exercise other functions as well, as in the case of van Praet, who was appointed by Charles V as royal ambassador in England. The burgo-masters (*consules*) to whom the work is dedicated are identified in the colophon of the second edition as Jozef de Baenst and Jan van Themseke. The senators, or members of council, to whom Vives assigns the duty of caring for the poor, acted as sheriffs (they are called *schepenen* in the Dutch translation of 1533). When he suggests that various officials be charged with certain duties, he associates these duties with already existing allocations of tasks which he had observed. In other words, he is not writing so much about innovative measures as about the valorization of existing political responsibilities and institutions. Important families of Spanish merchants like the Pardo, De la Torre and Aranda families were fully integrated into Bruges society. Many of them held political office or acquired prestigious manors in the countryside. Their daughters were married with rich dowries to the local nobility or were accepted into rich cloisters and abbeys. Their prosperity is still to be seen in the great houses on Spanjaardenstraat and adjacent streets built during this period, often with Renaissance features. Vives participated directly in the life of this Spanish circle, in which he found himself much at home. When he arrived in Bruges in 1512 he took up lodgings with a rich Spanish merchant, Pedro D'Aguirra, situated on the present-day Vlamingenstraat.

By the 1520s, after a succession of poor harvests in the Low Countries huge numbers of people migrated from the depressed countryside to the city in search of employment or assistance, which created severe



problems in caring for the poor. There was a great increase of the urban proletariat and a greater proportion of the population was now dependent on charity. The rather haphazard system of almsgiving and relief organizations like the *Tafels van de Heilige Geest*, *Godshuizen* and various other hospices were no longer adequate. The first experiments in poor relief were made in Nuremberg (1522), Strasbourg (1523) and Leisnig (1524). In the latter town Luther was personally responsible for the new initiative. By 1525 this new method of dealing with the poor had reached Flanders, first in Mons and in the following year in Ypres. Social legislation was instituted in both of these cities and in Ypres public begging was banned and a Common Fund was established to alleviate the conditions of poverty. At one time it was believed that Vives was the source of the reform movement in Ypres, but it is now known that the Ypres legislation preceded the publication of Vives's book by several months. It is quite possible, however, that he may have given advice to the city fathers of Ypres, of which we have no record.

The example of Ypres was followed by many other cities in the Low Countries between 1525 and 1545: Lille in 1527, Ghent in 1535, Breda and Brussels in 1539,<sup>50</sup> Leuven in 1541, to mention but a few, but ironically Bruges did nothing until 1560, and then not very much. In 1530, however, the mendicant orders of Ypres challenged the validity of the law in their city, arguing that it was against divine law to forbid begging and almsgiving, and that such measures had been introduced by Luther and condemned by the church. The matter was submitted to the Sorbonne for their opinion. In presenting their case the Ypres authorities described the situation in some detail, noting how the poor saw that it was to their advantage to quit their jobs in the wool factory and take to begging, which was more lucrative, and were encouraged by their parents in this endeavor. Vives was able to verify this same tendency in Bruges. The answer came back in January 1531: the laws were pious and salutary but no one should be forbidden to give alms on his own initiative; the poor laws should not serve as a pretext to secularize church property and, especially, religious orders should not be deprived of their right to beg for the poor. In September 1531 Charles V requested a copy of the Ypres document and less than a month later he promulgated an edict outlawing begging in his domain, save for any

---

<sup>50</sup> The Ordinance for the poor of Breda may well have been written by Vives, who was living there at the time, according to Simon Vosters, "Vives al hilo de algunas portadas," *Cuadernos de bibliofilia* 11 (1993), 25–42.

deserving pauper who could not be maintained by the public fund. The edict borrowed many details both from Ypres and Vives. He ordered a centralization of revenues for the poor and placed the administration of these funds under the control of the civil authority.

Of the two books that comprise the *De subventionē pauperum* the first is a general, theoretical, thoroughly Christian treatise on the human condition, especially as regards man's needs and the necessity of mutual assistance. The second is an astonishingly modern practical program on how to deal concretely with the needs of the poor. Vives is very careful in his dedication to the burgomasters not to make it appear that he is unduly interfering in the affairs of the city, which he says he has made his home. Rather, he says that his feelings towards this city are the same as those he nurtures for his native Valencia. He admires their system of government, the civility of the people and the tranquility and justice that reign there. He explains that he was moved to write the treatise not only because of the commission he received from van Praet but also because of the fact that there were great numbers of needy persons who flocked there from every side as if to a haven for the indigent. He dedicates it to the burgomasters since it is their duty to see to it that everyone help each other, that through mutual assistance charity can be consolidated and human society strengthened. In this opening Vives is careful to avoid any semblance between his proposals and the reforms taking place in Germany and elsewhere.

What distinguishes Vives's treatise from the various laws and pronouncements concerning the problem of poverty that were circulating in Europe in the early part of the sixteenth century is his philosophical and theological discussion of the matter in the first book. It is often passed over for the more practical measures that are the subject of the second book, which is seriously to misrepresent Vives's social theories. In broaching the subject, he goes back to the creation and fall of man. From being the culmination of God's handiwork man fell through his own blind aspirations to divinity to a state of anarchy and destitution. In this weakened condition mankind was not sufficient unto itself. Through mutual assistance and good deeds men gradually learned to live together harmoniously until ambition raised its ugly head and troubles began. As is his wont, Vives paints a rather pessimistic picture of mankind. Those who lack health or intelligence or make bad use of the gifts God has given them must turn to others for help. But it can be a source of virtue for others if they come to the aid of those in need of mercy (*eleemosyne* in Greek, the source of the English word "alms"). Vives is quick to explain that this does not consist solely in

the donation of money, as is commonly believed, but in every work by which human indigence is alleviated. He insists strongly on this point, showing how money and possessions are lowest in the scale of performing good deeds (*beneficia*), which are to be judged according to whether they benefit the mind or the body. The most important and greatest good deed is to help another in the exercise of virtue, the only true good. After virtue comes learning, as imparted by a good teacher, and it is the duty of the state to provide such teachers. Then come corporal works of mercy, like the services performed by doctors, and last of all comes money.

In chapter four Vives discourses on how natural a thing it is to do good, that there is a desire marvelously built into the human heart which inspires generous spirits to wish to do good and to help as many people as possible. Chapter five is a very frank discussion of the two principal reasons which, in his opinion, keep us from doing good: either because we do not think that we will be of profit to others or because we think that doing good to others will result in a diminution of our own prosperity. On the subject of the ingratitude of beggars and their ruses to solicit alms he becomes very eloquent and pitiless concerning professional beggars who practice every kind of deception to inspire pity. He quotes to good purpose a forceful comment of Seneca in his *De beneficiis* (3. 6. 2) that ingratitude exceeds any human judgment and must be classed as one of those misdeeds that are left to the judgment of God. He paints a truly repulsive picture of this squalid segment of society, their foul sores and stench and spreading of contagious diseases, and how some of them treat their ulcers with medicaments to make them the more hideous and thus elicit more pity. They disfigure their own bodies and the bodies of children not their own, whom they borrow from others for their fraudulent purposes. Rather than showing gratitude they hurl the alms back at the giver if they consider it inadequate and ridicule their benefactor. They glory in the fact that they are the poor of Jesus Christ. Vives comments sarcastically that Christ would never recognize this kind of pauper for he does not call the poor in money blessed, but the poor in spirit. He betrays a true aversion for this type of arrogant and depraved beggars who were now invading the city streets. He will return to it in even stronger terms in the second book. In the Paris edition<sup>51</sup> he adds that aid should be brought to the needy

---

<sup>51</sup> The *editio princeps*, now very rare, was published 17 March 1526 by a local printer, Hubert de Croock, and reissued with slight corrections in September of that year.

more because of their vices and crimes, with which they infect others, than because of their physical needs.

Chapter six is addressed directly to the poor, advising them how they should conduct themselves in whatever adverse fortune may have fallen to their lot. It is the usual medieval message of resignation and acceptance, with the promise of reward in the life to come. He counsels them against pride, arrogance and imposture, and reminds them of Paul's exhortation not to be idle. In the next two chapters Vives returns to those who are well-off and chastises them for their extravagant excesses. He complains that men have changed vices into virtue. Luxury and extravagance are prized; fraud and cunning are preferred to prudence. Everything is measured by money, no matter how it is acquired. In this new age of barbarism one who is a little more generous to the poor is said to be defrauding his heirs. There are even laws that favor the avidity of heirs and tie the hands of those that do good. If anyone gives money to a poor man, he thinks he has given him blood, not a piece of metal. Furthermore, everyone dies as he lives. The rich leave ostentatious memorials to themselves and make show of their armorial bearings, even armor itself, as if they could take heaven by storm. As to their being deterred by ingratitude from doing good, Vives quotes a significant passage from the beginning of Seneca's *De beneficiis* (1.1.9–13) to demonstrate that even the pagans were able to surmount this difficulty. Seneca tells us that we should give benefits as a free gift, not as a loan. He who thinks of receiving something in return when he gives deserves to be deceived. In conclusion he says that he who does not return a good deed does not sin more than he who does not give willingly. Vives supports his arguments with a plethora of tales and cogent quotations from the Old and New Testaments.

Chapter nine begins with a statement from Plato's *Republic* (5. 9) that nations would be happy if the two words "mine" and "thine" were eliminated from men's speech. In his commentary on this passage Vives says that first of all God gave us Nature, by which he understands God himself, for Nature is nothing else but his will and command. Then Nature in its generosity gave us everything to be held in common but

---

Another edition, with substantial additions, which could only have come from Vives himself, appeared in Paris in 1530, printed by Simon Colines. These additions were not included in any other edition, but they are given, in italics, as an integral part of the text, in the critical edition edited by Charles Fantazzi and Constant Matheuccussen (Leiden, 2002).

we in our niggardliness make it our own. What Nature put in everyone's reach we fence in and defend by force of arms and by law. And so our avarice and malice impose want and famine upon the abundance of Nature and bring poverty to God's riches (p. 60). We can claim nothing exclusively as our own, to be used solely for our own convenience. We are merely the dispensers (*dispensatores*) of what God has given us. In keeping with these principles Vives rules that anyone who does not share with the poor whatever is left over from his natural needs is a thief, and if he is not punished by natural laws, he will certainly be punished by divine law. Vives might well have introduced at this point the example of the early Christians as narrated in the Acts of the Apostles, but he saves that discussion until later in the second book, where he speaks of the means of financing aid for the poor. In this theoretical part of his work he relies more on ancient pagan sources, and the laws and customs of the Greeks and Romans.

In the last two chapters Vives relinquishes the purely rational plane and has recourse solely to the word of God, both Old and New Testaments. He cites for the first time a passage from Deuteronomy that recurs often in later treatises on the poor: "The poor will not be lacking upon the earth; therefore I command you, 'Open your hand to the poor and the needy who dwell with you in your land.'" Vives recounts the story told by Paul in Galatians 2:1–10, how when Paul and Barnabas went up to Jerusalem to see the other apostles, they were told that they must only be mindful of the poor. Whoever does not come to the aid of the poor, Vives admonishes, cannot be called a Christian. Love of their fellow man is the distinguishing mark of the followers of Christ. Their benefices must extend both to the soul and the body. He lashes out once again at the luxury and ostentation of the rich, who think they can compensate for their robbing of the poor by some tiny donation or by adorning a church with stained glass with their own names inscribed on it. In the Paris edition Vives adds a telling paragraph which acts as a kind of commentary to the story of Zaccheus the publican, which precedes it. He calls attention to the fact that Zaccheus gave half of his possessions to the poor while he was still alive, which is so much more efficacious than bequeathing things to charity in one's will to be distributed after his death. Almsgiving in life has an immediate reward: it softens a hard heart, it prepares us to repent of our misdeeds and fills us with a certain sweetness. God will not consider it an act of mercy when a person gives what he can no longer hold on to himself. A bit maliciously, Vives reflects how much a person is missed who

was accustomed to do good in life while one who puts off the doing of good until his death makes everyone hope for his quick death so that finally he will be of help to someone. On the manner of giving he emphasizes that it must be done with enthusiasm, freely, as Tobias said, and as Paul wrote: "Not reluctantly or from compulsion, for God loves a cheerful giver." (2 Cor. 9:7) And one final admonition, that it be done not to be seen by the eyes of men, but by the eyes of God. Christ's words in Matthew about not sounding a trumpet before you when you give alms, as do the hypocrites in the synagogue and in the streets, close out the first book with peremptory forcefulness.

The second book of the treatise turns from philosophical principles and pious exhortations addressed to the individual citizen to the duties and obligations incumbent upon the city and him who rules it, who is to it what the soul is to the body. As the soul animates all parts of the body, so the civic magistrate must not neglect any part of the community laid to his charge. If the more powerful neglect the weaker members of society, they do so at their own risk. The poor and downtrodden feel indignation at seeing the rich exulting in their absurd luxuries while they do not have enough to feed their hungry children. This was the reason for the uprising led by the Gracchi and Catiline. By contrast Vives gives an idealized picture of ancient society as presented by Isocrates in his *Areopagitica*, which he had recently translated for Cardinal Wolsey. The chapter ends with another lurid description of the masses of the poor crowding the entrances to the churches, spreading contagion from their foul running sores. The magistrates must take action to protect the interests of both the rich and the poor since, as Vives bluntly insinuates, the venal ministers of the church do not consider these shorn sheep to belong to their fold and pasture. They do not even administer the sacraments to them.

In chapters two to four Vives proposes some very practical and specific measures to deal with the problem of poverty. He speaks first about *hospitalia*, making clear that the more technical Greek term, which in fact is used in Justinian's code, is *ptochotrophia*, a Latinization of the Greek word, which originally referred to a place that took care of beggars (*ptochoi*) and the needy rather than the sick. Hospitals in this sense had long been in existence in many parts of Europe, and Vives does not wish to call this institution into question. However, they must be subject to the surveillance of the city, and for this purpose two senators should be appointed to look into their finances, to record the number and names of those who are given subsistence there, and

to investigate how each person got there. Two other senators will be assigned to register the poor who remain in their homes (*huisarmen* in Dutch) and ascertain their economic situation. Vagrant beggars in good health must declare the reason for their mendicancy and will be coerced to report to the proper authorities.

The law of work is firmly laid down by Vives, buttressed by the famous command of St. Paul: "If someone does not wish to work, then let him not eat." (2 Thess. 3:10) In imposing work health and age must be taken into consideration. Of those who feign illness and infirmity, as determined by a doctor, foreigners will be provided with food for the journey (*viaticum*) and sent back to their native cities; the native born will be taught a trade and put to work. Those who have squandered their possessions through dissolute living should be fed but made to feel the pangs of hunger. Vives refers specifically to the scarcity of workers in the wool industry in Armentières and the silk industry of Bruges. The city, like a well-ordered household, cannot harbor idlers in its midst. The blind, the aged and the infirm will not be exempted from working. There are many things in which they can be profitably employed. In a zealous spirit of reform Vives advocates that the hospitals be purged of sluggards and that their finances be examined. In the second edition of September 1526 Vives added a long paragraph on the mentally ill, suggesting remedies suitable to the different types of the insane and prescribing the restoration of tranquility to their minds as the ultimate goal in caring for them. When there is no more room in the hospitals for sick beggars Vives proposes that separate homes be built to care for them, equipped with a doctor, a pharmacist and nurses, both male and female. With great insight Vives counsels that if the wages earned by the poor who remain at home are not sufficient for their daily sustenance, the city must provide them with work, but if their earnings are still below the subsistence level, they must be given a subsidy.

Chapter four is dedicated to the care of abandoned children, for whom Vives wishes that schools and good teachers be provided, both for boys and for girls, repeating what he said in *De institutione*. The most promising among the girls should be allowed to continue their education further provided it contributes to their moral improvement. Boys who are particularly gifted in letters should be retained in the school so that they may later serve as teachers of the other children and may perhaps enter the priesthood; the rest should proceed to the trades for which they show particular aptitude. Vives congratulates the magistrates of Bruges later on in the book for the successful establishment of the

*Bogaardenschool*<sup>52</sup> without naming it specifically. In the ten years since its foundation it had grown from eighteen to over a hundred students and could even accommodate more. In chapter five Vives prescribes the creation of two supervisors (he uses the Roman term *censores*) whose duty would be to inquire into the life and behavior of the poor, with particular attention to be given to old women, who he says are the chief practitioners of pandering and the black arts. He extends the authority of these censors, in a rather extraordinary manner, to the lives of young people in general and the children of the rich. He thinks this measure would be of great benefit to the city, defending it with the precedent of the office of *quaestor* instituted by Justinian<sup>53</sup> to perform this very task and also to prohibit idleness.

Vives comes now to the matter of financing. First he harks back to the early days of the church, as recorded in Acts 4:35, when everyone laid their possessions at the feet of the apostles to be distributed according to each one's needs. This responsibility was passed on first to deacons and then to lay people. As abuses crept in, however, it devolved again upon bishops and priests to fulfill this duty, but soon they too succumbed to the temptations of pomp and luxury and diverted what had belonged to the poor to their own substance and possession. In those days, Vives says, there was nothing that was not entrusted to bishops, men of proven integrity and trust. He refers to the preaching of St. John Chrysostom in this regard, who showed particular concern for the needy and the oppressed, taught that personal property was a sacred trust and that whatever exceeded our needs should be given to the poor. In the Paris edition (1530) he appropriately adds the example of the holy bishop of Toulouse, Saint Exupéry, known for his austerities and almsgiving. He quotes tellingly from a letter of Jerome (*Epistles* 52. 11) that governors of the provinces dined more lavishly in the monastery than in the palace. He reminds the clergy that it is their duty not only to teach, to console and to correct in the realm of the spirit but also to heal the body. Audaciously, he states that bishops and abbots and other officials of the church, if they were willing, could relieve a great number of the needy from the vastness of their revenues. If they are not

---

<sup>52</sup> The *Bogaarden* were initially a group of lay brothers, mostly artisans, who wished to live a truly Christian life like the Beguines. They came to Bruges c. 1250 but it was only in 1516 that the city council entrusted a school for poor and abandoned children to them.

<sup>53</sup> Justinian, *Novellae* 80. 1. 1.



willing, Christ will have his revenge. Vives is very careful, however, not to mention the mendicant orders at all,<sup>54</sup> although it was obvious that their ministrations to the poor would be affected and their very raison d'être called into question by his proposed reforms. He adds cautiously that tumult and civil discord must always be avoided, referring perhaps to the revolts in Germany. He would later write a tract, *De communione rerum* (1535) against the Anabaptists, who in their fanatical zeal were bent on subverting the whole social order.

Concerning the finances of the hospitals Vives outlines rather draconian measures. Perhaps his most revolutionary innovation is to give control of hospices to the city. He attacks the hospitals for the poor administration of their rich revenues, which if properly administered (*si recte dispensentur*), would greatly alleviate the problem, and he urges them to get rid of the drones who consume their substance. He formulates his own prudent adaptations of procedures which had recently been introduced. For example, he also suggests that the funds collected in the "common boxes" should not be donated to the undeserving, able-bodied poor who have made begging their profession, but rather to the shame-faced poor who must be sought out. With his usual caution and distrust of mankind Vives insists that two honest and trustworthy men chosen by the Senate be put in charge of these. He does not wish that the sums of money in the collection accumulate, but that this common chest should contain only what is sufficient for each week, for he does not wish that these men become accustomed to handling large sums of money. They might suffer the same fate as certain people charged with administering hospital funds. Vives pleads ignorance of the situation in Bruges since he is too occupied with his studies, but says that he had heard that in Spain many people had enriched themselves with hospital funds, adding sarcastically that instead of depopulating the hospitals they were filling their houses with servants. The city, too, should donate its fair share from funds reserved for frivolous and excessive public entertainments. Whether they be given directly or indirectly, Vives insists that alms must be freely given, which is their essence. In chapter seven he concerns himself with those who suffer sudden misfortune,

---

<sup>54</sup> Bataillon wrote an excellent article on this subject shortly before his death: Marcel Bataillon, "J.L. Vives, Réformation de la bienfaisance," *Bibliothèque d'humanisme et de la Renaissance* 14 (1952), 141–58.

like natural disasters or captivity, especially Christians who fall into the hands of the Saracens, and those in prison.

After setting forth these suggestions Vives acknowledges that they will not be suitable at all times and in all places, and that they must be introduced gradually. He foresees that there will be critics who will object that it is cruel to banish people from the city and, playing the theologian, will revert to the old attitude based on Christ's words: "The poor you shall have always with you", which he refutes vigorously. He accuses them of taking the words out of context, for did Christ not also predict that there would be scandals (Matt. 18:7), and did not Paul say that there would be heresies (1 Cor. 11:19)? Christ did not predict that the poor would be always with us because he wished it so, Vives argues, nor that scandals would come because they were pleasing to him. It was merely that he knew our weakness, by which we fall into poverty, and our malice, by which we do not immediately raise up one who has fallen, but allow him to lie there and waste away. Therefore in these predictions Christ does not command us to act in this way, but foresees that we will so act. Vives professes that his proposals do not eliminate the poor but help them; they do not prevent anyone from being poor but provide that he does not remain poor for too long, by lending him a hand to help him get up.

He wishes that there were no poor in their city, but he has no fears that Christ's words may prove to be false for there would still be plenty of poor people in other cities. By the poor Vives does not mean merely those who have no money but those who are lacking in strength of body or health or intelligence or judgment, or those who receive meager nourishment in a hospital or in their poor hovel, obtained not by their own work but entirely through someone else's good deed. "Who acts more inhumanely," he asks, "those who let the poor rot in their filth, squalor, vices, crimes, shamelessness, immorality, ignorance, madness, misfortune and misery, or those who devise a way to rescue them from this condition and lead them to a more civilized, cleaner and wiser life?"<sup>55</sup> He singles out two kinds of people who will be opposed to his proposal: those who are used to filth and content with their idleness and consider work a heavier burden than death, and those who had been

---

<sup>55</sup> ("Iam vero utri faciunt inhumanius: qui pauperes in illis suis sordibus, squalore, vitiis, flagitiis, impudentia, impudicitia, ignorantia, dementia, calamitate, miseria volunt computrescere, an qui viam excogitat qua eos illinc ereptos, ad civiliores et puriores et sapientiores vitam traducant?") *De subventionem pauperum*, p. 129.

managing the funds of the poor and would resent being divested of this office. To the second group Vives answers that he has no desire to change the original purpose of these institutions or to render the will of the founder null and void. The records will show that the founders bequeathed money not to satisfy the demands of the rich but to sustain the poor, who will pray for the soul of the deceased.

Vives ends with a spirited coda heralding the names of noble and virtuous men of antiquity who never deviated from their determination to serve their country despite the malice and recriminations of their fellow citizens. How much greater and nobler deeds should be undertaken by Christians, fixing their gaze solely upon Christ, unmindful of the limits of human strength, and following his command to practice charity so that one day they will reap an eternal reward. Great advantages will accrue to cities where these reforms will be implemented. There will be fewer crimes; pandering and sorcery will be less common. Greater harmony will exist between rich and poor in a more truly Christian society. Ever mindful of the benefits of the universal education, Vives foresees that boys and girls will be taught letters, religion, frugality and practical skills and through this training will lead upright, honest, and pious lives. They will behave like human beings, courteous to one another; in a word, they will live up to their name of Christians. Vives is confident that those who were reluctant to contribute to charity because of the uncertainty and disorganization of its administration will now be more willing to do their part and their consciences will be relieved. In return God will bless his people, as the Psalmist tells us in verses of Psalm 144. It is significant that Vives quotes verses that speak of the flourishing of children as a particular blessing:

May our sons be like new plants in their youth,  
May our daughters be like corner pillars, adorned like a temple.<sup>56</sup>

As Vives had anticipated, his treatise soon met with opposition. It came first from Nicolas de Bureau, suffragan of the diocese of Tournai, a Franciscan friar who often preached in various towns, especially Bruges. Vives reports his criticism to Cranevelt in a letter of 16 August 1527,<sup>57</sup> complaining that the man accuses him of belonging to the Lutheran faction and threatens to denounce him to the authorities. For one

---

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>57</sup> *Litterae virorum eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium*, ed. Henry de Vocht (Louvain, 1929), cp. 246, p. 631.

reason or another Bureau did not pursue his purpose, as we learn in a subsequent letter to Cranevelt written a few weeks later. Vives insists that he cannot see a single passage that any calumniator could use to his own advantage and testifies that he had taken every precaution not to jeopardize the good works he envisioned for thousands of people. Cautious indeed he was, especially with regard to the mendicant orders, whom he does not even mention in the treatise, although it was obvious that their ministrations to the poor would be affected and their very *raison d'être* called into question by his proposed reforms.

A brief treatise appeared in his lifetime, the *Tratado de la misericordia divina y humana* of Gabriel de Toro (Salamanca, 1534), which defends the practice of begging. But it was not until some years after Vives's death that a real controversy grew up in reaction to a poor law passed in Castile in 1540 which introduced a licensed system of begging. The first *artículo* of the law instructed public officials to investigate whether the beggar's poverty was true or feigned, and to inquire into the life and morals of the poor, an objective that formed an important part of Vives's program. Begging without a license would be subject to punishment, imprisonment or temporary exile, but nothing like the provisions of other European cities that prescribed public lashing and galley service. The promoter of the law himself, Juan Tavera, cardinal archbishop of Toledo and Inquisitor General of Castile, asked for the opinions of two theologians on the new legislation. Thus five years after the promulgation of the law two treatises appeared. The first, written by Domingo de Soto, a learned Neo-scholastic philosopher and theologian, was published both in Spanish, *Deliberación en la causa de los pobres*, and in Latin, *In causa pauperum deliberatio*. His arguments are based on principles of natural law and the *ius gentium*. He admits the necessity of distinguishing between legitimate beggars and illegitimate vagabonds, but not between native and foreign beggars, which he considers a violation of Christian principles, and he supports his views with relevant quotations from Thomas Aquinas. He accuses Vives directly as being one of those responsible for inciting odium against the poor through the use of rhetorical artifice in describing their squalor, rapacity and ingratitude. De Soto makes subtle distinctions between mercy (*misericordia*) and justice (*iustitia*), two virtues which he says are joined together only in God. He has little faith in human justice and does not think it is necessary to create yet another mechanism for investigating the lives of the poor. He is also skeptical that the ministers of justice will be able to distinguish the various needs of individuals. In this he differs

very much from Vives, who has implicit confidence in the efficacy of the law. De Soto argues that mercy is above justice and that works of mercy should be accomplished without consideration of the merits of the recipient. The external act of giving is not as efficacious as the inner feeling of compassion aroused by direct contact with the sufferings of the poor. It is a means of self-sanctification, as it has always been regarded by the church. These are all very noble theological arguments, to be sure, but Vives was not writing a devotional treatise. He had been asked specifically to propose a remedy for the situation that existed in his own adopted city of Bruges and he was compelled to enter into practical matters and devise concrete solutions. He saw the potential danger of vagrancy to the body politic and made rather harsh pragmatic proposals, as opposed to De Soto's lenient attitude.

Barely a month and a half after the appearance of De Soto's treatise Juan de Robles published his *De la orden que en algunos pueblos de España se ha puesto en la limosna para remedio de los verdaderos pobres* (On the regulation that has been imposed on almsgiving in some cities in Spain for the benefit of those who are truly poor). Robles is more in sympathy with Vives, acknowledging that some practical measures had to be taken. He sees the necessity of distinguishing the vagabond from the deserving beggar and is also of the opinion that in addition to mere compassion some effort must be made to improve the condition of the poor. He defends very strongly, with Vives, the duty of work. He dismisses the pietistic view of many of the clergy (including De Soto) that the great clamor of beggars during Holy Week added to the devotion of the faithful. For Robles such demonstrations and begging in general were a distraction to piety and constituted a forceful indictment made by the poor against the indifference of the rich. He argues that the safeguarding of the public good is more important than individual liberties. Both De Soto and Robles, however, were adamantly opposed to any secularization of the care of the poor, which is implicitly advocated by Vives.

In Bruges itself, where the wool trade was languishing, the ranks of the poor continued to grow, so much so that the city felt the need to respond to the crisis. A pensionary of the city, Gilles Wyts, wrote a treatise entitled *De continendis et alendis domi pauperibus et in ordinem redigendis validis mendicantibus* (On maintaining and nourishing the poor at home and systematizing beggars able to work), Antwerp, 1562. The treatise called for more severe measures than those advanced by Vives: total prohibition of begging, the limiting of hospitality to foreigners to no more than two days, board and lodging for the genuinely poor to be

provided in their own homes or in houses established for them. In his view the poor were those who were by nature timid, the shame-faced (*verecundi*) poor who would not stoop to begging, such as manual workers who had fallen ill or even those of higher social rank stricken by misfortune. Wyts preached a gospel of work. He complains that there is no one to work in the fields or in the factories. Begging is more lucrative, a theme taken from Vives.

The regulations ultimately proposed by the city council of Bruges in 1564 are much more lenient than those suggested by Wyts: they allow those unable to earn their living by their own hands to ask for the leavings at the tables of monasteries and at the doors of the rich, and they would not be obliged to wear a badge identifying them as poor. At this point an Augustinian monk, Lorenzo de Villavicencio, a skilled orator appointed as chaplain to the merchant community in Bruges, appears on the scene. The bishop, not wishing to incur the hostility of the mendicant orders, commissioned Villavicencio to answer Wyts' pamphlet. His *De oeconomia sacra circa pauperum curam* (Antwerp, 1564) is a vehement attack against the city officials, accusing them of clandestine Lutheranism and of interfering with the sacred right of the church to supervise almsgiving. He cites Vives's text specifically as the source of this intrusion of the profane and the secular into the spiritual realm and refutes some of Vives's veiled charges against the clergy. For Wyts he reserves more serious accusations, including collusion with the bishop and senate of Bruges. But aside from defending the usual traditionalist position of the inviolability of the church's jurisdiction, Villavicencio has nothing new to offer. The controversy was turned over again to the Louvain theologians, who found his accusations against the senate too reckless. In the end it seems that no action was taken. Margaret of Austria refused to consign Wyts' book to the flames in the public square, as Villavicencio had urged. As a temporary solution to the problem of poverty it was decided in session xxv of the Council of Trent in December 1563 that bishops should convert some of their church revenue into works of charity and that more hospitals be provided for the poor, a measure that Vives had suggested forty years earlier.

The principles and structures outlined by Vives in the rather radical proposals of his treatise continued to have strong influence throughout the sixteenth century and it was translated into various languages wherever new social legislation was being contemplated. The first translation to appear in print was one into Dutch in 1533, and later in that same year it was translated into German by Caspar Hedio, a

Strasbourg Reformer, with whom Vives was acquainted. This was followed by an Italian translation which appeared in Venice in 1545, the work of Giandomenico Tarsio, who belonged to a family with Protestant sympathies. A French translation of 1583 was dedicated to the directors and administrators of the famous *Aumonerie générale* of Lyons. In recent times a forgotten translation into Spanish, probably written around 1531 by Bernardo Pérez Chinchón, has suddenly come to light, published in a splendid edition by Joaquim Parellada.<sup>58</sup> Chinchón, also a *converso*, was the tutor of the sons of the duke of Gandía, don Juan de Borja, a friend of Vives. Gregorio Mayans published a translation in 1781, which he attributed to a certain Juan Gonzalo Nieto Ibarra, whom Valentín Moreno has convincingly shown to be identical with a count of that name at the royal court in 1558.<sup>59</sup>

There were no early translations into English but Vives's ideas were transmitted in the English version of the Ypres document of 1535, *Forma subventionis pauperum*, which incorporates many of Vives's proposals. The translator was William Marshall,<sup>60</sup> who may well have been involved in the drafting of Cromwell's statute in 1536 to set vagabonds to work when they returned to their native towns, to provide weekly collections for the impotent poor as well as punishment for the able-bodied or "sturdy" poor. It also put a ban on begging and casual almsgiving. Various pieces of legislation followed, including a law of 1572 which ordered surveys and assessments of the poor, as Vives had urged, but the definitive implementation of all these measures was not enforced until the Elizabethan codification of 1597 and 1601, which remained fundamentally unchanged for 250 years.

It has been noted that there was little that was completely original in Vives's treatise, but it was his clear presentation of the whole problem and its possible remedies that made it a seminal work. The first book, despite its great merits, was too theoretical and philosophical for general consumption. What does seem to be original with him is his plan of transferring the administration of hospitals from private ownership to the municipal authorities. In one passage of the work he voices strong

---

<sup>58</sup> *Juan Luis Vives Tratado del Socorro de pobres. Traducción inédita del siglo XVI de Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón*, ed. Joaquim Parellada (Valencia, 2006).

<sup>59</sup> Valentín Moreno Gallego, *La recepción Hispana de Juan Luis Vives* (Valencia, 2006), p. 747.

<sup>60</sup> See Geoffrey Rudolph Elton, *Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 137–54.

criticism of the situation in Spain, which he says he had heard from older people in Spain.<sup>61</sup> He obviously did not wish to make any comments about the city of Bruges or other industrial cities of the Low Countries, but he made his point.

Vives's work remains a milestone in the history of the relief of the poor. It defended the dignity of work, advocated the creation of jobs for the handicapped, provided for the education of the more gifted children of the poor, transferred the responsibility of caring for the poor from private individuals and from the church to a centralized, lay administration. At the same time he never openly attacked the church or even hinted at expropriating church property, and prudently never mentioned the mendicant orders. He also made sure to maintain a safe distance from the wholesale secularization of charity that was instituted in the cities where religious reform had taken root.

---

<sup>61</sup> *De subventionem pauperum*, p. 118.





## THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUAN LUIS VIVES: CONCORD AND COUNSEL IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH

Catherine Curtis

Much previous scholarship on the social and political thought of the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives has focused on the question of his ‘pacifism’ and his conception of European unity in the face of the Turkish threat to the integrity of Christendom.<sup>1</sup> Rather than discuss whether Vives was an “absolute” pacifist or not, I wish to concentrate on the development of his conceptions in relation to the writings and diplomatic milieu of the English and Erasmian humanists, and their precursors.<sup>2</sup> It is well recognized that Vives developed his philosophy concerning peace and war with reference to the thought of Erasmus and others within his circle.<sup>3</sup> I will suggest that the Italian and earlier English origins of many of the ideas of Vives have not been sufficiently recognized; the key concepts of concord and discord, which are tethered to a psychological understanding of the passions of individuals and nations, find direct inspiration not only in Erasmus, but in the orations surrounding the Universal Peace of 1518—which in turn have their origins in Marsilius of Padua’s *Defensor Pacis*, orations delivered to

---

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful for the generosity of the Australian Humanities Research Council in offering a Travelling Fellowship to research this study, and to Charles Fantazzi, Conal Condren and Jean Pretorius for their very helpful criticisms. My study is greatly indebted to the Vives scholarship mentioned herein: *Juan Luis Vives. De Europae dissidiis et republica*. Translation and notes by Francisco Calero and Maria José Echarte (Valencia, 1992); *Obras políticas y pacifistas*, trans. and notes by Francisco Calero, Maria José Echarte, Luisa Arribas and Pilar Usábel, (Madrid, 1999), pp. 16–21, pp. 32–53. I refer to the Vives edition, *Joannis Ludovici Vvis Valentini opera omnia*, (hereafter Majansius), ed. Gregorio Majansius, 8 vols. (Valencia, 1782–90; London: Gregg Press, 1964). I use the male pronoun throughout, in accordance with Vives’s usage.

<sup>2</sup> José A. Fernández-Santamaría, *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance, 1516–1559*, (Cambridge, 1977) has compared Vives’s thought on war to that of Valdés in particular, and other Spanish thinkers such as Vitoria. Vives mentions Vitoria in a letter to Erasmus (Allen, ep. 1836) but he knew him only by report from Spanish acquaintances. He makes several unsubstantiated statements about him in this letter. José L. Abellán, *El pacifismo de Juan Luis Vives*, (Valencia, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> For example, Philip C. Dust, *Three Renaissance Pacifists. Essays in the Theories of Erasmus, More and Vives*, (Bern, Frankfurt and New York, 1987).

the Papal Court and in the peace discourse post The Hundred Year's War.

The main argument of this chapter is that Vives insisted on the need for freedom of speech in the admonition of princes, and indeed all the estates of civil and ecclesiastical society; wise counsel was crucial for the health of the Christian *respublica*. Vives himself adopted the role of counsellor in the period under discussion, although as one who retained more independence and acted more indirectly than others employed in the service of a pope or European prince—than, say, Thomas More. Vives's reforming voice continued to express his belief in a Christ-centred political ethos based in love, benevolence and peace when others became more constrained by the difficulties of courtly and diplomatic life.

The chapter moves from a initial brief presentation of the chronology of the texts under examination to the European and particularly English context in which they were composed, before pursuing a more detailed consideration of Vives's highly significant contribution to early modern thought on peace and war, tyranny and liberty, and the psychological origins of discord. The chapter concludes with an indication of some avenues for exploring the rich and under-used legacy of Vives. It is often held that Vives's message in his peace writings fell on unreceptive ears in the early sixteenth century and effected no change in the leaders to whom it was directed. In this regard there are two points to be made at the outset. First, Vives attempted to persuade all who held offices in the *respublica Christiana*, even at the level of family relationships, towards concord and away from discord. Second, in the later sixteenth century and into the seventeenth century, aspects of the thought of Vives may arguably be discerned in writers and monarchs—in, for example, Thomas Elyot, Elizabeth I, Justus Lipsius, Montaigne, James I and VI, Hugo Grotius, Descartes, Spinoza, Robert Burton, and Thomas Hobbes.

### I. *Vives's Socio-political Publications, 1522–1529*

Vives's political interventions, considered here, date from 1522 to 1529. The humanist epistle to leading secular and ecclesiastical leaders across Europe was a favored genre. Vives's satire, *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico* (*On Europe Divided and the Turkish War*) was first published

in Bruges in 1526 by Herbert de Croock.<sup>4</sup> It was part of an ensemble volume, the *De Europae dissidiis et re publica* which contained, in order, a letter from Vives to the new Pope Adrian VI dated 12 October 1522, and printed at Louvain, *De Europae statu ac tumultibus*, two letters to Henry VIII, dated 12 March 1525 and 8 October 1525 respectively, the dialogue *De dissidiis*, of October 1526, a letter to Cardinal Wolsey which dedicated Vives's translations of Isocrates, and a final letter to John Longland, Bishop of Lincoln and confessor to the king, of July 8, 1524.

Vives himself regarded the volume as a unity in its espousal of the urgent need for European secular and ecclesiastical princes to put aside internecine warfare and preserve the integrity of the Christian republic in the face of the Turkish incursions in Europe by combining their forces.<sup>5</sup> If the letters of the volume are primarily directed to English political players, the dialogue and the letter to Adrian VI open up the volume to a wider European audience—as does its publication on the continent. Indeed, the contents of the 'English' letters with their stress on the virtues of benevolent rule have application beyond their immediate recipients, to any Christian prince of the state or church, their advisors and their subjects.

Vives published the long treatise in four books, *De concordia et discordia in humano genere* in 1529, dedicated to Charles V, the king of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor. Later in the same year *De pacificatione*, a sequel to *De concordia*, was published in Bruges. It was dedicated to Alfonso Manrique, Spain's highest ecclesiastical authority and the Grand Inquisitor. This tract was composed also in 1529 as a necessary sequel to *De concordia*, as the dedicatory epistle maintains. It is also a companion to *De dissidiis*, all three concerned with the theme of Christian harmony and the proper conduct of all the offices of the commonweal, from prince to father, scholar to soldier, theologian to counsellor, farm worker to wife.

Throughout all is the Stoic conception of the *summum bonum*—peace. And throughout all is the pervasive belief in the efficacy of counsel.

<sup>4</sup> Reprinted in Basel in 1538. See Carlos Noreña, *A Vives Bibliography* (Lampeter, 1990), pp. 16–20. *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*, Majansius, 6, pp. 444–52.

<sup>5</sup> Edward V. George, "Juan Luis Vives's *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*: Its Place in the 1526 Ensemble," *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bariensis*, eds. Juan Francisco Alcina et al. (Tempe, AZ, 1998), pp. 259–66.

The two fundamental and interdependent categories which structure Vives's argumentation are concord and discord. The other conception underlying Vives's political thought is that of office.<sup>6</sup> Security and peace in society must be guaranteed by the prince so that all other members of the commonwealth can perform their designated offices without interruption or fear of molestation, so bringing prosperity and order. Such a structure at times forces a circular and therefore unconvincing argument, is highly didactic, and precludes a nuanced approach to the complex problems of the period. Its interest lies in the cumulative humanist historical method which recasts just war argument and attempts to alter contemporary European thought about governance and civil society in a time of religious, social and political crisis.

## II. *The European Context: the Diplomacy of War and Peace*

In October 1518 the long-awaited Treaty of Universal Peace was signed by England and France, with the provision for the inclusion of other powers and minor signatories, such as the Holy Roman Empire, the papacy, Spain, Hungary, Portugal Denmark, the Italian states, the Swiss Confederation and the Hanseatic towns.<sup>7</sup> In March 1518 Pope Leo X had called for a crusade against the Turks, issuing a bull pro-

---

<sup>6</sup> Conal Condren, *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England*, (Cambridge, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> See Nicholas Craft, "The 1518 Treaty of London and Early Modern Approaches to International Relations", MA Thesis, University of Melbourne, 2006. Craft points out that the *Confoederatio generalis* was actually five treaties grouped together, one being multi-lateral and the rest bi-lateral between England and France. He argues that the European players needed reassurance that the Anglo-French alliance was not offensive, so the treaty was cast as a universal defensive peace against the Turkish threat. His argument that the treaty marked a significant point of transition to modern ideas of international relations is very persuasive. This section is informed by Garrett Mattingly, "An Early Non-Aggression Pact," *The Journal of Modern History* 10, 1 (1938), 1–30; Glenn Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy: The Reigns of Henry VIII, Francis I and Charles V*, (2002), pp. 36–62; and his "Eternal Peace, Occasional War: Anglo-French Relations under Henry VIII," in *Tudor England and its Neighbours*, eds. Susan Doran and Glenn Richardson (Hampshire and New York, 2005), pp. 44–73; David Potter, "Foreign Policy," in *The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics, Policy and Piety*, ed. Diarmaid MacCulloch (London, 1995), pp. 101–34; also Richard Hoyle, "War and Public Finance," pp. 75–100 in the same; Randall Lesaffer, "Amicitia in Renaissance Peace and Alliance Treaties," *Journal of the History of International Law* 4, 1 (2002), 77–99 and his "The Westphalia Peace Treaties and the Development of the Tradition of the Great Peace Settlements Prior to 1648," *Grotiana* 18 (1997), 71–95.

posing a five year truce among European powers. With little response from France, Spain and Venice, many including Wolsey and Henry VIII were skeptical of the Crusade. Wolsey seized the initiative from Leo X with a proposed treaty of collective security in which all the powers would swear in advance to punish any breach of peace by any of the signatories, and in which England was to be arbiter. The treaty was framed in such a way as to take the reins of the Christian empire from the hands of the pope alone, and place them partially in those of the princes. It shows the probable influence of Erasmus' adage, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, and the *Querela pacis* of late 1517, along with the 1454 peace treaties of Lodi. Three of the signatories of the treaty were closely associated with Vives during his English visits—Thomas More, Richard Pace and Cuthbert Tunstall. Others whom Vives himself lists as friends are Linacre, Latimer, Claymond, Mountjoy, Fisher, Hannibal and Sampson.<sup>8</sup> What is important to stress at this point is that humanists associated with the Henrician court tended to cooperate as a group on a number of interrelated issues concerning governance, diplomacy and religious matters. While differences in emphases, style and degree of *parrhesia* can be discerned, they held to a scholarly ideal of *amicitia* in approaching issues in a coordinated manner. An examination of other humanists beyond Erasmus and More's interaction with Vives

---

<sup>8</sup> See Juan Luis Vives, *Epistolario*, ed. José Jiménez Delgado (Madrid, 1978), pp. 45–6, where the editor confuses the young English friend and student of Vives, Richard Pate, with Richard Pace in his reference to the letter of Vives to Cranevelt, no. 80, Oxford 1523, but Henry de Vocht correctly identifies Pace: "Ex conditione ista mea nihil concepti potest quod mihi arrideat magis, quam Principes. Est quidem stipendium, et amicis furor omni disciplinarum genere magnis et suscipiendis: nosti Moros, Linacros, Tunstallus, Latimeros, Claymundos, Montioyos, Roffenses; expectamus in dies Pacaeum, Annibalem; etiam Sampsonem; in quibus non potest maxime eruditioni quam dulce condimentum ab humanitate et commoditate Morum accesserit, quae deesse germanae et <gnesios> doctis non solet." *Litterae virorum eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium*, ed. Henry de Vocht (Louvain, 1929) ep. 80, note 6. Pate was the nephew of John Longland, Bishop of Lincoln, and became ambassador to Spain in 1533 and later Bishop himself who died in exile in 1559. George E. McCully, Jr., *Juan Luis Vives (1493–1540) and the Problem of Evil in His Time* (Diss. Columbia University, 1967) also confuses Pate with Pace as does Ángel Gómez-Hortigüela Amillo, "Dicha y Desaventura en la Corte de Inglaterra," *Luis Vives Entre Líneas: el humanista valenciano en su contexto*, (Valencia, 1992), pp. 241–52. p. 246. On Vives's relations with the English court see Foster Watson, *Les relations de Joan Luis Vives amb els anglesos i amb l'Angleterra* (Barcelona, 1918), esp. pp. 154–93; and with Pace, pp. 179–81. Henry de Vocht, "Vives and his Visits to England," *Monumenta Humanistica Lovaniensia* 4 (1934) pp. 1–60. More generally, see Enrique González y González, *De la escolástica al humanismo* (Valencia, 1988).

provides another counterpoint which further illuminates the writings of the Spaniard.

Pace, Dean of St Paul's, ambassador, servant of Wolsey and secretary to Henry VIII, had probably been closely involved in the negotiations and drafting of the treaty. It was therefore highly appropriate that he should be chosen by the king to give an oration praising peace as the highest good on the occasion of the proclamation of the Treaty at St. Paul's Cathedral on October 3, 1518. Tunstall also delivered an oration two days later, on the occasion of the solemnizing of the betrothal of Princess Mary of England and the French infant heir, which was to ratify the treaty. And this oration too rejoices in the pledge of peace between France and England that will be commodious for Europe (*Europa*) as a whole.

The orations of Pace and Tunstall are important sources for many of the main structuring ideas underlying Vives's writings under discussion. They reward detailed consideration because Pace and Tunstall express with admirable concision themes developed at length and in depth by Vives.<sup>9</sup> Pace's intellectual formation was in the universities of Italy, where he studied under famous humanist scholars of Latin and Greek, rhetoric, medicine, Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy and the natural sciences—such as Niccolò Leonico Tomeo of Padua.<sup>10</sup> Pace's long enduring friendship with Erasmus dates from these years. An accomplished humanist orator who himself composed *De fructu*, the first English textbook on the *ars eloquentiae* and its use in reforming civil and ecclesiastical life, he had witnessed many orations in the papal court and the Fifth Lateran Council while in the service of Cardinal Christopher Bainbridge. Pace admired Giles of Viterbo who spoke audaciously of the necessity for peace among Christian princes under the leadership

---

<sup>9</sup> *Oratio Richardi Pacei in pace nuperrime composita...inter Angliae regem et Francorum regem...in aede divi Pauli Londini habita*, Richard Pynson, London 1518, STC 19081a. English translation in Appendix A, "Richard Pace's oration," in Joycelyne G. Russell's *Peacemaking in the Renaissance* (London, 1986), pp. 234–41. Foster Watson makes a brief comment noticing the similarity between Pace's title and that of Vives's Letter to Henry VIII, *De Pace inter Caesarem et Franciscum Galliarum regem*, pp. 179–80. On Pace, see Cathy Curtis, "Richard Pace", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 298–302. Hereafter *ODNB*.

<sup>10</sup> Cathy Curtis, "Richard Pace on Pedagogy, Counsel and Satire," PhD dissertation, Univ. of Cambridge (1996), Chap. 1. Jervis Wegg, *Richard Pace: A Tudor Diplomatist* (New York and London, 1932), p. 9. *Contemporaries of Erasmus-A Biographical Register*, ed. Peter Bietenholz et al., 3 vols. (Toronto, 1985–87), vol. 2, pp. 323–24. Jonathan Woolfson, *Padua and the Tudors: English Students in Italy, 1485–1603* (Cambridge, 1998).

of the pope at the Fifth Lateran Council, and insisted on the necessity of church councils for religious reform; and expressed disgust for other papal orators such as Inghirami who justified war-mongering by Julius II as legitimate territorial expansion which preserved the ancient liberty and *imperium* of the church in exceptional circumstances.<sup>11</sup> I believe that oratory of the papal court was central to the development of peace discourse among humanists such as Pace, and more indirectly, to Vives. Drawing on the rhetorical topos of a universe of unity, concord and harmony, sermons in the papal court gave a theological base “to a practical task whose urgency in the light of schisms and threats of schisms, wars and threats of wars” was only too obvious. This was usually connected with a call to arms against the Turks which would reunite Christian princes in a common cause and redirect energies away from internecine campaigns.<sup>12</sup> The writings of Seneca, Pliny, Sallust and Silius Italicus also nourished humanist thought of war and peace, and especially that of Cicero’s *De officiis* on how princes (and all civil actors) should fulfill their respective offices in rule and conduct with one another.<sup>13</sup> Pace’s later contacts with republican theorists such as Contarini and Guicciardini, and support for conciliar structures of government for church and state, suggest a writer who struggled to serve

---

<sup>11</sup> *De fructu qui ex doctrina percipitur*, ed. and trans. Frank Manley and Richard S. Sylvester, (New York, 1967), pp. 16–17. Curtis, “Pace on Pedagogy, Counsel and Satire,” chap. 4. The Latin text of Giles’s sermon is in *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, ed. John D. Mansi (Paris, 1902), English Translation in “Egidio da Viterbo’s Address to the Fifth Lateran Council, 1512,” in *Catholic Reformation: Savonarola to Ignatius Loyola, Reform in the Church, 1495–1540*, ed. J. Olin (New York, 1969), pp. 40–53. Clare O’Reilly, “Without Councils we cannot be saved...”: Giles of Viterbo addresses the Fifth Lateran Council,” *Augustiniana* 27 (1977), 166–204. John McManamon points out that while Italian humanist orators concentrated on great deeds performed in battle, they grappled with issues related to the conduct of war, for example that generals should display justice and clemency to the defeated. Brunni had implicitly censured shifting alliances and open treachery. The appeal to Cicero was common, for example *De officiis* 1.2.34–35, no war could be waged unless peace were the final goal. See John McManamon, “The Ideal Renaissance Pope: Funeral Oratory from the Papal Court,” *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 14 (1976), pp. 9–70, esp. pp. 31–32, 40–42, 51, and his *Funeral Oratory and the Ideals of Italian Humanism* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1989). Joycelyne G. Russell, *Diplomats at Work* (Stroud, 1992), p. 17.

<sup>12</sup> John W. O’Malley, “The Discovery of America and Reform Thought at the Papal Court in the Early Cinquecento,” *First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old*, ed. Fred Chiapelli (London, 1976), 1, pp. 185–200. O’Malley argues that despite Julius II’s warrior exploits, there yet existed an insistent and explicit peace discourse among the orators and theologians of the papal court.

<sup>13</sup> Ben Lowe, “Peace Discourse and Mid-Tudor Policy,” in *Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth*, eds. Paul A. Fideler and T.F. Mayer (London, 1992), p. 113.



a monarch and his *alter rex*, Wolsey, in a way that best preserved the interests of all the subjects of England, not merely princely ambitions of glory and honour. Tunstall, also educated in Italy and associated with the Leonico circle, was likewise a student of rhetoric and well acquainted with the *negotium* of European courts.<sup>14</sup>

In his oration, Pace employs Greek and Roman (particularly Stoic) authorities along with Scriptural citation. It draws *copia* from *figurae sententiarum*, some of which Erasmus had recently expanded upon, such *Dulce bellum inexpertis* and *Sileni Alcibiadis*. Belonging to the *genus laudatio*, it is a praise of the fruits of peace as the outcome of the attainment of the Stoic goods of justice, honor and expediency (*iustitia, honestas* and *utilitas*) and a censure of the incommunities of pestilent war.<sup>15</sup> Much of its matter is a gloss on Cicero's *De officiis*. The *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius of Padua provides the underlying structure of contraries; this text opens with the authority of the late Roman author Cassiodorus (*Variae* 1.1), to the effect that all realms must desire tranquillity, so that peoples prosper, the arts flourish and the profit of the nations is guaranteed.<sup>16</sup> Marsilius refers to this letter, as setting forth the advantages and fruits of tranquillity or peace of civil regimes so that he might persuade men to pursue peace with one another, and so tranquillity. He then cites various Old and New Testament *sententiae* on peace, and Sallust's *Bellum Jugurthinum*, 1.10, as does Pace. Marsilius, appropriated by later conciliarists and considered by Rome to be guilty of heresy, is not explicitly identified by Pace as his source. To have done so would have invited opprobrium and suspicion from some quarters. Within an existing rich discourse of peace, Marsilius could be mined for useful material (especially under the cover of Aristotelianism) but the provenance left safely unstated.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Curtis, "Pace on Pedagogy, Counsel and Satire," chap. 1. "Cuthbert Tunstall", *ODNB*, pp. 551–55.

<sup>15</sup> Cf Erasmus, *Ecclesiastes* ASD V-4 312: pp. 631–34: *utilitas* depends on putting forth the advantageous (*commoda*) and driving out the disadvantageous (*incommoda*). Manfred Hoffmann, *Rhetoric and Theology: the Hermeneutic of Erasmus* (Toronto, 1994), p. 205.

<sup>16</sup> *Marsilius of Padua. The Defender of the Peace*, ed. and trans. Annabel Brett (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 3–10. This reliance on Marsilius in Pace's oration has not previously been recognized.

<sup>17</sup> For example, William Marshall was commissioned to translate the *Defensor pacis* into English between 1533 and 1535 as part of Henry's divorce campaign. Shelley Lockwood, "Marsilius of Padua and the case for the royal ecclesiastical supremacy," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 1 (1991) pp. 89–119. I am very grateful

Such praise and dispraise has as its rhetorical end the urging of a particular policy or action. Pace's audience is told that just as their ancestors revealed their prudence in the framing of holy treaties, so there is nothing more laudable, necessary and useful than the giving and receiving of faith. If faith be kept inviolate, as should be ensured by a treaty based in holiness, all discord and dissension, all war, is done away with.<sup>18</sup> It is replaced with ease, tranquillity and perpetual peace. The fruit of peace is so ample and abundant that no orator, no matter how learned or eloquent, can praise it sufficiently. "By discord do great affairs dissolve, by concord and peace do small affairs grow."<sup>19</sup> Peace makes the minds of men tranquil and quiet, and far removed from murder and crime, the services of war. Pace draws on the authority of Isocrates, St. Paul, Silius Italicus, the prophet David and the New Testament to insist on peace as being in accordance with nature and most useful for man. The teaching of the Redeemer Christ is concord, charity and peace (*concordia, caritas, pax*).<sup>20</sup> What could please God more than the practice of the arts of peace?

Set against the advantages of peace are the evils of the arts of war fuelled by greed and cruelty—the ruination of cities and religion. Pace despairs of the invention of stratagems and machines of war, fruits of an acute mind yet prone to evil. What honour is there in a victory prosecuted through the use of diabolical bombards which induce bewilderment, hallucination, the alienation of the senses—so depriving man of his self-control and reason that he does not know himself? Even wild animals, tigers, lions and serpents do not plan such devastation. Man, endowed with reason, should display virtue.

Amplifying his main theme, Pace turns to speak of the treaty. Pace adapts the Roman metaphor of the Church as the bark of Peter tossed on the seas, which was usually associated with the topos of the Turkish threat and the discord of internal schism (as in Giles of Viterbo's oration). His earlier allusion to Isocrates's *De pace* is apposite, as he had often urged a pan-Hellenic alliance to arrest internecine warfare among the Greeks who were threatened externally by the advance of

---

to Conal Condren for pointing out the difficulty in approaching the use of Marsilius in the period.

<sup>18</sup> *Oratio in pace*, pp. 234–35; Pynson, sig. A2v.

<sup>19</sup> "*Discordia res magnae dilabuntur, concordia vero crescent.*" Sallust, *Bellum Jugurthinum* 10.6. Cf. *Defensor pacis*, Discourse I, chap. 1, pp. 4–5.

<sup>20</sup> *Oratio in pace*, p. 236; Pynson, sig. A3v.

the Persians from the East.<sup>21</sup> Italian humanists, recognizing a parallel with their present situation with the Turks, admired the position and adopted it. Pace speaks of the Turkish threat, as set out in the preamble of the treaty, as constituting the necessity (*necessitas*) for health-giving peace (*salutifera pax*) amongst Christian monarchs. In the light of the advances of Selim in Egypt, princes must wake from their slumbers and unite to preserve the Christian faith, if not their own honour and safety. In a scarcely concealed sally at the triumphal processions of Popes Julius II and Leo X, Pace argues that when Isaiah had proclaimed the coming of Christ, he had promised a prince of peace to reconcile the world, rather than a leader experienced in war or triumphant warrior riding in glory on a white horse after gaining victory.<sup>22</sup>

From general argument from natural and divine law, Pace moves to an encomium on Henry VIII, praising the strength and beauty of Henry's body which breathes war, his wealth which is the sinews of war, the warlike nation that is his subject, and his glorious conduct in his recent war which he would have won had he chosen to continue. The emphasis then shifts. Henry nevertheless despised all glory and increase of fortune and rejected all incitements to the prosecution of war; and turned his mind to peace for the common tranquillity of all Christians. Pace presents both Henry VIII and Francis I, the Most Christian King, as young, powerful, wealthy and yet as having each repressed by reason (*ratio*) and counsel (*consilium*) the youthful propensity to extend territory. Nothing can be more alien from great princes than to violate their faith—excommunication awaits any one who abrogates this peace.<sup>23</sup> Pace also praises the critical role played by the counselors of both kings, with Wolsey receiving particular attention. The oration was well-received by French and Venetian ambassadors.<sup>24</sup> Its undercurrent of criticism and sharp admonition did not compromise Pace's standing with Henry.

<sup>21</sup> *Oratio in pace*, p. 235; Pynson, sig. A2r. cf. Isocrates, *De pace*, 2. See Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Philosophy and Rhetoric from Classical Antiquity to the Renaissance," in *Renaissance Thought and its Sources*, ed. Michael Mooney (New York, 1979), pp. 211–59.

<sup>22</sup> *Oratio in pace*, pp. 236–38; Pynson, sig. A3v–V4r. Isaiah 9:6.

<sup>23</sup> *Oratio in pace*, pp. 238–41; Pynson, sig. B1v–B3r.

<sup>24</sup> The French humanist Guillaume Budé reported to Pace his admiration for the oration and hopes for a mutually beneficial peace and opportunity for a crusade. *Epistolae Gulielmi Regii Secretarii*, (Basel, 1520, repr. 1521), sig. B2r.

Tunstall's oration similarly drew analogies between the inviolable nature of the marriage vows and the peace treaty, both a reflection of the mystical and sacramental relationship between Christ and his church. In his conception of the corporate and analogous structure of ecclesiastical and secular society, Tunstall is in agreement with Pace. The pledge of peace between two neighbouring lands and the revival of blood relations between these royal families through marriage would be expedient for all the Christian world. Peace between England and France would ensure that farming, commerce and trade, and the cause of good letters throughout Europe were possible. The inconveniences of war were disruption to all these, and terrible suffering for the common people.<sup>25</sup> A barb nestles within the encomium to princess Mary. Little children give joy to their father when they first attempt to speak and utter nonsense words, and when they contend for nuts with quickly aroused and dissipated anger—like kings for kingdoms.<sup>26</sup>

Between 1518 and the Field of the Cloth of Gold of June 1520 hopes for peace among Henry VIII's humanist counsellors and their friends remained high. Henry VIII and Richard Pace both made orations praising the benefits of peace at the meeting between Francis I and Henry at Calais, although neither text survives and the account is preserved by witnesses.<sup>27</sup> Pace beseeched God to render perpetual this peace and concord between the two kings, confirmed by their good friendship and fraternity. But the Venetian ambassador to France mused that these sovereigns were not at peace in fact, but rather accommodated themselves to circumstances and hated each other most cordially.<sup>28</sup>

Before outlining some pertinent diplomatic developments up till 1529, another likely source for the political ideas of Vives—and choice of satiric genre for *De dissidiis*—is provided by the highly controversial and anonymously issued satirical dialogue, the *Julius exclusus*, which was published in late 1517 or early 1518. It had circulated in manuscript

<sup>25</sup> *In laudem matrimonii oratio, habita in sponsalibus Mariae... Henrici filiae, et Francisci... Francorum Regis primogeniti*, Basel, 1519, sig. A2r, A4r, B4r. The King's printer Pynson, and John Froben both produced editions, in 1518 (London) and 1519 (Basel) respectively.

<sup>26</sup> *In laudem matrimonii oratio*, sigB2v–B3r.

<sup>27</sup> *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII*, ed. John S. Brewer et al. (London, 1862–1910) vol. 3, i, no. 869, p. 312. Joycelyne G. Russell, *The Field of the Cloth of Gold: Men and Manners in 1520*, (London, 1969), pp. 175–6.

<sup>28</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, ed. Rawdon Brown et al., 9 vols. (London, 1864–98) vol. 3, p. 119; Robert P. Adams, *The Better Part of Valor: More, Erasmus, Colet, and Vives on humanism, war, and peace, 1496–1535* (Seattle, 1962), pp. 158–85.

from around 1513, originally composed between the death of Pope Julius II and the election of Leo X, and revised in the light of the last sessions of the Fifth Lateran Council to be pirated, it appears, by German humanist Protestant printers. It went through twelve editions from 1518 to 1521. Well known to the Erasmian circle, and hence to members of the Henrician court, from its circulation in manuscript at least from 1517, it would become part of the propaganda campaign surrounding Henry's Great Matter in the early 1530s.<sup>29</sup> Its authorship is usually attributed to Erasmus; more recently I have argued that its English author was in fact Richard Pace, who never intended its publication, especially as he now occupied one of the highest offices in England and was intimately involved with diplomatic negotiations on the behalf of Henry and Wolsey across the continent, from the Italian states to the imperial courts.<sup>30</sup> Whether this widely read and translated satire should be attributed to Pace rather than Erasmus (or another such as Ulrich von Hutten) can be put to one side for the immediate purposes of this discussion, although it clearly has some bearing. What is crucial to recognize is that it provides a generic precedent for *De dissidiis*, as it does for Erasmus' Lucianic dialogue *Charon* and Valdés' *Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón* (*Dialogue between Mercury and Charon*), both of 1529. And furthermore, its conciliarist argument (found also in Pace's *De fructu* of 1518) finds resonance in Vives's version of this dialogue of the dead.

The colloquial language and change between rapid exchanges and longer speeches are shared, both modelled on the New Comedy of Terence and Plautus. Here I wish to specify a number of common themes. In the *Julius*, the interlocutor St Peter insists on the need for wide consultation and good counsel, for the exercise of freedom of speech by learned and virtuous men in frequently convened assemblies, whether church councils or senates, as a remedy against tyranny.<sup>31</sup> Against the

---

<sup>29</sup> English translations, with the text modified to please Henry, were printed in c. 1533 and 1535. E.J. Devereux, *Renaissance English Translations of Erasmus: A Bibliography to 1700*, (Toronto, 1983).

<sup>30</sup> The attribution to Pace is accepted by Patrick Collinson, "Peter's Heirs," *Times Literary Supplement*, 26 Dec. 1997; Susan Brigden, *New Worlds, Lost Worlds: The Rule of the Tudors 1485–1603* (London, 2001), p. 92; Conal Condren, "Between Social Constraint and Public Sphere: On Misreading Political Satire," *Contemporary Political Theory*, I (2002), pp. 79–101; p. 86; Diarmuid MacCulloch, *Reformation: Europe's House Divided 1490–1700* (London, 2004), pp. 102–3; and thought probable by David S. Chambers, *Popes, Cardinals and War* (London, 2006), p. 132.

<sup>31</sup> Curtis, "Pace on Pedagogy, Satire and Counsel," pp. 235–44.

self-damning argument of the shade of the absolutist Julius, St. Peter posits a return to the ideals of the Primitive church, a persuasive and health-giving discourse of reconciliation, *pax* and *concordia*, and a concerted effort against the Turkish threat. St Peter takes Julius to task for endangering the *respublica Christiana* through his policy of territorial expansion funded through illegal and punitive taxation and the sale of offices and indulgences, and by encouraging faction and discord between European princes—all outlined in great detail. For St. Peter, Christ is the true head and lawgiver of the body of the Church, not the pope; the welfare of the Christian commonwealth is more important than the majesty of any individual pope. The exchanges between the interlocutors St Peter and Julius are structured by the debate between Jacques Almain and Tommaso de Vio (Cardinal Cajetan), while the pope's self-encomium is a parody of Inghirami's funeral oration for Julius.<sup>32</sup> Such theory has its origins in the silver age of conciliarism, surrounding the politico-ecclesiastical Pisan Milan Council: the pope was not above the general council, properly and frequently convened councils were necessary to heal schism and doctrinal divisions, and the proper constitution of the church included lay as well as clerical members.

Parallels between the *oeuvre* of Vives and other humanist writings have often been noted and will not be laboured here. More's *Utopia* of 1517, for example, used the indirect way of satire and paradoxical declamation to express opinions *in utramque partem* on European war games, fraudulent diplomacy, broken treaties and princes who put self-interest before the needs of the commonwealth. Erasmus' *Dulce bellum* and *Querela pacis* are more direct essays on the same, while his letter of dedication to *Paraphrase* of St Matthew of 1522, addressed to Charles V, exhorted him to peace. Pace's *De fructu* of late 1517 or early 1518 aimed excoriating wit at the same, especially of Popes Julius II and Leo X.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> See Jimmy H. Burns and Thomas M. Izbicki (eds.), *Conciliarism and Papalism* (Cambridge, 1997) for translations of Almain's *Libellus de auctoritate ecclesiae* (Paris, 1512), Cajetan's *Auctoritas papae et concilii sive ecclesiae comparata* (Rome, 1514). Jimmy H. Burns, "Conciliarism, Papalism and Power, 1511–1518," in *The Church and sovereignty c. 590–1918: Essays in Honour of Michael Wilks*, ed. D. Wood (Oxford, 1991), pp. 409–28. Thomas Inghirami's sermon is found in *Orationes duae... altera item funebris pro Julio III, pont. max.*, ed. Pietro Aloisio Galletti (Rome, 1777), pp. 77–105.

<sup>33</sup> *De fructu*, pp. 69–71 and pp. 44–45. Erasmus wrote many letters asking various players in European affairs to help effect the reconciliation of princes, but in 1523 wrote

It is particularly illuminating, however, to recognize that those humanists dedicated to an ethic of peace also held to the notion, fully developed by Vives in his *De anima et vita* (published in 1538 but probably composed between 1529 and 1531), that moderation in the passions was essential for successful civil life. In analyzing and exposing political, religious and intellectual fraud which gave rise to dissent and discord in the Christian republic, Erasmus, More and Pace adhered to the ideal of moderation in demeanour and language. Assuming a Democritean persona and using Lucian's dialogues as a model, the three men praised the Stoic virtue of inner tranquillity and external affability. In his *Commentaries* on Augustine, Vives also applauded the Democritean moderation of the passions and *habitus*.<sup>34</sup> Ultimately, for Vives, war was the outcome of immoderate passions which consumed princes and popes, and many of their counsellors, which then spread like a disease throughout the polity and over national borders. But the emotions are a necessary part of a functioning civil society, according to God's plan. "Without fear, humans would fall prey to the threats of the environment. Without compassion and shame, social life would be utterly impossible."<sup>35</sup> Mild emotions are movements toward or away from evil, and can be manipulated to control other emotions, such that fear can tame anger, and irritation be minimized by joy.

Of course, the aim of all these orations, satires and treatises, some presented under a particular persona and/or employing a strategy of indirection, was the provision of good counsel to those who held power and had been granted certain extraordinary powers and liberties.<sup>36</sup>

---

that it was necessary to erect a funeral monument to peace. See *Erasmus Against War*, ed. John W. MacKail (Boston, 1970); Philip C. Dust, *Three Renaissance Pacifists*; Adams, *Better Part of Valor*; Richard J. Schoeck, *Erasmus of Europe* (Edinburgh, 1993).

<sup>34</sup> See Cathy Curtis, "The Laughing Philosopher: from Thomas More to Robert Burton," *The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Conal Condren, Ian Hunter, and Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 90–112 for the group construction of fluid, multiple and often classical Greek *personae* by the circle for the purpose of exercising liberty of speech. *Saint Augustine, of the Cité of God: with the learned comments of I.L. Vives*, (London, 1620) trans. I H[ealey]., second edn. corrected by William Crashawe, et al., p. 719. "Democritus and the Origins of Moral Psychology" *American Journal of Philology* 106 (1985), 1–31. Also Susan James, "The Passions and the Good Life," *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 198–220 on the early modern debate concerning the passions, virtue and wisdom.

<sup>35</sup> Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives*, pp. 270–1.

<sup>36</sup> John Guy, "Tudor Monarchy and its Critiques," in *The Tudor Monarchy*, ed. John Guy (London, 1997), pp. 78–109. Idem, "The Rhetoric of Counsel in Early Modern England," in *Tudor Political Culture*, ed. Dale Hoak (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 292–310. Curtis, *Richard Pace on Pedagogy, Satire and Counsel*, passim.

For those actually involved in negotiating peace treaties, buying Swiss mercenaries, rushing from one party to another in European courts, and dealing with intrigue and secret reversals of policy, the task of a broadly articulated case for peace in courts, the church and academic life became increasingly difficult.

What I would suggest at this point is that during Vives's visits to England from 1523 to 1528, Vives fashioned his role as counsellor, advocate for European peace and educator.<sup>37</sup> When More, Tunstall, Fisher and Pace (among others) became increasingly pressured by Henry and Wolsey's expedient diplomacy and the Divorce, Vives—constrained less by office and being Spanish—was passed the baton of public peace discourse which became centred on Charles V.<sup>38</sup>

It would seem reasonable to speculate that discussions between such friends, all dedicated to the cause of reform in the secular and ecclesiastical realms, gave rise to considerations of what might be safely and expediently said by whom and to whom. The relationships between these humanists were complicated and the evidence about them is incomplete; certainly they visited one another's houses, and actively orchestrated campaigns around a number of interrelated issues and disputes.<sup>39</sup> The younger Vives may be considered another important supporter who joined these reforming efforts slightly later.<sup>40</sup> Vives, however,

---

<sup>37</sup> See Charles Fantazzi who argues that Vives was not fully accepted into the Erasmus-More circle, although his relationship with More appears less strained. Erasmus and Vives became somewhat estranged over Vives's edition of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*. "Vives, More and Erasmus," in *Juan Luis Vives. Arbeitsgespräch in der Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel vom 6. bis zum 8. November 1980*, ed. August Buck (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 165–76, p. 175.

<sup>38</sup> David Potter remarks that English foreign policy from the treaties with Louis XII in 1514, Charles V in 1520–2, those of 1525–7 with France through to the 1543 treaty of Mutual Aid with the emperor "should not be regarded as long-term commitments." Henry was prepared to abandon any alliance if necessary. He suggests that English intervention in peace mediation as a principal contrahent was simply a policy tool. Henry feared the Emperor's potential power after Pavia. "Foreign Policy", pp. 116–19.

<sup>39</sup> Erasmus, More and Pace were mutually supportive of the promotion of Greek studies and the liberal arts in England and northern Europe more generally, Erasmus' scriptural programme, in criticizing scholastic philosophy in its more arid manifestations, church reform and peace in the Christian *respublica*.

<sup>40</sup> Pace seems to have owned an extensive library of manuscript and printed works on which Vives could have drawn, His manuscript copy of the anthology of Johannes Stobaeus copied by Callierges in Rome in late 1523 is in the Bodleian Library (New college MS 270). Its 298 folio pages contain passages from Greek authors on different forms of government, monarchy, condemnations of tyranny, war and peace. Tunstall also owned a significant library. Guido Rebecchini, "Further evidence about Books of



was careful to avoid engagement in theological and scriptural debates, perhaps because of his identity as a Jewish convert to Catholicism. Under the Spanish Inquisition, Vives's own family suffered terribly as a *converso* Jewish family.<sup>41</sup> Vives's father was executed in 1524, and his mother tried posthumously for apostasy, found guilty and her remains disinterred and burned in 1529. At what point Vives was aware of all these events is not clear, but from 1529 his thought further matures significantly and he leaves behind explicitly political writings. In his writings of the period under study, he cites an enormous range of classical, scriptural and traditional church authors. He assiduously avoids explicitly evoking any potentially contentious contemporary authors.

As Erasmus noted, Wolsey inclined to be the arbiter of Europe, and continued to intrigue; a new English incursion into France in 1522 unravelled the peace. France was said to have broken too many promises, so offending Henry's honour. Wolsey and Pace had deeply different approaches to the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy. It has been argued that many in the English ruling elite held that an alliance with the emperor best served English interests. Pace's position was based on a deeply held conviction in "some kind of Imperialist *pax christiana* in which the emperor served as protector, perhaps even as reformer, of the Church, if the papacy would not take up this task."<sup>42</sup> Wolsey was pragmatic and expedient in his approach; the highest good was evidently to serve Henry's best interests. In 1525, Wolsey was prepared to turn from an Imperial alliance to one with France, so undoing Pace's three years of diplomacy in Italy and the empire (trying to win the Venetians over to the emperor and away from the French).

And there appear to have been differences in opinion in England as to the desirability of war—these have been traced back to "a height-

---

Baldassarre Castiglione," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 63 (2000), 271–76. Curtis, "Pace on Pedagogy, Counsel and Satire," pp. 312–21.

<sup>41</sup> Angelina García, "Una familia de judeo-conversos: Vives," in *Erasmus in Hispania. Vives in Belgio*, eds. Jozef IJsewijn and Ángel Losada (Louvain, 1986), pp. 293–309.

<sup>42</sup> Peter Gwyn, *The King's Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey* (London, 1990), pp. 552–55. John M. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor: a Study of the Imperial Chancery under Gattinara* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 86ff. Pace was passionately and consistently anti-French and pro-imperial in outlook—the French ambassadors claimed that he was not an Englishman at all, but a "false Spaniard", while he himself considered that he was Venetian by inclination, if not by birth. For a detailed account of Pace's diplomatic career, and his dealings with popes Julius, Leo, Adrian and Clement, as well as Charles V and his ambassadors from his election until Pace's retreat from the *vita activa*, see Wegg, *Richard Pace*.

ened sensitivity to the practicalities of wars and the purposes behind them” ever since the Hundred Years War. Sections of the nobility and soldiers preferred peace; extra taxation associated with war was certainly highly unpopular with the people more generally. “Peace was being inextricably linked with economic vitality, and war with poverty. Peace was becoming a cherished value irrespective of its Christian foundation and more a practical consideration.”<sup>43</sup> The horrors of the Peasant’s War of 1524/25 reinforced the view.

In February 1525 the French army led by Francis I was defeated by imperial forces at Pavia, and the king taken prisoner. It had been an English-imperial coalition war. The emperor Charles V displayed little clemency to Francis I; a peace treaty was signed at Madrid in January 1526 but its stringent conditions ensured that Francis soon broke it. In 1527 large embassies travelled the Channel in both directions, securing the Peace of Amiens between England and France, supposedly for the protection of the papacy and the preservation of concord in Christendom. On the occasion of the Peace of Amiens being ratified in the autumn, there was a pageant organized by Wolsey for Henry’s courtiers and visiting ambassadors, in which relations between the principal princely and papal powers were dramatized. Wolsey rescues the imprisoned king and brings Francis I and Henry VIII to act against Charles V. Henry and Wolsey confront Charles, who kept the French king’s sons captive, the Emperor’s chancellor concluded a peace and the princes were freed. Hall’s account of Charles and Henry’s progress through London only a few years earlier in 1523 contained imagery of king and emperor blessed above by the Trinity and written below their feet was the inscription “behold the lover of peace and concord.”<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> Ben Lowe, *Imagining Peace: a history of early English pacifist ideas, 1340–1560* (University Park, PA, 1997), p. 179. Wolsey’s Amicable Grant of 1525, a wartime request for subsidies, caused major consternation and public dissent. Archbishop William Warham wrote to Wolsey in 1525 that those who he was commissioned to collect from would rather have peace than victory, as the winning and keeping of France would be more costly to England than profitable. Thomas More had earlier warned in his Latin epigrams on the subject of good governance and in *Utopia* that the excessive taxation of the commons by a king could provoke rebellion in his subjects. But More himself, as Speaker of the House of Commons since 1523 and one of Henry’s chief counsellors, was required to countenance the levy of 1523, and act as one of its collectors.

<sup>44</sup> Lowe, *Imagining Peace*, pp. 179–81; see also Sidney Anglo, *Spectacle, Pageantry and Early Tudor Policy* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 229, 232. With Pope Clement VII’s escape from captivity came yet another opportunity for a court performance for ambassadors at court, this time of Terence’s *Phormio*. Inscriptions decorated the sides of the dining hall—*Cedant arma togae* (Let arms cede to the toga), *Foedus pacis non movebitur* (The treaty

In April 1525 Vives stayed in More's house; note that his first letter to Henry is dated March. From June to December of that year, Vives wrote *De subventione pauperum*, (*On the Relief of the Poor*) at the request of the magistrates of the city of Bruges, which was conveyed to him by Louis de Praet, the Imperial ambassador to England. Before leaving Bruges for England, Vives wrote his October letter to Henry VIII on the need for concord between Christian princes and within his realm. Pace and Thomas Lupset met Vives in the early days of November 1525 in Bruges; they were returning from Pace's embassy in Venice.<sup>45</sup> Diplomatic dispatches and the correspondence in the Leonico circle formed in the Veneto (which included Reginald Pole, Lupset, Pace and Tunstall) provide an important context for Vives's letters and writings in this period. They reveal a pro-imperialist sentiment, and deep concern that the causes of the war between France, the Empire and England which terminated in the battle of Pavia had not been addressed. Leonico wrote to Pace that the Christian republic was sorely afflicted by the wounds of war and he rejoiced that Pace's friend, Giulio de' Medici, had been elected as Pope Clement VII; he prays that God will incline princes to listen to the good counsel of their Shepherd.<sup>46</sup> Vives himself was removed from the European theatre of war, as was Erasmus. Friends such as Pace and Lupset, so actively involved in the machinations of European foreign affairs, might well have been rich sources for the detailed political accounts given in *De dissidiis* and later, Erasmus' *Charon*. Might Pace have offered suggestions or read over the *De dissidiis*, or even suggested the topic?

It was not known by Vives that his letters to Henry were received in a different diplomatic climate. After a brief stay in Bruges Vives returned to England 18 February 1526 and soon perceived that he was no longer in the favour of several powerful men; he considered that he was "sailing against the stream".<sup>47</sup> He returned to Bruges once again

---

of peace will not be shaken), and *Pax cum homine et bellum cum vitiiis* (Peace with human-kind and war with sin). Wolsey was fashioned as *Cardinalis Pacificus*.

<sup>45</sup> Henry de Vocht, "Vives and his Visits to England," *Monumenta Humanistica Lovaniensia* (Louvain, 1934), pp. 1–60, p. 20; *Litterae virorum eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium*, ed. De Vocht, letter 169, 1–3.

<sup>46</sup> Adrian Gasquet, *Cardinal Pole and his Early Friends* (London, 1927), pp. 43–4, 74–86. *LP*, vol. 3., ii, no. 2420; John Foxe, *The Acts and Monuments*, ed. Stephen Reed Cattle, 8 vols. (London, 1837–41) vol. 4, p. 599.

<sup>47</sup> de Vocht, "Vives and his Visits to England," pp. 21–2. *Litterae virorum eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium*, letter 185.

in May 1526, and to his correspondents blamed Wolsey for leading England to war, and put responsibility on Henry for failing to dismiss him. Vives lost his Oxford lectureship and the king's pension,<sup>48</sup> and in October 1526 he finished his *De dissidiis*.

Vives's fourth visit to England was from April to June 1527, and he then returned again in October 1527 to April 1528. Pace was ill on his return to England, and the enmity of Wolsey soon made itself felt.<sup>49</sup> Evidence is incomplete and that which remains is probably sometimes partial to various political interests. In October 1527 the imperial ambassador Íñigo de Mendoza reported events that had befallen Vives's friend Pace. Pace was thought to be turning people against Wolsey, and taking Catherine's side in the Divorce. Wolsey imprisoned Pace briefly in the Tower of London.

Vives refers to his forebodings in a number of letters to his friends. In August 1527 he writes to Vergara that all is unstable, and that he is sticking to a slippery path rather than standing on it, and that he has no hope for the next day.<sup>50</sup> One can only speculate whether Pace, Lupset and/or More communicated their fears to him. Vives himself became highly unpopular with Wolsey, and he and Mendoza were confined in the house of a counsellor and cross-examined. Vives was forced by Wolsey to compose a declaration describing his part in receiving confidences from the queen and his communications with Mendoza about the queen's treatment and communications with the pope. On his release from confinement and on the queen's advice he left England, arriving at Bruges on 7 April 1528.

Noreña has argued that at this time Vives was influenced by the Erasmian imperialists of the Spanish court "who saw in Charles the divine instrument of Spanish supremacy and the only salvation against the Lutheran heresy and Turkish invasion."<sup>51</sup> But, I believe, his English friends had already implanted some of this vision, although certainly not Charles's hope for a universal monarchy. Vives's last visit in November 1528 was undertaken to support Queen Catherine as an advocate in

---

<sup>48</sup> de Vocht, "Vives and his Visits to England," pp. 39–41. Carlos G. Noreña, "Juan Luis Vives and Henry VIII," pp. 85–88.

<sup>49</sup> See Wegg, *Richard Pace*, pp. 271–72 for a survey of Wolsey's enmity and jealousy towards Pace as recorded in the early authorities, especially as resulting from Pace's assistance to Charles, Duke of Bourbon, against Francis I, Pace's failure to secure the papacy for Wolsey, and his closeness to Henry VIII.

<sup>50</sup> de Vocht, "Vives and his Visits to England," p. 27.

<sup>51</sup> Noreña, *Vives*, p. 226.

the trial over the validity of the marriage. His advice to refrain from mounting a defense did not please Catherine, but proved to be wise. Vives then left England for good.

In England the “peace party” was eclipsed by events surrounding Henry’s desire for an annulment. Counsel seemed now to be “asphyxiated” and hopes that Henry could be won from a propensity to tyranny, long entertained by the English courtiers, were apparently lost in his passion for Anne Boleyn. It was the Divorce which prompted Henry to define his prerogative powers in terms of *imperium*. “In a striking sense, Henry VIII reinvented the theocratic model of kingship. His *imperium* was ordained by God and embraced both ‘temporal’ and ‘spiritual’ sovereignty, part of which had been ‘lent’ to the priesthood by previous English monarchs.”<sup>52</sup>

With Suleiman’s advance to Vienna in 1529, many across Europe were extremely alarmed at the possibility that the Christian world faced complete destruction. It is against this background that Vives composed his major political text on European war and peace, *De concordia*, dedicated to Charles V. The letter dated 1 July 1529 apparently makes an allusion to the League of Cognac of May of that year which opposed Charles and was comprised of France, Pope Clement VII, Milan, Florence and Venice. *De pacificatione* followed later that same year. The Franco-imperial Treaty of Cambrai of August 1529 did bring a temporary peace, which allowed Charles to organize a campaign against the Turks; More and Tunstall were involved in its negotiation which paid little attention to English interests. The Emperor would in fact provide leadership in Europe against Suleiman in 1530, and also call a council of the Universal church.

### III. De Europae dissidiis et re publica: *the Letters of Counsel and the Dialogue of the Dead*

Let us now turn to the letters of the ensemble, *De Europae dissidiis et re publica* all composed before the *De dissidiis*, and self-consciously arranged in the collection to contextualize, develop and amplify its subject mat-

---

<sup>52</sup> John Guy, “Tudor Monarchy and its Critiques,” p. 83.

ter rather than obey strict chronology.<sup>53</sup> They are a compressed form of the *speculum principis* genre, in which counsel is proffered while the duties, skills and liberties of the various offices of the recipients are outlined.<sup>54</sup> Directed at individual leaders, these published letters also offer the other orders in society a set of criteria against which to judge the efforts of those anointed and charged with their care in this life and the next. The title of the collection explicitly connects Europe divided and the state of the *respublica Christiana*.

Vives's letter, *De Europae statu ac tumultibus*, to the recently elected Pope Adrian of Utrecht, focuses on the role of the papacy in salving political and religious disturbances in Europe.<sup>55</sup> Adrian had been a conservative Louvain theologian whose papacy would be a short-lived one of only twenty months (1522–3). He came to the See at a time of great crisis. Under Leo X, papal response to the Lutheran movement had been hesitant while debts grew enormously sustaining war and luxury in Rome; by the time of Adrian's election, reform had gathered momentum and Adrian was the first pope to cope with its full force. A stranger to Italy and the papal court, he died exhausted and dispirited by the burdens of office. He failed to deliver Rhodes and Hungary from the Turks, lacking the military and financial capacity to support the Knights of St. John or the Hungarians. When Francis invaded Italy, Adrian was forced into a military alliance with Charles when he had wished for neutrality. Erasmus corresponded with Adrian, who tried to enlist him to answer Luther and the reformers, and attempted unsuccessfully to get him to come to Rome. There are a number of letters from December 1522 to early March 1523 between Adrian and

---

<sup>53</sup> It was a common Renaissance practice to structure interpretation in such a way, from the paraliterary material accompanying More's *Utopia* to Erasmus' collected letters.

<sup>54</sup> His letter to Charles V makes this explicit, Majansius, 5, p. 191ff.

<sup>55</sup> George E. McCully, "A Letter of Juan Luis Vives to Jerome Aleander, from Louvain, December 17, 1522," *Renaissance Quarterly* 22 (1969), 121–28. Vives's letter to Aleander accords with the sentiments of the letter and describes Vives's desire for Christian princes to unite under the guidance of the pope. He should give peace to the world which it desires and requires of him by virtue of the precedents of his life and his proven goodness. But Vives thinks that fortune, as much as virtue and prudence, will decide the matter because of the inflamed passions and anger on both sides, as well as many injuries and offenses being exchanged. Even so, the attempt must be made, either aided by art or called forth by fortune. Vives refers to his own audacity in writing to the pope, relying on their previous friendship as if there were no difference between the Bishop of Tortosa and that of Rome.

Erasmus. Vives's letter is dated October 1522, was perhaps intended to pave the way for Erasmus to act as a counsellor to Adrian.

In this letter, Europe is conceived as a geographical and religious entity, or unity, which is being destroyed by internal disputes and wars.<sup>56</sup> Adrian is said to surpass men of old for whom war creates virtue, vigor and glory—perhaps an allusion to the celebration in previous papal courts of the classical Roman values of military *gloria* and *maiestas* fused with a notion of Christian *imperium*.<sup>57</sup> Even popes, writes Vives, had chosen war so as to show their virtues of mind and body, had killed and plundered for fame and immortal glory. European war must delight the Turks; Christians treat each other barbarously. Vives refers to religious discord within the church although he does not specify the Lutheran movement.<sup>58</sup> Adrian, an exemplar of virtue and moderation, is exhorted to act in these complex and difficult times; to accommodate to the play at hand and earn applause, rather than show weakness in the final act. There are two things that need to be achieved: the putting aside of arms by princes, and of disturbances between individuals.

Adrian is contrasted with his papal predecessors. He did not ambitiously seek the election (being unanimously elected), and is a man of virtue capable of the difficult tasks ahead. If the papal office failed in this, the office itself would suffer. Citing St. Paul and the New Testament to the effect that men must love one another, Vives maintained that internecine war among princes was unchristian.<sup>59</sup> When princes were isolated from the lives of the subjects, they viewed war more as a pastime or kingly sport, failing to appreciate the misery brought to their subjects (a theme to which Vives returns repeatedly). As one who had

---

<sup>56</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 164–74. It is often suggested that Vives was first to use the term *Europa* (in the *De dissidiis*) in the sense of a united territorial and cultural entity. See Calero *Sobre las dissensiones de Europa*, pp. 21–31; Denis Hays, “‘Europe’ and ‘Christendom’: a problem in Renaissance terminology and historical semantics,” *Diogenes* 17 (1957), 45–55. Antonio Fontán, “La política europea en la perspectiva de Vives,” in *Erasmus in Hispania. Vives in Belgio*, pp. 27–72; 37–38. Noreña, *Vives and the Emotions*, p. 39. Craft correctly identifies Tunstall's use in his 1518 oration, “The 1518 Treaty of London,” p. 91, n388; Tunstall, *Oratio*, A2r: “ex quibus non duobus modo regnis totius Europae florentissimis: sed etiam horum finitimis populis pace stabilita concordia speratur.”

<sup>57</sup> Inghirami's funeral oration for Julius II, for example, praised the pope's military successes, justified in terms of last resort, historical precedent and natural law and Scripture. Other orators, such as Celadoni and Flores, were critical, calling for a return to the values of the Primitive church, and for the election of a pope who did not desire war, wealth or wished to accede to the papacy.

<sup>58</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 169ff.

<sup>59</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 170.

lived among the common people, Adrian is urged to instruct princes concerning the evils of war, so that they would settle their fratricidal differences which are against divine law—he recalls Paul’s teaching that before God there is neither Greek nor Jew, Frenchman nor Spaniard, but each reborn in Christ anew.<sup>60</sup> This is the true pastoral leadership role of pope. Vives also cautioned the pope against counsellors to princes who argued that some wars were just, and then stretched the point to justify any war when it suited.<sup>61</sup>

Vives warns that those who defend the Church against the reformers with inadequate intellect or dubious arguments compromise the cause. It may be the case that Vives is exhorting the pope to take the counsel of men such as Erasmus, one of those distinguished men which the chaos of the time concealed. In this sense Vives articulates the moderate conciliarist view of church government, which is consultative and insists that papal power must not be abused. The solution to prevent dissensions is to call a church council to restore peace and concord through deliberation.

The two letters to Henry articulate themes which Vives would develop at more length in *De concordia*, and are themselves an arresting statement of an early modern conception of the office of kingship which Tudor scholars have seldom considered.<sup>62</sup> The first letter to Henry, *De Francisco Galliae rege a Caesare capto*, 12 March 1525 composed on the occasion of the capture of the French king at Pavia, appeals to Henry and Charles V to demonstrate clemency to Francis I, thus reconciling the monarchs and demonstrating the “victor’s divine

---

<sup>60</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 170: “Tuum est, Pater Sanctissime, ex praeceptis nostrae Pietatis, quorum interpretis mundo praesides, docere et Principes et Principum consultores, bellum hoc inter fratres, et quod plus est, initiatos eodem baptismo, iniquum, sceleratum esse, contra fas, contra pium, nec secus, quam si membra corporis ejusdem inter se dimicent, ex Pauli doctrina, juxta quam apud Deum jam non est Graecus, aut Judaeus, aut Gallus, aut Hispanus, quisquis per Christum renatus est, sed nova creatura: quod qui cogitant, et exequuntur, pax super eos.”

<sup>61</sup> On the “just war” theory and its critics in the period see Fernandez-Santamaría, *The State, War and Peace*, especially pp. 49–57 and 145–51 on Vives.

<sup>62</sup> See Valerio Del Nero, “La dedica di Vives a Carlo V del ‘De concordia et discordia,’” *Studi in onore di Arnaldi d’Addari* 1, (Lecce, 1995), pp. 615–24 and his preface to *De concordia et discordia, De pacificatione. Quam misera esset vita Christianorum sub Turcis*, ed. Francisco Calero, Maria Luisa Arribas y Pilar Usábel (Valencia, 1997), pp. 9–44. Greg Walker, *Writing Under Tyranny: English Literature and the Henrician Reformation* (Oxford, 2005) does not consider these highly relevant texts at all.



virtues".<sup>63</sup> Vives points out that the fate of Francis could have fallen to any of the three given the workings of fortune. Vives hopes that Henry will use the victory with a moderate spirit, and intervene in the reconciliation of Charles and Francis.

Henry is encouraged to friendly discussions with the French to settle differences. The French subjects are as orphans separated from their father, Francis. Through moderation and kindness, the allegiance of the French can be gained, thereby negating the desire for revenge. Vives, echoing Seneca's *De clementia*, tells Henry that it is clemency and moderation which best protects a ruler.<sup>64</sup> He cites the example of the Romans, who when subjugating a people, received them immediately into their protection and patronage, as friends (*amici*). In this manner, Henry can control fortune, rather than the converse. Vives recommends a pact with Charles V to ensure that peace is not chimerical.

A day after Vives's letter to Henry, there appeared a diplomatic dispatch dated 15 March from Sampson (whom Vives identified as one of his English friends) in Madrid to Wolsey, in which Sampson describes in some detail the reaction of the Emperor to the news of success at the battle of Pavia. Interestingly, Charles V reportedly used language similar to that of Vives, saying that victory gave him an opportunity to establish universal peace in Christendom, to reform the church and to serve God. His demeanor is described as moderate, humble, and without arrogance. Sampson claims that this moderation has taught him more than all the books that he has read. Charles immediately prayed alone and refused to celebrate the victory triumphantly but rather with a solemn mass at which the preacher was directed to refer the victory to the goodness of God.<sup>65</sup> It would appear, perhaps, on this evidence and other letters by courtiers and diplomats that a peace discourse focused on the emperor had developed, and was being promulgated not just by Vives in these years but by an pro-imperial party within

---

<sup>63</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 449–51. McCully, *Vives*, has an excellent discussion of these letters, providing the historical context. Edward George, "Rhetorical Strategies in Vives's Peace Writings: The Letter to Charles V and the *De concordia*," eds. Gilbert Tournoy and Dirk Sacré, *Ut Granum Sinapis: Essays on Neo-Latin Literature in Honor of Jozef Ijsewijn*, (Louvain, 1997), pp. 249–63, p. 262.

<sup>64</sup> Peter Stacey, *Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince* (Cambridge, 2007) is relevant here, as is Miriam Griffin, "Seneca and Pliny," *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, eds. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 532–58. Cf. Seneca, *De clementia*, 1.8.

<sup>65</sup> *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII*, vol. 3, no. 1189, pp. 520–1.

the Henrician court. More research is required to ascertain whether indeed there was an organized and sustained effort on the part of the English court and their friends to fashion their monarch and his chief adviser to peace in these years.

Wolsey himself wrote to John Clerk in Rome (on the same diplomacy as Pace who had been sent to Venice) earlier in January that year that he was to tell the pope that the rumoured secret treaty between Rome and the French would lead immediately to continual war and to damage to Christianity. Henry has always desired peace among Christian princes and war against the infidels—all his wars have been directed to that purpose and he had defended the church by sword and pen against Luther.<sup>66</sup> Clerk should furthermore inform the pope that if he supported the French, war would become hotter and Rome lose more of Italy due to the cupidity and ambition of Francis I. Wolsey ties the increase in Lutheranism and the gains of the Turks to the general dangers facing all of Europe. He then goes on with instructions to be passed on to Pace—let the Venetians know secretly that if they support England and rid Italy of the French and Spaniards, the Duke shall have the Duchy of Milan. It would seem that Wolsey was perfectly able to appropriate such an idiom of peace to further more expedient diplomacy based on double-dealing and the glory-seeking of Henry. As we will soon see, Vives was trenchant in his criticism of those princes and counsellors who could speak one thing, and do another.

Clearly, then, while Vives placed enormous faith in the possibility of modifying behaviour through education and advice based on his understanding of the emotions, he yet appreciated the difficulty of manipulating the passions of a Henry VIII—whom the English humanists had tried to save from tyranny from the time of his coronation.<sup>67</sup>

The second letter, *De pace inter Caesarem et Franciscum Galliarum regem, deque optimo regni statu*, outlines Vives's conception of the body politic, and how this relates to war and peace.<sup>68</sup> It resonates with More's Latin epigrams on virtuous rule and tyranny, and the orations of Pace and

<sup>66</sup> *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII*, vol. 3, no. 1017, pp. 444–45.

<sup>67</sup> See More's highly ambivalent Coronation Ode of 1508, which encouraged Henry VIII to not follow the example of his father in the abuse of the laws, and so deliver his people to liberty out of slavery; and John Colet's sermon of 1513, which argued in effect that warfare was incompatible with Christianity with such persuasiveness that Henry confided his uneasiness as to whether a Christian prince could be justified in going to war. See John B. Gleason, *John Colet* (Berkeley, 1989), p. 258.

<sup>68</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 175–86.

Tunstall on the occasion of the Universal Peace.<sup>69</sup> The welfare of the prince and the public are inseparable. Using Christological and sacramental imagery, the prince is said to be the image of the Author of all things; again adopting a theatrical simile, a prince is urged to behave in public and private as if in a crowded theatre where no deed or word can be hidden, as if an example for his subject's imitation.

In the commonwealth, the strongest and best bond is goodness; if both the prince and his subjects are virtuous they will desire the same things, and if evil, desire different things and thence be separated. Virtue is defined in terms of the qualities of quietness and moderation, which is grounded in the soul of every individual. It matters naught what a prince legislates for the body, if he has cared for the soul. A year or more of mortal bondage under a human prince matters little when there is also a celestial prince. One needs only to remain virtuous. Princes secure quiet of mind if their security is guaranteed not by arms and guards, but rather by their own benevolence (*benevolentia*) and the counsel of wise friends who support moderated power. The realm is quiet and there is a minimum desire for innovation. An evil prince is defined not only in terms of obvious cruelty, but is one who craves constant change without consideration for the future. An unquiet fool or impious man, he continually hankers after what he does not have or the place he does not occupy. The people are characterised as indiscriminating, assuming that supreme wisdom was aligned with supreme power and then drawn to what the prince desires. Therefore, Vives argues (somewhat fallaciously), if a king is evil, his subjects will be evil also. An evil king rules in his own interests, which by definition is opposed to those of the people. He rules as a tyrant, with arrogance; but the people will obey only reluctantly and stubbornly. True concord cannot survive among evil people. When a prince rules by violence and terror, subjects are deformed into slaves and not free men, seeking only to escape like slaves from a cruel master.<sup>70</sup> It was in the nature of man to be free. Monarchy has no more unstable foundations than an evil man ruling evil men, through fear; and the more fearful the multitude,

---

<sup>69</sup> *Complete Works of St Thomas More*, vol. III, part II, *Latin Poems*, eds. Clarence Miller, Leicester Bradner, Charles A. Lynch, Revilo P. Oliver (New Haven, 1984), Epigrams 112, 114, 115, 120, 121, 201.

<sup>70</sup> McCully, *Vives*, p. 120.

the more fearful the ruler. A king is imprisoned if unable to rely on other men for safety.<sup>71</sup>

Flatterers are so harmful to a ruler because they prevent his access to wise counsel:

To be instructed clearly, to be rebuked—these are no less necessary to princes than to other men. Indeed he needs more experience than the private citizen since so many more things depend on the foresight and wisdom of one man. No man can be wise without learning and one to counsel him; he has need of teachers, experience, persons who will point out his errors and those who will correct them in order to form his inexperienced mind. The flatterer drives all these people away from the prince, as if he were not brought forth in the manner of the rest of mortals, but was already great and perfect, no matter what he might do. On the contrary, his many delights and pleasures and supreme dominium over everyone spur him on to immoderate conduct; it is necessary to bridle him, to restrain his extravagant impetuosity. Otherwise he will drag himself and all his possessions into ruin, if all urge him on and there is no one to sustain him.<sup>72</sup>

Vives implicitly argues that Henry listen to the advice of true advisors—presumably those such as More, Longland, Pace and Tunstall—and less to Wolsey and fawning courtiers, such as the minions.<sup>73</sup> If the

---

<sup>71</sup> Edward George, "The *Declamationes Sullanae* of Juan Luis Vives: Sources and Departures," *Humanistica Lovaniensia*, vol. 38, (1989), pp. 124–153 discusses the dangers of rule by fear in these orations occasioned by the abdication of the dictator Sulla (and as found in Erasmus' *Education of a Christian Prince*), which ties in closely with my discussion. Speakers raise various connected issues: ruling over free and willing subjects is godlike; the Roman people could not stand servitude and so ruling over an unwilling Roman people brings great difficulties; moderate rule allows a people to experience it as benefaction and not enslavement. George points out that the Sullan declamations were reissued in 1538 with *De praesenti statu Europae et bello Turcico diversa opuscula* and his translations of Isocrates' orations. p. 149, n74.

<sup>72</sup> Majansius, V, p. 176: "*Edoceri, reprehendi*: quae non minus necessaria sunt Principi quam reliquis hominibus, videlicet et ipsi homini, et cui majore rerum usu est opus, quam privatis, quanto plura atque ampliora unius providentia et consilio tenentur. Nullus hominum citra doctrinam atque admonitorem satis instructus est ad sapientiam; magistris, rerum usu, ostensoribus errorum ac emendatoribus indiget ad rudem per se animum excolendum, quos omnes assentator abigit a principe, tamquam non ille reliquorum mortalium more ac modo editus sit, sed magnus jam et absolutus, quidquid agat, quum contra, cui tot deliciae, voluptates summum in omnes jus addant in omnem licentiam calcaria, huic oportet fraenos injici, quibus praeceps et effusus animus retineatur, alioqui seque ac sua pessum rapiet, si omnes cadentem impellant, nemo fulciat."

<sup>73</sup> On the expulsion of the minions from court, which involved More, Pace and other senior councillors, and Pace's role as King's Secretary, see David Starkey, *The Reign of Henry VIII: Personalities and Politics* (London, 1985), pp. 69–89; Thomas F. Mayer,

king should be the image of the divine, the man who holds the office is yet all too fallible.

The key to preserving *imperium* indefinitely and ensuring a hereditary succession is for a prince to be good and make his people good—clearly an allusion to Henry's preoccupation with producing a legitimate male heir. Like a trainer of wild beasts, the prince acts as a master who teaches obedience. The ruler must then encourage the education of subjects. For the health and quiet of the commonwealth, it is imperative that princes and magistrates instill from an early age reasoned opinions about "the use, the value, and the end of everything: money, possessions, friends, honors, nobility, dignity, power, beauty, pleasure, intelligence, wit, ambition, virtue, religion..." Otherwise, they will pursue wealth, pleasure and ambition and abandon what is *honestas*, betraying public things while they serve private interests, and contriving a foolish image of liberty which makes them not free but evil.<sup>74</sup>

All advantage resides in virtue; a renewal in the education and religious piety of not only the young but those already educated would allow the good to spread to all. The *vulgus* can be assisted by vernacular books and public sermons (*conciones*). If Henry were to encourage love between subjects and the value of virtue as the gain, as well as sobriety and moderation in all things, he could be as a spectator—the subjects would rule themselves, so that Henry would occupy an office of advice rather than punishment.<sup>75</sup>

This is the reason that education is crucial to humanists around Erasmus and in Henry's court. Good counsellors are as necessary, or even more so, than a good ruler, as Vives explicitly states in *De pacificatione*.<sup>76</sup> Liberty pertains to ensuring public welfare—this classical Roman idea

---

"Tournai and Tyranny: Imperial Kingship and Critical Humanism," *Historical Journal* 34 (1991), 257–77.

<sup>74</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 179–80: "...ne inversis rerum aestimationibus, maxima negligent, minima et abjecta consecretur, de pecunia, de umbris, et somniis, quae ipsi sibi confingant, graves moveant tragoedias, pietatis, prudentiae, ac verorum bonorum vel obliiti, vel securi; hi sunt qui pecuniae, aut voluptatibus, aut ambitioni dum metuunt, patriam, bonum atque honestum deserunt, publica produnt dum serviunt privatis, stultum quendam excogitant imaginem libertatis, qua non fiunt liberi, sed mali." McCully, *Vives*, p. 123.

<sup>75</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 180.

<sup>76</sup> See discussion below, pp. 163 ff.

that one must be educated in the virtues required to participate in public life is a humanist commonplace also found in More and Pace.<sup>77</sup>

The remainder of the letter moves to a *collatio* of the commodities of peace and the incommunities of war, inextricably linked as they are with kingship. The goodness of the people can be only conserved in peace. In contrast, in war no member of the commonwealth can execute his/her offices properly. Religion, laws, justice, commerce, communal activity all languish in war. In fact, war is a reversal of goods, is irrational. There can be no virtue, stability, or equity in such a condition—everyone is his own judge. There are no kings, since kings depend on the arms of others. What slaves obeyed his master as faithfully as the kings of France obeyed the Swiss?<sup>78</sup> This is servitude, associated with needing soldiers, since war empowers them and vice spreads because they behave with impunity. The people are oppressed in war by soldiers and taxation. Commerce suffers, and poverty follows. And so the prince fails as the guarantor of public protection, the trustee of concord. Vives addresses Henry directly: “We are secure through you—whether in public or in private, at table or in bed. You act as a guarantor to all of us in the name of the laws, otherwise it would be better to live in solitude.”<sup>79</sup>

I wish to reiterate Vives’s novel interpretation of kingship. Accepting the idea of the king’s two bodies, kingship is defined as an office held only in peacetime, since war renders discharge of the office impossible. If the people cannot be educated, bound by laws (as soldiers are not in war), this is not true kingship. In a war there are no kings, since kings are dependent on soldiers who can be the very worst of men; such an association brings a king into servitude. The virtue of the people can only be maintained and promoted in peace. Only in peace do all those things conducive to virtue flourish, such as letters, religion, laws, justice, business, quiet, and occupations beneficial to all.<sup>80</sup> “In war, as

---

<sup>77</sup> The *Sullan Declamations* suggest admiration for Roman republican liberty as valued by the citizens—*vera nobilitas est virtus*, education as necessary for civil life, the importance of active participation in public life and counsel. In *De conditione*, Vives argues that liberty was greatest in Athens, Sparta and Rome when they had laws, magistrates and justice. The commonwealth may demand your gold or your life whether you wish to contribute or not. Majansius, 5, p. 448ff. McCully, *Vives*, ch. 6.

<sup>78</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 181–82.

<sup>79</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 183: “Tu es, per quem, et in publico et in privato, et ad mensam, et in lecto tuti sumus; Tu nobis omnibus legum nomine spondes, alioqui praestaret in solitudine ac speluncis degere quam inter homines, quorum rari boni sunt;...”

<sup>80</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 183.

in a sick body, no member executes its office properly.”<sup>81</sup> The benefits which a king provides are sound integration of the commonwealth, created by a network of relationships, allowing everyone to exist and live as they were created to do. In war the population is oppressed by soldiers, taxation, and the suspension of usual commerce; even when peace returns, it takes much time to recover.

In a sharp point to Henry, Vives maintains that good men deplored this present state while evil men held the laws and courts in contempt. This should be cause for a prince to be alarmed. When a king provides prosperity and quiet, and does not impoverish his people for his own purposes, he fulfils his office, just as does the printer, the shoemaker, the shepherd or the carpenter when each had completed the task he was bound by conscience to fulfill. As the argument is constructed in this epistle, there is no choice to be made between war and peace; no allowance is made for a just war line even for self-defense within Europe against another Christian prince. This is a change in attitude. In his commentary on Augustine, Vives had made an allowance for the just holy war.<sup>82</sup>

The epistle concludes with a sweeter tone to Henry, who is said to rely not on force in his government, but good example only. The example of Augustus Caesar is intended to excite emulation in Henry. Celebrated by the learned and writers for whom he created the necessary leisure for work, and loved by the Senate and Roman people, Augustus continued to be commemorated upon his death. Finally, peace is said to be a gift of God, the ultimate author of *pax* and *concordia*, but mediated by Henry’s virtue and the good counsels of Wolsey. Vives then appealed to what he understood of Henry’s individual disposition or *ingenium*;<sup>83</sup> if

<sup>81</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 180ff.

<sup>82</sup> McCully, *Vives*, p. 439.

<sup>83</sup> The conception of individual *ingenium* is extremely important in Vives’s conception of emotional life and temperament. See Noreña on *De anima et vita*, in *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions*, esp. ch. 10 and in *The Passions of the Soul: the third book of De anima et vita* (Lewiston, NY, 1990). Pace and Tunstall were taught by Italian students of psychology, such as Leonico Tomeo, whose commentaries on Aristotle’s *Parva naturalia* and *De anima* are important texts in the history of Renaissance psychology. The *Parva naturalia* was dedicated to Pace. Whether Vives drew on the work of such Italian humanists, who also discussed *ingenium* and the immortality of the soul, is highly probable, I believe. Vives could have had access to Pace’s handsome copy of the edition which was so popular during the early modern period. See Katharine Park and Eckhard Kessler, “The Concept of Psychology,” *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 455–63.

sharp counsel did not meet with success, then Vives could deploy other rhetorical resources, such as appealing to Henry's desire for reputation and glory in Europe. What more appropriate achievement for Henry as Defender of the Faith than to reconcile discord among princes and quell religious disputes so that such matters could be deliberated properly? A comparison of Vives's encomiastic dedication to Henry VIII of his commentaries on Augustine, July 1522, with this letter and Pace's oration is also instructive; all appeal to Henry's military pride while enjoining him to resist his war-like nature. His majesty is esteemed for his large empire; he is a "prince of Nature" who joins mildness with majesty and good government. Those princes impressed by Henry's riches, bodily gifts and skill in the arts of war (valuing war as the commander of all things) desire Henry's friendship and alliance.

Vives's epistle to Wolsey is brief by comparison to the others here discussed. It is a dedication of a collection of translations of Isocrates, the *Areopagiticus* and *Nicocles*, which are described as texts on the relative merits of democracy and monarchy, the good citizen who upholds worthy constitution, and the loyalty owed by subjects to the good monarch. Vives refers to the old debate as to whether the rule of one monarch or democracy is preferable—who better to adjudicate this than Wolsey, by virtue of his experience in the administration of the affairs of state?<sup>84</sup> While the letter refers mainly to education and Wolsey's appointment of Vives to teach at Corpus Christi College, it perhaps implicitly raises the question of whether Henry's monarchy, with Wolsey frequently considered disparagingly as *alter rex* by contemporaries across Europe, is an ideal form of government.<sup>85</sup>

---

<sup>84</sup> Cf. More's epigram on the best state of the commonwealth, which interrupts the meditation before More decides the matter between monarchy and republicanism. *Complete Works of St Thomas More*, vol. 3, part 2, *Latin Poems*, Epigram 198, pp. 228–31. Alain Guy, *Vivès ou l'humanisme engagé* (Paris, 1972) speaks of Vives's "democratic" leanings based on his statements on equality, such as *homo homini par*, pp. 86–7. Cf. *Satellitium animi*, "Thought is free. Who will produce thought by force? The power of truth... All men are equal." (Cogitatus liber. Cogitatus quis coget? Vis veritatis. Homo homini par.) Majansius, 4, pp. 60–1. Vives's espousal of a type of Aristotelian equity should not be confused with a preference for democracy, as it is by Guy and Noreña.

<sup>85</sup> It has been argued by Baker-Smith and Stewart that Isocrates' *Nicocles* has a particular pertinence to counsel and good rule by those in authority, and formed part of translation exercises in the Erasmian circle. Dominic Baker-Smith, *More's Utopia* (London, 1991), p. 124; Alan Stewart, "The Trouble with English Humanism," in *Reassessing Tudor Humanism*, ed. Jonathan Woolfson (Hampshire and New York, 2002), pp. 78–98.



It is significant, perhaps, that Vives bypassed Wolsey (who was, after all Henry's chief adviser, an instigator of the now impotent Treaty of London and twice rebuffed candidate for the papacy), and instead directed a longer and more frank letter of advice to the King's Confessor, Bishop John Longland in 1524.<sup>86</sup> Henry had turned to Longland early in his crisis over his marriage to Catherine, citing Leviticus as a way to divorce—as he had to Richard Wakefield and Pace.<sup>87</sup> A powerful rumour would later circulate that as early as 1522 Wolsey had Longland insinuate to Henry that his marriage was invalid so that the king could remarry a sister of Francis I and so forge an alliance against Charles. Henry allegedly recalled the scruple when he fell in love with Anne Boleyn.<sup>88</sup> This is the final letter in the volume, but composed the year before the two letters to Henry which precede it. It is explicitly aimed at furthering the cause of peace, which Vives hears is the subject of embassies abroad, and has a theological emphasis of the workings of God and the Devil in the human condition. If the French, the English and the Emperor all desire peace, why is it that they pursue war? There can be nothing more honourable or glorious than taking the initiative in asking for peace.<sup>89</sup> It is in this letter that the famous reference to the New World occurs. Overturning the accepted wisdom that it is dishonourable to be the first to offer peace to an enemy, Vives cites the example of certain peoples of the new World, who single out for the greatest honour the person who indeed first offers peace.<sup>90</sup> These peoples shame selfish and ambitious Europeans who call themselves Christians, who without the benefit of European learning, religion and civility, have yet been exercised in right reason according to nature.

Why did men seek what they did not need, through war? If it had been established by nature that this small body could not be satisfied without a large amount of land and sea, nature might be to blame if to protect ourselves we stirred up tumults far and wide. But this tiny bag which is not only full, but full to overflowing, with a small supply of things, destined soon to die—what great tragedies it sets in motion.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 461–64.

<sup>87</sup> See Margaret Bowker, "Bishop John Longland", *ODNB*, 34, 395–98.

<sup>88</sup> See the discussion of Thomas Elyot below, pp. 169–71.

<sup>89</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 461.

<sup>90</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 462.

<sup>91</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 462: "si natura constitutum esset ut isti corpusculo non nisi magna terrarum et maris spatia possent satisfacere, illa esset forsitan culpanda si nostri tuendi causa, hos tumultus longe et late excitaremus; nunc sacculus iste angustus, tam

The warring of princes, and the hatred between private citizens who only pretend friendship, has led to the greatest danger, in the light of the Turkish advances. Lip service only is given to God-given peace. Wolsey gave such lip service in his letter to Clerk, cited earlier. Such behaviour is described as insane, that is, against right reason, which determines what lies in our best interests and conserves our well-being.

Vives's *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico* of 1526 sees the author assuming the persona of satirist philosopher/counsellor, as had More in *Utopia*.<sup>92</sup> Vives himself provides insight into the humanist reception of classical Greek and Roman satire in his commentary on *De civitate Dei*, demonstrating an acute awareness of its socio-political function. He contrasted the liberty of speech demanded by the Greeks with the concern for reputation which molded a less personal and audacious Roman satire.<sup>93</sup> Certainly Vives appreciated, as did others in his milieu, the very real dangers facing the satirist who dared "to represent the city to the city".<sup>94</sup> He wrote to Erasmus on 6 August 1526 that the latest peace had been negotiated, if by peace is meant merely a period of calm before men return to those evils that were interrupted by the exigencies of war. If only the peace of Christ could descend and cure the whole world torn apart by factions. In Greek, he continued on to remark that to write about such things was not without danger, and that surprisingly, the danger came from both sides.<sup>95</sup>

Vives had deployed satire in his earlier Menippean *Somnium Scipionis* against scholastic obscurantism and in support of the *vita activa*. In *De dissidiis* he turned again, and for the last time, to the genre, in the hope of providing a therapy to cure the acute distemper in Christian world and so reduce European civil and religious disharmony.<sup>96</sup> Such a dialogic form unmasked the culpability of the great, both secular and ecclesiastical, while putting forward strategies for addressing contemporary political and social problems. A comic approach allowed

---

exiguus rebus non plenus modo, sed etiam redundans, tam cito periturus, quantas movet tragoedias?" This is perhaps comparable to the Aristotelian and Marsilian argument for what is required for a sufficient life for human beings. *Defensor Pacis*, ed. Brett, pp. xxv–viii, Discourse I, ch. 4, pp. 18–21.

<sup>92</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 452–81.

<sup>93</sup> *Citie of God*, vol. 2, ch. 8–12, 14.

<sup>94</sup> I take the term from Simon Goldhill, *The Poet's Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 182–84.

<sup>95</sup> *CWE*, vol. 12, Ep. 1732, pp. 32–33.

<sup>96</sup> *Somnium et vigilia in Somnium Scipionis*, trans., ed. and notes Edward V. George (Greenwood, SC, 1989), p. xlix.

more uncomfortable truths to slip more agreeably into the minds of the audience. George has cast the dialogue as a form of *consultatio* in which the various speakers speak persuasively to influential European statesmen.<sup>97</sup>

The discussion between the interlocutors allows debate on both sides of the question with respect to finding a solution to the dissension and war between European princes and within the church. There is general agreement that the Turkish advances into Western Europe present a critical challenge, with the crossing of the Danube, and general frustration that internecine discord so consumes them that they do not unite to fight the common enemy.<sup>98</sup> What comes to be contested in the course of the dialogue is whether an offensive or defensive alliance is desirable. *De concordia*, as we shall see shortly, provides the answer.

The Lucianic dialogue is set in Underworld, with the mythical judge Minos (son of Zeus and Europa) and the blind seer Tiresias, in conversation with the shades of the Roman Republican hero Scipio Africanus and two recently deceased characters, Polypragmon (Busy with many things/Meddlesome) and Basilius Colax (Royal flatterer; also Gnatho, with lineage back to Midas).<sup>99</sup> The five interlocutors discuss the throng of souls falling like leaves at the River Styx from European wars. Minos and Tiresias comment on events as reported by Polypragmon, an experienced and knowledgeable analyst who has been in Venice, London, Rome, Naples and Alexandria—perhaps modelled on diplomats such as Pace, Tunstall, Sampson or Clerk rather than Vives himself as is sometimes thought. As I have suggested earlier, it shares with the *Julius exclusus* similarities in genre and content. The earlier satire was issued anonymously, as previously stated, its highly irreverent

<sup>97</sup> George, "Juan Luis Vives's *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*: Its Place in the 1526 Ensemble," p. 264. Vives wrote the treatise *De consultatione* in 1523. Other discussions of the dialogue are Michael Zappala, "Vives's *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*, the Quattrocento Dialogue and 'Open' Discourse," *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Torontonensis*, ed. Alexander Dalzell et al. (Binghamton, NY, 1991), pp. 823–30; and Jean Claude Margolin, "Conscience européenne et réaction à la menace turque d'après le '*De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*' de Vives (1526)," in *Juan Luis Vives*, ed. August Buck (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 107–40.

<sup>98</sup> Maria Cytowska, "Érasme et les turcs," *Eos* 62 (1974), 311–21. Michael Heath, "Erasmus and War against the Turks," *Actes du III Congrès international d'Études néo-latines* (Paris, 1980). Constantinos A. Patrides, "'The Cruel and Bloody Turke': the Background of a Renaissance Commonplace," *Studies in the Renaissance* 10 (1963), 126–35.

<sup>99</sup> Lucian was in Vives's mind around the time of composition; see his letter to Cranevelt of 17 Feb. 1526 in *Litterae virorum eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium*, ep. 175, p. 478.

tone and content ensuring both its popularity and notoriety, especially as ammunition for Protestant reformers. It is comparable in terms of its great specificity and historical approach with respect to political events—the wars in Italy especially over the previous century—and in its acuity of analysis.

Both satires reveal the origins and progress of Europe's dynastic wars, with the ambitions of the French, Spanish and papal states to take advantage of smaller powers in Italy: the conquest of Naples by Alfonso V of Aragon and the invasion of Italy in 1494 by French armies under Charles VIII. Both satires castigate papal quests for territorial expansion, with their deployment of Swiss mercenaries and ecclesiastical excommunications. The insatiable avarice, licentiousness and insanity (*insania*) of rulers leads soldiers to the Underworld/gates of heaven. Henry VIII and the English are spared the most trenchant criticism in each dialogue. In the *Julius*, the *ingenium* of Henry VIII and the characteristics of the English, and their mountains of gold, have been exploited by Julius, to bring them into war against France with the Spanish. In *De dissidiis*, Julius II is said by Polypragmon to have actively prosecuted war, which had waned somewhat upon his death, while Leo X had inherited a situation in which princes of Spain, England, France and Scotland were all caught up in war. The faithlessness attached to peace treaties merely exacerbates the problem (*Ex discordia confederatorum pax nascitur*).<sup>100</sup> Leo X then drew Henry into war along with Ferdinand of Aragon, against the Scots at Flodden. But Tiresias says that Henry won't stand in the way of the reconciliation of Charles V and Francis I, since Henry sent aid to Hungary, understanding the seriousness of a struggle for a Christian prince's domain.<sup>101</sup> Vicissitudes in conquering and losing territories over the long term reveal such efforts to be both futile and ludicrous. And it is the common people and the cause of religion which suffers for the immoderate passions of individual rulers.

Like the author of the *Julius*, Vives calls for an urgent General Council of the Church, and alerts his audience to the enormity which he feels the Turkish threat poses to the way of life of Christians. As in Pace's *oratio*, there is concern at the capacity of new weaponry to kill

<sup>100</sup> Majansius, 6, p. 459ff.

<sup>101</sup> *CWE*, vol. 27, p. 198; *Erasmii opuscula: A Supplement to the Opera omnia*, ed. Wallace K. Ferguson (The Hague, 1933) ll. 889–902. Majansius, 6, p. 480.

many at a time, and that men who should be guided by reason have been reduced to less than beasts, which will at least cooperate against a common threat. Minos comments that the military exploits of princes and peoples as related by Colax falls lower than the behaviour of cats and dogs.<sup>102</sup>

There is a palpable sense of urgency and anxiety. Issued under Vives's name, the dialogue was published in a period of greater complexity with respect to the rise of Protestantism and the increased threat posed by Muslim expansion into Western Europe. It would seem reasonable to speculate that its audience would have readily recognized the connection between the two satires, guaranteeing a rich intertextual commentary between them and amplifying the content and emotional force of both in the light of diplomatic and religious changes. The *Julius* itself had been a pasquinade which referred to other epigrams and dialogues dedicated to Pasquil. Pace, and possibly John Clerk, had been involved in the annual *fiesta* of St. Mark the Evangelist centred on the truncated, decorated stone statue in Rome from 1512 to 1514 when in the service of Cardinal Bainbridge who was its patron at that time.<sup>103</sup> What is a notable difference is the mode of debate: *Julius* and St. Peter reach no reconciliation in their heated exchanges, while the speakers of Vives's dialogue discourse more moderately, even if a final resolution is not clearly brought about and the views of military glory of the courtier Basilius are thoroughly discredited. And St. Peter of the *Julius* advocates a violent rising of the people against a papal tyrant if the Christian world is being led to its destruction, which Vives would reject as illegitimate violence between Christians (I shall return to this point later).

In Zappala's stimulating discussion of the dialogue, attention is drawn to the strategies of re-description and the paradiastolic treatment of usually accepted contraries, such as Christian/Turk, victory/defeat, Europe/Asia, Lutherans/Catholics.<sup>104</sup> Through the inversion of expectations, and the unsettling of held beliefs, Vives brings into view the true nature and consequences of discord and divisions beneath exterior appearances. Minos asks how one can distinguish between princes, Christians and Turks in their hatred for others, pursuit of wealth and

<sup>102</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 453ff.; p. 467.

<sup>103</sup> For more detail, see Curtis, "Pedagogy, Counsel and Satire," pp. 207–14.

<sup>104</sup> Zappala, "Vives's *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*," pp. 823–30.

sensual pleasure while the poor people remain hungry: “Quid agunt principes? Quid Christiani? Quid Turci?”<sup>105</sup> By answering questions with other questions and undermining assertions by telling observation, “Vives dismantles conventional discourse and forges a new vocabulary of anti-fame and anti-glory”.<sup>106</sup> For example, Minos remarks that some ask whether war between Christians is “war”, that is just, or merely outrage and theft (*latrocinium*). Surely it is not war but insanity (*Insanias mihi narrasti, non bella.*). Tiresias wonders what has become of humanity in Europe, so that from being truly men, so many have degenerated into savage wolves, not rightly to be called Christians. True Christians would rather conquer Turks by Christianity itself than fight amongst themselves. In peace all good arts flourish, while in war there is corruption, arson and poverty. What evil dementia prompts men to go long distances to fight with one another? When Basilius replies that princes seek glory in war, as did Alexander, Julius Ceasar and Pompey, Tiresias counters that such men are thieves (*latrones*).

In response to Minos’ contention that Christians should be characterized by mutual love, Polypragmon replies that never before in any part of the world has man hated more than in Europe today. Formerly, some nations from Asia abhorred the peoples of Europe, but at least there was a sea between them; hatred existed between empires such as the Athenians and Spartans, or between those who shared borders. But now neighbouring nations hate without any hope of reconciliation, such that Italians think trans-Alpines barbarians, the French loath the English while the English detest the Scots and French. And then there is the long-standing Valois-Habsburg war.

Such enmity was not restricted to external foes. Discord infected realms, between and within cities, such as the wars between the Orsini and Colonna in Rome, and the Velascos and the Manriques in Spain. The laity is divided from the clergy, plebeians from patricians, subjects from rulers and rulers from subjects. In the philosophy schools, supposedly dedicated to peace, tolerance and tranquillity, there are deadly rivalries between dialecticians and philosophers, students of Greek and Latin, Thomists and Scotists. And there is such hatred between Lutherans and anti-Lutherans:

<sup>105</sup> Majansius, 6, p. 454.

<sup>106</sup> Zappala, “Vives’s *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*,” p. 826.

What is more distressing is that one is so set against the other that they wish them destroyed and killed, rather than corrected. Not even among the Lutherans themselves is there love and concord, although they speak of nothing but faith, the Gospels, and charity. Even among those who profess the greatest charity, and are called brothers, what quarrels! And sometimes, even cruelty! A monk is set against a mendicant, a Minorite against a Dominican, a cloistered Minorite against an Observant: and with what expulsions, slanders, threats and persecutions!<sup>107</sup>

If Tiresias considers that afflictions overhanging Europe are now so enormous that only God's wisdom and benevolence may be able to alleviate them, he yet proposes that European princes should assemble and make an alliance for concord (that is, another Universal peace treaty). But is there a basis for such an agreement? Without such concord, there can be no preservation of Europe. If young Francis and Charles would content themselves with territories they already have, and live peaceably, the troubles of Europe would heal; if they must expand their possessions, better to do so against the Muslims than against their own, with whom they are bound by blood and sacraments (presumably meaning marriage and treaties as in Tunstall's oration). Henry was far enough away not to constitute an impediment to peace. Finally, Tiresias counsels as does St. Peter in the *Julius*: that in Christ is everything. He doubts, however, that his counsel would find receptive ears.<sup>108</sup>

It is fascinating that the experienced and pragmatic Scipio, the very model of the civil and military virtues of the Roman republic, advocates an aggressive invasion of Asia for glory and expropriation of wealth, as well as the evangelization of new peoples, rather than Christ-like peace and a policy of defensive containment advocated by Tiresias and Minos. The 1518 Treaty of London emphasized the latter. George argues that Scipio makes a play to the baser passions of princes, given that this appeal to self-interest is more likely to meet with success than exhortations to prayer and fraternal Christian alliance, and so constitutes the lesser of two evils.<sup>109</sup> This strategy was used in Vives's

---

<sup>107</sup> Majansius, 6, p. 455: "Nam inter Lutheranos, et Antilutheranos minus miror esse tanta odia; illud magis dolet alteros sic esse in alteros animatos, ut perditos et excisos velint, non emendatos;...nec inter Lutheranos ipsos est amor et concordia, quum tamen nihil in ore habeant aliud, quam fidem, evangelium, caritatem: jam, inter professos summam quandam caritatem, quique idcirco Fratres nominantur, quae dissidia! quam interdum cruenta! Monachus in mendicantem, Minorita adversus Dominicanum, Minorita claustralis in Observantem; quae expulsiones, convicia, minae, insectatio!"

<sup>108</sup> Majansius, 6, p. 480ff.

<sup>109</sup> George, "Vives's *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*", p. 266.

second letter to Henry. Another interpretative possibility is that of a debate between the classical Roman values of military *gloria* and ever-increasing *imperium*, and the irenic position permitting defensive alliances between Christians and the non-violent conversion of the non-Christian world. Tiresias admits that war on the heathen might be preferable to war among Christians, but religion should still be spread by holy example and admonition, not by force. Human minds cannot be compelled, but only led. This surely is an expression of Vives's religious tolerance.<sup>110</sup>

#### IV. De concordia et discordia: *the Emotions and Civil Life*

*De concordia et discordia* has been described as bringing to a "magnificent synthesis" Vives's vision of the history of nations which "is nothing but a grand-scale projection of the moral achievements and failures of both citizens and leaders."<sup>111</sup> It is recognized as a Stoic, Platonic, Aristotelian and Augustinian reflection on the binaries of concord and discord, and good and evil, which are presented as absolute values in an otherwise contingent human world governed by *fortuna*. It expands and draws together much of his previous political and religious thought to produce a discursive (and at times repetitious) tract which seeks to persuade through loose syllogistic argument which would cause a scholastic logician to despair. While scholarship has done much to recover this important tract, it still awaits a full examination of its reception across Europe in the early-modern period, especially in the light of the many editions.<sup>112</sup> My discussion can only offer some insights into its main themes and their connection to issues raised earlier. As I mentioned previously, I do not wish to frame my analysis as a pacifist one. The conception of concord and discord encompasses all levels or estates of human life, from the individual to the family, city, church and realm and in its spiritual, philosophical, intellectual and economic manifestations. Vives sets out the case for the origins of discord in society and

<sup>110</sup> Majansius, 6, p. 479.

<sup>111</sup> Noreña, *Vives and the Emotions*, p. 222.

<sup>112</sup> The main studies of *De concordia* include those by Dust, *Three Renaissance Pacifists*, pp. 135–90; George, "Rhetorical Strategies in Vives's Peace Writings: The Letter to Charles V and the *De Concordia*"; McCully, *Vives*, chapters 7–10; Noreña, *Vives*, passim; Adams, *Better Part of Valor*, pp. 285–91; Calero, *Obras políticas y pacifistas*; and Fernández-Santamaría, *The State, War and Peace*, pp. 49–57.



then aims to show how peace and concord can be fostered through knowledge of human nature, especially the emotions. This then provides the potential for the modification of corrupt behaviour. I do not believe that the importance of Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor pacis*, and Pace and Tunstall's 1518 orations (drawing on Italian humanist oratory and English peace discourse) has been recognized, however, and that these indeed enhance our understanding of Vives's analysis and the context in which he was writing.

The dedicatory epistle to Charles V, dated July 1, 1529, frames and in part encapsulates the matter of the treatise. It contains an apparent allusion to the League of Cognac which opposed Charles. The fulsome encomium on Charles' military successes, which Vives writes must surely have been the result of divine strength, has the same purpose of Pace's praise of Henry in his peace oration. Acknowledging Charles' gains against Francis, Vives then compares the emperor to Hercules and Alexander. Charles is exhorted to be another Hercules, alone in Europe in being sufficient to the task of bearing a tottering world upon his shoulders. He alone has both the will and the power to restore concord. Vives adopts an approach not previously used in his epistles, of characterizing Charles as a divinely appointed warrior, "though implying hope for peaceful objectives to his activity."<sup>113</sup>

If popular confidence was now placed in Charles V, it was expected that he perform his pacific duty. This would not be ephemeral, as were victories in Italy, but permanent. Peace between princes and concord in opinions were more necessary and useful, if more difficult to attain.<sup>114</sup> Vives raises the issue of the next church council, which he has heard Charles is promoting and is essential to security. With such difficulties facing Christendom, a council faithful to religion and divine law had never been more necessary. Vives, then, makes characteristic rhetorical appeals to *publica utilitas* and *necessitas*, in the cause of a moderate conciliarism.

Vives was not beyond making criticism of Charles regarding his contest with Francis for the crown of Emperor, which *De dissidiis* portrays as bought with large amounts of money, and Charles' propensity to war and the disaster of the Sack of Rome by Imperial soldiers.<sup>115</sup> In

<sup>113</sup> George, "Rhetorical Strategies," p. 254. It was a standard topos that victory implied divine favour.

<sup>114</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 188–90.

<sup>115</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 257, 268–69. George argues that in *De concordia* Vives makes somewhat circuitous references to the Sack of Rome and Charles' role in European

what appears to be a Marsilian preference, however, Vives now places his hopes in the Emperor rather than the papacy as the leader of the earthly City of God. Marsilius opened the *Defensor pacis* with an appeal to Ludwig of Bavaria to fulfill the role of restoring tranquillity to every realm in Christian empire at a time of increasing disintegration.<sup>116</sup> Like Marsilius, Vives also privileges the church council above other mechanisms in resolving doctrinal differences. As in the *Defensor pacis* (and Pace's *oratio de pace*), *De concordia* is structured around an extended *laudatio* of concord and *vituperatio* of discord, with the deliberative purpose of instructing and admonishing Charles and all citizens of the Christian empire. The high density of historical and contemporary references to good and bad rule, healthy and diseased body politics, illustrate the precepts that Vives urges upon Charles V, and so are designed to guide action in the present.<sup>117</sup>

In the first of the four books of *De concordia*, man is presented as a holy animal, able to contemplate the divine and born for social life (in the usual Aristotelian and Ciceronian humanist mode). But man has passions of the soul which can cause him to act against the needs of concord, especially pride, malice and anger. In creating man, God placed a free will in charge of passions and added reason, which moves the will to love, concord, quiet, justice and all the virtues.<sup>118</sup> Memory is a gift of man denied to other animals, which helps man to remember his similarity to other men, and therefore he cannot ignore the fact that he is born for the use of all. If he were to, this would be a violation of the natural and divine law. Man was sent into the world unarmed by God, so that he would unite with others in mutual dependency in the bonds of *amicitia*. The gifts of language and facial expression in order to communicate are for this purpose. But man fell away from concord. Not content with humanity and failing to understand his true nature, in

---

war, while being robustly hostile to the despoliation it caused. He detects a "tension in the texture...between dealing with an adversary and mitigating the polemical character of the treatise", p. 261. I would agree with this reading, although I would place more stress on the strong admonitory tone of Vives's letters and writings. The counsellor is charged with conveying the often unpalatable truth, in order to correct.

<sup>116</sup> *Defensor pacis*, Introduction.

<sup>117</sup> The commentary in *Obras políticas y pacifistas* reveals the extent of Vives's recourse to classical, biblical and patristic authorities.

<sup>118</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 196–97, 199ff.

his arrogance he sought divinity, sought equality with God, but fell to evil.<sup>119</sup> Forgetting the Fall, so as to escape guilt, man failed to learn.

The origin of concord is Christ; the chief origins of discord are pride, envy and anger. Pride inverts the true value of things, whereby men judge with reference to self-interest rather than to God and the commonwealth.<sup>120</sup> A perverted self-love decried by Augustine is described. If men truly loved themselves, this would entail loving the soul, as Plato said Socrates taught Alcibiades. But this distorted self-love (also an Erasmian conception) causes men to love their possessions, reputation, and bodily appetites. Vives then makes an important statement: kingship is constituted not by its attributes or the possessions of the king, but is the thing itself, the king.

There is a failure of moral judgment in the world which results in discordance between man's actual state and that which he conceives it to be. For example, Vives points to the paradiastolic re-description of terms which occurs because men perniciously use themselves as the yardstick of virtue and vice, rather than true Christian criteria. The rash damn the cowardly, and the extravagant the stingy.<sup>121</sup> Inflamed disputes between the learned arose which resulted in tragedy. Such a breakdown in consensus has given rise to numerous sects among scholars concerning grammar, orthography, ethics, philosophy, nature, theology and the interpretation of writers—again a theme developed, and indeed satirized and dramatized in dialogue, by Erasmus and English humanists.<sup>122</sup> Controversy infects all, and such unreasonable behaviour was actually relished by participants. Gladiatorial contests and battles in the ancient world had become the military, poetic and academic contests

---

<sup>119</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 201–2. See also Vives's *Fabula de homine* and the discussion by Fernández- Santamaría in *The Theatre of Man* (Philadelphia, 1997); Marcia Colish, "The Mime of God: Vives on the Nature of Man," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962), 3–21; Charles Fantazzi, "La Fabula de homine come parodia de la Oración de Pico de la Mirándola," in *La Universitat de València i l'Humanisme: Studia Humanitatis i renovació cultural a Europa i al Nou Món* (Valencia, 2003), pp. 79–88.

<sup>120</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 207–8.

<sup>121</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 209–11. On the re-description of moral terms, especially through the classical rhetorical strategy of paradiastole (favoured by Machiavelli in *The Prince*), see Quentin Skinner, "Moral Ambiguity and the Renaissance Art of Eloquence," *Essays in Criticism* 44 (1994), 267–92. It was just the type of ethically relativising speech which so appalled Vives, who here endeavours to stabilize meaning in the Christian moral universe. Hobbes would be similarly alarmed by this trope in the seventeenth century and attempted to define terms strictly so as to reduce the potential for conflict in political and religious society.

<sup>122</sup> Curtis, "Laughing Philosopher," passim.

of today. Seneca was more Christian, in claiming that anger was as far from greatness of the soul as boldness from courage, as insolence from confidence, as cruelty from severity.<sup>123</sup>

Book II provides insight into the realities of acting as counsellors to early modern monarchs and rulers, especially perhaps to Henry VIII:

Therefore there is no prince who does not wish all humankind to be alarmed by his passions, and, insofar as he is able, does not do his best to confuse all things with himself... wishing everything disturbed in line with his own internal tumult, hostile to all tranquillity... The violence of pride mounts, and not content to have disturbed men, would make trouble with God if he could. The prince gives in to his wildest passion, and while he avenges his injuries he is ready to imperil the law and religion to the greatest degree, calling to the service of his cruelty all those who trample underfoot and profane all things sacred.<sup>124</sup>

Of course, such an allusion could readily be applied to a number of past and present princes of the church and state, from Julius II, Louis XII and Maximilian I to Leo X and Francis I.

Like children who are easily injured and lash out hurting themselves more than those whom they strike, so there is no end to our discord and war—there are no wars that are ‘unjust’ since all injuries received are interpreted as injustices, and all inflicted on those who injure us.<sup>125</sup> Again there is the expression of great pessimism concerning man’s nature, which is prone to ignorance, to err and be deceived; man’s evil character, his failure in judgment and prudence, is the cause of discord. Yet set against this pessimism is the hope that humankind is not irredeemably fallen. If discord is made by us, we also have the capacity to reinstate concord using our God-given gifts of sociability, and reason to understand the emotional foundations of human behaviour.

Those higher orders of men, the educated theologians and philosophers, have sinned most. Philosophy itself which is supposed to moderate

<sup>123</sup> McCully, *Vives*, pp. 248–50.

<sup>124</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 244: “itaque nullus est Princeps, qui non affectibus suis totum humanum genus concuti vellet, et, quatenus potest, dat operam ut omnia secum confundat... relinquit immota, omnia ad internum suum tumultum vellet tumultuari, quietis iratus infensusque:... Ascendit altius superbiae impotentia, et non contenta homines inquietasse, Deo facesseret negotium, si valeret; dum ipse quas vocat injurias suas ulciscatur et obsequatur saevissimo animo, paratus est in extremum discrimen legem ac pietatem Dei adducere, accitis ad instrumentum suae crudelitatis, qui sacra omnia conculcent et profanant.” Cf. Seneca, *De clementia* 1.25; *De ira*, 3.16–21.

<sup>125</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 245.

the passions and fashion behaviour has now itself bred dissension; theologians debate about love with the bitterest of hatred. Vives cites the past scholarly debates over trivialities, fanned by pride, of Poggio with Valla and Filefo, and Poliziano with Scala and Merula.<sup>126</sup> Such debates can't be easily arbitrated, with scholars enlisting powerful allies and refusing to alter opinions. This is another instance of endless and fruitless war, sourced in human love of glory, wealth and reputation rather than based on an objective or Christian criteria. And such men were supposed to heal the soul! The cause of good learning was thus enormously harmed.

Neglecting to fulfil their office of study, counsel and teaching, scholars who had taken holy orders engage in fraud and steal benefices. Such large and small disputes have produced a religious crisis, in which opponents brand each other heretics; but what they call heresy is really impiety on the part of those who are arguing. Vives, perhaps following the Erasmian stricture against identifying individuals when criticizing general faults, does not name those mendicant orders or theologians he refers to, nor even the particular disputes. Erasmus, of course, and other northern humanists had been attacked for their Scriptural exegesis, efforts to improve the study of classical languages, and satirical assaults on what they thought to be intellectual fraud and impiety among scholastics and philosophers. Call to mind the many examples from the early sixteenth century, beyond the Lutheran/Catholic division—the debate over the Immaculate conception and the immortality of the soul, the Reuchlin dispute, the exchanges between Erasmus, More and Dorp over humanist studies, More and Pace's defence of the humanities at Oxford, the polemic between Hutten and Erasmus over the latter's apparently ambiguous position on Protestant reform, the polemic between Erasmus and Lee, and the Sorbonne's condemnation of certain works of Erasmus in 1527.<sup>127</sup> Most pressingly and poignantly for Vives was the Inquisition.

Vives merely alludes to divisions between Catholics, and between Catholics and Protestants. Both are symptoms of religious crisis. He does not simply attack Protestant reformers, but enlarges the scope to all who betray their office by indulging in controversy for personal gain.

---

<sup>126</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 247ff.

<sup>127</sup> Erica Rummel, *Erasmus and His Catholic Critics*, 2 vols. (Nieuwkoop, 1989) identifies Erasmus' critics across Europe.

Those who would prefer a 'heretic' to die rather than be returned to reason desire not religious renewal, but to retaliate and destroy. Again sounding against innovation or change, Vives pleads for a return to the traditions of the church. Some are so disenchanted that they would rather live under the rule of the Turks, than the rule of those who act like Turks but profess to be Christians.

Those institutions which had been constituted to establish and maintain order—the law, courts, magistrates, rulers—were unable to restore order now, infected themselves with human pride, anger and envy. Nor would reasoned persuasion, exemplary behaviour or force be any more effective.<sup>128</sup> Vives is no utopian in this book of the *De concordia*. Reform cannot now be achieved through institutional means, or constitutional innovation, but only through the moral improvement of all individuals in the commonwealth.

Book 3, "Qui est de bonis concordiae, et malis discordiae", opens with Vives articulating his bleak view of the human condition:

This life of ours, in which the immortal human mind is enclosed within this rotten and decaying body which some ancient writers called a prison, others death, or more appositely, a pilgrimage or exile, as our theologians have termed it, by whatever name it is given, it is the way to eternity, if it is completed as it should. Virtue is the only provision for the journey, all other things are either supportive of virtue or aids to life, which take their name from their maker and leader so that they are even called "goods". But I am not concerned about the name. Call them advantages or opportunities, if you like. Let us use the accepted Latin word, by which things are called by their right name; thus, they may be called goods, and their contraries evils."<sup>129</sup>

If wealth constitutes the lowest of the goods, war destroys it. Italy had been destroyed by wars, even more so than in the time of Lucan, with the security of the weak taken away by vicious soldiers who consumed

<sup>128</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 230–31.

<sup>129</sup> "Vita haec nostra, qua immortalis humana mens putrido hoc et caduco corpore includitur quam ideo veterum quidam alii carcerem, alii mortem nominarunt, nostri appositius peregrinationem atque exilium; ea ergo, quocunque sit nomine censenda, via est ad illam aeternitatem, si modo apte et convenienter ad illam exigatur: viae hujus unicum est viaticum virtus, reliqua, vel virtutis sunt adminicula atque instrumenta, vel adjuncta vitae, quae de artificis ac principis suae nomine appellationem sumunt, ut etiam bona a plerisque nominentur; sed nec in nomine ero sollicitus; sint sane commodo, si quis volet, aut opportunitates, nos latino et recepto utemur vocabulo, ubi res sunt expositae ac declaratae; ita, bona nuncupentur, contraria vero mala." Majansius, 5, p. 255.

much more than citizens and caused inflation of prices and thence dearth.<sup>130</sup> In the Sack of Rome, soldiers had not even spared their own countrymen.

Vives complains that he cannot comprehend the insanity of two kings who are compelled to struggle over territory, and devastate it in the meantime. Why destroy what you say you wish to recover as belonging to you? Henry VIII's seizure of territory which he then returned to Francis is one example cited.<sup>131</sup> There follows a long analysis of the sociological and economic effects of war. Maintaining armies never satisfied with their wages, the destruction of buildings, crops, and other resources, rampant inflation—all these produce general impoverishment. Vives compares two unnamed princes who today construct fine works, enrich places of learning and the arts, tax moderately and never impose extraordinary revenues while supporting patronage and their people living in abundance—with those kings who support a few useless men, whose taxes, impositions and loans mount daily, and who consume voraciously but are never satiated. What causes such difference, the opposite of the value of similitude in which people are brought together in Christ and friendship with one another? Like those afflicted with the thirsting disease, princes' appetites for plunder are ever more excited by war. But what else are the cities and peoples of a kingdom, than the members of the King, that is, the head?<sup>132</sup>

In contrast, Vives describes the goods of concord. People work the fields in security, the harvest is properly distributed, even if small, and if deficient, commerce allows the importation of more from other nations because land and sea routes are open and free. And furthermore, it is not only material goods which are secure, but credit relations under the protection of the laws.<sup>133</sup> Discord, even at the level of the family, disrupts such activity which is based on trust between friends in a civil society. Love, equity, simplicity and confidence—the qualities of *amicitia*—cannot exist.

The problem with a prince with an enraged soul is that he doesn't respect justice, the laws which proceed from it and the magistrates

<sup>130</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 256ff. McCully, *Vives*, p. 290ff.

<sup>131</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 258–59.

<sup>132</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 264.

<sup>133</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 265–67. Craig Muldrew, "Interpreting the Market: The Ethics of Credit and Community Relations in Early Modern England," *Social History* 18, 2 (1993), pp. 163–83.

who oversee them. Evil ones no longer respect the magistrates and the prince—the multitude is more prone to licence. The prince should avoid all occasion of disharmony which might imperil the commonwealth, as did Scipio Africanus and the Theban, Epaminondas, by pardoning wrongs if necessary, rather than seek revenge and perpetuating the cycle of discord.<sup>134</sup>

The “New Adam”, Christ, had come to purify our sins so that we might be citizens of the City of the Church, and also part of a greater chain, the Mystical Body. Therefore one cannot harm one part of this body without inflicting harm on the rest, on itself. Dissidence among Christians has opened the way for the Turkish advance. In concord the most powerful community of Christian Europe, from Cadiz to the Danube, was the superior of the Turks and Asia; but in discord was proof of the classical adage, “the greatest things disintegrate in discord” (*Discordia maximae res dilabuntur*).<sup>135</sup> Pace had cited just this adage from Sallust in his 1518 *oratio*. Rome grew while the good of the commonwealth had priority over private passions, and many such as Brutus, Publicola, Camillus, Fabius, Scipio, Lepidus, Flaccus, Nero and Sempronius held this view. Private offenses were pardoned for the sake of concord. When enmities overwhelmed public peace, the empire fell—just as Sallust had predicted to Caius Caesar.<sup>136</sup>

Only God is the master of things, and we the usufructuaries. Through concord, land and seas are open and safe for everyone. The entire Christian world becomes as a common city and *patria*. In discord we are excluded and divided from our own.<sup>137</sup> Charles visited Britain twice and Henry was once in Gravelines in Flanders, both without an army or retinue, and almost alone. In this way England belonged to Charles, and Belgium and Spain to Henry; they had only to indicate if either had wanted something done in the other’s kingdom. In this sense they ruled for both kingdoms. Now neither dare enter nor even look at the realm of the other.

Holding power in times of discord undermines it because *fortuna* governs more; the examples of Francis at Pavia and Pope Clement at Rome attest to this, as do many others. A king in war must be guarded

<sup>134</sup> Vives draws again on the Senecan essays, *De ira* and *De clementia*, passim. Epictetus also argues for forbearance in the face of injury, *Discourses* 1.25.29; 2.13.11.

<sup>135</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 274–75.

<sup>136</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 276ff.

<sup>137</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 278–82.



like a prisoner, and lives in a state of terror.<sup>138</sup> He must suffer insults to himself, his office and his laws. He becomes a servant to the most base of the realm and his subjects become resentful due to taxation. Not understanding this, some princes withdraw to their palaces surrounded only by flatterers who mislead him as to the true anger of the people. The aristocracy can't be trusted, testing the laws and customs. Armies will betray leaders for pay, as befell Andrea Doria.

Vives compares those peoples in Asia and Africa who disapprove of wars, which they consider savage and bestial. Surely it cannot be honourable to slaughter millions as had Caesar and Alexander, as Seneca, Pliny and Lucan held. Very few laud the Hannibals and Alexanders whereas even thieves admire Socrates, Plato, Seneca and St. Paul, St. Peter and Augustine. There is no profit from wars, argues Vives, as all victories are Pyrrhic. He illustrates his point by reference to the Roman rulers who were to regret their great conquests.<sup>139</sup> Many had wished to abdicate—Charles V would later abdicate, wearied by the burden of governing such a large empire. Again we encounter a very anti-Roman imperial philosophy, and indeed a very anti-Machiavellian one. Vives utterly refuses any appeal to the notion that *gloria*, *utilitas* and *honestas* lie in increasing empire.<sup>140</sup> As McCully has argued, "*Imperium* was, Vives thought, in his own time a cause of the greatest vices which went unpunished and which ultimately became civil and foreign war, which in turn brought destruction to the mighty... Government had become killing, destroying, and burning."<sup>141</sup> And so he warned Charles V against the desire to tyranny rather than rule. True honour and victory reside instead in competition, in wisdom, moderation, reason and character, founded in the examination of conscience and true self-knowledge.<sup>142</sup> For scholars and artists especially, war is injurious. Creativity requires tranquillity and quiet, as testified by Pythagoras and Democritus, among others.

---

<sup>138</sup> Cf. More's epigrams on good and bad rule. In sleep kings are no more elevated than beggars, and unless guarded by arms or virtue, their life may be taken by any assassin. In a well-governed realm there is a relationship of mutual obligation, affection and protection between king and subjects. This not only protects subjects, but also makes the ruler less vulnerable to internal and external threat.

<sup>139</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 294ff., pp. 321–22.

<sup>140</sup> Marcia Colish, "Cicero's *De officiis* and Machiavelli's *Prince*," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 9 (1978), pp. 443–49.

<sup>141</sup> McCully, *Vives*, p. 243; Majansius, 5, pp. 213–15.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. Seneca, *De ira* 3.36–38; *Epistles*, 28.10.

Practical solutions to this disease of the body politic are few. Vives again believes that a General Council of the church is necessary to cure religious wrangling and divisions, but is pessimistic that it could be convened, given that nations are set against each other and scholars are so divided that no consensus can be reached.

Book IV is a collection of chapters, related by subject matter. The passions inevitably bring tumult to the soul, clashing in their opposites (sorrow/joy, fear/hope; and so on) and even individual passions are at war with themselves (hope for one thing diminishes hope for another, fear of one thing lessens fear of another). Following a Stoic, and particularly, Senecan argument, Vives holds that passions must be subdued by judgment and reason.

Highly pertinent to the situation that Vives (and More, Fisher and Pace) found himself in with respect to the Divorce and the loss of Henry's favour, it is stated that one should meet adversity with equanimity, accommodating to circumstances. With Socrates as the model, Vives urges independence and security of spirit. The scholar should try to preserve his own tranquillity by disengagement although this in itself may be dangerous if it is perceived that one does not value what others honour through their licence, if armed with wisdom, he knows that he walks in a corrupt world but doesn't descend to its level. He should do what he can to cure discord in others—indeed this is a remodeling of the classical *vir bonus civilis* into the man of true charity who is free from harmful emotions. But if reform is not possible, retirement to the *vita contemplativa* is justified. With a weary tone Vives says that opposition to, or questioning of, God's powerful agents is to be discouraged; it only incites more anger and envy.<sup>143</sup> In his musings on liberty (*libertas*) in *De conditione vitae Christianorum sub Turca* (1529) Vives again rejects the possibility of resistance to, or deposition of, a bad ruler. Political liberty consists in quiet obedience, a ruler loved if good and tolerated if bad.<sup>144</sup> This is contrast to Hythloday's position: a king who treats his subjects as slaves has no right to hold authority and should retain command only as long as the people allow. And

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 4.3, 4.6, 5.4, 6.2.

<sup>144</sup> McCully, *Vives*, ch. 6. In this tract, composed when the Ottoman advance was at its greatest in the Balkans, Vives rejects the idea that some might hold that life under the Turk would be free of the usual constraints of law in a Christian society. Religion and culture would perish. Liberty was at its greatest in Athens and Rome when laws were obeyed. Vives still refuses to meet the just war argument head on.

St. Peter in the *Julius* holds that in cases of tyranny which lead the community to destruction, a pope or his secular analogue, the prince, may be deposed, or even put to death. Such an authority remains latent in the whole community, in line with the conciliarist argument of Gallican theorists such as Jacques Almain.<sup>145</sup>

Vives returns again to the theme of kingship in the important Chapter 10 of *De concordia*. Further demystifying monarchical rule, Vives poses the question: What is a prince but a wise man (*vir sapiens*) with public power (*Quid est porro aliud verus Princeps, quam vir sapiens cum publica potestate*)?<sup>146</sup> The substantive difference is that he must judge better than the ordinary subject, exercising a rare self-restraint since he is responsible for many. That is the essence of his prerogative, based in reason, counsel, and will. If he indulges in the passions, the danger is far greater for him and those he rules. The wise man won't look for worldly glory or try to please all. He decides what is virtuous, seeks advice and is invulnerable to transient emotions. Vives ascribes here to the Platonic philosopher-king, the educated, virtuous man of exemplary moral standing.

Later in Book IV Vives issues a warning to monarchs who fall short of the Platonic ideal. When a courtier falls out with a monarch, the monarch averts his countenance as if the courtier no longer existed.<sup>147</sup> But what if a king is rejected in the same way when he meets his God? This should be considered if ever a king is tempted to discord. *This* is the final heavenly court of accountability. At another point, Vives wonders that all watch in silence as the Christian world kills. Why don't we expose the "Most Christian" king (Francis I), the "Defender of the Faith" (Henry VIII) if he is not behaving as a Christian? Seneca, Plato and others had not hesitated to instruct their rulers, and so should Christians. Christians should dare to offend, even to martyrdom, as Socrates and Christ had done.

Vives reaffirms the corporatist and sacramental nature of the body politic, discussed in Book III. Christ is the head animating the body of the Christian community. Members have reciprocal effects on one another, with charity the glue that joins all into a harmonious whole.<sup>148</sup>

<sup>145</sup> *Erasmii opuscula*, ll. 460–70, 517–37. Erasmus, *CWE*, vol. 27, pp. 179–81, 193. *Defensor pacis*, pp. xxii–xxiv.

<sup>146</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 373.

<sup>147</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 400.

<sup>148</sup> Majansius, 5, chs. 12 and 13. McCully, *Vives*, p. 74.

The inheritance of the “Old Adam” had thus been replaced by that of the “New Adam”. Under the former, there was an unnatural separation in men which was remedied by various institutional means of reunion—cities, pacts, alliances, laws, colleges and fraternities.<sup>149</sup> But divisions occurred between cities, between Jew and Gentile, Greek and barbarian, Athenian and Lacedaemonian. So Christ was sent to give restore humankind to its first and true nature; His blood was shed so that all would belong to the same City, and live in concord based in His love. Strikingly, Vives concludes that the Turks should be met with love and not war, as they are men also whom Christ wishes to know the truth by the same means as Christians had attained it—through apostolic teaching, good example and the exercise of reason according to nature.

#### V. De pacificatione: *the Officers of Peace*

*De pacificatione* (*On the Making of Peace*) was composed also in 1529 as a necessary sequel to *De concordia*, as the dedicatory epistle maintains. Indeed it is also a companion to *De dissidiis*, all three concerned with the theme of Christian harmony and the proper conduct of all the offices of the commonweal.<sup>150</sup> *De pacificatione* concentrates on those who promote peace, that quality which accords with human nature and underpins all the commodities of social, political and religious life—their responsibilities, desirable conduct and proper education. The concept of similitude is used to found Vives’s view of the absolute for social harmony (*harmonia*) based on love, as opposed to discord based on difference. “For there is nothing in nature more pleasing than similitude.”<sup>151</sup> In his theological writings, Erasmus expressed the concept of similitude (*similia similibus*) in terms of Christ-centred moderation, accommodation to others and the meeting of minds. It extended beyond individual relations to those within church and state.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>149</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 388–90.

<sup>150</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 404–46. I draw on McCully, *Vives*, pp. 391–428; Dust, *Three Renaissance Pacifists*, pp. 191–214; and Edward V. George, “‘Suadendo, admonendo, hortando, precando’: Rhetoric and Peace-making in Juan Luis Vives’s *De pacificatione*,” *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Abulensis*, ed. Rhoda Schnur et al. (Tempe, AZ, 2000), pp. 253–63.

<sup>151</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 405: “nihil est enim in natura congruentius similitudine...”

<sup>152</sup> Hoffmann, *Rhetoric and Theology*, pp. 107–8, p. 116, p. 144.

The dedicatory epistle is addressed to Alfonso Manrique, the archbishop of Seville and Grand Inquisitor. This is highly pertinent to the interpretation of the treatise. Beyond the fact that Manrique was another highly placed ecclesiastical figure addressed by Vives (along with Adrian, Wolsey and Longland), he was a friend and counsellor to Charles V and a supporter of Spanish Erasmians. Vives's own family, as mentioned earlier, had suffered as a *converso* Jewish family. In the letter, Vives applauds Manrique's qualities which define him as a peace-maker, and these accord with discussion in the tract itself—his true nobility, position as a counsellor and thus guardian of the health of the commonweal through the constraint of unquiet passions, dignity as both Archbishop who watches his sheep and Inquisitor of heretics, and his learning in the humanities.

With respect to Manrique's inquisitorial responsibilities, Vives underlines their onerous and dangerous character. Such an office in the church bears the greatest importance, and must be aligned with great prudence and judgment so that the passions of the judge and accusers are resisted.<sup>153</sup> At stake are the reputation, health and life of many.

The Stoic argument is advanced that the wise man is trained not to be disturbed by any tumult, but rather to remain tranquil; he gives his life for the health and safety of others, as Christ also did. Cato the Younger is the exemplary case.<sup>154</sup> Christ is the "Jupitor saviour", the Hercules, the tamer of monsters and purifier of the world. Before the coming of Christ, there was war between men, between men and the angels, and with God. By Christ's death, he purified all creation and overcame these hatreds. All are united now; there is one father of all, one city, one God and one profession of faith and baptism. Swords were beaten into plowshares and spears into pruning-hooks, so that men were dedicated to mutual utility.<sup>155</sup> Deploying the New Testament beatitude, "Blessed are the peace-makers, for they will be called the sons of God", (as did Pace in his *oratio*) Christians are urged to imitate their Father in seeking concord and love, and driving out hatred, and

---

<sup>153</sup> Brad Inwood, "Moral Judgement in Seneca," *Stoicism Traditions and Transformations*, eds. Steven Strange and Jack Zupko (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 76–94, provides a useful discussion of the conception of moral judgement in *De clementia*, *De ira* and *Epistulae morales*. Here Vives follows Seneca's counsel to Nero, an emperor with extraordinary powers, who must therefore exercise leniency.

<sup>154</sup> Lucan, *Pharsalia* 2. 306–13.

<sup>155</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 409ff. Malachias 3:3–4; Isaiah 2:4; Micah 4:3.

thus receive their great reward.<sup>156</sup> The Devil represents all that which is opposed to this. Peace-making is the duty of all as sons of God; those who are able to act directly for peace must do so, while those who cannot should pray, fast and offer support to the former.

Vives continues on to examine the various categories of offices occupied in the community, and their orientation to fostering peace: the wealthy, the nobility, counsellors, teachers, soldiers, the learned, priests and bishops, strong men (soldiers, as mercenaries and others similarly criminal, and the more rare self-sacrificing servants of the commonwealth and prince), friends, heads of families, and subjects of princes.<sup>157</sup> The resources that can be used for good or ill are likewise discussed, and include wealth, power, nobility, honour, laws, possessions and family. A number of striking arguments are put forward, some consonant with humanist and Erasmian notions of *vera nobilitas*, counsel, the place of the *ars rhetorica* in civil life and the relationship between ruler and *subditi*, and others which appear to be peculiar to Vives. The basic premise is that all the resources of men should be invested in public utility; for example, the wealthy should contribute to supporting laws and equity so as to promote peace; the nobility should also maintain justice and public peace, and by so serving the polity conserve their own position and authority. If nobility has been established by a line of ancestors it can only be preserved by this form of civic virtue. It consists not in titles or the bending of a knee; war-mongering is a denial of the education given to the nobility.

The prince is the servant of his subjects.<sup>158</sup> Just as speech, commerce, laws and magistrates were established to aid concord, so the first king was chosen as the guarantor of public peace and defender of the laws. God added an occult majesty to strengthen his office. To encourage discord is akin to a shepherd endangering his sheep, or a guardian of a harvest burning it. To fail in this responsibility, to stir up discord, is to become a savage tyrant. Note here that Vives's view is characteristic of the Platonic and Aristotelian positions, which he cites as evidence, and the humanist view of his friends such as More, Erasmus and Pace. It would become the view of the next generation of English humanists, such as Thomas Elyot. A king cultivates peace among his citizens, while

<sup>156</sup> Matt. 5:9.

<sup>157</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 411ff.

<sup>158</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 417–20.

a tyrant sows the seeds of discord, and nourishes their increase. A tyrant cares not for the utility of those he rules, but exploits occasions of dissension to destroy the country. He treats his subjects as cattle and brute beasts are treated by their owner—that is, for the benefit of the tyrant, not the benefit of the commonwealth. On taking the coronation oath, the king takes the title of father of his commonwealth, so should love his subjects as he would his own children, and hate to see them divided by war. Vives cites classical examples from tragedies: Jocasta lamenting the war of Polynices and Eteocles, the grief of the Roman Severus and Philip of Macedon caused by the enmity of their children.<sup>159</sup> Christ, the very image for the prince to imitate, practiced what he preached. He loved his enemies and through his charity and piety expunged discord among his followers and drew them to him for all time.

The counsellor (*consiliarius*) to a prince occupies an extremely important office—indeed, Vives cites the adage that it is preferable for there to be a bad prince with good counsellors than a good prince with bad counsellors.<sup>160</sup> In a Platonic construction, the counsellor is said to be the reason of the state, and the king its will. The duties of the counsellor are to rule and restrain the will, to teach better things, to deter from wickedness, to advise, and to excite to that which is beautiful and outstanding, and honourable. It would be monstrous if reason should recommend the worst, rather than the best (the Aristotelian position) and carry off judgment into insanity. If both advisers and princes are subject to strong passions, great disturbances result. Vives describes the various forms of *amicitia*, or friendship, of those related by blood, or by law, and country as both lay and ecclesiastical fellow citizens, of neighbours, whose interests are mutual. Relationships are based on hierarchy—the prince over the subject, the teacher acts as a father over a few private citizens, the father of a house over wife and children. Robert Filmer and James I and VI would appeal to just such a thorough-going patriarchal justification of kingship in the seventeenth century.

Teachers fashion minds and temperaments to moderation, modesty and *humanitas*, which produces tranquillity, virtue and benevolence to others.<sup>161</sup> Between students friendship should be fostered; indeed this is the value to instill in all relationships that the student has with others in

<sup>159</sup> Dust, *Three Renaissance Pacifists*, p. 199.

<sup>160</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 420: "... Praestare malum esse Principem cum bonis consiliariis, quam bonum cum malis."

<sup>161</sup> Majansius, 5, pp. 420–44.

society. In this way, discord and hatreds become alien; even competition between students should be carefully monitored lest dissensions arise. Just as the school of Pythagoras taught friendship as much as the arts, and Christ's incarnation reconciliation, grace and peace, so the end of education now lies in the virtuous preparation of the souls of students for concord, a way of conducting one's life in society. Erudition refines the soul, excising barbarity and inhuman customs and putting in their place civility and humanity.

Vives next considers the family. The father endeavours to maintain peace and tranquillity at home, so that domestic offices may be discharged. Husbands and wives each have their obligations to one another, and in this serve the greater needs of the commonwealth. Citing the Pythagorean adage deployed by St. Jerome, Vives states forcefully what must be kept at bay: "weakness from the body, inexperience from the soul, luxury from the stomach, sedition from the *civitates*, discord from the home, and in general, intemperance from all things."<sup>162</sup>

"Thus the *De pacificatione* echoes an idea found in Vives's rhetorical advisory, the *De consultatione* of 1523 (not published until 1533, as far as we know) that the art of persuasion is applicable and important at various levels of public and private life."<sup>163</sup> This is a distinctive emphasis, and aligned with his conception of persuasion put to the services of concord at every level of society. The unity of the body politic, founded on a patriarchal hierarchy, demands such a conception—a husband and father must keep domestic concord, or else his credibility as a public figure carrying *authoritas* is compromised. The examples of Philip of Macedon and Gorgias of Leontini support Vives's argument.<sup>164</sup> Vives may have had Henry's Great Matter in mind. In this context, Vives's other writings such as *De institutione feminae Christianae* and *De ratione studii puerilis*, both dedicated to Queen Catherine, can be regarded as "political" works (and also *De officio mariti*). The Queen, as wife to a king and mother to a princess, has the responsibility of moderating the excesses of Henry and educating a future monarch. In a broader sense, such texts are intended to serve civil concord. Peace on an international scale

<sup>162</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 426: "Fuganda sunt omnibus modis et abscindenda, languor a corpore, imperitia ab animo, luxuria a ventre, a civitate seditio, a domo discordia, et in commune, a cunctis rebus intemperantia." Jerome, *Liber tertius seu ultima responsio adversus scripta Rufini* 39.

<sup>163</sup> George, "Rhetoric and Peace-making in Juan Luis Vives's *De pacificatione*," pp. 255–56.

<sup>164</sup> Majansius, 5, p. 426.



depends on the proper control of individuals' emotions within all their relationships; peace is the duty of all as sons of God.

### VI. *Peace and parrhesia: the Legacy of Vives*

While the importance of Vives's thinking regarding peace and war has been increasingly appreciated, his larger European legacy has been curiously neglected despite the fact that "his books were found in all the libraries of the continent."<sup>165</sup> Vives articulated a distinctive and novel theory of monarchical power and its potential abuses within a secular or ecclesiastical polity, and as situated in complex international relations within Western Europe, between the Christian and Muslim worlds, between the Old World and the New. He raised a series of interconnected issues of pressing concern in the early modern world of civil and religious unrest and wars—and indeed to our modern world. What were the origins and ends of the good life and civil society? How might peace be best preserved given the nature of humankind? When, if ever, is war justified? How are the emotions of individuals connected to attaining an ordered, prosperous, and peaceful commonwealth? What was the purpose of monarchy, its liberties, duties, and obligations? And those of the other orders or estates? When and how can wise counsel be offered most effectively to a single ruler? What are the origins and implications of religious, intellectual and political dissent? What is heresy and who defines it? How are international relations pursued? What is the effect of civil and international war on economies and trade? Should the lands and seas be open to free movement for trade and cultural exchange?

Permutations of these questions were posed again by other early modern European theorists, who may have found directly or indirectly in Vives's political writings a stimulating approach, even if they arrived at different conclusions.<sup>166</sup> Descartes refers to Vives in his *Traité des pas-*

---

<sup>165</sup> Noreña, *Vives*, p. 298. Only Peter Harrison, "Reading the Passions: The fall, the passions, and dominion over nature," makes reference to Vives among the excellent essays in *The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (London, 1998), pp. 49–78, p. 52.

<sup>166</sup> Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford, 1999).

sions, and it is thought that Grotius found much of interest.<sup>167</sup> I wish to survey briefly four English authors—a counsellor, a king, a controversial European intellectual and an Oxford Anglican cleric.

Sir Thomas Elyot was part of the generation of Henrician humanists which followed the Vives-More-Pace circle. His writings reflect back to their concerns and respond to an altered and increasingly dangerous environment for courtiers.<sup>168</sup> During the 1520s and early 1530s Elyot served as a clerk of the King's Council and then briefly as English ambassador to the Court of Charles V, so was well versed in matters of state concerning Henry's Divorce, the Royal Supremacy and foreign policy. It is highly likely that he knew Vives and his political writings, especially given Elyot's support for Catherine of Aragon. Certainly Elyot's pedagogical theory found inspiration in that of Vives.<sup>169</sup> The theme of counsel is a major focus of many of Elyot's writings. *The Boke named the Governour* (1531), an extremely popular treatise, supports monarchy as the best form of government, but only when complemented by the counsel of wise friends and companions. The king is assisted by magistrates or lesser governors educated in a humanist curriculum, so that whether they be soldiers, courtiers, diplomats, councillors or local officials they can ably discharge their office. The end of all learning for Elyot was the provision of "good counsayle".<sup>170</sup> In an Aristotelian allusion, Elyot argues that without good counsellors, the king lacks his eyes, ears, hands and feet—without such friends (*amici principis*) the king's propensity to cruelty and vice can't be bridled.<sup>171</sup> Like Vives, he asserts that a public weal with a corrupt prince and good counsellors and companions may be in a better state than a good prince with evil

---

<sup>167</sup> On Vives and Descartes see Noreña, *Vives*, pp. 291, 298, and his *Vives and the Emotions*, chs. 15–18. Hugo Grotius's *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625) also emphasizes our natural sociability in creating society based in the laws of nature, and although his analysis focused on the just war and conduct in war, contra Vives, he considers European international relations from comparable foundations. Whether Grotius was aware of Vives's advocacy of freedom of the seas when composing *Mare liberum* is open to speculation.

<sup>168</sup> Walker provides a fuller and highly pertinent discussion of Elyot's background and connections with More, from whom he distanced himself as the Royal Supremacy became established, and the question of counsel from the late 1520s, *Writing Under Tyranny*, pp. 123–240. For Elyot and Pace, see p. 129.

<sup>169</sup> Noreña, *Vives*, pp. 294–95.

<sup>170</sup> *The Boke named the Governour*, ed. Henry H.S. Croft, 2 vols. (London, 1880) 2, p. 433. Hereafter Croft.

<sup>171</sup> Croft, 2, p. 184. Aristotle, *Politics* 1287b.

counsellors.<sup>172</sup> Elyot's Platonic account of the soul and its relation to the emotions, judgment, conscience, corruption and virtue parallels that of Vives. Every governor must exercise double government—inner government, with the “affectes and passions” subject to reason, while external government pertains to the governor's children, servants and other subject to his authority.<sup>173</sup> A tyrant is governed not by reason and knowledge, but by the passions, which reduces him to the level of—or lower than—beasts, and so places him beyond the reach of good counsel. The ruler, in emulation of Augustus Caesar, should rather exercise benevolence and clemency, which safeguard rule more surely than terror.<sup>174</sup>

Elyot's dialogues, the Lucianic *Pasquil the Playne* (another satire bearing the print of the *Julius exclusus*, as well as *De dissidiis*) and *Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man*, were both printed in 1533. His English translation of Isocrates's *Nicocles*, (a translation of which Vives had dedicated to Wolsey) appeared as *The Doctrinal of Princes* in 1534 and was dedicated to Henry VIII himself. *Pasquil the Playne* insists on the necessity for freedom of speech at court. The interlocutors are Gnatho, the flatterer who always endorses his master, Harpocrates, the flatterer who keeps silent rather than admonishes, and the Roman stone statue Pasquil, who argues for the true counsellor's duty to exercise *parrhesia* and lead the master to virtue for the good of the commonwealth. Elyot's Pasquil holds that had both temporal and spiritual rulers listened to the statue's counsel rather than to their flatterers, “many thinges mought haue been preuented, that were after lamented. Germany shulde not haue kicked agayne her mother: Emperours and princes shuld not haue ben in perpetual discorde/ & often tymes in peril/ prelates haue ben laughed at, as dissardes...lawes and statutes contemned, and officers litell regarded.”<sup>175</sup> Elyot's close-hand observations of the counselling approaches, and subsequent tragic fortunes, of Henry's learned and faithful advisers such as Vives, Pace, More and Fisher no doubt led him

---

<sup>172</sup> Guy points out that in the Rainbow portrait of Elizabeth I, she is arrayed in Augustan majesty, while her costume is embossed with ears and eyes, symbolizing her privy councillors and servants who support, but also limit, her power, although they do not pronounce. But the lips can also be discerned in the folds of her gown. “Tudor Monarchy and its Critiques,” p. 81.

<sup>173</sup> Croft, 2, pp. 262–63.

<sup>174</sup> Walker, *Writing Under Tyranny*, ch. 8.

<sup>175</sup> *Pasquil the Playne*, in *Four Political Treatises by Sir Thomas Elyot*, ed. Lillian Gottesman, (Gainsville, 1967), p. 58.

to articulate the need for attention to opportunity, content and delivery. Henry's propensity to imprison and execute critics of policy, as well as wives and "heretics", shocked Christendom. The dialogue argues that plain-speaking does not always meet with success. A soothing, moderate manner in offering early admonishment and tactful advice is more likely to succeed than inflammatory words offered after vicious habits have already been established. One fascinating topical aspect of this pasquinade is that Harpocrates, the silent counsellor, is cast as the master's confessor in the first edition printed anonymously by the King's printer, Thomas Berthelet. It has been persuasively argued that the identification was then dropped in the next edition, as the royal confessor John Longland (one of those whom Vives counselled) was recognized as the target, in the context of widespread concern at the time that the bishop had neglected his duty to advise Henry in the ways of virtue and against the Divorce.<sup>176</sup>

King James VI and I is remarkable in being a humanist theologian and "philosopher-king", the King of Scotland who came to the English throne after the Elizabethan succession crisis, and united his kingdom to form Great Britain. James theorized about monarchical rule and actively worked to reunite Christendom. While he studied the educational works of Vives with his tutors, there is no firm evidence that he read his political works.<sup>177</sup> *The True Lawe of Free Monarchies* (1597–8) and *Basilikon Doron* (1599), however, bear many family resemblances. Given the breadth of James's knowledge of humanist authors, interest in justifying obedience to monarchical rule against monarchomach doctrine as well as promulgating irenic ecumenism, James could well have turned to Vives for inspiration.<sup>178</sup>

In common with Vives, James argues from divine and natural law that kingship is "the true pattern of Divinity".<sup>179</sup> The monarch is as

---

<sup>176</sup> Frederick W. Conrad, "The Problem of Counsel Reconsidered: the case of Sir Thomas Elyot," in *Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth*, eds. Paul A. Fidler and Thomas F. Mayer (London, 1992), pp. 75–107; pp. 97–9. Walker, however, has argued that Thomas Cranmer is the confessor.

<sup>177</sup> George Frederick Warner, "The Library of James VI, in the Hand of Peter Young, his tutor, 1573–1583," *Miscellany of the Scottish History Society* (Edinburgh, 1893), pp. ix–lxxv.

<sup>178</sup> William Brown Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge, 1997) and Jimmy H. Burns, *The True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Early Modern Scotland* (Oxford, 1996).

<sup>179</sup> *James I, The True Law of Free Monarchy and Basilikon Doron*, ed. and intro. Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier (Toronto, 1996), p. 52. Hereafter Fischlin.

a loving father accountable only to God for that authority, since it is He who has placed him as a lieutenant over his subjects; while the greatest necessity for subjects is to know their God. The king is a free and absolute monarch, unconstrained by human law. And like Vives, James theorized an irreversible transfer of authority to the first ruler when civil society was formed.<sup>180</sup> The only remedy to tyranny is prayer; resistance is abhorred against the head of the body politic.

The subtitle of *The True Lawe* is “the reciproock and mutuall duetie betwixt a free King and his Naturall subiects”. Subjects are to obey all commands of the king, unless against God; but the king meanwhile has obligations to administer justice, advance the common good and to procure the peace of the people.<sup>181</sup> *Basilikon Doron* similarly emphasises the heavy weight of such a high office to James’ son, Prince Henry (who would predecease his father), while explaining its temporal and ecclesiastical aspects.

James was in part refuting the theory of his tutor George Buchanan (and also that of the author of the anonymously issued *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*), although both men share key concepts with each other and with Vives. Buchanan’s Stoic king has a moral office of the greatest importance which he fulfills by providing a virtuous example so compelling that it cannot be resisted.<sup>182</sup> James and Buchanan repeat Vives’s use the image of the king set on a public stage in full view of his subjects, whose thoughts and actions should bring no shame if known to all.<sup>183</sup> Derived from the same Aristotelian definition of tyranny to which Vives and James appealed, kingship is said to be rule exercised over free men who willingly submit to it, while tyranny is the rule of a master over slaves. A tyrant is as a beast, is essentially inhuman. The fear of tyranny in Buchanan leads to an inflection in the theory characteristic of Vives, so that Buchanan seeks to constrain the monarch, who may be deposed and killed by his subjects. This is not to say for Buchanan that absolute power can’t be used beneficially, and that it may even be prudent for subjects to tolerate it.

<sup>180</sup> As stated in *De disciplinis*, Majansius, 6, pp. 222–29. Noreña, *Vives*, pp. 214–15.

<sup>181</sup> Fischlin, p. 57ff.

<sup>182</sup> Burns, *True Law of Kingship*, p. 203. *De iure regni apud Scotos*, pp. 41–50; ch. 34–40. The *Vindiciae* has many striking similarities with Vives’s ideas, and indeed tone, on the nature of tyranny and good kingship and the need for Christian princes to jointly address the Turkish threat, if not the right to resistance, *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*, ed. and trans. George Garnett (Cambridge, 1994) esp. pp. 107ff., 125, 140ff.

<sup>183</sup> Fischlin, p. 89, p. 155.

With respect to domestic and intra-European concord, James appears in revisionist historiography as a peace-making ecumenical king, who desired the reconciliation among Christians—whether Lutherans, Roman and English Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Calvinists or English Protestants. If his desire for a perpetual peace and stability in Christendom was disrupted by war in the latter years of his reign, he nevertheless had “a coherent plan for religious pacification aimed at resolving urgent problems in the wake of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.”<sup>184</sup> England was (still) involved in the Habsburg-Valois struggle for dominance, with the complication of the Dutch Revolt and the civil and religious wars within France. Without a resolution of religious divisions, James believed, wars fomented by ambitious princes and sometimes abetted by the popes themselves would continue interminably. Peace within the church was necessary in order to guarantee peace within Christendom, and James regarded an ecumenical council representing both Rome and the major reformation traditions as the chief mechanism for the resolution of religious divisions in England and Scotland, as well as abroad. Opposed to innovations in faith based on personal, inner convictions, James called for a return to the practices of the Primitive church and the traditions of the church “from which the Church may receive the most joyful fruits of peace and tranquillity, and may acquire that strength to repulse and carry the war to the finish against the common and most dangerous enemy of God and of all Christians.”<sup>185</sup> Apart from his reputation for licentiousness, James in many ways represented Vives’s model of the educated, moderate and religiously tolerant king who put the needs of concord within his realm, and in international relations, before self-interest, and who sought to educate his people and his son in their offices, affirming mutual and reciprocal responsibilities.

Appalled by the progress of the British Civil Wars and European religious wars, Thomas Hobbes regarded the period as one of political and societal chaos generated by a form of collective insanity. Indeed, the regicide of James’s son, King Charles I, in 1649 by some

---

<sup>184</sup> Patterson, *King James VI and I*, p. ix.

<sup>185</sup> Letter cited in Patterson, *King James VI and I*, p. 41. For James’s diplomatic efforts to secure and maintain a Europe-wide peace during most of his reign as king of Great Britain, see pp. 31–74; for the similar conciliar outlook and desire for peace and concord in European relations of Jean Hotman de Villiers (an admirer of James) and Grotius, see pp. 147–54.

Parliamentarian subjects elicited horror in England and throughout Europe. Hobbes's theory was based on a "pessimistic" view (though not Augustinian, as in the case of Vives) of human nature. Hobbes was less than hopeful about the capacity of human judgment and reasoning to discern what lies in our best interests, and very fearful indeed of the ambiguous signification of words which could be exploited to inflame passions and disputes within society. According to Hobbes, the people were too easily swayed by the corrupted eloquence of preachers and those democratical men in the House of Commons who branded others as heretics, and raised up rebellion and sedition. Accepting that powerful emotions are part of human nature and civil life, he sought to ameliorate the effects of the most negative and corrupting ones.<sup>186</sup> The similarities between Vives's and Hobbes's description of the passions as the appetite and aversion as motions towards or away from some object have been briefly flagged by Noreña, but he has not recognized those similarities arising from their respective discussions of memory, judgment, memory and imagination.<sup>187</sup> But further points of contact can be discerned, even if Hobbes arrives at different solutions for seemingly intractable dispute and war.

Hobbes wanted to replace less reliable and potentially divisive forms of belief with a more certain "science" based on first principles. *The Elements of Law* (1640), *De cive* (1642) and *Leviathan* (1651) insist that the preservation of peace, security and prosperity is the end to which civil society was formed. This is the first law of nature: "every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it".<sup>188</sup> The second Law is to lay aside his right to all things in return for peace and the preservation of life. Hobbes's innovative solution is to create sovereign, indivisible power (either a single ruler or small assembly) which decides on religious and political matters and determines all doctrine. In this way dissent is done away with on issues which bear on the commonwealth. For religion, a minimal number of beliefs are prescribed and

---

<sup>186</sup> Bernard Gert, "Hobbes's psychology," *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, ed. Tom Sorell (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 157–74.

<sup>187</sup> Similarities between Vives and Spinoza's conception of the passions and the necessity for freedom of speech in civil life are also apparent. Spinoza looked for a constitutionalist solution to ensure that both rulers and the ruled subordinated or assimilated their self-interest to serve the larger community. See Noel Malcolm, "Hobbes and Spinoza," *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 27–52. Noreña, *Vives*, pp. 289–91. Noreña, *Vives and the Emotions*, pp. 213–14.

<sup>188</sup> *Leviathan*, ed. and intro. by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, 1994), p. xiv, p. 4.

the rest which do not threaten the peace are left free from legislation; it is Hobbes's task to convince his audience that such disputed points are not worth the disruption to the commonwealth. The ruler is absolute and accountable only to God, and obedience owed until the point where the ruler can no longer guarantee the individual's security. Vives's definitional move to equate true monarchy with the maintenance of peace enhanced the capacity of others such as Hobbes to bring a narrowed criterion to bear on rule such that consent could be withdrawn if peace and security were not delivered. When Hobbes later feared that he himself would face charges of heresy, he embarked on an account of its history and legal status. *The Historical Narration Concerning Heresy* argued that the accusation of heresy and the desire to punish it were at odds with the values of true Christianity, and rather represented a weapon wielded against one's enemies.<sup>189</sup>

Vives's *De anima* and *De concordia* were read in England by Hobbes's contemporary, Robert Burton, who cites a range of works by Vives in his *serio-ludere* study of the problem of civil and religious discord, or "melancholy" writ large in his enormously popular *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (in its various editions from 1624 to 1651).<sup>190</sup> The persona of Burton/Democritus Junior scurries despairingly to every writer from Plato, Aristotle, Lucan and Sallust to Erasmus, Thomas More, Cuthbert Tunstall, Thomas Elyot, Pasquil, Jean Bodin, Justus Lipsius, Botero and James I and VI to no avail, before declaring that he will make his own Utopia. In the light of religious wars, the millions who have perished in the New World under Spanish colonialism, and the Spanish Inquisition, he argues that the only value to adhere to is Christian moderation—of the passions, and so too in religious debate, scholarship and governance. Ironically, Burton's satiric persona disintegrates before his audience, dramatizing the effects of immoderate and vacillating passions. From this position of safety, the authorial Burton integrates Vives's *oeuvre*

<sup>189</sup> Conal Condren, "Curtailing the Office of the Priest: Two Seventeenth Century Views of the Causes and Functions of Heresy," in *Heresy in Transition: Transforming Ideas of Heresy in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, eds. Ian Hunter et al. (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 115–28. Richard Serjeantson, "Hobbes and the Universities," *The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Condren et al., pp. 113–39; p. 137.

<sup>190</sup> Curtis, "The Laughing Philosopher", pp. 90–1, 111–12. Angus Gowland, *The Worlds of Renaissance Melancholy* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 40, 43, 125. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, eds. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicholas K. Kiessling and Rhonda L. Blair, with intro. J.B. Bamforth, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1989–2000), vol. 6 for index of many references to Vives, mainly to *De anima*, for example, *De concordia* at vol. 1, 44:24 on the paradiastolic re-description of rapacious, thieving soldiers as heroes.



(and that of a multitude of Renaissance authors), along with many of Vives's classical sources, to mount a hilarious yet revealing study of the relationship between individual emotional life and European civil peace and war. Burton's *Anatomy* is a worthy successor to the tradition of *parrhesia* established by the Vives and the Henrician counsellors. In our present days of war and religious intolerance, it is more than time for renewed attention to the legacy of Vives, who taught that it is the duty of all to be peace-makers, in whatever capacity they are able.

## THE *DE DISCIPLINIS* AS A MODEL OF A HUMANISTIC TEXT\*

Valerio Del Nero

### 1. *What Encyclopedism?*

I think there can be little doubt that the *De disciplinis* is the most complete and most important philosophical text of Vives. In this treatise, divided into several books, certain fundamental reflections converge, which by multiple threads can be traced and linked up with the entire literary production of the Valencian thinker, be it prior or subsequent to 1531. It is true that Vives is a thinker of various inspiration, unsystematic, but this does not prevent us from perceiving a basic organic unity in his writings, which goes to explain his quiet but solid reputation in the modern age and beyond.<sup>1</sup> As the interpretations of the Renaissance have become more and more refined, especially in the twentieth century, the work of Vives has begun to free itself from nationalistic, or at any rate prejudiced readings, to recover the decidedly European dimension that is proper to it. At the same time his thought has gradually been delivered from theories of philosophical currents which aside from their very weak historiographical foundation lead one astray. In this critical repositioning the *De disciplinis* has been the object of particular attention to scholars.

The wide-ranging and varied cultural production of Vives, therefore, far from appearing dispersive, demonstrates to the contrary a closely-woven web of references that stimulate the reader to embark on a fascinating intertextual journey which seems to reflect the classical ideal of an “encyclopedic” knowledge re-launched on a wider scale, in the age of humanism. An ideal which implies etymologically a “circular” training and formation, in which the various disciplines are not only not disconnected with one another, but on the contrary form a rich

---

\* Translated into English by Charles Fantazzi.

<sup>1</sup> Enrique González González, “La recepción de la obra de Vives durante el antiguo regimen,” *Rinascimento* 38 (1998), 455–514.

and stimulating cultural model, destined for great success, especially in the field of education.

On a first level, the pattern of this plan of research on the part of Vives gives prominence, among other things, to the relation between culture and religion, the desire for a just and equilibrated society, the analysis of the cognitive and moral faculties, as well as of the passions of mankind, the basic questions of education and of language. These are the themes that are central to the *De disciplinis*, although not exclusively. At a second level, within his total production it is appropriate to cast a particularly attentive glance at some writings, like *De concordia et discordia*, *De subventionem pauperum*, *De ratione dicendi*, *De anima et vita* and the *Linguae latinae exercitatio*, which constitute indispensable, valuable points of reference for the global reader of the *De disciplinis*. At a third level, finally, the penetrating gaze that one must cast on the *De disciplinis* reveals its exemplary typology as an authentic humanistic text, which placed it at the center of the Spanish humanist's total output and lays bare its organic encyclopedic force. If in any author's total production a continual hermeneutic series of references from the whole to the part can be considered profitable, this is eminently true of Vives, where from the entire body of writing to the *De disciplinis* and vice versa, it serves undoubtedly to illuminate the many implications of an intellect so rich in ideas and implications.

A part of medieval culture and a large portion of modern knowledge are structured in an unequivocally "encyclopedic" style. It is well known in this regard that there is still open discussion today concerning the "encyclopedia" as a type of organization and transmission of learning, with the eighteenth-century *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and D'Alembert as its canonical, though not exclusive, historical point of reference. In reality, models of encyclopedias have been fairly numerous throughout history, so that it is not easy to identify the turning point from a coherent construction of learning with a strong formative capacity, of which instruction and education represent the two ineluctable poles, to the acceptance, now widely diffused, which distinguishes in the format of the "encyclopedia" a container that assembles orderly information in diverse disciplines. This turning point is probably to be allocated to the seventeenth century.

It will thus be appropriate, by way of hypothesis, to attempt to evaluate the long transition from medieval encyclopedias to modern ones, bearing in mind that the long time period of the Middle Ages amply justifies the appearance of diverse types of encyclopedias, which go

from repertories of information about nature and man that pretend to be all-comprehensive, to models that show the direct influence of the scholastic organization of culture in general and of the university in particular, as well as the abundant circulation of the works of Aristotle beginning in the thirteenth century.<sup>2</sup> It is clear that humanistic culture marks a profound discontinuity in the elaboration of the “encyclopedic” genre, which, despite its variety, is profoundly influenced by the rediscovery and circulation of ancient learning, classical and patristic. In evaluating Vives and his *De disciplinis* one must never forget this enormous cultural opening of humanism, which in other respects is also a polemically decisive break with scholasticism and particularly with terministic logic. Here a split takes place which runs through the whole period of Renaissance civilization, in which the Spanish humanist is undeniably one of the chief protagonists. The anti-scholastic controversy of the humanists is not a passing fad but a profound cultural need, which certainly does not ignore or undervalue the merit of logic (of which Vives was a master), but its goal is to broaden immensely the confines of a culture which wishes to effect a creative joining of *verba* and *res*, breaking down the rigid barriers of a language, namely, that of medieval logic, which had become over-specialized, abstruse, and even jargonistic, incapable by this time of advancing the study of philosophy.<sup>3</sup>

It envisions a philosophy which involves itself ever more frequently with other branches of learning and which finds an increasingly fertile meeting ground with religion, well beyond rigid doctrinal orthodoxy and closed university circles. From this point of view the radical revision of the traditional linguistic disciplines is the signal of the urgent necessity to broaden and refashion the usual parameters of logic towards an innovative and enriching dimension of language, towards a true and proper linguistics. This was no longer possible within the limits of medieval dialectics, of itself no longer capable of analysing even the ordinary human dimension of communication, which is one of the great implicit requirements of modernity, inevitably bound up

---

<sup>2</sup> Andrea Battistini, “Un’enciclopedia senza frontiere: l’ecumenismo culturale di Juan Luis Vives,” *Studi ispanici* 3 (1997–1998), 9–19, with important bibliographical references.

<sup>3</sup> J.L. Vives, *In pseudodialecticos*, ed. Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 1979).

with the re-launching in grand style of rhetoric on the one hand and the problem of education on the other.<sup>4</sup>

But let us now try to see the position of *De disciplinis* in the framework of Renaissance encyclopedism, taking into account that this finds expression in multiple forms, from poetic encyclopedias to systematic disciplinary organizations (these latter destined to increase numerically in the seventeenth century). This second trend, rather organic in its basic structure and pedagogical bent, is likewise very rich and differentiated internally, frequently reflecting different scientific, religious and educational concepts. It presents itself, above all, as decidedly Renaissance in origin.<sup>5</sup> The basic filter, in short, is that of humanism, mediated in all its forms, but undoubtedly also capable of imprinting itself on the first centuries of the modern era. The Jesuitic cultural and educational plan, which reigned supreme in the Catholic world until the eighteenth century, falls within this framework, *inter alia*, in an interesting and complex relation with Vives, some of whose texts circulated widely in the colleges of the Company of Jesus.<sup>6</sup> But probably the Valencian humanist, together with other intellectuals, primarily Erasmus, in his contributions in elaborating an educational and pedagogical view of man, constituted a point of reference in the long elaboration of the *ratio studiorum*. It is not a question here of diminishing the importance of the controversies against Erasmus and other humanists, who quickly became the object of heavy censure, nor of underestimating the Jesuit change in direction of humanistic culture, often lacking in creative critical features, be they secular or religious. It is rather a question of taking into account, beyond the discussion of the “*modus parisiensis*”, the objective agreement of educational and even scholastic proposals, designed to fill an immense cultural and social void incapable of establishing natural bridges between basic levels of preparation and university education.

It is not surprising that what strikes us in *De disciplinis* is the concern for school buildings and all the other details that can improve the work of the teachers and the learning of the pupils. Obviously

---

<sup>4</sup> Cesare Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica dell' Umanesimo. "Invenzione" e "metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo* (Milan, 1968).

<sup>5</sup> Alfredo Serrai, *Storia della bibliografia*, 2 *Le enciclopedie rinascimentali* a cura di Maria Cochetti (Rome, 1991).

<sup>6</sup> Miguel Battlori, S.J., “Las obras de Vives en los colegios jesuíticos del siglo XVI,” in *Erasmus in Hispania. Vives in Belgio*, eds. Jozef IJsewijn – Angel Losada (Louvain, 1986), 121–45.

Vives, together with many other intellectuals, assists at the beginnings of a new and intensive concern for the establishment of schools. *De disciplinis*, which appeared for the first time in 1531,<sup>7</sup> cannot be easily compared with similar texts. All of Vives's production exhibits the influence of models from classical culture which, broadly speaking, we would define as "encyclopedic". I am thinking in particular of Quintilian, Gellius and Macrobius. As for humanists of more or less the same period, it is Vives himself who introduces us to a Pietro Crinito or a Francesco Filelfo, while various hypotheses and suggestions of a wider range may indicate in Polidoro Virgilio (1499) or Giorgio Valla (1501) special examples of humanistic encyclopedism, which are nonetheless still useful for comparison. One must not forget the small and pithy *Panepistemon* of Angelo Poliziano, while the *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum* of Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim may have acted as a dialectical response since it appeared immediately after *De disciplinis*. Agrippa was a noted theoretician of occult sciences, a field that was ostracized or rejected by our humanist. His *De incertitudine*, on the contrary, manifests itself as a work of critical rebellion and controversy towards consolidated learning and assumes the curious oxymoronic stamp of an "anti-encyclopedia" containing salient features of an "encyclopedia". One of the fundamental messages of Agrippa to the reader seems to be precisely that of blissful ignorance, of the necessity to retreat from pride, to avoid allegiance to teachers and doctors, not to incur charges of cultural lèse-majesté or even heresy, motifs which are partially present in *De disciplinis*. Certainly in the case of Agrippa there emerges a substructure of skepticism, which, with different fundamental principles, has been pointed out as a central theme in Vives, giving rise to a particular interpretation of his thought.<sup>8</sup> Aside from the fact that this discussion cannot be examined closely at this time, it must nonetheless be said that the skeptical features of Vives's thought must probably be reappraised, because they surely represent a part

<sup>7</sup> J.L. Vives, *De disciplinis libri XX* (Antwerp, 1531). I shall cite *De disciplinis* from this edition, taking into account that the internal division of the pages is the following: *De causis corruptarum artium*, pp. 1r–77v; *De tradendis disciplinis*, pp. 79r–134r; *De vita et moribus eruditi*, pp. 134r–160r. *De prima philosophia* continues with independent numbering, pp. 1r–39r; the remaining books, *De artibus*, are contained on pp. 39v–78r. On the first edition of the works of Vives cf. *Vives. Edicions princeps*, eds. Enrique González González, Salvador Albiñana and Víctor Gutiérrez (Valencia, 1992).

<sup>8</sup> José A. Fernández Santamaría, *Juan Luis Vives. Escepticismo y prudencia en el renacimiento* (Salamanca, 1990), and *The Theater of Man: J.L. Vives on Society* (Philadelphia, 1998).

of the cultural influences absorbed and re-elaborated by the Spanish philosopher without however playing a predominant role. It must be borne in mind that Renaissance culture, in fact, is radically pluralistic and each philosophical position easily coexists with others. In Vives Cicero is frequently mentioned together with Aristotle. Moreover, it is precisely the reform of the language arts with the new roles played by dialectic and rhetoric that does damage to every dogmatic dimension of knowledge. In this effort to criticize and re-dimension traditional learning the entire prestige of the intellectual Vives is at stake.

In evaluating the “encyclopedic” dimension of *De disciplinis* other typologies and referents of humanistic learning must be taken into account. In the first place there is the exemplary typology of the commentary on a classical text, which the humanists continue to perfect from the philological point of view, to such an extent that some of these commentaries assume, in their globality, a decidedly “encyclopedic” aspect. We are confronted by a rigorous exercise, which Vives also did not disregard. I refer in particular to the grandiose and in a certain sense ill-fortuned commentary on the *City of God*. The notes to the Augustinian masterpiece undoubtedly constitute one of the richest laboratories of the great original philosophic works of the 1530s. Moreover, this commentary has a strong historiographical importance because, as is well known, it was partially censured after the death of the author. In the second place, we must keep in mind that some great repertoires of classical and Christian culture, like the *Adagia* of Erasmus, which as they were progressively expanded and enriched, end up being much more substantial than a mere collection of mottoes, sayings and proverbs. In the third place, finally, we must take into consideration those philosophic religious texts, like the *Theologia platonica* of Ficino and the *Oratio* of Pico, which in the fifteenth century aim at harmonious relations between philosophy and religion.

In the sixteenth century it is explicitly through the impetus of the Erasmian cultural program, which has strong connections with the texts of Lorenzo Valla, that many intellectuals, including Vives, will look with particular attention to a renewed and fertile relationship between religion, philosophy, and education.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, works like the *Anti-barbari*, the *Folly*, the *Colloquies* and *De pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis*,

---

<sup>9</sup> Salvatore Ignazio Camporeale, *Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, Riforma e Controriforma. Studi e testi* (Rome, 2002).

to cite only a few, will become together with More's *Utopia* and Budé's *De philologia*, *De asse* and later *De transitu Hellenismi ad Christianismum* objective points of reference of an open and unbiased debate, in which instances of theological and religious renewal, educational goals, desire for peace, reform of philosophy in the direction of anti-scholasticism, and urgent need of renewed philological exactness stand at the center of a cultural interchange among European humanists of far-reaching creativity. *De disciplinis* is the fulcrum of this constellation of texts. In focusing on the characteristics of *De disciplinis* there has been insistence on certain qualities of this work, such as the richness and variety of its components, which while perhaps not forming a completely coherent and homogeneous cultural framework, indicate other interesting perspectives. Among these we may discern an underlying irenicism, related certainly to dramatic biographical episodes, which on a cultural level one is "more disposed to integrate rather than exclude."<sup>10</sup> Unswerving in his fundamental choice of a tolerant attitude, following in the humanistic direction which strives continually to unite *res* and *verba*, and in the framework of a convinced re-evaluation of rhetoric and the faculty of intelligence, the Spanish humanist succeeds in offering to the reader a comprehensive vision of learning, methodologically balanced between a firm criticism of tradition and precise innovative proposals.

It is undeniable that a precise classification of *De disciplinis* cannot be entirely comparable to others; it reflects some aspects of other works but in the end reveals characteristics of stimulating originality. Whoever intends to occupy himself in the future with the specific fortunes of this masterpiece in the modern age will probably be surprised by its extensive, though unnoticed diffusion. Certainly, as we shall see presently, the comprehensive critical attention that Vives has dedicated to language in all its nuances, in this work especially, but also in other of his writings, lends it a singular originality in the framework of philosophical writings in the Renaissance. Reconsideration of the language arts, revisitation of linguistic tradition going back to antiquity, strong criticism of late scholastic logic, the question of translation, particular

---

<sup>10</sup> Andrea Battistini, "Il *De disciplinis*, enciclopedia irenica di Juan Luis Vives," in *Le origini della modernità, I. Linguaggi e saperi tra XV e XVI secolo*, ed. Walter Tega (Florence, 1998), p. 153. On the consequences of inquisitorial trials against his family members and on the life and works of Vives see the important essay of Enrique González González, "Vives: un umanista judeoconverso en el exilio de Flandes," in *The Expulsion of the Jews and their Emigration to the Southern Low Countries (15th–16th Centuries)*, eds. Luc Dequeker and Werner Verbeke (Louvain, 1988), pp. 35–81.



attention to the linguistic sign (semiology), to philology, to the relation between the classical languages and national languages in their educational and pedagogical function, expansion of precise rhetorico-literary problems in an independent work (*De ratione dicendi* of 1532, which appears from every point of view to be connected by countless threads to *De disciplinis*)—all of these things constitute not only a truly distinctive characteristic of this treatise but illustrate in particular its “encyclopedic” character. In point of fact, language is the interpretive key of learning, and here Vives joins himself, through the most long-standing representatives of the sixteenth century cultural *res publica*, to the great plan of Valla, which starting with the re-evaluation of Quintilian and the consequent severe criticism of scholastic dialectic, had projected the “encyclopedic design of a new system of learning, in which language plays an absolutely central role.”<sup>11</sup> Criticism of scholastic abstraction, the return to the ordinary use of language, precise critical and historical analysis of words and concepts constitute an area of common interest between Valla and Vives. This is not to deny, however, that the attitude of the Spaniard towards the Italian is so ambiguous at times as to be contradictory. Here we wish simply to underline that the linguistic, philosophic and religious proposal of Valla, by way of Erasmus, reaches the heartbeat of the best fifteenth century culture, including Vives, and renders it abundantly fruitful.

But what is the structure of *De disciplinis* which justifies this particular “encyclopedic” dimension that makes language its fulcrum? *De disciplinis* is made up as a whole of twenty books. The first seven, under the title of *De causis corruptarum artium*, deal with the question of the deterioration of learning (the corruption of the arts in general: grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, natural philosophy, civil law); the next five books, given the comprehensive title of *De tradendis disciplinis*, comprise the exposition of the subject matter in which Vives’s philosophical and educational ideas are illustrated (these five books do not have individual titles); three books follow, *De prima philosophia sive de intimo naturae opificio*, on the physical and metaphysical structure of reality (the second of these books is the longest of the three); some more or less brief texts conclude the treatise, which may be substantially regarded as appendices or expansions of particular linguistic problems (*De instrumento probabilitatis*, a book on the

---

<sup>11</sup> Eugenio Garin, “Lorenzo Valla e l’Umanesimo,” in *Lorenzo Valla e l’Umanesimo italiano*, eds. Ottavio Besomi and Maria Regoliosi (Padova, 1986), p. 7.

invention of arguments; *De explanatione cuiusque essentiae*, a book precisely on the essence of each individual thing, which we know not in themselves but through the medium of the senses; *De disputatione*, a book on the comparison of arguments to confirm or refute something; *De censura veri*, two books dedicated to the investigation of truth, in formulation and argumentation respectively. This structure is maintained from the *editio princeps* of 1531 to the inclusion of this treatise in the *Opera omnia* of Basel of 1555. On the other hand, in some editions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries *De disciplinis* is reduced to the first two parts of *De causis* and *De tradendis*, perhaps because they constitute an organic model in which the *pars destruens* and the *pars construens* are integrated symmetrically and harmoniously, while the presence of the other books would have been more clashing. Or perhaps because on the level of content *De prima philosophia* and the other texts were read as more traditional and less in harmony with the developments of more lively humanistic philosophical thought. By way of hypothesis it may be suggested that modern centuries have found of particular interest the anti-scholastic controversies, the analysis of language, the appreciation of the intellect, and the educational features of Vives's design. In reality the last books, beginning with *De prima philosophia*, are important in themselves and very functional for the interpretive enrichment of numerous topics in *De causis* and *De tradendis*. In the eighteenth-century edition of Gregorio Mayans the twenty books in their totality were rearranged. One particular must be pointed out, however, that even in the *editio princeps* the numbering of the pages is continuous only for *De causis* and *De tradendis*, as if they were intended from the beginning to be formally independent from the rest of the work.

## 2. *Why Criticize Traditional Learning?*

A treatise like *De disciplinis* also corresponds to a formal organization in which each section answers precise questions and the answers are elaborated in relation first to the criticism of traditional learning and then to the construction of a new cultural model. The dedication of the work to King John III of Portugal, while responding in good part to the need of praising the descendant of the Aviz dynasty for the exploits of geographical exploration and conquest undertaken for some years by the Portuguese court, also provides the opportunity to assess the relation between power and intellectuals, which makes a profound impact on the

whole Renaissance. In particular, this relationship represents for Vives a kind of accord and division of powers advantageous to both parties which have been assigned providentially by God to cities and peoples. Specifically, the exchange silently agreed upon and the consequent accord are based on the fact that on one side intellectual work needs the tranquility which only kingly power can offer and guarantee in its entirety, while political power can and must benefit by the competence and preparation of intellectuals.<sup>12</sup>

The critical segment concerning traditional learning is therefore introduced by some general considerations expressed in the *Praefatio*, which are designed to sum up rapidly the genesis of *De disciplinis*, beginning with the reflection that there is nothing more exalted than the formative process of man's intellect, which is summarized in the disciplines of learning, opening a path which removes us from the bestial state in order to elevate us in the end to God. In undertaking this journey of cultural formation, the author emphasizes that he has determined to follow the humanistic tendency of uniting *verba* and *res* at every level, in accordance with a certain stylistic refinement that can compensate for the painful annoyance too often and too long associated with the process of learning. Furthermore, Vives alludes to the passage of the arts from the darkness of paganism to the light of the Christian religion, a philosophical, not a theological process, in conformity with the whole procedure of his reasoning.<sup>13</sup> It is only an allusion, but a clear one, which individuates a new relationship, entirely humanistic in its formulation, between classical and Christian culture. The entire opus of Vives could be read and interpreted according to this perspective, which recalls the general Erasmian delineation of the question. It would probably be useful to go back to numerous explanations of Erasmus in the *Antibarbari* on the great cultural legacy left by the pagans, which the Christians too frequently and unfortunately looked down upon. It is, after all, ignorance itself that generates arrogance and pride. It is especially right, therefore, to appropriate to ourselves whatever validity can be found in the pagan writings. Pagan culture can certainly be purified and made part of Christian culture itself. The point of primary mediation is represented by the fathers of the church, who show an exemplary knowledge of Greco-Roman culture, thus refuting

---

<sup>12</sup> J.L. Vives, *De disciplinis*, p. AiiV.

<sup>13</sup> J.L. Vives, op. cit., p. A 3r-v.

in advance every exaltation of holy ignorance, which is then utilized in the fight against all criticism and all doctrinal dissent.<sup>14</sup> It is superfluous to remark how much of these ideas is transferred into the works of Vives and into *De disciplinis* in particular.

Continuing in the pages of the preface, the Spanish humanist confesses that for this very daring intellectual enterprise he had to dispute with several authorities of antiquity, including Aristotle, whom in other respects he appreciated more than all other thinkers. Indeed, to achieve an adequate mastery of the disciplines it is absolutely indispensable to connect oneself with the discoveries of past centuries and the experience of the ancients with a critical sense and awareness of the historicity of culture. All authors and all content must be desacralized. Indeed Aristotle himself dared to demolish the opinions of those who preceded him. As Seneca affirms, those who have opened up a path in the field of culture are not our masters, but only our guides (*Epistolae morales*, 33.11). Truth has not been attained once and for all, research has not been exhausted and consequently posterity has before it ample terrain to excavate. It is known that Vives recovers and reinterprets the celebrated medieval image of dwarves on the shoulders of giants. We are neither dwarves, he asserts, nor are the ancients giants; our stature is identical. Certainly, we are thrust higher up through them and through their beneficence, provided we remain animated by the love of study and truth and by critical alertness and attention to the ancients.<sup>15</sup> Truth is the daughter of time, as an adage circulating in the Renaissance recounts. The sense of choice consists in the precaution not to trust intellectually the first one who comes along, to exercise critical intelligence unceasingly, to exploit a multiplicity of references instead of only one, to compare the thoughts and texts of tradition. This helps to explain, among other things, the attention and ample discussion that is dedicated in *De disciplinis* to the problems of imitation, notoriously central to humanistic culture. To put it succinctly, Vives's message reveals a profoundly antidogmatic resonance. The very last part of the preface reiterates this critical attitude of the humanist, who puts himself at risk in the first person. Judge the weight of the arguments,

<sup>14</sup> Luca D. Ascia, "L'ombra di Valla. La formazione 'Laica' di un genio religioso del Cinquecento," in Erasmo da Rotterdam, *Antibarbari*, ed. Luca D. Ascia (Turin, 2002), pp. 7–76; cf. also Enrique González González, "Humanistas contro escolásticos. Repaso de un capítulo de la correspondencia de Vives y Erasmo," *Dianoia* (1983), 135–61.

<sup>15</sup> J.L. Vives, op. cit., pp. 10v–11r.

he suggests, but when it is equal, do not hesitate to prefer the ancients to me. No one will be obliged to devote himself to me, or swear by my name, because I will never be the founder of a sect. It is necessary, on the contrary, to assume the attitude of followers of the truth and to be indulgent towards the audacity of one who (like myself) has dared to set himself up as judge of the culture of the past, revealing the errors of men, no matter how great they are. For the rest, no art was discovered and elevated to perfection immediately.<sup>16</sup>

The introductory pages of *De causis corruptarum artium* and *De tradendis disciplinis* can be read almost synoptically because their aim is to identify the place of man in nature in relation to the divine plan for the world. For the Christian Vives, if any classical image of the Golden Age is not acceptable, original sin plays a fundamental role since it has radically weakened man compared to other living beings. Compared to their strong natural defenses, man seems weak and in need of everything.<sup>17</sup> God nevertheless granted him a gift of inestimable value, a lively and creative sharpness of intellect, by means of which he could make all his discoveries, be they positive or negative.<sup>18</sup> From the resolution of problems through repeated experience rules arose which, since they were able to be put to practical use in similar circumstances, were defined as arts or skills. Then, on the basis of the material activities without which human life could not survive for a single day, man elaborated an intellectual search directed at laying the foundations of mathematics, philosophy, law and politics. In this cultural process, which today we might define as anthropologico-philosophical, language and writing take on a particularly significant function. Nevertheless, however much Vives's vision of this cultural development is based on a conception which tends to emphasize the difference between soul and body, after observing, from a Christian viewpoint, the superiority of the first over the second, he never let himself be led astray by anti-naturalistic and spiritualizing interpretations of man and his place in nature. Vives's philosophy perfectly reflects European humanistic culture even in its continued reference to a plurality of "*auctoritates*" (whether they be Plato,

<sup>16</sup> J.L. Vives, op. cit., p. Aiiiv.

<sup>17</sup> J.L. Vives, op. cit., p. 1r.

<sup>18</sup> It would be convenient for the reader to have some monographs on Vives before him for the background of his biography and writings: Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, *Luis Vives y la filosofía del Renacimiento* (Madrid, 1903); Carlos G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives* (The Hague, 1970); Enrique González González, *Juan Lluís Vives de la escolástica al humanismo* (Valencia, 1987).

Aristotle, Cicero or Augustine), as well as in the desire to capture a proteiform reality, irreducible to uniformity. This is probably the origin of his particular attention to culture in its globality, which involves both the contemplative and the active life and reevaluates, in addition to the liberal arts, the mechanical arts, recovering the most rigorous theoretical models but at the same time making continual appeal to the practical, utilitarian, and material dimension of learning. Let it not be forgotten that our humanist lived during a period of Renaissance culture that was in open social transformation, progressing toward a paradigm shift which will take place in the "scientific revolution", to which the intellectuals of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had given and were giving a profound contribution on the level of intellectual transformation and the circulation of classical texts, including scientific ones.<sup>19</sup>

Deferring to another time the analysis of the arts of the body, the author here wishes to enter upon a discussion of those arts that are concerned with the investigation of the mind (*quae inquisitione mentis constant*),<sup>20</sup> how they were developed in antiquity and how they were later weakened to the point of utter decadence. After reasoning about the definition of some arts and about their reciprocal inclusion or exclusion in antique debate, Vives lends much attention to the social recognition attributed at one time to experts in an art. It is then that money, honor, prestige, public and private recognition became factors in social transformation and in the stratification of power which reveal dimensions of human activity that are not always positive. To this is opposed the Aristotelian vision of learning, whose sole aim is the attainment of the truth.<sup>21</sup> Wherever intelligence, inventor of all the arts, diligence and the incentives of honor and money found welcome within a society, there the arts developed with care. It was no accident that eloquence found fertile terrain, for example, in Athens and Rome, as a basis for achieving the greatest honors and the greatest power. The seed of their decadence, however, was lurking there from their very beginnings, almost in the hands of the one who was fashioning them. Certainly, we must pay homage to the men of ancient times who invented them, but without any feelings of subordination towards authorities who, in the beginning, were weak and uncertain. When one who made profession

---

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Paolo Rossi, *I filosofi e le macchine (1400-1700)* (Milan, 1962).

<sup>20</sup> J.L. Vives, op. cit., p. 4r.

<sup>21</sup> Vives, op. cit., pp. 2v-3r.

of the arts and applied himself to them, distinguishing himself through zeal and ability, their progress was undeniable. On the contrary, once the sharpness of the mind was suffocated, the light of the arts was obfuscated and inertia and decadence began to lord it over them. The causes of this phenomenon are various, but they are all centered on the limits of the human mind; the blindness of self-love; the incapacity of most fathers to discern objectively the defects of their children; the greed for money on the part of the teachers who for this reason woo any student, even the least gifted intellectually; ambition, pride, scarce esteem for the capacities and interests of young students, who are spurred on to undertake careers for which they are not suited. Some gave themselves over to the occult sciences for money and power. Remember that the condemnation of this kind of learning is constant in Vives's works, who, after the example of his recent commentary on Augustine and in the steps of More and Erasmus, remains extraneous (in contrast think of Marsilio Ficino) to the great development of magic and astrology in the Renaissance.<sup>22</sup> The progress of the arts, therefore, reflected these human defects. The Socratic consciousness of one's own ignorance balances the arrogant presumption of one who presumed to know how to answer any question. Here is rooted the obstinacy of the person who ensnares his hearers in useless, "sophistic" questions, which antiquity in a few instances but above all the Middle Ages developed to an extraordinary degree. The "antisophistic", antidialectic polemic against the medieval logicians is one of the most important battles waged by Vives, which pervades not only his whole literary production, but undoubtedly the whole of Renaissance culture, from Petrarch to the height of the 16th century. Communicative clarity declines and useless doubts are formulated.

In this context we cannot omit reference to the school, which together with education is a central interest for the Valencian philosopher. It suffices to think of the importance and fortune of a text like the *Colloquia sive linguae Latinae exercitatio* (1539),<sup>23</sup> but we cannot neglect a reflection about the knowledge of the ancient authors and the classical languages,

<sup>22</sup> Vives, op. cit., p. 4r.

<sup>23</sup> Enrique González González-Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Los Diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1539–1994)* (Valencia, 1999); Dirk Sacré, "Exercitatio linguae Latinae (1538–1539). Les colloques scolaires de Vives," in *Il sapere delle parole. Studi sul dialogo latino e italiano del Rinascimento*, ed. Walter Geerts (Rome, 2001), pp. 7–22.

which had perished through wars and the barbaric invasions, which destroyed the libraries. The Greek language was practically snatched away from the West but Latin also degenerated irremediably, surviving in a bastardized form when the classical languages disappeared into the darkness. The arts and disciplines also felt the consequences, because languages are the principal vehicle of learning.<sup>24</sup> It is not difficult to read between the lines the fundamental movement of humanism, which, attaching itself to the full riches of the classical world, elaborates at the same time the concept of a middle age (*medium aevum*, *media aetas*, *media tempestas*), an important historiographical concept. "The Greek and Latin languages return after a long period of exile, or rather they are reborn."<sup>25</sup> Indeed languages are the port of entry of the arts and of their best criteria of judgment. The critical attitude of Vives is also put to the test in the evaluation of the great ancient thinkers, Aristotle first of all, whose merits and limits he recognizes objectively. But it is precisely the knowledge of the classical languages and their subsequent corruption that becomes an important hermeneutic criterion in interpreting the thought of the Stagirite. The humanistic recovery of ancient Greek allows for a reading of the Aristotelian texts that is scientifically much more effective than in their medieval Latin translations. In relation to this philosopher, above all, Vives introduces an attitude that will become quite widespread at the beginning of the modern age, to be consecrated in famous pages of Galileo Galilei. The original thought of Aristotle is one thing, the commentaries and positions of the Aristotelians is another, and the two are not interchangeable. Medieval tradition, in particular, contributed to the decadence of an entire culture; one has only to think of the errors introduced by copyists in the transcription of manuscripts. In this regard Vives seems to reproach narrowness of culture in general and absence of philological competence in particular, a tendency which the humanists radically reversed, as an unequivocal sign of change. Our philosopher, in fact, pays great attention to the figure of the grammarian and the philologist, viewed in their profound transformation.<sup>26</sup>

Intellectual and cultural limits together with inveterate moral defects constitute, in short, the fundamental causes of the corruption of the

---

<sup>24</sup> J.L. Vives, op. cit., p. 4r.

<sup>25</sup> J.L. Vives, op. cit., p. 7v.

<sup>26</sup> Jozef IJsewijn, "Vives and humanistic philology," in *J.L. Vives Valentini Opera omnia*, 1. *Volumen introductorio*, ed. Antonio Mestre (Valencia, 1992), pp. 77–111.



arts, reduced for the most part to the level of sterile and quarrelsome disputes. The image presented by Vives is articulate and impressive, even if one were only to consider the solid erudition that he exhibits in this analysis. To my knowledge, in the case of *De causis corruptarum artium* we find ourselves before the most extensive and drastic analysis of the level of a culture in a determined historical period to be elaborated between the medieval and the modern age, and not for skeptical or fideistic purposes, but to lay new and more solid foundations for the edifice of the new learning.

### 3. *Why Construct?*

The second section of *De disciplinis*, purposely entitled *De tradendis disciplinis*, wishes to represent the constructive, methodologically positive, formative and didactically functional dimension of the whole treatise, the other side of the coin with respect to *De causis corruptarum artium*. From this point of view it is the most stimulating part of Vives's text.

The first pages of *De tradendis*, as noted above, must be read parallel with the corresponding parts of *De causis*. Here from the title itself the meaning and dimension of the word "*disciplina*" is accentuated, a concept which, as is well known, has a rich and complex history, touching on diversified fields, but it is joined to the broad theme of behavior, of self-regulation on the part of the individual and his social conditioning. The subject matter of the passions, to which our humanist has given an original contribution, via Descartes, will enter into the great debate of modern philosophy through the grille-work, as it were, of the interpretation proposed in analyzing the gnoseological and ethical dimension of the individual.<sup>27</sup> It is certain that with the Renaissance and the modern age the discussion of the concept of *disciplina* is intensified and broadened. Independently from the disputed clerical or courtly origins of good manners as a central component of the theorization and practice of "*disciplina*", it finds in the *De civilitate morum puerilium* of Erasmus (1530) a moment of great re-launching of the educational question connected precisely with models of behavior.

---

<sup>27</sup> Andrea Battistini, "Retorica delle passioni fra Vives e Vico," *Rivista di letterature moderne e comparate* 47 (1994), 197–221; Carlos G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions* (Carbondale, Ill., 1989).

The other concept of “*disciplina*” which finds abundant echo in the Renaissance is that which is more technically cultural and scholastic, only apparently detached from the problem of behavior. In reality, the expansion of educational and scholastic procedures involves and requires of students and teachers an ever more rigorous interior self-discipline that corresponds also to the progressively more certain limitation of the “disciplinary” fields of learning, in harmony in their turn with those processes of social discipline which from the mid-sixteenth century will invade all confessionally demarcated European societies. Vives is at the origin of this typical process of modernity and offers a valid contribution to the deepening of the strictly cultural dimension of the concept of “*disciplina*”.

Therefore, according to the Valencian humanist, “*ars*” and “*disciplina*” have culture as their object, understood anthropologically as the sum total of the intellectual and material products elaborated by man in the course of his history in his continuous and controversial relation with nature. Sometimes these two terms are used synonymously, but much more frequently Vives differentiates them with a certain precision. In fact, while “*ars*” is connected with the moment of development and then of the learning (theoretical and physical) of a precise ability or technique, “*disciplina*” is related to a semantic field where the aspects of learning, teaching, transmission and communication of a determined content are prevalent. Art and discipline, however, do not merely concern a cognitive patrimony or a technical ability, but constitute one of the distinctive features of the human being compared to brute animals, a theme which Vives reinstates through some significant moments of the classical and patristic debate on the subject. Arts and disciplines, in other words, symbolize the “passage from nature to culture, from the bestiality of his origins to an ever more complete civilization, which justly entitles man to “*humanitas*”, raising him therefore to divinity.”<sup>28</sup>

Reiterating some aspects of the introductory discourse to *De causis*, the author reveals here a fundamentally confident conviction about man and the construction of society, founded on the idea that education and cultural formation can fulfill a radically positive function in the framework of the Christian religion, in which original sin did not completely obliterate the possibility of a spiritual and historical deliverance

---

<sup>28</sup> Valerio Del Nero, *Linguaggio e filosofia in Vives. L'organizzazione del sapere nel “De disciplinis” (1531)* (Bologna, 1991), p. 29.

capable of laying the foundations of civilization. Arts and disciplines, as he had already maintained at the beginning of *De causis*, prove to be fundamental in this process, because the human answer to the challenges of nature is in the process of being structured on the basis of the experience of generations into transmissible “*praecepta*”, the most useful of which, conceptually organized, will take the name of “*artes*”. Vives emphasizes that what cannot be reduced to precise rules cannot be made to pass under the name of “*ars*”, but more generically under that of generic knowledge or ability. “*Ars*” can accurately be defined as a “collection of universal precepts put together for the purpose of knowing, acting or operating within a certain confined area.”<sup>29</sup>

Once again one must observe the operative, practical aspect of this concept, which is indubitably apparent in the broad use the humanist makes of the concepts of “*experientia*”, “*usus*”, “*utilitas*”, in a significant period of the cultural history of Europe.<sup>30</sup> Regarding the educational usefulness of the concept of “*disciplina*”, this much stands out clearly. The educational and pedagogical dimension is absolutely central in *De tradendis*, even if it must be made clear again that the important position of education in the thought of Vives, probably more than in other Renaissance thinkers, consists in sinking one’s own roots into a precise philosophy which, by itself alone, can account for and give sense even to the most minute details concerning schools, teachers, methods of learning and teaching, and so forth.<sup>31</sup> Only by realizing that the humanists were not mere technicians of literature, poetry, the word, and beautiful formal style, but on the contrary that in the full recovery of classical culture and in the fierce polemics against scholastic degeneracy they elaborated a profound and original philosophical and religious vision, in which philology played an important role, is it possible to evaluate adequately the sense of the educational and pedagogical treatises of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in which, among other things, a substantial discontinuity with the middle ages is posited. This avoids considering the educational projects elaborated in this period as an ethereal limbo without solid footholds in other consolidated

<sup>29</sup> J.L. Vives, op. cit., p. 81v.

<sup>30</sup> Eugenio Garin, *Scienza e vita civile nel Rinascimento italiano* (Bari, 1965).

<sup>31</sup> Valerio Del Nero, “Pedagogia e psicologia nel pensiero di Vives,” in Vives, *Opera omnia. Volumen introductorio*, pp. 179–216; idem, “L’educazione in Vives,” in *Luis Vives y el humanismo europeo*, eds. Francisco Javier Nieto, Antonio Melero y Antonio Mestre (Valencia, 1998), pp. 131–46.

cultural territories. Vives's thought on the contrary is to be radicated in the "*humus*" that is truly characteristic of him, i.e., that of the great European humanism of men like Erasmus, Budé and More,<sup>32</sup> since it is the close relationship with the *Moria*, the *Enchiridion*, the *Ratio verae theologiae*, and the *Querela pacis* that is the basis of the "*pietas*" which is at the heart of the religious connotation of the development of the arts and disciplines that characterizes *De tradendis disciplinis*.

#### 4. *Languages and Language*

If, as we have suggested, an intertextual reading of Vives's works is of benefit, one of the most original problems that emerges from it is that of language and languages, understood in a very broad acceptance of the terms, which finds its strong point in *De tradendis disciplinis*. The question of languages and its articulation in the classical and modern languages is one that can be confronted from various points of view: the restructuring of the language arts, the struggle against scholastic jargon, language as the key to learning, the philosophy of language. After all, together with justice speech is the foundation of society, as is asserted in *De disciplinis* and *De ratione dicendi*. In particular, the power of the word is based on the clear perception of the difference between "*loquentia*" and "*eloquentia*" as well as on the recognition of the intrinsic complexity of the linguistic art, which demands the active participation of the whole life of man. Foolishness of heart, coarseness of life and immorality heavily condition and contrast the capacities of linguistic communication in man. In particular, "*stultitia*", carefully distinguished from ignorance, reproduces on a linguistic level the dichotomy, "*verba et res*", which constitutes one of the limits of the traditional culture humanists like Vives try to reestablish. Without a solid grasp of philosophical, historical and moral content—the humanist suggests, fully conscious of the importance of rhetoric—which have been acquired beforehand on the basis of dialectical procedures, rhetorical figures and ornamentations risk becoming empty aestheticizing shells. This had been intimated by Aristotle himself, who invites the reader to study texts with dialectical or philosophical content before entering into the expressly rhetorical

---

<sup>32</sup> Charles Fantazzi, "Vives, More and Erasmus," in *Juan Luis Vives*, ed. August Buck (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 165–76.

domain.<sup>33</sup> The reconsideration of the relation between grammar, dialectic and rhetoric is designed to discover a different equilibrium among them. The figure and function of the grammarian, in particular, also emerges in a different guise, seeming to assume, in the steps of Valla and Poliziano, the unmistakable features of the humanist philologist and commentator. It must not be forgotten that *De ratione dicendi*, which was published a year after *De disciplinis*, clearly appears to have been originally an expansion of that work, dedicated specifically to the treatment of “*elocutio*”, according to a descriptive rather than a prescriptive perspective, which makes of it a proper stylistic manual,<sup>34</sup> useful for an ecclesiastical career. There is a general cultural climate that favors such works. Similarly Erasmus will publish the lengthy treatise *Ecclesiastes, sive de ratione concionandi* on preaching, in 1535.

All of these themes are profoundly felt by our author. If, for example, we go back to the *Praelectio in Quartum Rhetoricorum ad Herennium* we find, in embryo, the awareness of the enormous persuasive potentiality by which man externalizes his own personality and his own feelings in order to “move others”.<sup>35</sup> A formless mass of words not only will not serve this purpose, but will even be counterproductive. On the other hand, a man who has the ability to express himself in an accomplished rhetorical manner will choose his own language and will attain an exceptional social prestige, as happened in the historical periods in which “*libertas*” and “*sermo*” had progressed *pari passu*. In another youthful contribution, the *Praelectio in Convivia Philelphi*, one reads a strong anti-sophistic polemic, destined to be expanded and further elaborated in successive works. Turning to his interlocutor friend he asserts: “Do you think, my good man, that natural philosophy consists merely of Swineshead’s nonsense and those useless sophistical discourses on the ‘intension’ and ‘remission’ of qualities, or uniform motion, or motion uniformly deformed and deformedly deformed, whereas the truth is that it is, like you, something deformedly deformed? I do not deny that this learning was transmitted by men of genius, but it certainly

<sup>33</sup> Juan Luis Vives, *El arte retórica*, introd. Emilio Hidalgo-Serna, ed. Ana Isabel Comacho (Barcelona, 1998).

<sup>34</sup> Brian Vickers, “Rhetorical and anti-rhetorical tropes: on writing the history of ‘elocutio’,” in *Comparative Criticism. A Year Book*, ed. Elinor S. Schaffler (Cambridge, 1981), p. 126; idem, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford, 1988).

<sup>35</sup> J.L. Vives, “Praelectio in Quartum Rhetoricorum ad Herennium,” in J.L. Vives, *Early Writings 2*, eds. Jozef IJsewijn and Angela Fritsen with Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 1991), pp. 130–36.

is not worth spending so much time on.”<sup>36</sup> These words were written in 1514, the year in which the Dorp-Erasmus controversy exploded, in which More would also become involved while he was occupied in the planning of the *Utopia*. Between 1516 and 1518 Erasmus’s *Novum Instrumentum* appeared, together with the constellation of important writings about theological methodology, the *Paraclesis*, *Methodus* and *Ratio*, works which summarize in themselves a significant intolerance for the logical language of scholasticism, which was often applied to theology. It is a question that deserves great attention. Vives not only knows this innovative humanistic production but profoundly assimilates it. It re-emerges several times in his mature works, especially in *De disciplinis*, and gives substance to a precise religious as well as philosophical vision of man.<sup>37</sup> The nausea experienced in connection with the application of “sophisms” to religious matters makes of Vives and the European humanist coalition a significant point of reference for the understanding of a complex and turbulent period immediately before the Lutheran reform, which bears traces of the far-off sources of the *devotio moderna* and other mystical and spiritual currents of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, bound together in part with other traditional religious orders, but united in their determined rejection of scholastic theology. For Vives, in particular, the laboratory of “linguistic” ideas that will later come together also in *De disciplinis* is clearly indicated, as noted above, in the *In pseudodialecticos* of 1519, in which he accuses the late scholastic logicians of forging a new language which only they understood. On the contrary, the language arts and dialectic in particular are related to the ordinary language of communication and cannot, vice versa, impose their own laws on a historically determined language.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> “Et putas inquam, vir bone, naturalem totam philosophiam in Suisethicis quicquiliis, in perditissimis quibusdam cavillationibus de intensione ac remissione qualitatum, de motu uniformi; de motu uniformiter difformi et difformiter difformi, et bene profecto es ut tu difformiter difformis, consistere. Non eo inficias rem esse a summis ingeniis proditam, sed indignam sane in qua plurimum temporis consumatur.” J.L. Vives, “Praelectio in *Convivia Philelphi*,” in J.L. Vives, *Early Writings* 2, p. 148. Cf. Jozef Ijsewijn, “La fortuna di Filelfo nei Paesi Bassi,” in *Francesco Filelfo nel quinto centenario della morte* (Padua, 1986), pp. 529–50.

<sup>37</sup> José María Belarte Forment, “Aproximación al e-studio della teología humanista de Juan Luis Vives,” in Vives, *Opera omnia. Volumen introductorio*, pp. 317–408; Antonio Mestre, “La espiritualidad de Juan Luis Vives,” in op. cit., pp. 409–59.

<sup>38</sup> On the concept of language and languages in Vives see Eugenio Coseriu, “Das Problem des Übersetzens bei Juan Luis Vives,” in *Interlinguistica. Sprachvergleich und Übersetzung* (Tübingen, 1971), pp. 571–82. Idem, “Zur Sprachphilosophie von J.L. Vives,” in *Aus der französischen Kultur-und-Geistesgeschichte*, eds. Werner Dierlamm and

Consequently this model of dialectic distances itself irremediably from linguistic “*consuetudo*” and “*usus*”, i.e., from the models which classical Greek and Latin elaborated in their development through the ages. It is a question of a concept of Valla which Vives valued, to which he will make frequent reference also in *De disciplinis*, the famous dichotomy of “speaking grammar or speaking Latin” (*grammaticae an latine loqui*), so dear to the author of the *Elegantiae*. Connected to this problem is the question of the meaning of terms and propositions. In this regard, harking back to the teaching of Quintilian, Vives emphasizes that one cannot reject with impunity a specific historical semantics, because it would be like rejecting the usual value of a currency conventionally accepted in a society. Often the theologians themselves aggravated this situation, when they embraced without reserve the language of the “sophists”, applying it to biblical contexts and consequently gave the name of “grammar” to any writing whose content was expressed in rigorously philological terms and in a style more refined than their obscure and captious mode of expression. This too is a critical point, confronted also in *De disciplinis*, which associates Vives with Erasmus and other contemporary humanists. Behind the factious polemics of the traditionalists against philology and grammar are hidden accusations of heresy hurled with too much casualness to arouse dissent of any kind.<sup>39</sup> In particular, languages were formally accused of being “seedbeds of heresy”. It is not difficult in this regard to point out a precise connection, for example, between the Erasmian adage, “The Sileni of Alcibiades,” in which the facility with which theologians make charges of heresy for a banal grammatical subtlety is refuted, and Vives, who wages battle on the same front.

Returning to the *In pseudodialecticos*, the author expresses the idea that for the late-scholastic sophists dialectic passed from being an instrument for the other arts to being an end in itself, completely identifying itself with logic. In the meantime dialectic saw the progressive elimination within itself of any distinction between a part of invention and a part of judgment, losing any practical finality altogether. Three years later, various sections of his extensive commentary on Augustine’s *City of God* touch on linguistic subjects, from various points of view. For example,

---

Wolfgang Drost (Heidelberg, 1971), pp. 234–55, and Emilio Hidalgo-Serna, *Linguaggio e pensiero originario. L’umanesimo di J.L. Vives* (Milan, 1992).

<sup>39</sup> J.L. Vives, *De disciplinis*, pp. 26r–v.

the defense of Augustinian theology in an anti-scholastic key is curious. "If Augustine had read the *Parva logicalia* [of Peter of Spain], he would not say: 'For there are certain suppositions and distributions, which those learned masters invented in that language of which they were totally ignorant. Here Augustine shows sufficiently that language must be adapted to the understanding of the people. Why not? Since the people are the lords of language.'"<sup>40</sup> The idea of the people as the lords of language is found identically in *De disciplinis* where, citing Horace (*Ars poetica* 71–72), he maintains that no one can better decide on the meaning of words and statements than the grammarian "or certainly the people". From this point of view the revival in grand style of the classical languages can make a contribution to the confutation of the errors deriving from the misunderstanding and scarce knowledge of Latin on the part of those who, with an air of superiority, relegated the use of language to the common people, reserving to a restricted group of learned men the exclusive right of a presumed rigorous and scientific level of the same language. In reality the road to be followed is different according to Vives because the "*exacta loquendi ratio*" and the "*linguae proprietas*" must be sought from the greatest Latin and Greek authors.

Once again, it seems to me that the most probable source for our humanist is Lorenzo Valla, according to whom it is usage (*usus*) that unceasingly creates the meaning of words. To the meaning of "*usus*" as the linguistic usage of the users Vives superimposes also a pragmatic acceptance of the same concept, not only because the arts always reveal a dimension of practical utility in the same way as languages possess a vital and concrete communicative finality, but above all because it constitutes an antidote to the "*calculationes*" of the late-scholastic logicians. In this context his acute sensitivity concerning the learning of the vernacular languages is manifested.<sup>41</sup> As the sensitive man of culture and sincere humanist that he is, he exalts the classical languages as an indispensable key to learning and proposes for students a limited experimentation of spoken Latin during playtime. At the same time he perceives clearly the irreversible rise of the national languages, showing

<sup>40</sup> Vives, *Commentary on the City of God*, 12.15.

<sup>41</sup> León Esteban Mateo-Ramón López Martín, *La escuela de primeras letras según Juan Luis Vives: estudio, iconografía y textos* (Valencia, 1993); Manuel Breva-Claramonte, *La didáctica de las lenguas en el Renacimiento: Juan Luis Vives y Pedro Simón Abril*. Con selección de textos (Bilbao, 1994).



in addition his awareness of the crisis that the ancient language of Rome is undergoing. Looking to the past, he brings out the advantages of Latin substantially in the manner of Valla, but regarding the future more uncertainties than certainties seem to accumulate along its horizon. An indication of this is his incisive appraisal of the vernacular languages, accompanied by a drastic attack against the excesses of the Ciceronians, which allows him to review critically the celebrated epistolary exchange between Poliziano and Cortesi, to express a perceptive opinion of Erasmus' *Ciceronianus* and to fix the boundary that separates imitation from theft. He holds that if one is to use imitation correctly, it is necessary to presuppose a knowledge of the limits of imitation itself.<sup>42</sup> These observations form part of the study of rhetoric in *De disciplinis* in a historical perspective and according to the usual model which demonstrates on the one hand the corruption of this discipline, and on the other its recovery and re-launching, with precise indications of authors and texts (Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian among the ancient authors; George of Trebizond, Poliziano, Theodore of Gaza, Agricola, Melanchthon and Erasmus among the contemporaries). The task assigned to *De ratione dicendi* is instead that of classifying and analysing the rhetorical figures, such as metaphor, hypallage, oxymoron and so forth.

These are undoubtedly diffuse and profound interests of his since in *De explanatione cuiusque essentiae* (one of the writings that forms part of *De artibus* i.e., the third section of *De disciplinis*), he finds a way to deal with metaphor again, as if wishing to point out its predominance in the group of those figures of speech that are characterized as an exception to the basic norms of language. Rhetoric, whose specific province is that of the verisimilar and the probable, draws on the great reservoir of "commonplaces", thus displaying a rather high rate of creativity in content, which justifies, among other things, Vives's interest in such a characteristic work as *De inventione dialectica* of Rudolph Agricola. To sum up, grammar, dialectic and rhetoric not only look to renewed equilibrium and a more fruitful convergence in an anti-metaphysical and communicative vein, but also reveal concrete educational implications, of which the battle of the humanists in behalf of the pedagogical

---

<sup>42</sup> J.L. Vives, *De disciplinis*, p. 54rff.

model of “historical” grammar in opposition to “speculative” medieval grammar is an example.<sup>43</sup>

In conclusion, the problem of “language”, our humanist seems to suggest, is eminently philosophical, playing a basic role in the definition of man, since “no aspect of life can be without speech” (*nulla vitae ratio carere potest sermone*). Rising from the depths of consciousness, it conditions also the domain of the emotions. Moreover, the “*ratio loquendi*” is connected indissolubly with the world of moral values, in the sense that the word is the primary sign of the innermost responsibility of man. The power of language is in fact enormous. It cannot be used to wound or kill others.

### 5. *Education and Culture*

One of the richest and most attractive dimensions of *De disciplinis* is the educational and the pedagogic. In no other humanistic text can the reader find such stimulating observation on very young students, teachers, school buildings and the processes of learning. If one compares Vives with the preceding pedagogic tradition from Vittorino da Feltre and Guarino Veronese, through Battista Guarino, Maffeo Vegio, Leon Battista Alberti, Enea Silvio Piccolomini to the great production of Erasmus, Budé, and Rabelais, while not forgetting how much the Reformation (Luther, Melancthon, Sturm) owes to this debate, the Spanish humanist is seen to play the role of protagonist. The framework of the reform of learning on humanistic foundations totally embraces the emerging exigencies and demands of society. In addition, the return to the classics means renewed or at least more extensive circulation of educational texts. The *Institutio oratoria* of Quintilian and the *De liberis educandis* of the pseudo-Plutarch represent works of wide interest in this period.

More than other authors, however, Vives expresses an element of concreteness, which within the general coordinates that establish a

---

<sup>43</sup> Cesare Vasoli, “Giovanni Ludovico Vives e la logica come strumento delle ‘arti’,” in *La dialettica e la retorica dell’Umanesimo. “Invenzione” e “metodo” nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo*, pp. 214–46; idem, “Juan Luis Vives e il ‘nuovo ordine’ del sapere,” in *Studi filologici e letterari in memoria di Danilo Aguzzi-Barbagi*, ed. Daniela Boccassini, Forum Italicum Supplement (1977), pp. 123–46. See also Edward V. George, “Rhetoric in Vives,” in Vives, *Opera omnia* 1. *Volumen introductorio*, pp. 113–77.

profound accord between pagan culture and Christian piety, lead him to take an interest in the location of schools in relation to the climate of the region, the good of the students, the public salary of the teachers, the careful observation by the teachers of the attitudes of the pupils in order not to neglect their intellectual capacities, the games which are also an indication of their aptitudes,<sup>44</sup> all of these things, naturally, with the purpose of acquiring a cultivation of the mind (*animi culturam*), “so that the young man will become more learned and through sound learning improve in virtue” (*ut doctior fiat iuuenis et per sanam doctrinam virtute melior*).<sup>45</sup> Also following the example of Quintilian, he devotes particular attention to intelligence and memory. The multiple types of intelligence make it possible to evaluate the student in a precise manner in order to direct him towards further studies or, alternatively, to manual labor, which not only is appreciated by Vives for the variety of trades it can offer the young man, but as a continual reference for one who continues his own intellectual preparation. All students must periodically be put in contact with those who perform manual jobs.

As for the daily process of learning, it will be expedient that the schoolmasters teach following an exact schedule so that the pupils understand and remember the contents of the course in the best possible manner. The rapid learning to read and write will then be accompanied by the use of a copybook to take notes, which will help exercise the memory, the natural faculty that is chiefly connected with the processes of the acquisition of knowledge. Language, thought and memory are the object of constant attention in general in philosophical and educational spheres. In Vives in particular this is a theme which, besides being treated in *De disciplinis*, will be dealt with again in *De anima et vita* of 1538, in which, following Democritus and the ancient Greeks in general, he insists on the very close connection between word and reason. If language flows like a stream of water from the spring that is the mind, the result is a precise relationship between these two realities. One who, for example, manifests mental confusion expresses himself badly, just as a loquacious person is not necessarily considered eloquent since eloquence is the sign of a mature expression of thought. In any case, language requires care and constant exercise, beginning obviously at school. Speech (*sermo*), a precious heredity of nature, cannot be aban-

<sup>44</sup> Vives, *De disciplinis*, pp. 88rff.

<sup>45</sup> Vives, op. cit., p. 92r.

doned to itself, and on the other hand tools are not lacking to develop its potentiality, beginning precisely with memory, which “greatly helps the faculty of speaking” (*loquendi facultatem vehementer adiuvat*). Language, understood as the capacity to express oneself and to communicate, is born of reason and is as natural as reason itself. Nevertheless, no specific “*sermo*” is “certain and natural” (*certus ac naturalis*), inasmuch as it is always historically and conventionally conditioned, being formed “*ex arte*”, as the existence of a multitude of human languages demonstrates.<sup>46</sup> Vives expressed the same concept, almost in the same words in another passage, asserting in no uncertain terms that as the mind (*mens*) is a divine gift, in the same way language is the expression of nature, while the various historically determined languages are the product of *ars*. Now, if we consider that these observations precede a chapter of *De anima et vita* dedicated exactly to the method of learning, we can intuit that the interest in language does not suffer any decline whatsoever up to the last years of life of our humanist. The circle between *De disciplinis* and *De anima et vita* closes so coherently, by way of the fundamental transition of *De ratione dicendi*, as to lead finally to the very successful manual entitled *Colloquia sive exercitatio linguae latinae*.

The patrimony of philosophical, literary and philological learning that Vives demonstrates in *De tradendis disciplinis* is striking. Here emerges an exalted model of the “humanistic” school, organically structured into disciplinary areas (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, law, medicine, mathematics, history), which only in appearance reflects some moments of the traditional university organizations of learning (Faculty of Arts and higher faculties). In reality everything undergoes change beginning here with the change of proposed contents (authors and texts), which reflect the breadth of humanistic culture, exceptionally favored by the invention of printing.<sup>47</sup> We are evidently at a much higher level compared to the traditional grammar school, which appears on the scene well into the fifteenth century with its paraphernalia of old medieval didactic tools. We wish to emphasize that in *De tradendis* there is the proposal of new content and methods in the indefinite scholastic space which is yet to be built between elementary schooling and the university. It could be defined as the space of a middle and higher education which

<sup>46</sup> Vives, *De anima et vita*, ed. Mario Sancipriano (Padua, 1974), pp. 222ff.

<sup>47</sup> Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change. Communication and Cultural Transformation in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1983).

is not the university, that space which the Jesuits will ably take it upon themselves to occupy, beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century. Vives makes a decisive contribution to a formative, innovative proposal even at a basic grammatical level, if it were only for the scholastic atmosphere that it demands, the criticism of the use of excessive physical punishment, the diffuse pedagogical and didactic suggestions that he puts forward. With the *De tradendis* we have a widening and a perfecting of curricular reading plans of authors and texts, which the humanists had begun to elaborate from the early fifteenth century for the express purpose of distinguishing themselves from a medieval method of work. These are essentially of a university nature, proposing a model of learning illustrated and structured in “*lectiones*” and discussion, beginning with canonical texts, true and proper “*auctoritates*” in their specific fields.

The value of the curricula in the various disciplines proposed by Vives consists both in their comprehensive richness and in their method, which in fact proposes not one or few authorities, but many, offering a guided trajectory to teachers and students alike which allows an almost embarrassing freedom of choice, save for certain restrictive criteria of a moral order which must guide the selection of literary works, especially poetry. Discussing the position of Plutarch on the manner of reading the poets, he re-proposes the question of whether it is better to prepare an antidote for the poisonous mushroom or abstain from tasting the mushroom itself. It is certainly not easy to oppose and balance opinions and images of corruption with those of value if the one who has to teach does not have them ready at hand. A possible solution, still following the Greek writer, seems to be that of grading the reading of the poets according to the age of the pupil. “What would you do if good maxims were not at hand? Is it not true that evil sayings have a tendency to make our nature more efficient in doing evil than good sayings in doing good? He goes as far as to admit that the reading of poets is harmful unless you use it very carefully. If that is so, it seems that it must not be touched by the boy whom Plutarch is instructing in his treatise, but an older boy imbued with sensible opinions.”<sup>48</sup> In

---

<sup>48</sup> “Quid porro facias si bonae sententiae non sint ad manum? Quid quod malae sententiae proclivitatem pro se habent naturae nostrae ad malitiam ut efficaciores sint quam bonae? Eo denique deducit rem ut confiteatur nocere lectionem poetarum nisi cautissime utaris. Id si ita est, non videtur attingenda puero, quem illic Plutarchus instituit, sed iam grandiori natu et sanis opinionibus imbuto.” Vives, *De disciplinis*,

this regard the Spanish humanist shows himself intransigent. Since the enticements of poetry are so many, he counsels that it should not be removed, but cleansed. But true obscenities should be removed altogether, like dead parts that could contaminate everything with which they come in contact. The subsequent self-justification of the proposed censorship with regard to the young student and reader in general does not seem particularly convincing. Nevertheless, we have before us ideas and attitudes, found also in other texts of his, that are particularly dear to Vives. When we confront the dimension and quality of his religious vision of man and of the world, it is necessary to remember this complex aspect of his personality and cultural ideas. It is evident that they must not be identified as harbingers of those censorial practices that will be instituted more or less at the same time as the Council of Trent. It is not a question of anticipation here but, to a certain degree, of forms of self-censure that can be linked to the long Christian tradition, from the church fathers to the scholastics, related not only to classical culture in a general way, but to certain models of morally questionable pagan poetry (and literature). Another example of this type of sensitivity can be offered by the indication concerning readings considered improper for women in the educational treatise consecrated to them.<sup>49</sup>

Though cognizant of the rich cultural background of Vives, one is still astonished by the very clear plans he puts forward in the various curricula and in a particular manner by the modernity of his knowledge. Indeed contemporary European humanistic culture is solidly dominated by Vives, Petrarch and Boccaccio, through Bruni and Piccolomini, to arrive finally at Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, to cite only a few authors. The same is true of the sixteenth century, where More, Budé and Erasmus, but also Luther and Longeuil are frequently evoked.

It would be opportune at this point to cite a passage from *De disciplinis* as an example of the formative function of Greek and Latin from the point of view of the relationship between language and culture:

---

p. 104r. Cf. in general Karl Kohut, "Literaturtheorie und Literaturkritik bei Juan Luis Vives," in *Juan Luis Vives*, ed. August Buck, pp. 35–47; idem, "Retorica, poesia e historiografia en Juan Luis Vives, Sebastian Fox Morcillo y Antonio Lull," *Revista de literatura* 52 (1990), 345–74.

<sup>49</sup> J.L. Vives, *De institutione feminae Christianae Liber primus*, eds. Charles Fantazzi and Constant Matheeußen (Leiden, 1996), pp. 42ff.

Language is a sanctuary of learning and it decides whether something must be concealed from view or brought out into the open. And since it is a treasury of learning and an instrument of human society, it would be to the advantage of the human race if there were one language which all nations could make use of in common. If this could not be effected, at least that there be one which many peoples and nations could use, or at least one which we Christians, initiated in the same sacred rites, could use for commerce and for spreading practical knowledge. The fact that there are so many languages is the punishment for original sin. That one language should be both sweet-sounding, learned and eloquent. Sweetness exists in the sound of single, separate words or combinations of words. Learning consists in the proper designation of things; eloquence in the abundance and variety of words and phrases. All of these qualities would bring it about that men would speak this language willingly and would be able to express their feelings in the most fitting way, and their judgment would be increased by it. Such seems to me to be the Latin language, of those at least which men use and which are known to us. For that language would be the most perfect of all whose words would explain the natural meaning of things, such as it is reasonable to think was the language by which Adam gave names to each individual thing.<sup>50</sup>

There is no culture without language, Vives insists, language which is the basis of human association. It is appropriate, however, to point out the important eulogy of the Latin language here delineated, the Latin language that was diffused among so many peoples and became the extraordinary vehicle of the “*artes*” and “*disciplinae*”. He says. “It would be an impiety for it not to be cultivated and preserved. If it were lost, it would result in a great confusion of all the disciplines and great discord and aversion among men because of their ignorance of language.”<sup>51</sup>

Since it is fundamental that there should be mutual understanding among men, Vives expresses the fervent wish that schools of language be established in our cities, in which not only the three biblical languages, but also Arabic and other languages spoken by peoples of the Islamic religion should be taught, even if it were only for the purpose of announcing the gospel to them. Probably he recalls the missionary project of the Franciscan Roger Bacon (to whom the knowledge of the languages of various people was of great concern) and has in mind the contemporary foundation of the Collegium Trilingue of Louvain. But even in this case the reflection on language is extended to potentially

<sup>50</sup> Vives, *De disciplinis*, p. 96v.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 97r.

new missionary perspectives, which are already demanded by the more abundant knowledge brought back by the geographical explorations (especially by the Portuguese) and they are perhaps linked up with his own personal memories and experience, brief though it was, in his native land of Spain (he was born at the same time as the capitulation of Granada). At any rate, it is a matter of an intuition soon destined to nourish fierce debates following the ever more intense colonial and missionary expansion of modern Europe.

It is therefore imperative to learn a pure and exact Latin as soon as possible so that it may be an instrument of cultural conservation and communication. To that end the child must apply himself under the attentive guidance of the teacher, who will determine the gradual progression of the course according to the intellectual capacities of each student. It would be even better if one would add the study of Greek to the learning of Latin. "He will acquire many seeds of the other arts from both languages" (*ex ambabus multa reliquarum artium semina accipiet*), with extreme benefit for his formation because not only do the two classical languages make up a whole, but they are useful for the positive development of the vulgar tongues.

Add to this the consideration that Greek is a very learned and rich language; and as the Latin language can instruct and aid other languages through its abundance, so Greek enhances and adorns both Latin and other languages, and it is necessary for the perfection of Latinity, just as Latin is necessary for Italian or Spanish. There was never anyone who was a complete master of the Latin language who was not also imbued with Greek, for Latin came from Greek, and Italian, Spanish and French came from Latin, in which nations Latin was once the native tongue.<sup>52</sup>

This problem of the "*translatio linguarum*" demonstrates once again the profound sense of the historical dimension of culture that is characteristic of Vives. If the Greek language is useful for learning Latin, or better still, indispensable for its perfection, just as Latin is with regard to Italian and Spanish, an interesting connection is established between the classical world and the Romance world, in the manner of a true

---

<sup>52</sup> "Adde quod graeca est erudita admodum et locuples; et quemadmodum latina lingua alias potest copia sua instruere ac iuvare, sic graeca tum latinam ipsam tum alias quoque auget et adornat; estque perfectioni latinitatis necessaria, non secus quam Latina Italicae aut Hispanae; nec ullus absolute fuit latini sermonis peritus nisi et Graeco imbutus; ex sermone enim Graeco latinus, ex latino Italus, Hispanus, Gallus manarunt, quibus olim nationibus Latina lingua erat vernacula." Ibidem.



and proper concatenation. The connecting link in this centuries-old passage is Latin, at one time the vernacular language of those peoples who would afterwards express themselves in the various national languages.<sup>53</sup>

### 6. *Stimulating Curricula*

Grammar plays an important role when a language is no longer spoken by a people, to avoid defects and errors. This is the case with Latin, for the learning of which “*ars grammatica*” follows a gradual course of increasing difficulty, which in brief outline is constituted by simple vowels, composition of consonants, syllables, joining of letters, proper, common and substantive nouns; then verbs, participles, pronouns; inflection of nouns and conjugation of verbs. The young pupil is given a little Latin book in prose that is pleasant, easy and clear. He will learn little by little to put things in order and to distinguish cases, nouns and verbs, in order to begin to create some clarity in what was formulated previously in a jumbled and confused manner.

These directions are given by Donatus, Servius, Theodore of Gaza and other expositors of the rules of Latin and Greek, less childishly, however, than the masters of the lower schools of grammar. After this initial sketch, these notions must be explained all over again with more exactness and accuracy. Then they will confront the eight parts of speech, next syntax, and from there they will proceed to some author of some difficulty and solidity, who expresses himself in a richer language. Finally they will approach prosody and poetry, but without anxiety and tediousness. Vives wisely emphasizes that to accomplish this it is harmful both to neglect the rules and to insist excessively on them, though in the end “the evil of too much diligence is more tolerable” (*tolerabilius est malum nimiae diligentiae*). The relationship posited between the learning of Greek and that of Latin is an interesting one, a question for which Vives brings in Quintilian. The author of the *Institutio* prescribes that the study of Greek should precede that of Latin, but for children for whom Latin was a mother language, observes our humanist. But since we must teach these languages by way of grammar, the course to be

---

<sup>53</sup> Mirko Tavoni, “On the Renaissance idea that Latin derives from Greek,” *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Class. Lettere e filosofia* 16 (1986), 205–35.

followed is the opposite, that is to say that the approach to the rudiments of Greek is facilitated by a more accurate knowledge of Latin. In the last analysis, however, the position of the Spanish humanist and the Roman rhetor are not so distant. "If one should look more closely he would find that my methods of teaching and those of Quintilian are quite similar. For at one time when children first went to school, many things had been learned at home in the Latin language."<sup>54</sup>

The next level of development in the teaching of the Latin language will provide for the annotation of tropes and figures and the beginning of a philological approach to the texts. This is a notable passage, in which Vives speaks of the level of competence which can and should be attained. Philology thus understood entails "some knowledge of things, namely, times, places, history, myth, proverbs, wise sayings, apophthegms, household matters, husbandry, and a taste of legal and public matters, all of which will bring great light to their minds".<sup>56</sup> These could be valid notes or recommendations even for the highest level of competence required of the scholar, but there must be room for the habit of philology even in the young student. It is well-known that the approach to texts requires a hermeneutic circle made up not only of horizons of expectation, curiosity, attention to errors and corruptions of the text and therefore the desire to correct them, but also a solid overall culture capable of illuminating many passages of the text. We know well that this philological attitude is typically humanistic (it suffices to think of the formidable commentaries to so many classical texts that appeared in the age of the Renaissance) and it is characteristic of Vives himself. The formation of this philological mentality (today it would be called scientific) in the approach to texts must be a task to be begun at an early age, starting in the years of elementary school, because it is necessary to begin to break that circle at a certain precise moment, to begin to develop those reading and interpretive skills that will become gradually more and more rich and profound.

As far as regards the order to be followed in studying, the first concern will be the meanings of words and idiomatic expressions; next, the understanding of the authors, not so much on the level of concept as on a formal level so that the boy will become accustomed to extract

---

<sup>54</sup> "Si quis attentius inspiciat, similes prorsum comperiat esse meam et Quintiliani instituendi rationes. Nam pueris olim, quum primum ad scholam venirent, multa erant iam in sermone latino domi cognita." Vives, *op. cit.*, p. 98r.

those sentiments that have been expressed in an obscure and tortuous manner, thus sharpening his own capacity of judgment; lastly the *sententiae* and maxims, famous sayings and proverbs.<sup>55</sup>

An indispensable requirement for this study, of course, is the grammarian, whom Vives wishes to be affable in his rapport with the student and cultivated, capable of using the mother tongue of the pupils and clear in his exposition, in all events, far removed from the negative image and even object of scorn which tradition had associated with him. As for suggested authors for reading, which is perhaps the most attractive part of this section of the text, the humanist makes this preliminary observation: not all authors are to be evaluated according to the same criterion, in the sense that some have followed an order and method that is brief and clear and easy to comprehend. These authors are not only to be read well but learned in depth. Others, instead, although having examined the argument thoroughly, have done so a little too diffusely and minutely to be useful to the learner. For others it will be sufficient to have read them. Still others do not have to be read but it is enough that they be kept in the library for eventual consultation. Vives immediately joins to this the invitation, which remains constant and recurring in his works, to use a moral criterion in the evaluation and choice of authors, in this case in relation to the character of the learner and in particular to some specific vice of his. Thus the boy inclined to pleasures will have to be kept far away from Ovid, the scurrilous boy from Martial, the malicious and scornful from Lucian, one inclined to impiety from Lucretius and the Epicureans, one avid for glory from Cicero. There must be a corrective to the reading of the pagan writers, an antidote to the poison it contains. The criterion of reading is Christian, that of "*pietas*," which has been handed down by God and which is our path to him. In a word, in the encounter with pagan culture, the young student should grasp only the concepts that can be of value to him and reject the rest. In fact, when an obscene word is encountered, the teacher 'should avoid it as much as possible and translate it in a more seemly manner' (*avertat potius quantum poterit longissime et ad sensum magis sincerum traducat*).<sup>56</sup> Clearly Vives's advice constitutes a repository of suggestions and indications, which within the

---

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 103rv.

span of a few decades the schools of the new religious congregations will find consonant with their own educational approach.

The survey of tools and authors proposed for the “*institutor*” of the Latin course is quite stimulating. For basic instruction he will avail himself of Donatus among the ancient writers, Niccolò Perotti, Sulpizio da Veroli, Antonio Nebrija, Aldus Manutius, and Philip Melanchthon among contemporaries. He may choose whomever he wishes among these, all of whom seem sufficiently advantageous to Vives. For a more articulated grammatical and syntactic level he does not concede that there are tools available that are fully satisfying. A long and diligent personal reading of the authors would be appropriate but books like those of Thomas Linacre and Antonio Mancinelli could also be of help. The advice of creating a dictionary of the Latin language is not lacking either, one that will contain two features: an enumeration “merely of the words joined with a brief interpretation” (*tantum vocabulorum brevi interpretatione adiecta*), and a listing of examples and expressions from the authors. In addition, a translation of the Latin words into the vernacular language and vice versa will be useful to the students. Finally the teacher must extrapolate those words which are indispensable for daily use.<sup>57</sup> A synthetic historical framework from the first man to Charles V, “under whom we live” (*sub quo agimus*), should be offered to the students, but the compressed periodization must be articulated chronologically through the names of famous personages and significant events.

At this point the student will gradually be able to approach writers truly worthy of being imitated, from Caesar to Cicero’s *Epistulae ad familiares*, to the comedies of Terence, while “in Plautus there is much less purity of style.”<sup>58</sup> Among the poetical works some odes of Horace are counseled, and of the Christian poets Prudentius among the ancient writers and Battista Mantovano among the contemporaries. This latter writer is described as “more copious and natural than terse or suitable to the sublimity of the subject matter” (*magis copiosum et facilem quam tersum aut sublimitati argumentorum respondentem*), where one may note the critical acuteness of Vives’s characterizations. For subsequent readings he recommends the *Georgics* of Virgil and the *Rusticus* of Poliziano, the *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti* of Ovid, select epigrams of Martial, and Persius, who in antiquity was deemed worthy of being read by pagans

---

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 104v–105r.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp. 105v–106r.

and Christians, then the *Aeneid* and Lucan. It need hardly be remarked how the choice of authors is based on a centuries-old tradition of Latin-ity, in which contemporaries play a leading role. This is the case of Giovanni Boccaccio, whose *Genealogia deorum gentilium* is recommended as a help “for the knowledge of poets and myths” (*ad poetarum fabularumque cognitionem*) since the Tuscan writer in this regard labored “with more success than one could hope for in that age, even if in interpreting the myths he is often rather tedious” (*felicius quam illo erat saeculo sperandum, tametsi in interpretandis fabulis saepe est nimis frigidus*). For history “he will have a sampling of some books of Livy” (*libros aliquot degustabit Livii*), then Valerius Maximus and the Ciceronian orations, “in which there are the embellishments, splendid style and all the virtues of speaking” (*in quibus sunt ornamenta, lumina et virtutes omnes dicendi*). Sallust will not be absent nor Tacitus, “who contains certain elements that are somewhat harsh and dangerous to imitate, but he is grand and audacious, and there is much spirit in him” (*qui habet quaedam duriuscula et imitatu periculosa, sed est grandis, audax multumque inest in eo spiritus*). For elegance of vocabulary Lorenzo Valla will be unbeatable,<sup>59</sup> but Budé’s commentary on the *Pandects* and the *De asse*<sup>60</sup> will also prove most useful.

As for the agrarian lexicon, Cato, Varro and Columella will be chosen, for architecture Vitruvius. Among the contemporaries who can offer some contributions to language Vives singles out Longueil “who aped Cicero” (*simiolus... Ciceronis*), Giovanni Pontano, Angelo Poliziano, the latter “possessed of great cleverness” (*magnas habet argutias*), and Erasmus, who has an “admiral facility and brilliance” (*admirabilem facilitatem ac lucem*). Also to have ready at hand in the library there will be the *De lingua latina* of Varro, Festus Pompeius, Nonius Marcellus, and among contemporaries the *Cornucopiae* of Perotti and the *Orthographia* of Tortelli, from which Ambrogio Calepino drew the material for his well-known dictionary.<sup>61</sup> The originality of the observations and judgments of Vives is evident. The model of the survey of authors and texts that is to be included in the formative curriculum is a creative imitation of formulas already outlined, like those of Erasmus which can be found in *De copia verborum ac rerum*, *De ratione studii* and *De recta latini graecique*

<sup>59</sup> One remembers the celebrated judgment of Carlo Dionisotti: “Insomma le *Elegantiae*...son la *Magna Charta* dell’Umanesimo, non italiano soltanto ma europeo,” *Geografia e storia della letteratura italiana* (Turin, 1977), p. 189.

<sup>60</sup> Vives, op. cit., pp. 106v–107r.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 107r.

*sermonis pronuntiatione*. An attractive critical survey of contemporary literary culture is also represented by the *Ciceronianus*, which our humanist surely knew.

Equally interesting is the course on Greek language and literature which, as we know, must begin a little later with respect to the Latin course. For the first rudiments of Greek one can make use of Alean-der and the first book of Theodore of Gaza, translated into Latin by Erasmus. Then we pass to Aesop's *Fables*, some passages from Isocrates and Lucian, which "must be free of any corruption" (*quod quidem sit certe sine corruptela*) or even from John Chrysostom, "who is terse and exceptionally clear" (*qui est tersus atque eximie dilucidus*). The syntax of Greek is less easily structuralized than Latin. At this point the young student will begin to translate something from Greek to Latin. It would likewise be a particularly fruitful exercise to point out the principal differences between the syntaxes of the two classical languages. A particularly complex problem, of course, are the dialects. It will also be opportune to compose a dictionary for Greek as copious as that projected for Latin. As for the poets, Vives presents a long assessment of Homer, and then gives his opinion of Hesiod, Aristophanes and Euripides. Last comes Pindar, "especially obscure and one who uses abstruse words" (*obscurum in primis et reconditorum vocabulorum usurpatorem*). For history he recommends Herodian, compared with Poliziano's translation, then the stylistically pure Xenophon and some books of Thucydides, a writer who is "difficult... harsh and quite hard-hearted" (*difficiles... duri ac plane ferrei*), Vives remarks.<sup>62</sup>

There are, besides, "certain mixed authors" (*auctores quidam misti*) in these two languages, who concern themselves simultaneously with history, theatre, oration and philosophy. They should be defined, in the strict sense, as philologists. Among the ancients he names Athenaeus, Aulus Gellius, Augustine in *De civitate Dei*, Macrobius; among recent writers Pietro Crinito, Raffaele Volterrano, Erasmus in the *Adagia*, Budé in his *Annotations* and *De asse*. One must, however, abstain from the sometimes excessively subtle questions raised by Greek philologists. Quintilian's advice about "not to know certain things" (*aliquid nescire*) is worth following. Eventual problems, in both Greek and Latin writers,

---

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 108r.

which concern special disciplinary areas, such as metaphysics, medicine, law and theology should be left to specialists in those subjects.<sup>63</sup>

To conclude the exemplification concerning curricula it is fitting once again to point out Vives's involvement with contemporary European culture. So we come to Francesco Petrarca, who "was the first to open up libraries that were long closed and shook off the dust and mold from the monuments of the greatest authors" (*bibliothecas tamdiu clausas reseravit primus, et pulverem situmque e monimentis maximorum auctorum excussit*); Giovanni Boccaccio, his inferior disciple; Leonardo Bruni, "was quite without fault, simple, natural" (*satis fuit emendatus, simplex, naturalis*); Lorenzo Valla, of whom *De vero bono*, the *Elegantiae* and the translations from the Greek are mentioned; Francesco Filelfo, who is hard to read; Theodore of Gaza, who can enrich our language with his translations from Greek; George of Trebizond, more verbose than accurate. And then there are also Giovanni Pontano, Pomponio Leto, Ermolao Barbaro, Angelo Poliziano, "highly finished" (*elaboratus*), Giovanni Pico, "impressive . . . and quite severe" (*gravior . . . et satis castigatus*), and Antonio Sabellico. "To our memory" (*memoriae nostrae*), on the other hand, belong Erasmus, Budé, Melanchthon, Sadoletto, Bembo, Francesco Pico, Andrea Alciato and many others, about whom it is not his intention to express his opinion because they are still living. The survey of poets and their interpreters, ancient or modern, are likewise wide-ranging. Cristoforo Landino, Filippo Beroaldo, Michele Marullo, Girolamo Vida, Thomas More are among the many recorded.<sup>64</sup>

### 7. *The Knowledge of Nature*

There is no doubt that one encounters an exceptional cultural preparation, to say the least, in *De disciplinis*, a preparation filtered through an attentive reading at first hand of ancient and recent texts. And this undoubtedly poses an interpretive problem the moment our humanist confronts the theme of the knowledge of nature. In this regard we must hypothesize a classification of Vives, fully conscious, however, of its provisional nature because we do not yet have serious studies at our disposal, for example, on *De prima philosophia sive de intimo naturae opificio*, a

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 108vff.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 109vff.

work in which it is possible to sense Platonic but especially Aristotelian influences, as well as of several other philosophers. This agrees with a life choice theorized in *De causis corruptarum artium* according to which one must not become an exclusive follower of anyone because otherwise one becomes a theorist of a sectarian rather than communicative philosophic thought, as happened with the medieval sophists. The title *De prima philosophia*, among other things, should not mislead us, because in the three books that compose it exclusively metaphysical subjects are not to be found, but many questions of physics are discussed, such as matter, motion, time, etc. In brief, *De prima philosophia* merits a careful study to examine its venous system, as it were, and internal structure. It will become evident that the presence of Aristotle is quite extensive, but this does not imply certainly that Vives is an Aristotelian. He himself, more than once, wished to eliminate fundamentally every interpretation that was too certain (a skeptic would say dogmatic), from religious motivations, because our gnoseological uncertainty derives from the profound darkness that we carry within us, in the last analysis, original sin. This religious position, often repeated, cannot be lost sight of or marginalized. For example, in a passage of *De tradendis disciplinis* our philosopher says:

Those things which we have drawn from nature were either produced from the senses or the imagination, to which the ruler of the senses imparted the judgment of the mind. As a result we have grasped little and even that insufficiently because of the thick darkness which besets and oppresses human minds, and therefore we comprehend the appearance of truth rather than what we can regard as certain.<sup>65</sup>

Truth and verisimilitude constitute two important dialectically related terms in Vives, which to examine thoroughly requires taking into account above all the considerable presence of Cicero in the framework of his thought. The attention given to the sensible is much influenced by Aristotle, but no one would dream of defining Vives as an Aristotelian, as was already mentioned above. Situated chronologically between the end of the fifteenth century and the first forty years of the sixteenth, Vives lives in an age of change which nonetheless on the level of

---

<sup>65</sup> "quae de natura exculpsimus, vel sensibus sunt parta vel phantasia, quibus iudicium mentis accessit rector sensuum, quocirca pauca et maligne sumus consecuti propter eas tenebras, quae densissimae animos humanos obsident ac premunt, ideoque verisimilia consecutur magis quam assequimur quae pro comperto habeamus vera." *Ibid.*, p. 112r.



cosmology and physics still shows traces of the ancient and medieval paradigm. Yet the attention that he gives to “*usus*” and “*experientia*”, mechanical skills, the work of farmers and artisans betrays a mentality in a state of change. There is a practical aspect of Vives’s philosophy which also conditions the study of nature. In the contemplation of nature, for example, it is not necessary to indulge in investigations that are too subtle, in search of solutions which we know we cannot achieve. Let us direct our studies instead to the necessities of life, “to some use of the body or the mind, to the cultivation and increase of piety” (*ad usum aliquem corporis aut animi, ad cultum et incrementa pietatis*).<sup>66</sup> From the standpoint of humanistic culture and in particular concerning the reform of the traditional arts of discourse, the contribution of the Spanish humanist proceeds at the same pace as other philosophers in the attempt to become oriented in an historical and social world in the process of radical transformation. In sum, from whatever approach we wish to employ, the position of Vives in the end remains not easily or univocally definable.

The *De tradendis disciplinis* in particular offers us an important hermeneutic key even for those problematic areas which seem to be most distant from the humanistic philological sphere, such as nature, medicine and mathematics. In the first place the general pedagogical dimension that accompanies even these disciplinary areas remains preponderant. Thus in every philosophical model that concerns nature, the Valencian philosopher proclaims. “The young man will be told beforehand that he will only hear things that have the resemblance of truth” (*illud praedicetur iuveni ea illum modo auditurum quae imaginem veri habeant*), in accordance with the usual gradations, by which at the beginning he will be shown the easiest things, accessible to the senses, which constitute the entrance way to every form of knowledge. From this derives the importance of a general description of nature, the heavens, the elements (water, air, earth and fire). As always, the emergence of a new content is accompanied by bibliographical indications. In this case both the teacher, directly, and the pupil, indirectly, will benefit from the *De mundo* of Aristotelian tradition, Pliny, Pomponius Mela, and the more recent works of Giovanni Sacrobosco and Georg Peuerbach. This is a disciplinary area different from others, because it is *per se* extraneous to the disputes that contributed to weaken the arts seriously. “There is

---

<sup>66</sup> Ibidem.

no need here of disputation but of the silent contemplation of nature; from time to time they will seek and will ask rather than wrangle and dispute.”<sup>67</sup>

There are those who are not sufficiently suited for a more extensive research in this field, endowed perhaps with a slower intellect and a less keen mental vision, who will have to linger longer on this plane of the “*contemplatio naturae*”. To another audience the teacher will read various texts of Aratus, Manilius, Strabo, Theophrastus and Dioscorides, the *De animalibus* of Aristotle, writers of *De re rustica*, ichthyology, experts on gems and metals. Even this aspect of voracious and potentially global knowledge constitutes one of the possible features of the “encyclopedism” of *De disciplinis*, where the author seems especially concerned with a generous quantitative offering which will satisfy the most diverse personalities.

Some passages of *De prima philosophia* seem instead to integrate this predominantly didactic-pedagogical dimension of nature. Probably the reader of this treatise, which the author wishes to be an integrating part of *De disciplinis*, should not expect a particular originality in it. Yet it is possible to extrapolate some stimulating observations from it. Nature is nothing else than “a force instilled into each individual thing by God to act or to be acted upon” (*vis indita unicuique rei a Deo ad agendum aut patiendum*), for which reason the nature of fire is to give heat, that of tow to be easily set on fire, etc. In particular, nature is like a machine prepared and adapted by God, “an automatic machine, like a clock” (*machinam aliquam automatam, horologium puta*), with the difference, however, that while “*homo artifex*” separates himself from his machine and allows it to perform its work on its own, God is always present to nature, “holding together his construction with the help of his presence” (*instructionem illam praesentiae suae ope continens*), with continual assistance, in the same way as the soul maintains the harmony of the body, so that, with a more appropriate image, we should consider God as a “*neurospaston*”, a puppet-master.<sup>68</sup> Other questions discussed here regard the eternity or non-eternity of the world, the earth, the elements, bodies and their diseases, heat, cold, wet. By means of Aristotelian interpretive models (at least in general terms, as potency and

<sup>67</sup> “nihil est hic opus disputationibus, sed contemplatione naturae tacita; quaerent interim et rogabunt verius quam altercabuntur aut disputabunt.” Ibid., p. 112v.

<sup>68</sup> Vives, *De prima philosophia* in *De disciplinis*, 10v.

act, matter and form) the discussion passes to natural kingdoms, result of the will, wisdom and power of God, symbolized in the passage from stone (*lapis*), through plant (*planta*) to living being (*animans*) and finally to man. The natural faculties of man are then analysed and a discussion is included on the relation between nature and art, which is so characteristic of *De disciplinis* as a whole, as we have mentioned. A first approach to *De prima philosophia*, therefore, exhibits a Vives attentive to the relation between metaphysics and physics, considered through important cultural references chiefly to ancient, but also to medieval tradition. We are presented with an integration of *De causis corruptarum artium* and *De tradendis disciplinis*, but on a more antiquated, traditional plane, where there is little trace, if any, of that effervescent plunge into Renaissance culture, which is really one of the most original features of the great 1531 treatise.

In addition, this work contains quite precise indications about the sciences that have useful implications for life, drawn more from medicine than from mathematics, which Aristotle classifies among the theoretical or cognitive sciences. For Vives the study of the mathematical arts imposes on the young student the silence of the tongue after it has been intensely put to the test in the language arts. Articulated in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, perspective and music, they are not adapted to “fickle and restless” (*levia et inquieta*) minds.<sup>69</sup> Medicine, on the other hand, is introduced by considerations of practical philosophy, which for the student now advanced in the basics of his education deal with the “skills and inventions” (*artes et inventa*) that concern nourishment, dress and living. Of these inventions and discoveries it will be fitting to study how they were discovered, increased, preserved and applied to the uses of our individual and collective lives. Moreover, our humanist suggests, the attention given to the practical aspects of learning should be fostered by a continual curiosity and therefore the youngest students should not be ashamed of frequenting stores and workshops and benefiting from the experience of working men. One must follow the example of Carolus Virulus, whom he had heard of in Louvain, head of the Gymnasium Lilianum of that city, who would arrange meetings with relatives and parents in a convivial atmosphere. In such encounters they conveyed

---

<sup>69</sup> Vives, *De disciplinis*, p. 119r.

to the students the characteristics and particulars of their respective professions, with mutual profit.<sup>70</sup>

As far as medicine is concerned, its practice presupposes a profound knowledge of the products extracted from the earth: balsams, stones, gems, plants, animals and the human body. It is a necessary knowledge, because a true and proper power of life and death over men's bodies is attributed to medicine. Certainly, if to this power is added ignorance and incompetence, or arrogance or unwillingness to concede, the disaster is complete, as has been the case on numerous occasions, Vives intimates. The errors of an expert in law or of a theologian can be corrected in some way, but who can repair those of a doctor? "Who can bring remedy to a dead man?" (*homini extincto quis adferet remedium?*)<sup>71</sup> In the case of this discipline we also have an example of the procedural method used by Vives, who delineates the characteristics of the discipline, demonstrates the qualities of the good doctor, and puts in evidence the risks of bad medicine (this is subjected to a stringent critical analysis in *De causis corruptarum artium*). He is interested above all in indicating to the "*magister*" the bibliographical tools for a good curriculum, beginning with Hippocrates, Galen, Celsus and other ancient writers. Among the Arabs Avicenna merits special place. Vives confesses honestly that his personal abilities in this field are neither solid nor extensive as in other disciplines. In any case "The method of transmitting the art of medicine, as far as I understand it, is that first all the parts of the human body are explained and clearly understood, the strength and nature of each part, the proportion and almost harmony that exists between them."<sup>72</sup> Then the discourse must expand to the various and numerous pathologies. Particular care must be devoted to the anatomy of the human body, always with a vigilant eye to the slightest differences that can be perceived.

According to the ancient saying the doctor must care especially for himself. "What hope will the sick person conceive from that doctor whose art he sees is of no benefit to himself?" (*Quam spem de eo medico aeger concipiet, cuius artem in illo ipso videt nihil proficere?*). He must have an ethically correct relation with his patients and he must not immediately prescribe medicine, no matter how light, because at the beginning he

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 121r.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 122rff.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 123r.

must try to cure his patient ‘by means of nutriment, that is, diet’ (*victus ratione, hoc est, diaeta*).<sup>73</sup> If necessary, he should consult other doctors and be ready to welcome the opinions of others in a field in which, at times, certainties are at a minimum and jealousies among professionals many.

### 8. *A Lofty Model of the Intellectual*

The standard typology of a discipline and of the one who practices it which Vives outlines in this treatise comprises more or less constantly three aspects: an internal description of the discipline, the tools and the procedure for learning it, and ethical and professional considerations of the one who practices it. These latter considerations occupy a position of importance for Vives because, as he demonstrated persuasively in *De causis corruptarum artium*, pride, haughtiness, arrogance, ignorance, abuse of power, etc. have been historical constants which, together with many other factors, contribute to explain the crisis of learning. The possible remedies are procured either through a wider and more solid culture or through moral reform. It remains understood that the frame of reference for Vives is a sincere adherence to the Christian religion. Nevertheless, the figure of the teacher, the researcher and the intellectual is so dear to our philosopher that he dedicated scattered reflections on the subject throughout the treatise as well as some final extremely significant pages.<sup>74</sup>

We refer to the concise but dense *De vita et moribus eruditi*,<sup>75</sup> which arises precisely from the need to delineate the function of the intellectual, once he had completed the curriculum plan of the “*artes humanitatis*”. The learned man will not have to follow the didactic order proposed by the author, but will be free to create his own course of study, since “all these things have a connection and affinity with each other” (*connexionem inter se habent omnia haec et affinitatem quandam*). Instead, he will be a lover of study and will not be presumptuous, thinking that he has reached the peak of learning, nor will he be ashamed to learn from his fellow man. The limit must be set by a constant reference to God.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 124v.

<sup>74</sup> August Buck, “Juan Luis Vives’s Konzeption des humanistischen Gelehrten,” in *Juan Luis Vives*, ed. August Buck, pp. 1–21.

<sup>75</sup> *Opera omnia I.L. Vvivi*, Basel, 1555, vol. I, pp. 518–27.

Culture itself (*eruditio*) consists of four elements: intellect, judgment, memory and study. "Tell me, where do the first three come from? do they not come from God?" (*tria prima, cedo, unde habes? numquid non ex Deo?*).<sup>76</sup> The truly wise man must be capable of rising above the praises accorded him to the contemplation of that holy and divine wisdom before which, as St. Paul affirms, all human wisdom is pure folly. If men are capable of being amazed at the splendid appearance of a drop of water, with all the more reason should they remain in wonder if it were possible to see the source of all things (*si copiosissimum illum et aethernum fontem daretur intueri unde manant universa?*). We must ask God that education should profit us, not harm us, lest we suffer the same fate as those doctors who cure others but cannot cure themselves (recall the saying "doctor, cure thyself" (*medice, cura teipsum*), which we quoted above regarding medicine).

*De vita et moribus eruditi* proves itself to be a particularly useful reading because it crowns *De disciplinis* and takes up again some fundamental ideas traceable in all his works, especially the idea that studies should not be an end in themselves, must not do harm to anyone, and must be salutary (*salutifera*) for each of us singularly and for society as a whole, an idea that is reinforced with an allusion to Thomas Aquinas (interesting, because the thought of the great Dominican, apart from certain religious orders and some philosophers like Marsilio Ficino, is certainly known in the Renaissance, but does not have the same importance he enjoyed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries). But what counts is the circulation in Vives's mind of this fundamentally Christian idea, evangelical, patristic and also scholastic, that education is a gift of God and as such should be offered to others, not in a neutral manner or directed towards glory and personal success, but as a most powerful help to salvation. For that matter everything in nature and society is directed to an end. The insistence on the negativity of the relation of education to money, which has ancient and medieval roots, is probably dictated to our humanist by the progressive consciousness of a change in the course of economy, in ethics and in the politics of mercantile societies, more and more dedicated to trade and commerce, which makes new and disturbing demands upon more sensitive consciences.

From this point of view it is necessary to remember that Vives is a layman who sometimes offers solutions to delicate social problems, like

---

<sup>76</sup> Vives, op. cit., p. 518.

that of the regulation of begging, different from those of the mendicant orders. Surely he was not ignorant of the discussion of loans and interest. Perhaps as a man of study he intuited as particularly acute the problem of how a mercantile society, on its way to economic processes typical of capitalism, made learning a component of its own power. Learning, once secularized, began to enter, in fact, into a market in which diversified and specific intellectual abilities were now acquiring the status of merchandise. In all events Vives well knows how acute this problem is in the field of the practical disciplines, beginning with medicine. Therefore his anchoring himself in an ethical and religious vision of learning, which has profound roots in the Christian tradition, must be taken into serious consideration:

The benefits deriving from studies is much less appreciated than the possession of money, which men of lowly character who are the most removed from the true meaning of studies consider to be the only benefit. For there is nothing so unlike literary studies as the desire for and preoccupation with money, so that wherever this holds sway, it immediately expels the desire for knowledge, which is only imparted in good faith to hearts free of that disease.<sup>77</sup>

Vives overturns the recommendation that one must first become rich and then philosophize. To dedicate oneself immediately to become rich would mean to be the prey of a thousand vices and to misunderstand the use of riches, precisely because you are ignorant of philosophy, that is, of the deeper meaning of life and of the values that are its foundation. The problem, let it be clear, is not that of not becoming rich, but on the contrary of becoming rich with complete awareness. "If you were only to exercise philosophy, it would become easy for you to become rich enough to get along" (*Quod si semel philosophare, expeditum erit tibi postea ditari quantum sat erit*).<sup>78</sup> The Epicurean maxim that it is never too early or too late to dedicate oneself to philosophy is interpreted in this explicit manner: the poor man must philosophize because he has no possessions, so that he will be able to support poverty; the rich man must philosophize, because he has possessions, so that he can manage his

---

<sup>77</sup> "Multo minus studiorum fructus pecunia aestimandus est, quem unum esse arbitrantur homines ingeniis abiectis, quique plurimum a vera studiorum ratione absunt. Nihil est enim tam diversum literis quam pecuniae vel cupiditas vel cura, ut quocunque haec incubuerit, protinus studiorum rerum cognoscendarum expellat quod se bona fide nisi liberis ac morbo illo solutis pectoribus non committit." Vives, op. cit., p. 519.

<sup>78</sup> Ibidem.

riches more justly; the happy man will philosophize in order to control his happiness properly; the unhappy man will philosophize in order to bear up better in his misery. This counsel is less banal than it appears on the surface. It is necessary to reflect on this consolatory aspect of philosophy, which has a long and glorious tradition behind it. Here the basic coordinates of the discussion are represented by Christian tradition, which sees in God the limit of man's activism.

Representing through himself the general condition of the intellectual, Vives exemplifies in a very precise manner some aspects of the relation between the man of culture and the man of power in the Renaissance. In his own personal case, with reference specifically to *De disciplinis*, it is noteworthy that the treatise is dedicated to the sovereign of Portugal, as we saw, which supposes a sort of division of labor between the holders of power and those invested with cultural power, a division of power which is obviously not equally apportioned, as is illustrated in the case of Thomas More. But it is a problem of great historical importance, because it signals a fundamental change, beginning with Petrarch and the appearance of the *signorie* in Italy and modern monarchies in some regions of Europe, as regards the organic relationship of medieval intellectuals with the church and the university in particular. With humanistic civilization, the situation becomes more fluid and dynamic from this point of view. There is certainly no diminution of intellectuals connected with the church and especially with religious orders, just as university lecturers remain in a rather protected niche. But there is no doubt that the domain of culture is broadened, the educational demands of society become more pressing, the centers of power multiply, the sites of the advancement of learning become diversified (one has only to think of the great importance of the academies). After all, there is not a humanist of the sixteenth and seventeenth century who does not have some relation with the courts and other centers of power, secular or ecclesiastic. A good example is the clericalization of culture that the Roman curia openly favored, filtrating within its own domain so great a part of what the humanist intellectuals had to offer and re-launching it with profound transformations to the Europe of the sixteenth century. The case of the relationship of Vives with power can be usefully compared, in its specific differences, with that of Erasmus, Budé and More, and the specific reflection of the Spaniard in this regard is frequently striking.

In the center of this discussion is the function of power, incarnate in the sovereign, at the heart of a long and radical debate on the meaning



and autonomy of politics, from the mirrors of princes of medieval origin to the educational profiles of the Christian prince, like the classic work of Erasmus, to the unscrupulousness of the Machiavellian prince. I have often wondered whether Vives had known or heard of any works of the Florentine secretary. His own ethico-political works of the 1520s, at any rate, much in harmony with the *De vita et moribus eruditi*, following a line of Christian tradition and closely related to Erasmian ideas, express ideas far removed from the Machiavellian horizon. And yet his reflection on the relation between intellectual and power are singularly articulated and require considerable interpretive delicacy. According to the Valencian humanist intellectuals are often subjected to power and they have deformed the image of the prince, sweetening it, one might say, according to an ideal image. A prince who is thus exalted by the pen of a courtier sometimes deforms his own personality to the point of seeing himself as he is described, becoming with each day that passes more arrogant and intolerable. From the scholar a critical function is required, one that is not abjectly flattering towards the holders of power:

If men of learning had not become so accustomed to flattering princes and the latter would value their learning more and would find particular joy in being praised by those who themselves were praised, according to the saying of the ancient poet,<sup>79</sup> their criticism would carry more weight and the approbation of a learned man would be regarded as the grave testimony of a most scrupulous witness. And princes no less than others would consider it a great reward for their virtue in this life to receive the approval of a learned man. But as it is, they make no account of their approval, which they know they can buy with money, no, even with a crust of bread.<sup>80</sup>

Other learned men do not seek money from their relationship with power, but glory. This is a source of stimulation but in the long run

---

<sup>79</sup> The reference is to a line of the poet Naevius from his tragedy *Hector proficiscens*, in *Remains of Old Latin* 2, ed. Eric Herbert Warmington (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), p. 118.

<sup>80</sup> “Si studiosi assentari non consuevissent principibus, et eruditionem illi pluris facerent, et laudari se ab illis impensissime gauderent, videlicet iuxta prisca poetarum dictum, laudatis viris, tum reprehensio magni esset ponderis, nec aliter acciperetur docti hominis approbatio quam religiosissimi testis testimonium gravissimum. Nec minus principes quam alius quivis amplissimum virtutis suae in hac vita praemium ducerent erudito se homini approbari. Nunc vero pili non faciunt, quae sciunt se numo uno sestertio, numo vero, imo frusto panis empturos.” Vives, *De vita et moribus eruditi*, p. 520.

it becomes a source of evil because the search for glory compels us to subject ourselves continually to the opinions of others, abandoning the privacy of our own conscience. Time destroys vain opinions but confirms right judgment. Fame is uncertain and slippery, fortune is changeable. True glory consists in obedience to one's own conscience, and through it, to God:

But if, ignoring human praise, you wish to serve your conscience and through it God, how much more solid and lasting glory will be yours if the living God praises you when you are alive, the present God in your presence, the immortal God when you have reached immortality, who will always look down upon you, who will pronounce judgement on you, not from false opinion but from your own testimony? It is not he who commends himself who is approved but he whom God commends.<sup>81</sup> (2 Cor. 10:18)

The reference to the divine plan is constant and gives the precise sense of a will which requires that culture be to the advantage of all men. The success and the goal of men of learning is to offer advantages for the common good, a means by which one attains an immortal reward (*merces immortalis*). The figure and functions of the man of culture are connoted in the Gospel as the salt of the earth and the light of the world. Woe to the intellectual who transforms himself into an insipid salt and dark light (*lux tenebrosa*). His external bearing should also be characterized by sobriety (*gravitas*) and constancy (*constantia*). Even this brief text is rich with suggestions and would merit careful separate study to demonstrate all its potentialities and put it in its proper context.

It is appropriate to draw attention briefly, however, to the full consciousness that Vives exhibits of participating in a comprehensive cultural movement which is very innovative. As a figure midway between Leonard Bruni and Erasmus of Rotterdam, his definition of humanistic culture has the merit of synthesizing in a set formula the richness of classical antiquity and the novelty of Christianity, at the same time uttering a good auspice. "They are called the humanities, may they render us human; they were given to us by the good God, may they

---

<sup>81</sup> "Quod si tu neglectis humanis laudibus, conscientiae tuae volueris servire et per illam Deo, quanto solidior tibi et diuturnior gloria continget si te laudarit Deus vivens viventem, praesens praesentem, immortalis immortalem, qui te semper intuetur, qui de te non ex falso pronuntiabit iudicio, sed ex tuo ipsius testimonio? non qui seipsum commendat, is probatus est, inquit Paulus, sed quem Deus commendat." Vives, op. cit., p. 521.

make us good.” (*Artes humanitatis reddant nos humanos; a Deo optimo sunt traditae, reddant bonos*).<sup>82</sup> In the humanist debate over “*verba et res*” the Spanish humanist polemizes against those who seem to award too much importance to form compared to content and seems to be inclined towards a Pauline-Augustinian position, capable of balancing “*scientia signorum*” and “*scientia rerum*”. In the end the ultimate substance of “*res*” exists in the content of a profound religious and moral message. It is no accident that in the last pages of *De vita et moribus eruditi* the names of his great contemporaries resound once more: Valla, Poliziano, Mancinelli, Beroaldo, Giovanni Pico. In conclusion, *De disciplinis* presents itself as an organically structured plan according to various critical perspectives, which go from the criticism of the transmission of learning in general to the new method of re-launching and transmitting culture, to the role of religion, metaphysics and natural science up to the role of the intellectual. In sinking its own roots in classical and Christian tradition and, above all, in the constant positive dialogue with the culture of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, *De disciplinis* is one of the most limpid mirrors of European humanism.

---

<sup>82</sup> Vives, op. cit., p. 524.

## VIVES'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO RHETORIC AND DIALECTIC

Peter Mack<sup>1</sup>

Although Vives today enjoys fame mainly as an educational and social theorist, for his work in psychology and his commentary on St Augustine's *City of God*, he published eleven works concerned with rhetoric and dialectic, amounting to perhaps a sixth of his total oeuvre.<sup>2</sup> But most of these works were scarcely reprinted and he is rarely mentioned by later writers in these fields.<sup>3</sup> The aim of this paper is to survey his publications in rhetoric and dialectic in order to determine Vives's original contribution and to discuss whether or not his subsequent neglect was justified.<sup>4</sup> I shall begin with a chronological survey of the works in question and a consideration of how they might be thought to fit together as a unified treatment of the two subjects. Then I shall analyse some detailed examples of Vives's significant contributions. Finally I

---

<sup>1</sup> I am very grateful to Kees Meerhoff and Marc van der Poel for their comments on an earlier version of part of this chapter, and especially to Charles Fantazzi for his many suggestions and improvements.

<sup>2</sup> Since I refer to so many different works my main reference is always to Gregorio Mayans y Siscar's edition, J.L. Vives, *Opera omnia*, 8 vols (Valencia, 1782–90), supplemented by references to modern editions where these are to hand. In the cases in which I have made comparisons Mayans y Siscar's edition is generally reliable except in punctuation. Hereafter Majansius.

<sup>3</sup> All information on publication history is based on Lawrence D. Green and James J. Murphy eds. *Renaissance Rhetoric Short-Title Catalogue 1460–1700* (Aldershot, 2006). Lawrence D. Green, *John Rainolds's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Newark, 1986), pp. 74–76 and index, notes Rainolds's use of several details from Vives. Ben Jonson used *De disciplinis*, *De causis corruptarum artium* and *De ratione dicendi* in his *Discoveries*. Ben Jonson, *Works* ed. Charles Harold Herford and Percy Simpson, vol. xi (Oxford, 1952), pp. 214–18, 265–66, 268–72.

<sup>4</sup> The two older surveys, Cesare Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo* (Milan, 1968), pp. 214–46 and Edward George, "Rhetoric in Vives," in *Ioannis Lodovici Vitis Valentini Opera omnia*, I (Valencia, 1992), pp. 113–177 are still useful, especially the latter. Thomas B. Deutscher, "Juan Luis Vives," in Peter Bietenholz, ed. *Contemporaries of Erasmus*, 3 vols (Toronto, 1987), pp. 409–13 provides a reliable brief life and works. On Vives's early works and his training in Paris see Charles Fantazzi, "Vives's Parisian Writings," in Christopher S. Celenza and Kenneth Gouwens, eds. *Humanism and Creativity in the Renaissance: Essays in Honor of Ronald G. Witt* (Leiden, 2006), pp. 245–70.

shall consider the factors in the texts and the context of their reception which may explain their lack of success in the sixteenth century.

Vives's publications in rhetoric and dialectic fall into two main periods of his career. In 1519, while he was living in Louvain, teaching at the University and supervising his pupil William de Croy, Archbishop designate of Toledo, he wrote *Adversus Pseudodialecticos*, framed as a letter to John Fortis, warning him against the scholastic logic taught at Paris, where Vives had studied between 1509 and 1514.<sup>5</sup> He attacks the scholastic manner of analysing the implications of words as well as specific doctrines and technical terms. He argues that sentences in Latin should be understood according to the customary usage of the learned rather than subjected to incomprehensible technical analysis. The treatise owes clear debts to Lorenzo Valla's *Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae* and Thomas More's *Letter to Martin Dorp*. While it no doubt represents a sincere embrace of humanist ideas about Latin and protest against his Parisian logical training, this treatise may also have formed part of his plan of publically identifying himself with the Trilingual College at Louvain and with Erasmus. It was first published by Dirk Martens (Antwerp, 1519) and republished, with some changes, probably authorial, by Lazare Schürer (Séléstat, 1520).

After the death of Croy in 1521 and the dedication of his commentary on Augustine's *City of God* to Henry VIII in 1522, Vives spent parts of the following six years in England. His *De consultatione*, a treatise on deliberative oratory and the giving of advice, is dated from Oxford in 1523, where he was appointed University Lecturer in Rhetoric at Corpus Christi College.<sup>6</sup> This is dedicated to Louis de Præet, Charles V's ambassador, who was at Oxford at the time. In contrast to some of his later works Vives here gives most attention to invention, saying relatively little about either disposition or style. For Vives the person preparing a deliberative speech must concentrate above all on the people

---

<sup>5</sup> There are modern editions with translation and commentary by Fantazzi (Leiden, 1979), and Guerlac (Dordrecht, 1979). Vasoli makes the most important comments on Vives's indebtedness to Valla, *La dialettica*, pp. 223, 230, 233. See also Peter Mack, *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic* (Leiden, 1993), pp. 314–19.

<sup>6</sup> Foster Watson, *Vives on Education* (Cambridge, 1913, repr. Totowa, 1971), p. lxvii. On this work more generally see Marc van der Poel, "Observations on J.L. Vives's Theory of Deliberative Oratory in *De consultatione*," in Alexander Dalzell, Charles Fantazzi and Richard J. Schoeck, eds. *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Torontonensis* (Binghamton, 1991), pp. 803–10.

being advised, the person of the speaker, the other advisors, the subject, the place, the time and the state of affairs.<sup>7</sup> The speaker must keep all these elements in mind simultaneously. Vives provides categories for analysing some of these features. He lays great stress on the speaker's need to present himself as honest and wise. He analyses arguments from what is good and what is useful, arguing that the good (and particularly what religion requires) must always take precedence. In contrast to his later comments in *De causis corruptarum artium*, Vives here acknowledges the traditional division of rhetoric, giving most space to invention but adding sections on disposition (258–60) and style (261–2). Although the work draws on treatments of deliberative oratory found in established textbooks, such as Cicero's *De inventione* and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, the main emphases are original. Vives gives the impression of writing a treatise on deliberative oratory on the basis of thinking about first principles and of his own experience. Although it was written in 1523, *De consultatione* was published only to accompany two reprintings of Vives's *De ratione dicendi* (Louvain, 1533 and Basel, 1537).

Most of Vives's publications date from the 1530s when he had returned to Bruges, having lost the patronage of Henry VIII and Queen Catherine in the course of the royal divorce proceedings. The twenty books of *De disciplinis*, which he dedicated to John III of Portugal in 1531, comprise seven distinct treatises, of which two are partly concerned with rhetoric and dialectic and four entirely devoted to parts of dialectic. *De disciplinis* was printed five times in the sixteenth century (Antwerp 1531, Cologne, 1531, 1532, 1536 and Lyon, 1551) and three times in the seventeenth (London, 1612 (2) and Leiden, 1636). *De causis corruptarum artium* in seven books presents itself as an establishment of new foundations, subjecting classical (and medieval) doctrines to criticism so as to establish a basis from which to move forward. Vives attractively presents his criticism as part of the collaborative process of reaching truth, by sifting the ideas of others and trying to develop what seems to be correct. He invites later scholars to subject his own work to the same process of constructive criticism.<sup>8</sup> Book four is devoted to rhetoric, in which he finds fault with several of the doctrines which had dictated the structure of received accounts of

---

<sup>7</sup> Many of the issues which Vives develops in this treatise are raised in Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 3.8.

<sup>8</sup> Majansius, 6, p. 7.

the subject. As with several subjects he believes that errors have been caused by the failure to state the aims and limits of the discipline correctly. Rhetoric should not be regarded as comprising five skills since, for example, invention belongs to the mind in general or to dialectic, memory to psychology. The special domain of rhetoric is the doctrine of style. Furthermore the ancients have erred in restricting rhetoric to three genres of speech (judicial, deliberative and epideictic) when in reality there are many more. Vives also finds artificially restrictive the classical rhetorical analysis of style into three levels, preferring to speak of many different levels of style. He also criticizes the manner in which imitation has been taught, in particular by the hard-line Ciceronians.<sup>9</sup> His third book finds that dialectic, too, has been incorrectly delimited. For him dialectic is concerned with finding arguments (part of which belongs to practical wisdom as much as to dialectic) and judging their strength. The subject-matter of both Aristotle's *Categories* and his *Posterior Analytics* belongs to metaphysics rather than to dialectic. The benefit of Aristotle's teaching would be carried by simplified versions of parts of *De interpretatione* (parts of which belong to grammar and theology), *Prior Analytics* (for the syllogism) and *Topica*. He expresses his anxieties about the way in which disputation has become an arena for argumentative trickery rather than a way of seeking out truth. He argues that many of the un-necessary technicalities of recent dialectic (some of which he repeats from *Adversus pseudodialecticos*) are the consequence of devoting too much study time to dialectic, which he regards (following Valla) as a simple and straightforward subject.<sup>10</sup>

The five books of *De tradendis disciplinis* set out a theory of education.<sup>11</sup> In book IV, parts of chapters one and two are devoted to dialectic, chapter three to rhetoric and chapter four to imitation. The aim of dialectic is to test truth and falsehood in simple and complex propositions.<sup>12</sup> The art consists of definitions of key terms, simple and complex propositions and formulae for proof.<sup>13</sup> To this very simple outline of the

<sup>9</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 152–80.

<sup>10</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 110–51, Lorenzo Valla, *Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae*, ed. Gianni Zippel, 2 vols (Padua, 1982), pp. 175, 177, 447, 448.

<sup>11</sup> Foster Watson, *Vives on Education*, provides a translation of *De tradendis disciplinis* with a useful historical introduction.

<sup>12</sup> Ratio examinandi instrumentum veri et falsi per enuntiata simplicia et composita, quae censura veri nuncupatur. Majansius, 6, p. 345.

<sup>13</sup> Primum ea vocabula explicabuntur, quae huius tractationis sunt propria, hinc de simplicibus effatis, tum de compositis, postremo loco de argumentationum formulis;

critical part of dialectic Vives adds brief comments on an unfeasibly long reading list.<sup>14</sup> The second part of dialectic is the searching out of evidence, in other words, the topics. Vives here suggests Cicero's *Topica*, "to which I prefer the *Dialectica* of Rudolph Agricola, most eloquently expounded in three sections",<sup>15</sup> before adding Boethius's *De differentiis topicis*, the fifth book of Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, Cicero's *De inventione* with Victorinus's commentary and Aristotle's *Topica*. This is the right booklist to show comprehensive knowledge of the subject but it is not practical as a selection of reading for students. The section concludes with recommendations for practising topical invention which are based on Agricola.<sup>16</sup> Vives also proposes a reform of the practice of disputation. In place of a showcase for the display of rather dubious dialectical skill he wants it to return to being an examination of contrasting viewpoints which aims at establishing the truth.<sup>17</sup> Turning to rhetoric, Vives emphasizes its power and the importance of equipping morally educated people with rhetorical skills. The aims of rhetoric are to teach, to persuade and to move. Rhetoric teaches the way in which words may be fashioned for those purposes. The speaker must attend to his own character, the feelings of the audience addressed and the nature of the subject in order to work out which verbal patterns will be effective in each case.<sup>18</sup> The brief discussion concludes with another reading list. He aims to alleviate the excesses of imitation and provides a long list of writers worthy of imitation.<sup>19</sup>

The short treatises which follow the two principal sections of *De disciplinis* offer humanist approaches to some particular aspects of the traditional syllabus of dialectic. Rather than engage with the predicables and categories, *De explanatione cuiusque essentiae* offers an account of definition, analysing the reasons for giving a definition and the elements (such as genus, property, differentia, etymology, metaphor and comparison) from which different types of definition are composed. Vives quotes

---

eaque dialectica *kritike* nominatur, id est, de iudicio argumentationis. Majansius, 6, p. 346.

<sup>14</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 346–7.

<sup>15</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 354–6 "aut quod malim Rodolphi Agricolae dialecticam voluminibus tribus facundissime et ingeniosissime expositam" (p. 355).

<sup>16</sup> Majansius, 6, p. 356, Agricola, *De inventione dialectica* (Cologne, 1539; repr. Nieuwkoop, 1967), pp. 362–72.

<sup>17</sup> Majansius, 6, p. 346.

<sup>18</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 357–60.

<sup>19</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 361–66.



at length Agricola's description of a step by step construction of a definition of law.<sup>20</sup> Following Agricola's example, Vives concludes with a discussion of the laws of definition and of the force and usefulness of a good definition.

*De censura veri* provides a thorough but humanist-inflected account of the key doctrines concerning the understanding of terms, the nature of the proposition and the syllogism, taken from Aristotle's *De interpretatione* and *Prior Analytics*. He begins by distinguishing dialectic from other disciplines. The instrument for examining the truth of propositions must be adapted to the individual disciplines and has no subject-matter of its own, unless it be the examination of probability. It has two aspects, examining how well something is formulated in order to express truth and how well it investigates the truth through things which are likely.<sup>21</sup> This means it has two parts, the examination of the simple elements which are incorporated in arguments and testing the ways in which these arguments are constructed. Accordingly the first and shorter part of the work is concerned with the meaning of individual words. Although Vives uses a considerable amount of Aristotelian and scholastic terminology (at one point even suggesting that Cicero had invoked *suppositio confusa* in *De finibus* 5),<sup>22</sup> the main force of this section is strongly humanist.

Therefore we will define a word which signifies as: a common sign, by which among themselves people explain to others their notions, that is to say, what they conceive in their mind. Therefore usage is the ruler of signification.<sup>23</sup>

Among the ways of signifying he discusses are ideas from Aristotle such as univocal and equivocal signification, ideas from scholastic logic, such as concrete, abstract, first and second intention and more literary preoccupations, such as metaphor and analogy. He sets out the qualities (affirmative and negative) and quantities (universal, particular,

---

<sup>20</sup> Majansius, 3, p. 134, Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 27–28.

<sup>21</sup> Instrumentum examinandae veritatis singulis disciplinarum atque artium idem accommodatur, nec ullam habet certam materiam rerum, in qua versetur, sicut nec illud alterum de quaerenda probabilitate; adhibetur enim a quoque artifice, dum in materia sua inquit quam apte enuntiatum sit ad veritatem expromendam, aut quam recte veritatem per probabilia investigarit. Majansius, 3, p. 142.

<sup>22</sup> Majansius, 3, p. 157.

<sup>23</sup> Sic ergo diffiniamus vocem significantem, ut sit communis nota, qua inter se aliqui aliis notiones suas explicant, id est, quae mente concipiunt. Itaque usus est dominus significatum. Majansius, 3, p. 143.

singular, indefinite) of the proposition and the square of contradictions between them, as in *De interpretatione*, including a short discussion of future contingents.

In the second book Vives defines argumentation as a conjunction of propositions in which one follows from the other, and in a certain way seems to arise from it and to belong with it almost through necessity.<sup>24</sup> He explains that the truth of argumentations can depend either on the words in which they are expressed or in the forms in which they are combined. Valid formal connections are more universal and generalisable than those based on particular words.<sup>25</sup> Some argumentative connections are always true, because of their nature, or causation or some strong reason, others depend on conditions and may be true only at certain times. Vives defines a series of forms of argumentation: enthymeme, epicheireme, ascent, descent, example, comparison, induction, step by step argument, sorites, dilemma and antistrophe. He gives examples of each form, usually taken from or related to classical or Christian literature. Vives's list deliberately incorporates and extends the four forms of proof taught by scholastic logicians and the ordering recalls Valla's treatment of argumentation in *Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae*. The last third of the book is devoted to the syllogism, providing a definition, an explanation and a list of the eighteen valid forms with examples. After summarising Aristotelian teaching on the reduction of the later figures of the syllogism to the first, Vives adds a more Valla-influenced section on syllogisms involving words like "always" and "never" rather than "some" and "all". He adds forms related to the syllogism, an extended syllogism using an example from Plato and syllogisms using comparatives and superlatives, with examples from Cicero. The treatise concludes with a humanist-influenced section on the invention of middle terms and a scholastic-based section on insoluble propositions (such as "this proposition is false").

Where *De censura veri* was devoted to judgement, *De instrumento probabilitatis* is concerned with invention. Vives connects the search for

<sup>24</sup> Argumentatio est connexio enuntiationum, ut prius ex posteriori sequi, et quodam modo nasci videatur, et cum eo quasi necessario cohaerere. Majansius, 3, p. 163. I think Vives must have intended to write *posterius ex priore*.

<sup>25</sup> Sed connexio haec rectae fit vel ex significatione vocum, vel ex structura pronuntiationum; illa si bona est, privatim in se bona est, non perpetuo in simili; haec vero altera quae ex constructione nascitur universalis est, ubique idem valet dummodo similis constructio sive compositio servetur, id est, similis sit nodus et ratio colligandi. Majansius, 3, p. 164.

ideas with the nature of the human mind, which he says has a natural affinity to the first principles which are as it were the seeds from which the other truths are born. From the first principles the mind discovers other truths. But the mind always questions the conclusions it reaches, which is the province of judgement. Judgement can assent to or deny a conclusion with different degrees of force. Wondering about the truth of a conclusion compels us to ask questions, which can be divided into different types. In order to resolve questions the mind must make connections between what is known and what is in doubt. Finding these connections or arguments is the role of invention. The starting points for arguments are the things which are already believed (either things we perceive with our senses or things which our emotions predispose us to believe). The arguments connecting what we believe already to what we are unsure of can be either plausible or necessary.

Therefore whoever investigates dark and uncertain things from more certain or clearer things uses the same tools of argument, like weapons, in very different kinds of subject matter; so the lawyer and the doctor, the surveyor and the orator, each aiming to explore something in his own field or art, examines essence, inherent properties, causes and effects.<sup>26</sup>

In order to make this process of investigation easier the arguments have been classified into what Aristotle and Cicero call topics. After this freshly formulated justification of topical invention, Vives provides a humanist-influenced version of the topics, using literary examples, defining the relationship specified by each topic and analysing the kinds of arguments (and their effectiveness) which can be derived from each. His list of topics and his attempt to organise them shows definite obligations to Agricola.<sup>27</sup> He gives an example of investigating “man” using all the topics. This is the exercise Agricola called topical description. Vives adds that this treasurehouse (*copia*) is valuable not only for arguing but for speaking about anything you wish. The book concludes

---

<sup>26</sup> Ergo quicunque obscuras atque incertas res ex certioribus et clarioribus investigant, eisdem argumentorum instrumentis, ac velut armis, in diversissimo materialium genere utuntur. Quippe et jurisconsultus et medicus et geometres et rhetor, aliquid in sua peritia atque arte quaesiturus, essentiam scrutatur, inhaerentia, causas, effecta. Majansius, 3, p. 86.

<sup>27</sup> Vives's topics: definition, genus, property, whole, parts, conjugates, invariants (corresponding to Agricola's adjacents), action, efficient cause, final cause, effect, eventus, subject, place, time, relatives, attributes, comparisons, examples, differences, before, after, authority, name of a thing. This list is very close to Agricola's at the outset, adding to it later on. See Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 130–50, 317.

with a discussion of the problems (and benefits) of analysing other people's use of the topics (for which Agricola gave instructions under the heading of dialectical reading) and advice on how the method works in practice.

Everything does not fit with everything else, just as we do not stuff all the letters of the alphabet into any particular word and as the letters needed for particular words cannot be specified by rules but are taught by ordinary usage, it happens the same way in the case in point, that it cannot be prescribed which topics will suit particular cases, but we must bear in mind what we want to achieve, we must know the case in every detail, and we must engage in our mind and thought everything which is involved in the question. For this reason anyone who wishes to invent material needs to be well informed about the question at issue and must master at least the main principles of the science to which the matter he is to speak about belongs. Or if it is not taken from any science he must certainly know the ordinary feeling of life, what will seem plausible, and what incongruous, to those before whom he is about to speak. Practical wisdom will help with this. Therefore for the question which has been proposed what is included in each of the terms must be inquired into through these topics, then the individual results must be compared with each other and with everything else. Familiarity will ensure that we will notice everything necessary as if at a single glance, just as we do with the letters of the alphabet.<sup>28</sup>

As in Vives's version of the topics, this practical advice is supported with examples.

*De disputatione* defines disputation as the comparison of arguments proving or disproving something.<sup>29</sup> Vives especially values internal disputation which he regards as a process of establishing the truth about

---

<sup>28</sup> Nec omnia omnibus congruunt, sicut nec litteras omnes in unumquodque verbum infarcimus; ac ut quae litterae quibus verbis necessariae sint, non queunt tradi regulae, communis usus docet, ita in hac observatione contingit, ut qui quibus causis loci congruant, praescribi non possit, videndum tamen quid velimus efficere, cognoscenda exactissime causa, et omnia quae versantur in quaestione animo et cogitatione complectenda. Quocirca oportet eum, qui inventurus est, versatum esse diligenter in praesenti quaestione, et tenere saltem generalia in ea arte de qua sumitur materia dicendi. Si non sit ex arte ulla, certe sensum communem vitae quid probabile sit iis, apud quos est dicturus, quid absonum, ad quae prudentia adiuvamur. Ergo proposita quaestione, vestigandum per sedes has quid sub utroque termino claudatur, deinde conferenda singula cum singulis et cum omnibus. Assuefactio praestabit ut uno quasi intuitu pervideamus necessaria, sicut in coniungendis litteris. Majansius, 3, pp. 119–20.

<sup>29</sup> Argumentorum ad aliquid probandum aut improbandum comparatio. Majansius, 3, p. 68.

something by weighing the force of arguments for and against.<sup>30</sup> He grounds his account of internal disputation in a discussion of the role of the different powers of the mind, arbitrating the input of the senses and necessary and plausible arguments. He makes the important point that different people will assign different degrees of strength to the same argument.<sup>31</sup> After analysing in general terms the different ways in which arguments can be faulted and the different degrees of plausibility, he examines the force and then the weakness of a series of different kinds of argumentation: example, enumeration of species, comparison, step by step arguments, sorites, dilemma, and arguments from denial of the consequent or antecedent.<sup>32</sup> Presumably the syllogism is excluded from this list (which seems to owe something to Valla's *Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae*) either because Vives thinks of it as part of necessary reasoning or because he has already described it in *De censura veri*. He concludes the first part of the treatise by insisting that some arguments can be resolved more persuasively than others.

The second part is devoted to external disputation between two speakers, which he regards as less likely to succeed in sifting out the truth because of the element of conflict and emotional involvement and because deceit can play a part.<sup>33</sup> Then he gives some practical advice aimed at improving disputation and enabling people to make better use of it (presumably since it remains an important part of university training and a requirement in order to obtain a degree). The main thing is that it should be made clear what is placed in controversy and what the disputers are arguing about. Secondly the respondent should keep his attention on the nature of the things in dispute, not allowing himself to digress on to unrelated issues or matters which look similar. The key here will be the skills of distinguishing different uses of terms and dividing and defining correctly. Participants must maintain the integrity of their judgement, not allowing it to be overcome by emotional involvement in the conflict. People who are liable to anger should not take part in disputations. Disputers should ensure that they understand the way in which their opponent understands the meaning

---

<sup>30</sup> Hactenus de tacita et vera cuiusque secum disputatione. Majansius, 3, p. 78

<sup>31</sup> Majansius, 3, pp. 68–70.

<sup>32</sup> Majansius, 3, pp. 72–77.

<sup>33</sup> Majansius, 3, p. 78.

of the words he uses and the meaning that the onlookers are likely to give them.<sup>34</sup>

After these instructions for good disputation he defines a sophist as one who is preoccupied not with reaching truth but with the impression which he makes on the audience and with the glory which he may obtain by winning the disputation. In such cases (and here Vives touches on the rules of university disputations) there are two ways of winning, either by persuading the opponent to admit that he has said something false or by getting him to contradict common opinions on some question. Vives gives advice on how to avoid being caught in traps by arguers of this type. These mainly involve scrutinizing the sophist's axioms, urging him to keep to the point, eliminating ambiguity and explaining as carefully as possible.<sup>35</sup> Although he criticizes contemporary disputations, Vives offers ways of avoiding their worst defects and, in the internal disputation, a more positive approach to sifting truth from falsehood. In addition to its appearances in *De disciplinis*, *De disputatione* was printed in Strasbourg with Caspar Rodolph's *Dialectica* in Strasbourg in 1542. The title page suggests that it was used there as a humanist version of the treatise on obligations often included in collections of medieval logic.

In 1533 Vives published what looks like a brief introductory lecture to a course on book 4 of the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the summa of classical rhetoric which was most widely used in the middle ages and the Renaissance.<sup>36</sup> Book four provided one of the most comprehensive treatments of style and, in particular, of the tropes and figures. It was commonly lectured on apart from the rest of the work, so Vives may have given these lectures either at Oxford or at Louvain. Vives's lecture consists mainly of a praise of the powers of rhetoric and an outline of the skills which the successful orator needs to cultivate. He emphasizes the speaker's need to adapt his style to the material and to arouse appropriate emotions in the audience. It is a pity that the full course of lectures has not survived.

Following on from Vives's criticism of the five skills of the orator which have traditionally underpinned the organisation of rhetoric textbooks, Vives's *De ratione dicendi*, first printed in 1533, provides a new

---

<sup>34</sup> Majansius, 3, pp. 78–79.

<sup>35</sup> Majansius, 3, pp. 79–82.

<sup>36</sup> Majansius, 2, pp. 87–89, now edited in Vives, *Early Writings*, ed. Jozef IJsewijn (Leiden, 1991), *Selected Works of J.L. Vives*, 2, pp. 130–36.

synthesis of rhetorical teaching based around style.<sup>37</sup> After discussing the aim of rhetoric, book one focuses on the elements of language, showing how words, phrases and sentences contribute to stylistic effects and including discussions of prose rhythm, amplification and *copia*, the periodic sentence and selected figures and tropes. Rejecting the traditional rhetorical analysis of style into three levels (high, middle and low), book two describes numerous different qualities of style (for example, *color, forma, affectus, faceta, gravis, habitudo, nervi, acumen, subtilitas, eruditio, iudicium*). Then Vives analyses ways of achieving four aims of rhetoric: to explain, to persuade, to move and to keep the attention. These four aims are related to the traditional three aims of rhetoric (to teach, to move and to please) with the division of teaching into explaining and persuading, following Agricola and the substitution of keeping the attention (*detinere*) for pleasing (*delectare*). Within this section Vives gives particular attention to manipulating the emotions. The third section of the book is concerned with the process of suiting language to fit subject, speaker and audience. Vives's decision to highlight a thorough consideration of decorum is one of the important original features of his book. The second book ends with a discussion of the composition of opening sections (where the relation between speaker and audience is especially important) and disposition more generally. The third book is concerned with ten genres that a sixteenth-century writer (and in particular, an educator) might attempt: description, history, persuasive narration, fables, poetic fictions, precepts of an art, paraphrase, epitome, commentary and translation. Here Vives decisively

---

<sup>37</sup> There is a good modern edition with introduction, Spanish translation and full bibliography, J.L. Vives, *Del arte de hablar*, ed. José Manuel Rodríguez Peregrina (Granada, 2000), hereafter RP. A shorter version of the introduction is José Manuel Rodríguez Peregrina, "Algunas consideraciones en torno al *De ratione dicendi* de Luis Vives," *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 45 (1996), 348–71; Emilio Hidalgo-Serna, "Die Rhetorikauffassung von Juan Luis Vives," in Vives, *De ratione dicendi*, trans. Angelika Ott (Marburg, 1993), pp. ix–xxxviii, Peter Mack, "Vives's *De ratione dicendi*: Structure, Innovations, Problems," *Rhetorica* 23 (2005), 5–92, which I sometimes adapt in what follows. I am grateful to Harvey Yunis, editor of *Rhetorica*, for permission to reuse this material. To qualify my comments in that article on the lack of influence of *De ratione dicendi*, I should like to add that six pages of Ben Jonson's *Discoveries* are based on translated extracts from it. Jonson, *Works*, viii (Oxford, 1947), pp. 620–27. Jonson mainly copied Vives's remarks on language and meaning, metaphor (621), sentence composition and short periods (623–25), the comparison between language and man, and the use of a pointed muscular style (625–27). These sections correspond to Vives Majansius, 2, pp. 93–100, 110–27 and 130–35. Jonson's copy of Vives 1555 *Opera* is in the library of St John's College Cambridge.

abandons the traditional division of rhetoric according to three kinds of speech in favour of a group of genres (some of them adapted from Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*) suitable to the conditions of sixteenth-century education. His usual approach is to define the form, to divide and describe each of its main types, to discuss the purpose and effect of the genre, to refer to examples of the genre, and to discuss its organisation and issues of language and style that arise.

Vives's book includes many of the elements which one would expect to find in a rhetoric manual (such as the figures and tropes, amplification, the periodic sentence, disposition and composition exercises), and its arrangement, moving from the elements of language, through qualities of style, consideration of the speaker's role and disposition to discussion of types of composition, has a certain logical force. The contents are no more miscellaneous than those of other rhetoric manuals. Nevertheless the structure has proved hard to follow, partly because it is so unlike the familiar structures of a rhetoric book based on the distinctions between invention, disposition and style. In its length and in the amount of new material *De ratione dicendi* must be considered Vives's major contribution to rhetoric yet it was only printed three times in the sixteenth century (Louvain, 1533, Basel, 1536–37 and Cologne, 1537).

The omission from *De ratione dicendi* of the essential humanist (and educational) genre of the letter was made good in 1534 with the publication of Vives's *De conscribendis epistolis*.<sup>38</sup> Charles Fantazzi has argued that Vives's treatise on letter-writing needs to be understood as a supplement (and in some respects a corrective) to Erasmus's more famous and more successful work of the same title.<sup>39</sup> Where Erasmus provides recipes, phrases and examples of a bewildering array of sub-genres of the letter, Vives prefers to emphasize the informality and the freedom of what can be included in a letter, provided one always keeps in mind the identity of writer and recipient and the relationship between them. Students probably need the prescriptiveness of a manual like Erasmus's before they are prepared to make use of the freedom which Vives rightly insists on. Vives follows the classical definition of a letter

<sup>38</sup> Vives, *De conscribendis epistolis*, ed. Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 1989) with an introduction and English translation; Charles Fantazzi, "Vives versus Erasmus on the Art of Letter Writing," in Toon van Houdt et al. eds., *Self-presentation and Social Identification: The Rhetoric and Pragmatics of Letter Writing in Early Modern Times* (Leuven, 2002), pp. 39–56; Pedro Martín Baños, *El arte epistolar en el Renacimiento europeo 1400–1600* (Bilbao, 2005), especially pp. 412–18.

<sup>39</sup> Charles Fantazzi, "Introduction," *De conscribendis epistolis*, p. 16.



as “speech by means of writing between people in different places” and endorses Cicero’s letter to Curio which divides letters into two classes: familiar and humourous as opposed to austere and serious.<sup>40</sup> Later he adds some more specific purposes: business letters such as letters of information, petition, recommendation, advice and admonishment and more personally, letters of consolation, reconciliation, instruction and discussion of the various arts.<sup>41</sup> Rather than being something which can be set out in a textbook the invention of material for letters requires practical wisdom, that is to say perception, memory, judgement and experience. This leads up to Vives’s principal point.

Anyone who intends to write a letter should consider who they are, who the person they are writing to is and on what subject: who we are to him and who he is in his own right.<sup>42</sup>

He provides a number of headings for analysing the persons involved (for example, strangers, acquaintances, friends, enemies, equals, different in profession or rank). Before writing we must gather together everything we know about the recipient so that we can work out how to approach him or her. With this in mind Vives suggests a number of possible ways of beginning a letter (he admits that this is the most difficult part, expecting that once the letter is underway what we want to say will become obvious to us).<sup>43</sup> Vives makes a number of suggestions for ways of presenting oneself (make it appear that you are influenced by his virtues, allude to friendship between his father and yours) depending always on the relationship between sender and receiver. He uses the case of the letter of petition, which he analyses at greater length than other types, to suggest different ways in which the writer may present himself. Later chapters are devoted to replies, formulae for addressing, opening and closing letters, the appropriate style for letters, the issue of brevity and a critical review of the letters of many famous authors. *De conscribendis epistolis* was the most successful of Vives’s manuals on rhetoric and dialectic. In the sixteenth century it was printed once on its own (Antwerp, 1534), thirteen times in a collection with Barland,

---

<sup>40</sup> Epistola est sermo absentium per litteras. Majansius, 2, p. 263. Judith Rice Henderson, “Defining the Genre of the Letter: Juan Luis Vives’s *De conscribendis epistolis*,” *Renaissance and Reformation* 19 (1983), 89–105.

<sup>41</sup> Majansius, 2, p. 264.

<sup>42</sup> Scripturus epistolam consideret quis et cui scribat et quibus de rebus, qui simus nos ad illum, qui ille in se. Majansius, 2, p. 265, trans. Fantazzi, p. 29.

<sup>43</sup> Majansius, 2, pp. 265–68.

Celtis, Hegendorff and Erasmus's *Brevissima formula* (Basel, 1536, 1539, Leipzig, 1536, Wittenberg 1536, Cologne, 1537, 1544, 1548, Zurich, 1540, 1555 and no date, Mainz 1547, Antwerp, 1565 and no place, 1552), four times with Vives's Latin language reader, *Colloquia* (Antwerp, 1540, Venice 1580, Nuremberg, 1582, Perugia, 1591), thirteen times in a collection with the letter-writing manuals of Erasmus, Celtis and Hegendorff (Basel 1545, 1549, 1555, 1561, 1567, Mainz, 1547 1550, 1556, Cologne, 1557, 1563, 1569, 1579, 1587) six times with Libanius, *Methodus conscribendi epistolarum* and other works (Basel, 1548, 1552, 1553, 1554, 1558 and no date) and six times with Brandolini's *De ratione scribendi* and other letter-writing manuals (Basel, 1549, 1565, Frankfurt, 1568, Cologne, 1573 and London, 1573).<sup>44</sup> The success of the work in going through 43 mainly northern European editions in the century was no doubt connected with the regular grammar-school expectation that pupils would be taught from a manual of letter-writing.

A different way of looking would present this whole group of works as the product of an integrated outlook, with the implication that together they form a comprehensive account of rhetoric and dialectic. On this view *De causis corruptarum artium* and *Adversus pseudodialecticos* would dig new foundations for the related verbal disciplines by criticizing their classical and medieval heritage. *De tradendis disciplinis* would provide a positive outline of the contents of linguistic education which would then be filled out by the other works. The basis for compositions in both language arts is invention, provided by Vives's Agricolan account of the topics, *De instrumento probabilitatis*. The arguments discovered through the topics must be tested and organised into appropriate forms through the exercise of judgement, represented by *De censura veri* and by Vives's account of true, internal disputation in *De disputatione*. Moving from logical argument to their expression in persuasive discourse, Vives emphasizes investigation of the speaker's self-presentation and of the nature of the audience (particularly in *De conscribendis epistolis* and *De consultatione*). Suiting language to a speech situation involves informing notions of style with ideas about decorum (as in *De ratione dicendi*). The

---

<sup>44</sup> Green and Murphy, *Renaissance Rhetoric STC*, pp. 80, 184, 270–1, 448. Charles Fantazzi points out that 54 counter-reformation Italian editions, mostly printed in combination with Vives's *Latinae linguae exercitatio*, are listed in Enrique González González and Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Los diálogos de Vives y la imprenta: Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1539–94)* (Valencia, 1999), pp. 233–64. I am not able to say how many of these editions also appear in *Renaissance Rhetoric STC*.

importance which Vives gives to the relationship between the speaker and the audience also explains why *De conscribendis epistolis* and *De ratione dicendi* give special attention to strategies for beginning speeches and letters. The former work also gives some special attention to endings. In order to compose language which will impress and move an audience the orator must master techniques of amplification and the use of the tropes and figures, which are discussed in *De ratione dicendi* and in the lectures on *Rhetorica ad Herennium* book IV, though less so in the introductory lecture which is all that survives. Finally these techniques must be put into practice in forms of expression which correspond to sixteenth century practices, not the three genres of the rhetorical tradition but ten types of humanistic writing (*De ratione dicendi*), advice giving and deliberative oratory (*De consultatione*) and letters (*De conscribendis epistolis*). A case can be made, then, that Vives's writings on rhetoric and dialectic should be considered not merely as a series of (often critical) contributions to particular parts of the existing syllabus but as constituting an original, unified and distinctively sixteenth-century account of the art of thinking and composition, articulated in a set of related moves:

Foundations (including criticism) and overview: *De causis corruptarum artium*, *Adversus pseudodialecticos*, *De tradendis disciplinis*

Invention: *De instrumento probabilitatis*

Judgement: *De censura veri*, *De disputatione*

Ethos and Audience: *De conscribendis epistolis*, *De consultatione*

Style and Decorum: *De ratione dicendi*, commentary on *Rhetorica ad Herennium* book IV (mostly lost)

Beginning and ending: *De conscribendis epistolis*, *De ratione dicendi*

Genres: 10 genres, plus letters and consultations: *De ratione dicendi*, *De conscribendis epistolis*, *De consultatione*.

In order to substantiate this account through a more detailed analysis and to provide a sample of what is most truly original and striking in Vives's approach to the advanced use of language I want to analyse some examples of Vives's contributions to rhetoric and dialectic.

So far I have written of Vives's approach to the foundations of the arts of language mainly in negative terms, as we find it in *Adversus pseudodialecticos* and *De causis corruptarum artium*, but Vives also attempts to ground his presentation of the language arts in what he regards as the fundamental conditions of human experience and in scientific

method. When Vives criticizes previous authorities he does so in the full knowledge that his work too will be subjected to criticism. Indeed he argues that the only way of making intellectual progress involves a willingness to question previous authority in order to determine what aspects can form a strong foundation for future development and what aspects need to be conceived in a new way.

I beg therefore that no one condemn me for ingratitude and rashness on this score. For I have always held that we must render the ancients our warmest thanks for not withholding from us, their successors, the results of their study and industry. If they have been mistaken in any matter we must excuse it as error due to that frailty which is part of the human lot. Moreover it is far more profitable to human learning to form a critical judgment on the writings of the great authors than to merely acquiesce in their authority... Truth stands open to all. It is not as yet taken possession of. Much of truth has been left for future generations to discover. I do not profess myself the equal of the ancients, but I bring my views into comparison with theirs. Just so much confidence should be given to my opinions as the cogency of my reasoning justifies... I do not doubt that I have often made mistakes in what I have brought forward, as is naturally the case, with anyone who tries to point out the mistakes of others, with whose minds, intellectual zeal, knowledge and experience, he cannot for a moment compare. But just as Aristotle begged for gratitude in respect of what he had discovered and pardon for what he had omitted, so I ask that my good will in the attempt to pursue the good be recognised, and that you pardon with ready good will the errors of an undertaking which is so new. No knowledge is at the same time discovered and perfected.<sup>45</sup>

Vives's understanding of the progress of human knowledge, through statement, criticism, scrutiny of the critique and restatement could hardly be phrased more attractively or humbly. He insists that the

---

<sup>45</sup> Sed rogo ne quis me idcirco vel ingritudinis vel temeritatis damnet. Nam et habendam ego illis maximam gratiam semper duxi, qui quod et solertia potuerunt exculpere non inviderunt nobis suis posteris, et si quo lapsi sunt loco ignoscendum humanae infirmitati in culpa communi. Porro de scriptis magnorum auctorum existimare multo est litteris conducibilis quam auctoritate sola acquiescere... Patet omnibus veritas. Nondum est occupata. Multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. Neque vero ipse aequari me antiquis illis postulo, sed rationes eorum comparari cum meis, ut tantum mihi habeatur fidei, quantum ratio mea eviderit... Nec dubito quin ipse sim in his quae attuli saepenumero falsus, videlicet qui lapsos esse illos contendo cum quibus ego nec ingenio nec studio neque usu et cognitione rerum ulla ex parte sum comparandus. Sed quemadmodum Aristoteles pro inventis a se reposcebat gratiam, veniam vero pro omissis, ita ego voluntatem meam oro consulatis boni, erratis autem in novo dumtaxat invento faciles benigneque ignoscatis. Nulla ars simul et inventa est et absoluta. Majansius, 6, pp. 6–7, trans. Foster Watson, *Vives: On Education*, pp. 8–10.

writings of the ancients must be analysed critically so that the collective enterprise of human learning can progress.

While recognizing the tentative and potentially correctable nature of human learning Vives also liked to ground his understanding of language in the fundamental conditions of human existence. So *De tradendis disciplinis* opens with a schematic narrative of human progress founded on God's gift to mankind of a certain kind of mind and on the consequent development of human society and knowledge.

Man has received from God a great gift, that is, a mind, and the power of inquiring into things; with which power he can behold not only the present, but also cast his gaze over the past and the future. In all this man considered the chief use of so great an instrument to be to examine all things to collect, to compare, and to roam through the universe of nature as if it were his own possession. Nevertheless man has wandered further out of the way than he has advanced in the way. If anyone looks at the steps he has accomplished and the results at which he has arrived, by themselves, they seem quite marvellous. If he compares them with what has yet to be attained he must conclude that man has scarcely put his foot beyond the threshold.<sup>46</sup>

Man's instinct for self-preservation, Vives, tells us, prompted him to make discoveries about foods and medicinal herbs, and about sources of clothing and shelter. His sense of his own helplessness led him to form family and larger social units, which in turn fostered the development of the arts of speaking and reasoning.<sup>47</sup> While the details of this moralised pre-history can seem arbitrary and fanciful, it expresses Vives's determination to understand human knowledge on the basis of the bodily realities of human existence and of the consequences of God's gift of a mind to such a creature. The opening of *De instrumento probabilitatis* seeks the roots of persuasive argument equally far back in the natural constitution of the mind.

---

<sup>46</sup> Quum ingenti Dei munere mentem et vim inquirendi homo esset nactus, qua vi non solum quae adessent aspiceret sed oculos in futura et praeterita mitteret, proprium tanti instrumenti opus esse duxit intueri omnia, colligere, componere inter se et universam hanc naturam quasi possessionem suam peragraré, tametsi evagatus est magis extra viam, quam in via progressus. Sed quae spatia confecerit et quousque pervenerit mirabile admodum fuerit, si quis per se contempletur, sin vero ad ea conferat quae non est consequutus, vix eum existimet pedem extra limen posuisse. *De tradendis disciplinis*, I, 1, Majansius, 6, p. 243, trans. Foster Watson, *Vives: On Education*, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup> Majansius, 6, pp. 243–45, Foster Watson, *Vives: On Education*, pp. 11–13.

The human mind, which is the faculty of knowing truth, has a natural affinity and friendship with the first principles and as it were seeds from which the other truths are born, which are called *anticipationes* and *informationes*, *katalepseis* by the Greeks... From these true principles gradually other truths are collected, like saplings growing from seeds, but all novelty produces wonder, which after it has remained a little while in the attention of the mind stimulates to questioning and investigating. That province is entrusted to the judgement, from which assent and acceptance is given to things judged to be true, disagreement and aversion from what is false. But there is a medium between these two when neither of them applies, which is contingency.<sup>48</sup>

In a rather similar way Vives evokes the deep foundations which provide the basis for human language in the introductory section of *De ratione dicendi*.<sup>49</sup> His approach to knowledge requires that particular elements of his account of reasoning and arguing should be anchored far back in the conditions of human existence. This provides the long chronological framework on the basis of which he can both praise and criticize the state of human learning and thereby insist on the method of close, questioning reading followed by criticism, adaptation and extension of the work that has already been done.

While he grounds his account of argumentative language in the nature of the mind which God has given to humans, he also acknowledges that all perceptions which reach the mind in order to be potentially organisable into argument pass through the senses of the body. On one hand the corruptibility of the body and its propensity for making mistakes obliges the mind to question sense data, while on the other the experience of the body conditions even that learning we do achieve. Vives attends to the connections between mind and body most directly in *De anima et vita* but the conditions of the body leave a considerable mark on his understanding of qualities of style in *De ratione dicendi*.

---

<sup>48</sup> Mens humana, quae est facultas veri cognoscendi, naturalem quandam habet cognationem atque amicitiam cum veris illis primis et tamquam seminibus, unde reliqua vera nascuntur, quae anticipationes atque informationes nominantur, a Graecis *katalepseis*... Ex principibus illis veris paulatim ad alia vera colligit, sicut ex seminibus stirpes crescunt, sed novitas omnis admirationem parit, quae postquam aliquandiu in ea subsistit mentis acies, stimulat ad quaerendum atque investigandum. Ea provincia iudicio mandatur, unde assensio sequitur eius, quod iudicatum est verum, et quasi accessio, dissensio autem et aversatio ab eo quod falsum. Est medium quiddam quum neutrum horum agit, quod contigit. Majansius, 3, p. 82.

<sup>49</sup> Majansius, 2, pp. 89–90, 93–94, RP, as in note 37, Prefacio, pp. 2–4; I, 1.

Nerves, sinews, laterals, muscles. As these parts of the body serve for strength and action, so in a speech they are identified from action and used for force and efficacy in moving minds. Therefore in this place I will begin with action and vigour. A language which has nerve and sinew has force and vigour of arguments, constructions and diction so that the meanings acquire much strength, which is helped by suitable words, whether these be used in their usual senses or metaphorically, by figures of speech and by a sentence structure which is lively and energetic and suitable for imparting strength. Nerves are often overwhelmed by flesh and fat so that they are weakened and made less fitted to their functions. In the same way, in language it often happens that extravagant vocabulary and flabbiness and a feeble, rambling composition result in ineffective speech.<sup>50</sup>

In *De consultatione* some of the same bodily qualities are listed among the categories for understanding the speaker and audience which lies at the root of the issue of giving advice.

Before everything else we have to consider who we are advising, then who we are, next who the other advisors are, and on what subject, what place, what time and the state of affairs... For every person we have to consider what comes before, what with them and what after... With them consists in soul and body and what is outside.

In the mind is sharpness of invention, firmness of memory, gifts of nature, ability to learn, judgement and things which are acquired through labour and practice, such as all arts and learnings... In the body are these things: beauty in the skin, strength or weakness in the nerves, health in the inner organs, stature in the size of the body, beauty or ugliness in proportion.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> Nervi, lacerti, latera, musculi. Hae partes corporis, ut viribus et actioni serviunt, ita in oratione ex actione censentur et ad vim atque efficacitatem movendi animorum referuntur. Quocirca et hoc eodem loco de vigore atque actione pariter praecipiam. Hinc existunt oratio nervosa et lacertosa, argumentorum et conformationum et verborum vi ac vigore, ut sensa multum obtineant roboris, quod etiam aptis verbis adiuvetur, sive ea naturalia sint, seu translata, figuris et compositione vegeta ac vibranti et ad vires exserendas apposita. Nervi obruuntur saepe carne atque arvina, ut debilitentur et ad suas functiones sint minus idonei. Sic in oratione usu evenit ut luxuries verborum et carnis redundantia et fluxa illa vagaque compositio orationem praestet invalidam. RP, 2, 25, Majansius, 2, p. 144.

<sup>51</sup> Ante omnia considerandum qui sit cui consulimus, tum qui nos, deinde qui alii consultores, et quibus de rebus, quo loco, quo tempore, ac rerum statu... Denique in unaquaque persona haec considerari debent, quae ante ipsam, quae cum ipsa quae post ipsam... cum ipsa, quae in animo, quae in corpore, quaeque extra... In animo est acumen ingenii, firmitas memoriae, dotes naturae, docilitas, iudicium, et quae industria atque usu comparantur, disciplinae et artes omnes... In corpore sunt haec, in cute forma, in nervis robor aut imbecillitas, in vitalibus valetudo utraque, in mole corporis statura, in proportionem pulchritudo aut deformitas. Majansius, 2, pp. 238–39.

This quotation also illustrates Vives's characteristic method of proceeding, moving from the large foundational elements of the speech act through definition and division to lists of categories of analysing different aspects of the situation in which a particular piece of advice must be offered. Such an introduction provides a fresh look at the question, founded on first principles, but with a diligent attempt to list all the factors which should be taken into account in deciding what to say. It can sometimes lose its focus by dealing in turn with each of a long series of headings. The general qualities of person listed above also occur in *De conscribendis epistolis*, where they are linked to the classification of letters.<sup>52</sup>

These openings emphasize Vives's sense of the way that every part of the enterprise of thinking and self-expression must be grounded in the physical and intellectual basis of human life. They also encourage us to see Vives's rhetoric and logic as part of a consistent view of intellectual endeavour grounded in his religious beliefs and his investigation of the soul. Within this structure Vives asserts a special role for plausible reasoning and invention in the acquisition of knowledge. Following Aristotle's practice he used dialectic to criticize earlier writers and establish a basis from which to proceed. Like Agricola he believed that the topics of invention represented categories of relation pre-established in the human mind. But the plausible materials discovered by invention always have to be tested using the instruments of logic and subjected to the internal disputation which winnows truth from falsehood.

While Vives's conception of the working of dialectic, with its firm basis in Aristotle and Agricola, expresses the advanced humanist consensus of the 1520s, his understanding and use of some of the individual topics is more innovative. When Vives discusses the practicalities of mediating between arguments for different kinds of good and between the good and the useful, he notes that Quintilian said that the art of writing deliberative orations depended on comparisons between things themselves and then on comparisons in relation to person, place and time.<sup>53</sup> The founding concept of *De disputatione* is the comparison between arguments for and against.<sup>54</sup> In the same work Vives finds that it is difficult to find methods to determine the exact force of arguments

---

<sup>52</sup> Majansius, 2, pp. 269–70.

<sup>53</sup> Majansius, 2, p. 251. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 3.8.33 (more a parallel than an exact source).

<sup>54</sup> Majansius, 3, p. 68.



from comparisons. But he acknowledges their importance by providing examples of effective and erroneous arguments from the topic of comparison.<sup>55</sup> The discussion of comparisons in *De instrumento probabilitatis* distinguishes between comparisons made to explain the nature of something and those which have persuasive force.

Comparisons or similitudes are partly used to express something, which belongs to the method of style and not to this work, and partly to create belief that something is or is not in a certain way, because there is nothing in nature which is not joined to something else by the bond of comparison. Moreover those things which are similar share the same nature in that respect, otherwise they would not be similar. Those things which have the same nature conform to other things in the same way to the extent that those others have the same nature. Therefore a comparison is an equal reason why this proposition fits with this object just as much as that proposition with that. Examples are sought in those things that have happened, as from histories, from those which happen, as in facts of nature or from those which we want to seem to happen or to have happened, such as fables and tales, and must be known, for instance, 'just as one sun is enough for everyone, so the one opinion of the teacher is enough for all the pupils'.<sup>56</sup>

Vives develops this point from one of his core ideas, that our logical processes depend on the sensations which we receive through the body. The general idea that accumulation of knowledge depends on comparisons is correct and important but here he may seem to place too much stress on the logical force of comparison. Some comparisons depend more on the point of view and perception of an observer than on the nature of things. Agricola's comments on the way comparisons can condition an audience to think in a particular way even though

<sup>55</sup> Majansius, 3, pp. 74–75

<sup>56</sup> Parabolae seu similitudines aliae ad declarandum rem adsumuntur, quae sunt ex ratione dicendi, non huius tractationis, aliae ad fidem faciendam ita esse quid, aut non esse, quoniam nihil est in natura quod non cum aliquo alio similitudinis nodo vinciat. Porro quae similia sunt eandem habent ea ex parte naturam, alioqui non essent similia. At quibus eadem est natura, eadem illis conveniunt, quatenus quidem natura est illis una. Itaque similitudo est par ratio cur dictum hoc tam congruat huic objecto, quam illud illi. Petuntur exempla ex iis quae contigerunt, ut historiis, aut contingunt, ut rebus naturae, vel quae videri volumus contingere aut contigisse, quod genus sunt fabulae et apologi, sciendumque est, ut quemadmodum sol unus omnibus sufficit, ita vox una praeceptoris cunctis discipulis. Majansius, 3, p. 104.

comparison of itself does not have strong logical force seem more acute here.<sup>57</sup>

In *De disputatione* Vives explains that arguments from examples derive their force from similarity. For nature gives similar effects to similar causes, similar results to similar beginnings and similar qualities. For this reason this form of proof is more appropriate when an addressee is following willingly than when he or she is challenging what is said. It teaches and shows rather than compels assent.<sup>58</sup> This account is strongly reminiscent of Agricola's comments on comparisons.<sup>59</sup> In *De consultatione* Vives discusses the effectiveness of examples and the need to adapt the examples chosen to the audience.

Examples are taken from the past and are of use in the future, so that everyone may see as if in a mirror what results certain actions have had and may expect similar outcomes from similar actions. They are also useful in exhortation as we do when we ask to what extent something seems less difficult when we know it has already been done by someone else, but the kind of examples we choose is important. For the Romans examples of barbarians had very little consequence, those of the Greeks had some weight but most forceful were examples from their own history. With us the greatest importance should be attached to the examples of Christians rather than those of pagans.<sup>60</sup>

In *De instrumento probabilitatis* Vives suggests that apart from the case of imitation (as for example in Christians imitating Christ) examples have the same force as comparisons. They are more useful as encouragement than as proof. They do not so much argue that something is the case as urge you to do something. For this reason they should be connected to arguments about equity, integrity, the useful and the suitable, which belong to deliberative oratory.<sup>61</sup> He points out that many indications which can be classified temporally as "before a thing" may be revealed

<sup>57</sup> Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 142–43, Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 161–65.

<sup>58</sup> Majansius, 3, p. 72.

<sup>59</sup> Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, p. 142.

<sup>60</sup> *Exempla a praeterito sumuntur, et in futurum proficiunt, ut tamquam in speculo cernat quisque quos exitus quaeque actiones sortiuntur, et ex similibus actibus similes eventus expectet, tum ad exhortationem, ut agamus, quatenus minus videtur difficile quod scimus iam antea esse factum ab alio, sed refert quae quibus exempla proponamus. Apud Romanos minimum valebant barbarorum exempla, aliquantum Graecorum, plurimum maiorum suorum, apud nos praecipua debent esse non gentilium sed Christianorum.* Majansius, 2, p. 254.

<sup>61</sup> Majansius, 3, p. 104.

by deeper analysis to be causes.<sup>62</sup> Vives adds a long and thoughtful analysis of the often neglected topic of argument from authority, which includes an attempt to rank the different kinds of authority, discussion of the force and problems of several examples of arguments from authority and advice on how to counter arguments from authority.<sup>63</sup> Many of Vives's observations about topics seem to result from a combination of logical and rhetorical perspectives, others reflect his questioning approach to his reading.

In contrast to his developed humanist approach to invention, Vives's account of logical judgement is generally more traditional, though he makes an important innovation in describing the role of internal disputation in examining tentative solutions and weighing up alternative answers to problems. When he turns to external disputation, he gives useful practical advice on ways to avoid becoming entangled by debating tricks.

The most important thing in every disputation is that one should know what is the subject of the disputation and what the participants are arguing about, otherwise they will argue randomly and foolishly to and fro, as we often see happen in disputations, as when one says that the heavens move, while the other tries to prove that the earth lies at rest in the middle of the universe. The next point is that the respondent should keep clearly before him the nature of all the things they are arguing about, so that he keeps his thought and the judgement of his mind away not only from separate and dissimilar issues but also from related ones, because they can create mistakes out of similarities leading to deceptions. From this need for separation arises the importance of distinguishing different meanings of words, dividing and defining correctly. Ignorance of these three skills causes great and disturbing mistakes in disputing and incoherent cries full of contention, when like blindfolded gladiators fighting hand to hand, they struggle with their eyes shut.... For this reason in order for both contenders to consider these things more clearly it is necessary to maintain the integrity of one's judgement free as far as possible from being swayed by any whirlwind of emotions, which when they are incited and aroused interfere with the reason and the faculty of judgement like smoke with the effect that the view of the truth is impeded. It is very advantageous that the mind of someone involved in an argument should not be affected by emotion... The limit of understanding of those things which are involved in argument is that you should interpret the words

---

<sup>62</sup> Majansius, 3, p. 106.

<sup>63</sup> Majansius, 3, pp. 108–13.

of your opponent accurately, in the meaning which he is accustomed to use and which the audience are accustomed to receive.<sup>64</sup>

Vives gives practical, sensible advice which connects his knowledge of the elements of dialectic with his understanding of the psychological situation of disputation. There are so many ways of going grievously wrong in argument (and my shortening of the quotation has reduced Vives's dramatisation of some of them) he seems to say that it is overwhelmingly important to stick to the basics: agree what the subject at issue is, don't be drawn into sidelines by different subjects or (even more dangerously) similar ones, keep up your skills in distinguishing meanings (avoiding ambiguity, defining and dividing), don't get too emotionally involved in the argument and try to understand what your adversary says according to that person's usual habits and according to the way the words will be understood by the audience. The severe (but also human) practicality of his approach reflects his understanding of the mind's tendency to become distracted, especially when other people are involved. Vives's knack of combining ideas taken from logic, which sometimes aims to be abstractly valid and independent of perception and emotion, with insight into the mind and human experience is also apparent in *De consultatione*, where, in considering the special topics of deliberative oratory, Vives goes as far as to observe that the categories of *utile* and *honestum* may vary according to the audience.<sup>65</sup> The psychological impact of logical form on an audience is noted in *De instrumento probabilitatis*

---

<sup>64</sup> Caput est in altercatione omni ut sciatur quid positum sit in controversia et de quo disputantes contendunt, alioqui enim temere ac ridicule multa ultro citroque jactabunt, quod passim videmus in disceptationibus contingere, ut alter aiat coelum agitari, alter conetur evincere terram in mundi medio quiescere. Proximum est ut respondens perspectam illorum omnium habeat naturam de quibus agitur, ut ea non solum a diversis atque absimilibus cogitatione ac animi iudicio sejungat, sed a conformibus etiam, quaeque ex similitudine fucum possent facere ad fraudem. Ex hac separatione nascetur, ut et distinguere ambigua et dividere et diffinire recte valeat, quorum trium ignorantia magnos in disputando et turbulentos errores affert, clamoresque absonos plenos contentionis, quum velut Andabatae qui pedem contulerunt oculis clausis dimicent... Quapropter ut haec uterque clarius pervideat conservandum est iudicium integrum minime perturbatum tempestate aliqua affectionum, quae omnes incitatae et accensae, velut fumum quendam rationi et facultati iudicandi offendent, quo veri perspicentia impeditur: utilissimum est altercando non commoveri animo... Confine intelligentiae rerum earum, quae in contentione versantur, illud est, ut adversarii verba probe intelligat quo sensu ab illo soleant dici, quo ab auditoribus accipi. Majansius, 3, pp. 78–79.

<sup>65</sup> Bonum est omne quod prodest, malum quod obest, quae ad iudicia nostra referuntur magis quam ad veritatem rerum. Majansius, 2, p. 242. The idea is developed further on p. 252.

when Vives points out that some forms of argumentation work more as impressive decoration than as logical support for a case.<sup>66</sup>

Several of Vives's most important contributions to rhetorical theory are gathered in the area of ethos and audience. In contrast to the emphasis by the classical rhetorical textbooks on the genre of the speech (from among only three) and after that on identifying and analysing the question as a prelude to devising arguments, Vives continually reminds his readers that speeches require consideration of speaker, audience, subject, place and time, as if to insist that speaker and audience are as important as subject. *De consultatione* provides original and detailed instructions for cultivating the kind of persona which will encourage people to accept your advice

In giving advice two things are of greatest strength in persuading: the reputation for uprightness and the reputation for good judgement. The latter is of greatest value in consultation, hence Hecuba's words to Ulysses, "Your authority will persuade." The same words spoken by different people do not have the same effect. Moreover prudence without justice has no value in persuasion, as Plato says, because it will be regarded as fraud and slyness. For unless we think them to be upright as well, we judge prudent people as crafty, shrewd, sly and to be avoided, and no one will entrust himself to them more readily than to a good man with weak judgement. The reputation for uprightness can most easily be obtained or sustained in two ways. First it will be obtained if you live and give advice honourably and piously, whence the old proverb: "Life persuades most of all." And there is nothing that so much averts men from persuasion than if someone's life seems to contradict their words... It will work well in place of uprightness if you are thought to love the person who asks your advice, and possibly this works even better than to be considered a good man. Nature so much dictates that our friends always seem better to us than our enemies. So all the advice you give must be adapted in such a way that you seem to look more to the advantage and affairs of the person you advise than to your own or anyone else's... The concomitant of love is at times to have greater care and solicitude for our friend's affairs than for our own. This will also help our reputation for prudence since it is a property of the prudent friend to think much of your friend's affairs and to take care of them. Cicero says that the role of the consul is to be vigilant, to think, to concentrate, always to do or say something on

---

<sup>66</sup> Si non esset nox, studeremus; sed est nox, non igitur studendum, cui argumento alio argumento est opus, nam per se imbecillum est, et ornat magis quam probat, quamvis interdum quibusdam sufficit. Majansius, 3, p. 106.

behalf of the common good. It never does any harm to make a show of caring about the subject matter of the deliberation.<sup>67</sup>

After giving a long list of categories under which to try to understand the people being advised, Vives here assigns the advisor the aim of making himself trustworthy and considering practical measures for achieving this. Here the ethical tone becomes awkward, for having said that the best way to be thought trustworthy is to live an upright life, he then describes ways of achieving the effect without this precondition. In his anxiety to present forcefully the lessons he has drawn from his observation of life and reading, Vives's original and highly practical reflections here border on the cynical, which is uncharacteristic of him. Like other textbook writers Vives finds the art of letter-writing to be a privileged space for considering the specific character of an audience.

One who sets out to write a letter should consider who he is and to whom he is writing and on what subject; who we are to him and who he is in himself. For we may be strangers or acquaintances, friends or enemies, casual or doubtful friends, or open and close ones, equal or unequal and this in many different ways: family, fortune, learning and age [Then he subdivides each of these categories]... Frequently you must apologise that you are writing as someone unacquainted, or as a casual friend, or to someone of importance or to someone whom you may think to be ill-disposed... The opening must be drawn either from yourself or from your affairs or from the recipient or his affairs, or from the subject on which you are writing... From yourself in this manner: that you have

---

<sup>67</sup> Duo sunt in consiliis potentissima ad persuadendum, opinio probitatis et opinio prudentiae. Haec maximopere in consiliis valet, unde illud Hecubae ad Ulysem: auctoritas persuadebit tua. Eadem enim a variis dicta non idem efficiunt. Porro prudentia, detracta iustitia, nihil valet ad faciendam fidem, ut inquit Plato, quippe quae fraus et astutia existimatur. Prudentes enim nisi et probos esse arbitremur, vafros, callidos, veteratores, fugiendos esse ducimus, nec est qui se illis credat facilius bono imprudenti. Existimatio probitatis duabus potissimum rebus vel paratur vel confirmatur, parabitur primum si honeste et sancte vivas ac consulas, unde vetus illud, vitam maxime persuadere, nec est quod perinde avertat homines a persuasione, quam si vitam dictis videant dissentire... In locum probitatis succedit ut amare illum credaris cui consulis, ac nescio an istud fortius sit quam credi virum bonum. Adeo natura fert ut amici nostri semper meliores nobis esse videantur quam inimici. Ita totum consilium sic temperandum est ut commoda et rem illius, qui consulit, videaris spectare non tuam vel alterius cuiusquam... Amoris comes est cura et sollicitudo rerum amici maior interdum quam nostrarum. Prodest id quoque ad opinionem prudentiae, quando hoc est prudentis amici multum de rebus amicorum cogitare et illis prospicere. Consularium est, inquit Cicero, vigilare, cogitare, adesse animo, semper aliquid pro republica aut facere aut dicere. Et in eam rem, super qua deliberatur, curam ostentare non inconveniet. Majansius, 2, pp. 245, 247. Compare Plato, *Gorgias* 459c–461b, 527. Cicero, *Philippica* 7.7.20. Compare Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 3.8.48–51.

always loved and cherished him; that you have always both thought and spoken of him in the highest terms, that you regret that you have so long remained unknown or hardly acquainted with him... From him you will say that the intelligence, writings, kindness, virtues which you have always admired in him have induced you to write to him, as in letters of conciliation.<sup>68</sup>

Here again Vives's clear division into different possible relationships between writer and recipient rapidly gives way to practical advice on strategies for making a favourable impression in each of the different circumstances. The practicality of the suggestions illustrates the possible results of the intending writer following Vives's more general advice of thinking hard about the addressee and the relationship between writer and addressee.

This concern with the people at either end of the act of communication naturally leads Vives to a special interest in emotional persuasion. This topic also connects with the interest in the place of the mind within the body in *De anima et vita*. His major rhetorical treatise, *De ratione dicendi*, includes an important section on the method of arousing emotions which draws on material from *De anima et vita*.<sup>69</sup> Vives derives the principal emotions of hope, fear, wrath and compassion from the primary impulses of love towards the good and hatred of the bad. Like Aristotle and Rudolph Agricola he argues that the emotions of particular audiences can be aroused by making logical connections between their beliefs and interests and particular aspects of the case in hand.<sup>70</sup> At the outset he describes the range of issues which have to be kept in mind in planning the emotional appeal of a speech:

---

<sup>68</sup> Scripturus epistolam consideret quis et cui scribat et quibus de rebus, qui simus nos ad illum, qui ille in se. Aut enim ignoti sumus aut noti, amici aut inimici, leviter seu dubie amici, aut aperte aut arcte, pares aut impares, et hoc variis in rebus: genere, fortunis, eruditione, aetate... Frequenter enim excusandum est quod ignotus scribas aut leviter amicus aut tanto viro aut in ei quem forsan crederis inimico esse animo... Sumendum igitur principium vel ex te aut rebus tuis, vel ex illo aut rebus eius, vel ex re ipsa de qua scribis... Ex te ad hunc fere modum: semper te amasse et coluisse illum; ubique optime et sensisse de illo et dixisse; dolere quod tam diu illi ignotus aut tenuiter notus fueris... Ab illo: ingenium, litteras, humanitatem, virtutes, quas in eo es admiratus, adduxisse te ad scribendum, ut in conciliatoriis. Majansius, 2, pp. 265–67, trans Fantazzi, pp. 29–31.

<sup>69</sup> Majansius, 2, p. 164, RP, 2.58; Vives, *De anima et vita*, lib. 3, Majansius, 3, pp. 421–520, esp. pp. 421–36, 458–63, 475–83, 502–08.

<sup>70</sup> Peter Mack, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Northern Humanist Textbooks," in Gilbert Dahan and Irène Rosier-Catach, eds. *La rhétorique d' Aristote: traditions et commentaires* (Paris, 1998), pp. 299–313.

Before everything else we must consider who we are and who are the people whose emotions we wish to arouse or placate, what is their judgement of the matter in question, what do they value greatly, what very little, which emotions are they liable to, which immune from, out of which emotions do they move easily to which others... We must put on their mindset and their whole character just so long as we are thinking about what would benefit our case and we must put ourselves in their place, that is we must consider diligently, supposing we were them, that is, if we had the same convictions about things as they do, by what means we would now be moved (or placated) in the present business. This act of imagining (*phantasia*) is wonderfully adapted for finding out what we must do.<sup>71</sup>

Vives here lays out both the main elements in the situation on which the speaker must work and the broad approach he or she should adopt. First the speaker must consider the characteristics of the audience and his or her own position in relation to them. Then in order to work out what procedure to adopt the speaker must put him or herself as far as possible in the shoes of the audience. Interestingly Vives regards this as an act of imagination.

In his discussion of arousing emotion he uses some literary examples to support his analysis.

All types of argument are useful in their own place for moving and pacifying emotions, but especially examples, because of the similarity of nature, then comparisons, images and similes which are close to the senses. In bringing about strong emotional disturbance a speech must be full of arguments drawn from different topics, for this expresses the ardor of the mind running through many ideas with wonderful speed, like a spark which is unable to remain in a single place. Macrobius in the *Saturnalia* teaches this in discussing Juno's speech in *Aeneid* 7 and later Diomedes shows the unworthiness of the death of Agamemnon, from the arguments of dignity ("This Mycenae leader of the great Greeks"), of close relations ("of an atrocious wife"), of place ("just within the threshold") and so forth.<sup>72</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> Ante omnia considerandum, qui nos simus, qui illi quos agitare volumus aut sedare, quod eorum iudicium de rebus, quibus plurimum tribuunt, quibus parum, in quos affectus sunt proclives, a quibus alieni, ex quibus in quos leviter transeant... Induenda mens illorum et totum ingenium tantisper dum quae ad rem nostram faciant excogitamus, ponamusque nos illorum loco, id est contemplemur sedulo, si nos essemus illi, hoc est si nobis ita esset de rebus persuasum atque illis, quibus tandem in praesenti negotio moveremur aut sedaremur. Haec phantasia mirifice est ad inveniendum quae opus sint conducibilis. Majansius, 2, pp. 165–66, RP, 2, 60.

<sup>72</sup> Omnia argumentorum genera ad movendum et sedandum suo loco proficiunt, sed potissimum exempla, propter similitudinem naturae, tum comparationes, imagines,



In the gentler emotions the diction can be more everyday, simpler and close to the emotion required, changeable, moderate, mild or serious. In the more excitable emotions, the metaphors can be harsh, extended, sought from far off, such as one finds in tragedy. Indignation, ridicule and contempt sometimes employ obscene words, as in satire... Words which are grand, threatening and compounded from other words suit an angry and disturbed frame of mind, as Horace says of tragedy, "bombast and words half a yard long"... A sudden outburst of emotion bears witness to a person inflamed with passion, which cannot be controlled or prevented from bursting forth: "How long will you abuse our patience, Catiline?", "Must I always be only a listener?" Frequent repetition of words or maxims can result from being overcome with emotion, which spurs on the mind and immediately after recalls it to itself, and so does not allow it to wander further. A troubled mind results in confusion and being struck dumb, as I have shown elsewhere. It is also allowable sometimes to say less than we should when we are overcome by emotion, as long as the hearer can understand what we want, otherwise we will have said nothing. It shows a great and burning emotion to question something which no one can doubt: "Do we live in darkness? What is going on here? Are we awake or asleep? Are the things which we see true or are our eyes deceived by false images?"<sup>73</sup>

Like Agricola Vives states that arguments (and in particular the topics of invention) play an important role in arousing emotions.<sup>74</sup> He con-

---

similitudines quae sunt sensibus vicinae. In effingenda perturbatione vehementi oratio debet esse plena argumentis variorum locorum, id enim exprimit ardorem animi per multa discurrentem mira celeritate, velut scintillam, quae uno aliquo in loco nequit sistere; quod Macrobius in *Saturnaliis* docet ex oratione Iunonis apud Vergilium libro septimo, et indignitatem necis Agamemnoniae Diomedes ostendit a dignitate, *Ipse Mycenaeus magnorum ductor Achivum*, a coniunctis, *Coniugis infandae*, a loco, *prima intra limina*, et quae sequuntur. Majansius, 2, p. 167, RP, 2, 63, Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 4.2.2, *Aeneid* 7.293–322; 11, 266–67.

<sup>73</sup> Dictio erit in mitibus vulgatio, simplicior et affectui suo similis, mobilis, modesta, mansueta, gravis. In concitatis translationes asperae, tractae, procul petitae, quales sunt in tragoediis. Indignatio et irrisio et contemptus recipit nonnumquam spurca vocabula, ut in satira... Congruunt irae et perturbato animo verba grandia, atrocia, composita ex multis, ut in tragoedia *ampullae et sesquipedalia verba*, sicut Horatius inquit... Subita in affectum irruptio tumentem illum testatur, nec posse regi aut contineri quin foras se proruat: *Quousque tandem abutere patientia nostra, Catilina? Semper ego auditor tantum?* Verbi aut sententiae crebra repetitio ex affectu est permoto, qui urget animum et subinde ad se revocat nec sinit evagari longius. Confusionem et obtinentiam turbatus animus parit, ut alias docui. Licet etiam minus interdum dicere quam oportet rapiente nos affectu, modo satis intelligat auditor quid velimus, alioqui nihil dixerimus. Magnum et ardentem affectum ostendit interrogatio eius rei quam nemo potest ignorare: *Vivimus in tenebris? Quid istuc est, vigilamus an dormimus? Sunt haec vera quae cernimus, an falsis imaginibus deluduntur oculi?* Majansius, 2, p. 169, RP, 2, 65; Horace, *Ars Poetica* 93 (Russell's translation); Cicero, *In Cat.* 1.1; Juvenal, *Satires* 1.1.

<sup>74</sup> Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 198–201, 378–84.

firms this point with a brief but close analysis of a passage from the *Aeneid*. When discussing the choice of words and the use of metaphor appropriate to particular emotions he cites some familiar and some constructed examples to give an indication of his general point. But in these instances he seems to be using his knowledge as an illustration rather than analysing examples to show how particular classical texts work. The impact of the example is too general to convince the reader of the correctness and richness of Vives's analysis. A detailed analysis of a more substantial example would have shown the reader more about the approach required in achieving an effect and would have contributed more to his or her understanding of the potential uses of language.<sup>75</sup>

Vives also makes major innovations in his approach to style, which he considered the principal and distinguishing concern of rhetoric. By his arrangement and approach in *De ratione dicendi* he insists that all aspects of language, sounds, words, sentences, word-patterns and larger structures contribute to style. To emphasize this he embodies his remarks on the figures of style within his account of the different resources of language. He places considerable emphasis on amplification as a means of inflecting a style, connecting his own approach to style to Erasmus's famous text-book *De copia*, and gives an especially thoughtful and penetrating account of brevity.

But just as it is part of the art to expand what one says when the situation demands, and as it were spread the sails to a following wind, in the same way it includes shortening, when the time advises it, and tightening up your speech, which has much charm, and, just as much as that earlier copiousness, decorates and enriches language. Both kinds have their own force and effectiveness in appropriate circumstances. This kind of writing has many different species. It is tight and succinct discourse when nothing at all could be taken away without a loss, as in the constructions of the Attic orator Lysias, as we are told. But all the Attic writers were concise, even if some were briefer than others, for there is gradation even in this; so, for example Aeschines is more copious in speech than Demosthenes and Aristotle surpasses all in brevity... There is another kind of brevity of language which deliberately condenses substantial meanings into few words, and as it were stuffs and crowds them in, as in what the Greeks call apophthegms, answers of the wise men and philosophers and the well-known Laconic sayings. Another kind of concision states less than

---

<sup>75</sup> See Peter Mack, "Rudolph Agricola's Reading of Literature," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 48 (1985), 23-41.

understanding requires, but the practice of speaking in that way helps the meaning and supplies what is lacking... Shortened discourse is brought about by the opposites of the techniques of extension and expansion. Synonyms should be left out and words should be used in the most suitable way, whether this is natural or metaphorical; instead of many words one should make use of few, which fittingly convey the force of what you want to say, such as "Caesar had calmly set about overthrowing the republic". Universal expressions should be used more than singulars,<sup>76</sup> the genus rather than the species... Lastly great concision of words can be achieved by allusion to history or fable... "dog in the Nile", for someone who drinks and runs away through fear; "The criticisms of a friend are aloes" that is bitter to the taste but useful; "crocodile man", for someone who runs away from those who like him but runs after his adversaries. Things which cannot exist without prior events are taken as if for the whole, from which the earlier things can be assumed, as "the fields where Troy stood", meaning that Troy has been destroyed.<sup>77</sup>

Vives's method here is to distinguish different types and effects of brevity and then give practical advice, including examples, about how to achieve these effects. Some of his distinctions are made with the

---

<sup>76</sup> To the Aristotelian logical quantities Universal ("All horses are white") and Particular ("Some horses are white") Valla, in a work which Vives certainly knew and used, adds the class of Singular ("This horse is white"). Valla, *Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae*, pp. 183–86.

<sup>77</sup> Ac quemadmodum artificii est orationem extendere, cum res postulat, et tamquam vela pandere secundo vento, ita eandem contrahere, quando admonet tempus, et orationem astringere, quod multum habet venustatis, sicut prius illud copiae, ornat et locupletat orationem; utrumque autem suas habet vires et efficaciam in sua occasione. Huius generis quam multae sunt formae. Est astricta et succincta oratio, cum nihil omnino est, quod possis demere sine iactura, qualem fuisse Lysiae Attici structuram memoriae proditum est. Sed omnes Attici fuerunt astricti, etsi alii plus aliis, nam in hoc quoque sunt gradus, ut Aeschines copiosior Demosthene; Aristoteles parsimonia hac omnes superat... Est alia oratio brevis, quae dedita opera magnas sententias in pauca verba confert, et tamquam infarcit ac constipat, qualia sunt quae a Graecis nominantur apophthegmata, reponsa philosophorum et prudentium virorum, et dicta illa Laconica. Est alia concisa quae minus exprimit quam intelligentia requirat, sed usus ita loquendi adiuvat sensum et supplet quod deest... Oratio contracta fit ac brevis contrariis modis atque extenditur et diffunditur. Parcendum synonymis, verbis utendum maxime propriis, sive ea naturalia sint, seu translata; usurpanda pro multis pauca, quae apte vim eius declarent quod volumus, ut Caesarem sobrium venisse ad evertendum rempublicam. Universalis magis ponenda quam singularis, et genus potius quam formas... Denique allusione ad historiam vel fabulam magnum fit saepe verborum compendium:... canis in Nilo, pro illo qui bibit et fugit metuens; Admonitiones amicae aloë sunt, quasi amarae gustu, sed utiles; Homo crocodilus, qui appetentes se fugit, aversantes sequitur. Posteriora quae non possunt esse sine primis velut totum quoddam sunt, a quo priora concluduntur, ut Campos, ubi Troia fuit, significat enim periisse Troiam. Majansius, 2, pp. 113–14, RP, 1, 29–30. Compare Quintilian 10.1.78, Erasmus, *Adagia* I.ix.80.

short-hand device of referring to authors or titles we are all presumed to know. He is delightfully and perceptively alert to the flattering effect on an audience of an author's implication that he can rely on them to notice allusions and to fill in context which he has not needed to spell out. He persuasively connects the advantages of brevity with the vogue for *sententiae*, axioms and proverbs as ways of conveying moral teaching. Again his wide and responsive reading evidently underlies the practical observations.

Vives supports and elaborates his rejection of the classical doctrine of three levels of style by describing a number of different kinds of style. Some of these are based on observation of the body (as we saw in his remarks on styles which have sinews, nerves or muscles), others rely on ideas of proportion or on mental qualities such as, in the example which follows, sharpness and subtlety.

A text is acute when either its words or its meanings penetrate the heart of the subject being discussed, by a sort of comparison with the human intellect which is said to be acute for this reason; for in the same way discourse which only grazes, or more properly touches, the outer surface of something is called dull or leaden. Arguments taken from the heart and nature of something make a text acute, as does that arrangement which we have said is called demonstration, because it is based on acuteness of arguments. Adjectives and epithets likewise show acuteness insofar as they comprehend or express the nature of something in a single word, as in "ill-advising hunger" and "squalid poverty",<sup>78</sup> in which the inspiration of the poets stands out, more of nature than of art. For the same reason the force and appropriateness of individual words can make a text acute; the same goes, in short, for all those expressions which require acuteness of intellect to devise or understand, when a word is used differently from the way it functions in ordinary language, for example in allegories, riddles, dense metaphors taken from recondite things, subtle questions and proverbs that cannot easily be found, like that one in Cicero, "owing a favour is not the same as owing money"<sup>79</sup> and others. The language of Quintilian is acute and that characteristic is made a distinguishing feature by St Jerome, but Aristotle easily surpasses everyone else in acuteness. Meticulous and artificial acuteness in relation to very small issues turns into nitpicking. Sophistical reasoning is a false imitation of acuteness.

In some cases subtlety reduces a thing to simplicity by close investigation and cutting away; in others it anatomizes and presents something to our eyes as if it had been cut into small parts. Seneca on the subtlety

---

<sup>78</sup> *Aeneid* 6. 276.

<sup>79</sup> Cicero, *Pro Plancio* 68. Aulus Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 1. 11.

of Porcius Latro: "Before he would begin to speak, sitting down he would propose to himself the points at issue in the *controversia* he was to declaim, which showed his great confidence. An actual speech gives many opportunities for concealment, and it will not be easily apparent if subtlety is lacking in any place, because the flow of the oration impedes the judgement of the audience and hides that of the speaker. But where the sections of the speech are listed without decoration any mistakes in order or any omissions are quite obvious." Therefore that splitting up and breaking apart of questions used to belong to subtlety, so that if it was asked "should Socrates take a wife?", it used to be debated like this: "of what importance is this to a philosopher, and to such a great philosopher? Of what use will this woman Xantippe be?" And other questions of the same type. So it is subtlety when it penetrates to the heart of the matter proposed and when with the outer shell thrown away the essence is shown properly cleaned. Another kind of subtlety is shown in appropriate, suitable and natural words, fittingly joined. If you want to speak grandly you must avoid subtlety.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>80</sup> Acuta est, cum eius vel verba, vel sensa intima rei penetrant de qua agitur, similitudine quadam humani ingenii quod ea de causa acutum dicitur; nam quod supremam modo faciem perstringit, vel attingit verius, hebes nominatur ac plumbeum: eodem modo oratio. Acutam orationem faciunt argumenta ex intima ratione ac natura rei deprompta; tum conformatio illa quam demonstrationem nominari diximus, quoniam ex argumentorum acumine oritur. Adiecta itidem seu epitheta acumen ostendunt, tamquam natura rei uno verbo sive comprehensa, sive exposita, ut *malesuada James* et *turpis egestas*; in quo poetarum eminet spiritus, naturae magis quam artis. Hac eadem de causa acutam quoque orationem reddunt vis ac proprietas singulorum verborum; denique ea omnia ad quae vel excogitanda vel intelligenda opus est ingenii acumine, ut verbum aliter quam in communi sermone positum, allegoriae, aenigmata, translationes crebrae ex reconditis rebus erutae, interrogationes argutae, sententiae, quales non facile quivis inveniatur, uti est illa apud Ciceronem: *Non idem est gratiae et pecuniae debitor*, et cetera. Quintiliani oratio acuta est, et ea nota insignitur a divo Hieronymo; sed acumine facile omnes superat Aristoteles.

Acumen circa res minutas anxium atque affectatum in argutias vertitur. Captiones sunt falsa acuminis imitatio. Subtilitas rem alias ad tenuitatem perscrutando et rescando deducit, alias discindit et quasi in particulas sectam proponit ante oculos. Seneca de subtilitate Portii Latronis: *Antequam dicere inciperet, sedens quaestiones eius quam dicturus erat, controversiae proponebat, quod summae fiducia est. Ipsa enim actio multas latebras habet, nec facile potest, si quo loco subtilitas fuerit* [modern editions of Seneca read: *defuit*], *apparere, cum orationis cursus iudicium audientis impediatur, dicentis abscondat. At ubi nuda proponuntur membra, si quid aut numero aut ordine excidit, manifestum est*. Sic ille. Itaque discissio illa et comminutio quaestionum ad subtilitatem pertinebat, ut si quaesitum esset *Sitne Socrati ducenda uxor*, ita proponebatur: *Quid philosopho, quid huic tanto, quid haec Xantippe?* Et alia in hunc modum. Tum subtilitas est, cum usque ad intimum penetratur rei propositae et reiectis corticibus nucleus ostenditur bene purgatus. Est et alia subtilitas in verbis propriis, aptis,

Vives attempts something difficult and important here. He aims to describe the impression which a reader will receive from a piece of writing in such a way that a prospective writer will understand what to aim at and which specific techniques to employ. He begins by analysing the meaning of acuteness of style, showing how the stylistic implication of the term is related to its more general meanings and uses. Acuteness may be a matter of penetrating thought or of tight sentence structure or of single words chosen so as to convey an experience with striking exactness. Vives uses literary examples and references to reading quite sparingly but they play an important role in the argument. Arguably his point would have been easier to appreciate (one feels this even more strongly with some of his more recondite qualities of style) if he had quoted a somewhat longer passage and showed in detail what made it acute, but he needed to attempt a general account of the acute style rather than guidance on imitating a specific passage. With subtlety, on the other hand, Vives focuses on divisions and arguments, providing examples which suggest both a stylistic model and a logical method.

In a few instances, for example in discussing the style associated with *gravitas* Vives evidently draws on ideas about style considered in the rhetorical tradition. Taking his discussion as a whole, though, Vives presents too many different kinds of style and does not do enough to distinguish between them or to provide practical instruction in the way to exploit them. For both these purposes more extensive analysis of literary examples would have been helpful.

Vives devotes a lengthy section in the middle of book two to *decorum*, the principle of adapting style to audience, speaker, subject-matter and situation.

Moreover every action has an agent from which and a patient towards which it sets out. The tools of rhetoric need to be adapted to suit these two. Of the tools, some are not suited to the agent, others not to the patient. Some of them scarcely suit a particular agent addressing a particular patient. The agent is the one who speaks, the patient the one who listens. The chief point of the art is said to be to ensure that what you do is appropriate, and this is the one thing that cannot be taught because this belongs not so much to the art of rhetoric as to one's whole life. For it belongs to prudence, which cannot be encompassed by rules, and to the individual factors, and which concerns itself with subjects, people,

---

naturalibus, compositione pressa. Qui magnifice volunt dicere subtilitatem effugiunt. Majansius, 2, pp. 147–48, RP, 2, 29–30; Seneca the Elder, *Controversiae* 1, Pref., 21.

places and times. But we will outline the main headings in order to give an indication so that the rest can be understood from the manner in which they are discussed. The most important point of all is to keep in mind what you are trying to achieve. If there is only one way, that must be the one you take, for example if the whole approach to the speech must be adapted only to the subject-matter, or only to the condition of the speaker or the audience, or only to the time or the place, or to some of these together. If, on the other hand, there are many ways, the most suitable must be chosen, or if they are all equally suitable, you should choose whichever you like or the one which leads most easily or best to the aim you have in view.

Therefore when we are about to speak, all the following things should be considered: the speaker, the hearer, the place, the time and the subject or the thing we are going to speak about; among these are included all the things discussed in *De instrumento probabilitatis* and *De prima philosophia*, which include numerous intricate points. But now we will review those elements which belong to the subject we are teaching at present. In the speaker, age, profession or kind of life and dignity should be considered. Under age we should consider adolescence, youth, manhood and old age... Gravity of speech does not suit an adolescent or a young man... It is not inappropriate for an adolescent to use archaic words, which suggest a reading of classical authors, difficult metaphors or those taken from remote sources, even if there is some risk involved, although this will be avoided in maxims. Grand and sonorous words are appropriate, as are all the figures and graces of language, and smooth and harmonious constructions.<sup>81</sup>

---

<sup>81</sup> Porro actio quaecunque agens habet a quo et patiens in quod proficiscitur; istis aptanda sunt instrumenta huius artis. De instrumentis quaedam sunt non congruentia agenti, quaedam non passo, nonnulla parum conveniunt huic agenti in hoc patiens. Agens est qui dicit, patiens qui audit. Caput artis dicunt esse decere quod facias, atque id unum esse quod tradi non possit, quod non tam est huius artis proprium quam vitae totius; itaque prudentiae est, quae praeceptis contineri nequit, nempe singularum rerum, quaeque spectat res, personas, loca, tempora. Sed praecipua quaedam dicemus admonendi gratia, ut ex iis quemadmodum tractanda sint cetera intelligatur. Primum omnium est ut spectet quisque quo tendat; ad quod, si una est modo via, ea est illi necessario ingrediendum, videlicet si dicendi ratio soli est materiae accommodanda, vel soli conditioni dicentis vel audientis, tempori tantummodo, vel loco, aut simul certis quibusdam; si multae sint, gradiendum per commodissimam, sin aequae omnes commodae, qualibet, aut qua se optime et facillime perventurum confidet quo destinavit.

Cum ergo dicimus haec sunt cogitanda omnia, dicens, audiens, locus, tempus et materia, seu res de quibus dicitur, in his sunt illa omnia quae exposita sunt in *Tractatu probabilitatis* et *Prima philosophia*, quae infinitos quidem habent anfractus. Verum nunc recensebimus ea potissimum quae ad institutum hoc pertinent, ut in dicente considerentur aetas, professio seu vitae genus, dignitas. In aetatis considerationem veniunt adolescens, iuvenis, vir, senex... Adolescentem atque etiam iuvenem non decet gravitas orationis... Non dedebunt iuvenem verba antiquaria, quae arguunt in eo lectionem veterum auctorum, translationes duriusculae et petitae longius atque etiam ex periculo,

Vives is evidently correct to place such a strong emphasis on achieving a fit between the speaker's words and speaker, audience, occasion and subject-matter. Classical rhetoric textbooks had tended to elide this issue by focusing on arguments suited to their three genres and assuming that within those matrices it was enough to divide audiences into favourable and unfavourable. In their defence one should add that it was advantageous to keep the textbook relatively simple and allow the subsequent analysis of existing speeches and apprenticeship to a practising orator to introduce the greater complexities of practical oratory. In responding both to a change of educational context and to his own rejection of the three genres, Vives needed to give a more thorough and general account of decorum. He is right to emphasize both the overriding importance of decorum and the great difficulty of teaching its principles. In spite of his understandable apologies the treatment offered does not really live up to the importance of the subject. The listing of the subdivisions and the helpful if miscellaneous advice on points which arise in particular cases will not really offer the reader sufficient help. Here again the better solution would seem to be to analyse in detail examples of the best practice, which might then form the basis for some general advice. Vives does discuss examples in his account of decorum, but he tends to make quite brief references in order to discuss very specific points, for example when he cites Quintilian in discussing what one should say in one's own voice and what one might attribute to others, or when he gives examples from Martial and Cicero in relation to the use of *sententiae*.<sup>82</sup>

By rejecting the three traditional genres of rhetoric, Vives obliged himself to provide descriptions of genres of writing more appropriate to the sixteenth century. In *De ratione dicendi* he described ten genres of writing practised by humanists. Some of these genres, like description, can be seen as based on the *progymnasmata* and as forming sections of larger compositions; others, like histories, commentaries and translations describe forms of writing practised by humanists which had not previously been discussed in textbooks on writing.

---

etsi hoc in sententiis vitabitur. Conveniunt verba grandia et sonora, ornant eum omnes orationis conformationes et gratiae, compositio mollior et suavior. Majansius, 2, pp. 173–75, RP, 2, 72–74.

<sup>82</sup> Majansius, 2, pp. 184–86, RP, 2, 88–89.



Therefore let us first discuss description, which is simpler and which often occurs within narrative. Its aim is to propose something to the contemplation of the mind, which when it does this so exactly that we seem to perceive it before our eye, it is called clarity or vividness, which the Greeks call *enargeia*. So clarity is nothing other than very vivid description in which the person listening is brought as it were into the presence of the thing and it is like Quintilian's comment on one of Cicero's descriptions, "someone who went inside would not have seen more",<sup>83</sup> so Aristotle appropriately called it "putting it before the eyes". Homer, whom the other poets have followed, especially Vergil, is more admirable than anyone else for the power of putting something about which he is speaking before the eyes not just through the meaning of the words but also through the sound and the connection of words, as George of Trebizond has shown with many examples. Furthermore a description does not so much depict how something is, since it cannot do this because the essence of each substance cannot be grasped with the eyes, as the adjacent qualities with which it is covered or the things taken for adjacents, as when God, who has no adjacent qualities, is described.<sup>84</sup>

Now some apparent qualities are perceived by the senses themselves, others by the mind through the senses... the description of things which fall under the senses is not at all difficult, just as it is not hard to paint what you see: an example might be man, in whom the following qualities are perceived through the eyes: colour, height, size, proportion, gait, motion, dress and adornment, for example, clothed, armed, sitting, standing.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 8.3.67 on a fragment from Cicero's lost oration *Pro Q. Gallio*.

<sup>84</sup> Adjacents in Agricola's version of the topics cover approximately the same ground as Valla's category of quality (a little expanded from Aristotle's). Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 25, 62–65; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 148, 165–66.

<sup>85</sup> Ergo de descriptione dicemus primum, quae simplicior est et saepe in narrationem incurrit. Finis eius est aliquid animo intuendum proponere, quod cum fit adeo exacte, ut prope oculis videamur id cernere, perspicuitas seu evidentia nuncupatur, a Graecis *enargeia*, ut nihil sit perspicuitas aliud quam evidentissima descriptio, in quam ceu in rem praesentem adducitur, qui audit, et quemadmodum Quintilianus de quadam Ciceronis descriptione dicit, *nihil plus videret qui intrasset*; itaque Aristoteles apposite eam nominat *pro ommaton poiein*. Hac virtute admirabilis est praeter ceteros Homerus, quem reliqui sunt poetae aemulati, et in primis Vergilius Maro, ut non solum significatione verborum rem subiiciant oculis, de qua loquuntur, sed sono ipso et compositione vocum, sicuti multis exemplis docet Georgius Trapezontius. Porro in descriptione non tam quid res sit depingitur, hoc enim fieri nequit, nam essentia cuiusque substantiae non potest oculis capi, sed quibus vestita est adiacentibus aut iis quae tamquam adiacentia sumuntur, ut cum Deus describitur, in quo nihil est omnino adiacens.

Porro adhaerentia alia cognoscuntur a sensibus, alia per sensus a mente... Eorum quae sub sensum cadunt descriptio est minime difficilis, ut non operosum pingere quae sub oculis: exemplum sit in homine, in quo ad oculos pertinent color, statura, quantitas, proportio, incessus, motus, habitus cultusque, ut vestitus, armatus, sedens, stans... Majansius, 2, pp. 198–99, RP 3.2–3.

Vives begins by explaining the reasons for analysing descriptions. Then he defines, exemplifies and explains further before establishing some headings. Before long he describes the usefulness of description in persuasion, quoting Quintilian's analysis of one of Vergil's phrases about Troy.<sup>86</sup> Then he discusses the order to follow in composing descriptions, which leads him to more examples.<sup>87</sup> He concludes with a discussion of the style appropriate to descriptions, again supported with examples.<sup>88</sup>

Vives's account of history begins by defining it as a setting out of things that have happened and as an image and mirror of things past.<sup>89</sup> Then history is divided into classes according to subjects (e.g. private matters of individual, public affairs of individual, public affairs of many, events of a people, single or multiple aspects). Those things should be told in history which help the common practice of life and are able to make its readers better (3.11). The first law of history is that it should be true. Some histories have to be true in every word; others must be true in general terms but may add words, sentences or orations to create belief or to give pleasure. History should be concerned with subjects of lasting importance. A historian should not write too long after the events or there will be nothing new to say (3.13). The historian must focus on the most significant events, which Vives regards as those which contribute most to the development of prudence and good behaviour. There is no need to relate in detail things which would be better forgotten, such as the conduct of battles. In order to increase the reader's prudence the historian should consider in detail causes, plans and things which were concealed at the time (3.14). Vives discusses different kinds of history in relation to the way events are described, the parts of a history and the order in which events should be narrated (3.15–16). He considers successful examples of digressions from Sallust and Livy and quotes Cicero's comments on history from *De oratore* 2.63 (3.17).

Historians must ensure that if they interpose judgements these should be unbiased. These are better if briefer like those in Valerius Maximus rather than longer, like those in Plutarch. If you feel constrained in

---

<sup>86</sup> Multum habent momenti descriptiones ad persuadendum, nam quae res strictae et quasi convolutae nullum sui sensum relinquunt, apertae atque evolutae acriter commovent. Majansius, 2, p. 202, RP 3.7; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 8.3.67–8.

<sup>87</sup> Majansius, 2, pp. 202–03, RP 3.8.

<sup>88</sup> Majansius, 2, pp. 203–04, RP 3.9.

<sup>89</sup> References in this paragraph and the next are to Rodríguez Peregrina's paragraph numbers, corresponding to Majansius, 2, pp. 205–12, RP 3.11–22.

expressing a judgement openly, then express it figuratively or put it into the mouth of another character (3.18). Historians should not overuse metaphors. Their style must be fluent. A slightly old-fashioned flavour may be best. The style must be varied and capable of including speeches and dialogue. Avoid amplification and (following Sallust) attempt to suit the words to the events. Avoid repetition (3.19–21). Vives concludes with a lengthy quotation about Livy from John Bishop of Aleria, which summarises the stylistic and ethical virtues of a good history (3.22).

Vives's comments show thorough knowledge of a wide range of classical historians. His comments on the ethical value of history, while conventional in some respects, show how far he thinks historians should go in selecting their material. Vives cites the most important classical authorities but also makes interesting comments of his own on the stylistic devices appropriate to history. His opposition to the history of war is particularly striking. But the really perceptive comments are relatively few, mixed in among a good deal of summarising and classifying of received ideas. The section offers the reader little practical help in writing history and only quite general categories for analysing histories. Vives's discussion of fables is much briefer and can be quoted in full.

Fables are made-up exemplary stories for conduct of life, which were devised to encourage virtue and deter from vice, at any rate to do or not do something; without this purpose they would be vain and superfluous, since they are told not on their own account but for the sake of the example we take from them. In these we give words either to man alone, which sub-type the Greeks call *logikos*, as in "the farmer ordered his sons to carry a bundle of twigs", or to dumb things alone, for example to an eagle or an olive-tree, which sub-type the Greeks call *ethikos*, or to man and dumb creatures, which is the mixed type, for example to a man and a snake or to a man and a dog. Once there were many species of fables, as Aphthonius tells us: Sybaritic, Cyprian, Cilician and Aesopian, from the names of those who composed them, but now they are all attributed to Aesop. This form of narrative is not concerned with truth but still it ought to achieve a degree of verisimilitude to the point where, having considered the nature and character of the thing to be discussed the speakers give it a language suited to it both in meanings and in words. The lion and the eagle should speak proudly, regally, angrily and magnificently, with splendid and brilliant words; a fox should speak cleverly, craftily, turning everything to its own advantage; a hare timorously; an ass ignorantly, coldly and dully; a bee and an ant prudently, energetically, sparingly, so that frugality should appear even in their speech; an oak solidly; a reed lightly; to sum up they should speak in such a way that it would be credible that they would speak if they were to receive language as a gift from some divinity.

There should be gaiety and ease in the narration, and simplicity in the language, nothing difficult, nothing affected, but pure language, as Quintilian says, with nothing extending itself above the mean, even though I want a distinction between speakers to be observed so that the fox should speak more carefully than the ass, the lion more brilliantly than the ant, still everything must be within the limits of the middle style or rather below the middle. Everything, or at least the main things, should be said for the sake of the target the fable aims at, that is what we mean to convey by it. This is often stated explicitly. If it comes first it is called the *promythion*, that is the pre-narrative; if it comes after it is called the *epimythion*, or the post-fable. Sometimes it is left out altogether and left to be inferred by each person's mind. This is more weighty as when Menenius Agrippa spoke of the conspiracy of the parts of the body against the idleness of the stomach, Demosthenes of the agreement between the foxes and the shepherds once the dogs had been betrayed (when Philip demanded orators) and Themistocles of the fleas besieging the dog's wounds, when a change in the magistrates was being debated. You won't always find a historical narrative which suits your purpose; then it will be easy to make up a fable. Therefore it is a good idea to keep them in practice, for they have much charm and effectiveness in the right place.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> Apologi conficta exempla sunt in usum vitae, qui ad suadendam virtutem, ad dissuadendum vitium, ad aliquid denique agendum aut non agendum, sunt reperti, alioqui vani sunt et superflui, quippe non narrantur propter se ipsos, sed propter exemplum quod nos sumamus. In his sermonem damus aut homini soli, quod genus a Graecis dicitur *logikon*, velut cum *agricola filios suos afferre fascem virgarum iussit*; vel mutis solis, ut aquilae aut oleae, hoc est *ethikon*; vel homini et muto, quod *mikton*, sicut homini et serpenti, homini et cani. Apologorum olim multae fuerunt species, sicut Aphthonius tradit: Sybariticus, Cyprius, Cilicianus, Aesopius ab inventoribus, omnes vero in Aesopium concessere. Narratio haec veritatem non spectat, et tamen verisimilitudinem hactenus debet obtinere, ut considerata rei quam inducit loquentem natura atque ingenio, congruentem ei attribuat et sentiis et verbis sermonem: leo et aquila superbe, regaliter, iracunde loquentur, ac magnifice, verbis amplioribus et nitidioribus; vulpes callide, versute, omnia ad utilitatem suam referens; lepus meticulose; asinus imperite, frigide, stolidè; apes et formicae prudenter, gnaviter, parce, ut etiam in oratione appareat frugalitas; quercus solide; arundo leviter; denique sic loquantur, quemadmodum credibile est ea locutura, si beneficio aliquo numinis sermonem acciperent.

Debet esse in narratione festivitas et facilitas, tum simplicitas in verbis, nihil molestum, nihil affectum, sed purus sermo, ut Quintilianus inquit, et nihil se supra modum extollens, quamvis ego differentiam velim servatam loquentium, ut accuratius loquatur vulpes quam asinus et illustrius leo quam formica, omnia vero intra mediocritatem, seu potius sub mediocritate. Quaecumque dicentur aut certe praecipua ad scopum dirigentur quo fabella pertinet, id est, quod per eam velimus significari. Id vero nonnumquam exprimitur, et si praeponatur dicitur *promythion*, id est, praefabulatio; si posponatur, *epimythion*, id est, affabulatio. Est cum prorsum omittitur et animo cuiusque relinquitur coniectandum, quod est maioris gravitatis, ut fecerunt Menenius Agrippa de membris corporis in otiosum ventrem coniurantibus; et Demosthenes de concordia luporum et pastorum traditis canibus, cum Philippus oratores posceret; et Themistocles de muscis obsidentibus ulcus canis, cum de mutandis magistratibus ageretur. Res gestas quae ad

Vives begins methodically with a definition, a division into types and a historical note. Then he distinguishes the approach in the fable from the other types of narrative he has been describing. The surface narrative of a fable does not need to be true but it must have a particular kind of plausibility. The long list of carefully chosen qualities which should be recognizable in portrayals of different animals reveals Vives's love of the genre and refer to his and the reader's shared knowledge of particular fables. The last line of the first paragraph allusively associates the beast fable with miracles and with Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. The second paragraph gives practical advice, about the style to adopt, about the different ways of presenting the moral (with reference to telling examples from history and oratory) and about the use and effect of the fable. The fable had also been the first of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*. Vives borrows the divisions of fable and the historical note from Aphthonius.<sup>91</sup> He uses Aphthonius for the distinction between *promythion* and *epimythion* but he adds the comment on the weighty effect of leaving the moral for the audience to deduce. The examples of fables used by Menenius, Demosthenes and Themistocles appear in Lorichius's commentary on Aphthonius and Vives probably took them from there.<sup>92</sup> The definition, the discussion on the kind of verisimilitude, the examples from animal fables, the comments on style and the clear and suggestive arrangement of the whole are Vives's own.

Vives's comments on the precepts of an art and commentary are sensible and practical but brief. On commentary Vives begins by dis-

---

propositum tuum faciant non semper invenies: apologos facile erit confingere. Itaque conservandus est eorum usus, nam habent suo loco plurimum iucunditatis ac virium. Majansius, 2, pp. 215–16, RP, 3.26–7; Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 23, Livy 2.32.8–12. Erasmus, *De copia, Opera omnia* (Leiden, 1703), I, 98E attributes the story of the fleas to Themistocles but Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1393b23–94a2 gave it to Aesop. See Thomas Wilson, *The Art of Rhetoric*, ed. Peter Medine (University Park, 1994), pp. 222, 293.

<sup>91</sup> Aphthonius's account, in Lorichius's Latin translation: *Fabula traxit a poetis originem, qua rhetores etiam communiter utuntur, quod admonitionibus sit idonea et erudiendis imperitiis apta. Est autem fabula sermo falsus veritatem effingens. Varias sortitur appellationes, nam modo Sybaritica, modo Cilix, modo Cypria dicitur, receptis pro inventorum varietate nominibus. Obtinuit tamen ac evicit, ut potius Aesopica vocaretur, quod Aesopus omnium optime fabulas conscripserit. Sunt autem fabularum aliae rationales, aliae morales, quae ratione carentium morem imitantur, mixtae in quibus utrumque rationale et irrationale iunguntur. Quod si admonitum, cuius causa fabula inventa est, praeposueris, *promythion*, id est, ut ita dixerim, praefabulare; si vero postposueris, *epimythion*, hoc est, adfabulationem appellabis. Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata* (London, 1575), sig. A1r–v, STC 700.3.*

<sup>92</sup> Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata*, sigs A2v–3r.

tinguishing between commentaries and glosses on single words. Among true commentaries the more complex ones inquire into and explain the thought of the author and must be regarded almost as works on their own account (3.50). Where the text is obscure the commentary may include the author's source or summarise the views of other commentators. Commentators are advised to avoid long disputations or unnecessary importation of material from other disciplines (the mention of Augustus in Luke's gospel should not require the commentator to retell the history of his war with Antony). The commentator should observe moderation and take from other subjects only what is useful and illuminating. The style should suit the subject-matter (3.51). Simpler commentaries may be no more than brief marginal notes to assist the reader in grasping the structure of the text and remembering it (3.52).

Vives devoted separate treatises to two other important sixteenth-century genres, letter-writing, perhaps the most practised of all, and advice giving. He never wrote about sermons, but he may have considered this to be the province of the clergy. His letter-writing manual is full of experienced practical advice. Here on the letter of petition:

If we make a request it must be for something good or something indifferent, because a good man should neither ask for nor grant something bad. I consider as good things: advice, friendship, admonition, instruction; as indifferent and neutral things: money, favour, assistance for ourselves or our friends. There should always be a certain modesty in making a request (since the person who asks for something puts himself in an inferior position) but it will be greater or lesser according to the persons and things requested. We shall ask for a good thing rather freely and confidently, as long as there is no element of insolence or imperiousness, as if you were commanding rather than asking, which Cicero criticizes in Brutus. You will show why you are making a request and why from this person particularly. For if there is no reason for asking it will seem insolent or arrogant or foolish and unnecessary, as if an old woman or a wagon-driver were to ask a theologian to explain the mystery of the Trinity, as it is expounded by Augustine or Hilary... [the approach will depend on the closeness of the relationship] But if the addressee is more of a stranger and not such a friend, you must show why you are worthy of receiving anything. From yourself, because you are friendly towards him or have always liked him or because you have preferred to ask him rather than anyone else; you prefer to owe this favour to him rather than to anyone else because you like him so much or because of his uprightness; or because already owing him much you prefer to owe him more, which is more gentlemanly, as Cicero says. Or since it is always serious to be in debt you prefer to be indebted to good men rather than to the unworthy, because in that way

the debt is made lighter; or if you have ever done him any favours you may allude to them, lightly and sparingly without any hint of reproach. Show how obliged you will be to him, how you will always be grateful, how you will always be on the lookout to repay the favour if you are able to; that since you have never been accustomed to be ungrateful for small favours and obligations, you are even less likely to neglect such a large favour given at such an important time, for the gratitude of a suppliant strongly calls forth the generosity of the giver.<sup>93</sup>

Vives sets out the kinds of things to ask for and the manner in which to ask. In particular the writer must explain why he or she makes this particular request and to this particular person. Vives gives most attention to the different approaches one might make depending on the addressee, even suggesting lines of argument or phrases which might be employed. Erasmus had devoted several pages of his *De conscribendis epistolis* to this type of letter, starting with an outline of the main logical points (based on Servius's commentary on a passage from the *Aeneid*), dividing the petitionary letter into two classes (direct and oblique), giving a good deal of advice on ways of making an awkward request and obtaining the good will of the addressee and ending with three examples and five pages of appropriate phrases.<sup>94</sup> Where Erasmus uses definition and division to attempt analysis of the whole genre, Vives

---

<sup>93</sup> Si petimus, aut rem honestam aut mediam, nam turpem nec decet bonum virum petere nec petitam concedere; honestam voco consilium, amicitiam, admonitionem, institutionem; mediam vero et quasi neutram, pecuniam, favorem, adiumentum pro nobis aut amicis. Adsit in petitione omni pudor (nam inferiorem se facit quisquis rogat), sed in aliis rebus et apud alios maior aut minor. Rem honestam liberius petemus et audacius, modo ne admisceatur impudentia et velut imperiositas quaedam, tamquam non roges, sed imperes, quod in Bruto culpat M. Tullius. Ostendes cur petas, cur ab eo potissimum; nam si causa non sit petendi, videtur res insolens aut arrogans aut inepta et supervacanea petere, velut si vetula aut auriga a magno theologo roget explicari sibi mysterium Trinitatis, ut ab Augustino traditur vel Hilario... Sin alienior sit et non adeo familiaris, ostende aliquid cur dignus sis qui impetres. Ex te, quoniam amicus aut quod amasti semper aut ad illum maluisti accurrere quam ad alium quemvis; cui mavis vel quod tantum amas vel ob eius probitatem debere hoc tantum beneficium quam ulli alteri; vel quod plurimum ei debes, ideo plus velis debere, quod est ingenui (sicut Cicero ait) animi. Aut quoniam debere omnia grave est, malle te bonis debere quam indignis, ita enim fit levius; aut si in eum tua ulla exstant beneficia, leviter admoneas et parce, citra exprobrationem. Declara quantum te devincit, quantam habiturus sis semper gratiam, quomodo observaturus semper tempus ut remunereris si qua possis; non solere te ingratum esse vel minimis beneficiis aut officiis, quanto minus futurum in hoc tanto aut tali tempore, nam petentis gratitudo vehementer elicit dantis benignitatem. Majansius, 2, pp. 271–73, trans. Fantazzi, pp. 41–45.

<sup>94</sup> Erasmus, "De conscribendis epistolis," ed. Jean-Claude Margolin, *Opera omnia Des. Erasmi Roterodami ASD I-2* (Amsterdam, 1971), pp. 465–75.

seems to cut more directly to the practical issues: only certain kinds of things can be asked for, only some of the approaches are appropriate. Erasmus and Vives agree most strongly on the advantage of promising gratitude and reciprocation. Here Vives comes across as thoughtful and practical, perhaps because, as Fantazzi has suggested, he could rely on his readers' prior knowledge of Erasmus's divisions. Equally thoughtful and practical is Vives's advice on replying to letters received.

Two things above all must be considered in replying: what was written by the person to whom we are replying and in what frame of mind. For bad or less good things can be present within a good intention. In that case the seasoning is of the kind that will easily sweeten the bitterness of the content; his intention will be praised and we will excuse the content in view of the intention, and say that nothing could perturb us which comes from such a source, that is to say from a good intention... If the content of the letter is to our advantage, we shall express thanks and acknowledge the role of a friend and a wise counsellor. If it seems to be in his interest to speak also about ourselves, let it be done very sparingly and moderately... An invective and abusive letter should either receive no response at all, or not immediately upon its receipt. But after your agitation has subsided and the ardour of your excitement has cooled down, then you must ponder the substance of the reproof and what occasions it. If the reproach is deserved, not only is pardon ready at hand for one who confesses and acknowledges a wrong-doing but praise as well, since he could have defended himself. But if it is undeserved, great approval is won by moderation, that when bitten you do not bite back. It is permissible to give a reasoned explanation of why you did or said certain things, but you will let all insulting remarks pass by... In answering it is most natural and convenient approach to follow the order of the person to whom we are responding. But sometimes it is expedient to deal first with matters without which the letter could not proceed and many words would be uttered in vain, because such matters stand in the way and must be removed at the start. For example, if one is accused of ingratitude or arrogance at the end or in the middle of the letter, this must be answered before all else, unless perhaps the charge can be mitigated more easily by replying to other matters, for example [gives an invented reproach and reply].<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> Duo sunt in respondendo spectanda potissimum: quae scripta sunt ab eo cui respondemus et quo animo. Possunt enim res esse malae aut parum rectae in animo bono. Tum condimentum est eiusmodi ut facile condulcoret amaritudinem rerum; laudabitur animus, res ipsas pro illo excusabimus, nec res posse nobis molestas esse, quarum talis sit fons a quo dimanent, mente videlicet... Res si sint in nostram utilitatem, agemus gratias et agnoscemus amici partes et sapientis consultoris; si in rem illius et de nobis sit dicendum, id fiat parce omnino et modice... Invectivae et maledicae epistolae vel in totum repondendum nihil est vel non ilico ubi est reddita, sed sedata



Here Vives seems to say everything necessary (and indeed to give very good advice) clearly and succinctly. The distinction between the words used and the writer's frame of mind allows the responder to make the best of the advice he is given, while maintaining his own position without alienating a well-wisher. The advice on responses to hostile letters is both psychologically prudent (in urging delay) and charitable, in emphasizing the benefits of acknowledging faults (even when this is not strictly necessary) and of a moderate response. The explanation of the advantages of different orders in replying is clear and persuasive. Erasmus gives his advice on replies within each genre,<sup>96</sup> but here Vives seems more practical and more comprehensive.

There is no earlier example of a prominent humanist giving his views on such a wide range of forms of writing. Some of Vives's comments summarise his understanding of received views but others show practical and independent development of those ideas. It is valuable for us to have this as a record of Vives's understanding of these genres but there is little which is either strikingly original or of great assistance to the student in writing within these genres. The impression is of a clever and well-read person working through his classification and making observations as he goes.

In *De tradendis disciplinis* and *De conscribendis epistolis*, Vives provides guides to reading matter and assessments of books he has read. He assumes that his readers will want to consult other authorities and to supplement what they have learned from the manual with study and imitation of previous writers. Here are some of his comments on recent letter-writers.

Poggio is garrulous, trifling and ranting... Giovanni Pico and Angelo Poliziano are great writers; you could readily embrace and admire greatly

---

commotione illa animi et refrigerato ardore illo perturbationis, tum expendendum quid obiciatur et quibus de causis. Si merito reprehendimur, non solum parata est venia, sed laus etiam confitenti delictum et agnoscenti, cum licuisset defendere; sin immerito, magna quaeritur ex animi moderatione commendatio, quod non remorderis morsus. Dabitur ratione patefacere cur quidquam vel feceris vel dixeris; convicia vero sines praeterfluere... In respondendo promptissimum et commodissimum est ordinem eius cui respondemus sequi. Sed fit non raro ut expediat quaedam anteverti sine quibus progredi non posset epistola et frustra iactarentur multa verba, illo impedimento obiecto quod statim est amoliendum, ut si quis in calce aut medio epistolae ingratitudinis aut malevolentiae accusetur. Huic enim occurrendum est ante omnia, nisi forte ad alia facilius diluatur crimen, exempli gratia... Majansius, 2, pp. 283–85, 291, trans. Fantazzi, pp. 65–67, 85.

<sup>96</sup> E.g. Erasmus, *opera omnia*, ASD I-2, pp. 475–76, 487–88, 509.

the latter's words and you cannot help commending the former's. Pico excels in solemnity of thought and purity of diction; Poliziano attracts us by his acumen and liveliness, save that in his excessive desire for praise he rises above the confines of the letter. He is often playful and frivolous; he might also offend severe and learned men by his subject matter, because he makes ostentatious display of himself in very trivial and slight material, and he is harshly abusive towards those with whom he did not find approval... Surpassing all writers of this age and equal in talent, learning and eloquence to those who lived in the days of our fathers and grandfathers are Erasmus of Rotterdam and Guillaume Budé. Each has a varied and very distinct style, but each excels in his manner. Erasmus is natural and clear, as he is at all times, for that matter. Budé took pleasure in a new and unusual type of language which is easier to admire than to imitate.<sup>97</sup>

Vives demonstrates his breadth of reading and his skill in choosing apt epithets. No doubt there is an element of flattery in relation to Erasmus, with whom his personal relationship was sometimes strained, but otherwise he gives his readers a perceptive indication of what they might learn from reading the epistolary classics and how they might experience it.

Vives is well-read and perceptive. It's always a pleasure to turn to his thoughtful, intelligent prose. His works on argument and expression always presuppose a strong commitment to the humanist project of connecting rhetoric and dialectic. I have argued above that one could see all these works as a new and unified synthesis of the two subjects. This synthesis is based first on his understanding of the status of the mind within the body and second on the need to adapt doctrines received from antiquity to modern practice. Logical analysis is at the root of Vives's ideas about expression. At the same time his changes of emphasis within dialectic always drive the subject towards practical usefulness,

---

<sup>97</sup> Poggius garrulus, nugator et rabula... Ioannes Picus et Angelus Politianus magni; huius verba facile complexarum atque exocularum, illius non possis non probare; ille sententiarum pondere et sanctitate dictionis excellens, hic acumine et festivitate amabilis, nisi quod laudis nimia cupiditate supra epistolae limites assurgit. Ludit etiam non raro et lascivit; rebus quoque displicere posset severis et eruditione praestantibus quia multus est in materia levissima et minutissima sui ostentator, et in eos quibus non probaretur acerbè maledicus... Superant scriptores omnes aetatis huius et aequant eos qui patrum atque avorum memoria vixerunt ingenio, eruditione, facundia Erasmus Roterodamus et Gulielmus Budaeus, vario et diversissimo dicendi genere, sed uterque in suo praestans. Erasmus facilis et dilucidus, ut alias semper; G. Budaeus novo quodam atque inusitato dicendi genere est delectatus, quod sit admirari quam imitari promptius. Majansius, 2, pp. 313–14, trans. Fantazzi, pp. 135–39.

towards an awareness of the context, in the knowledge of the wider role of logic. Advice must be given and argument made in the light of considerations about speaker, audience and context. Vives rejects the formulaic nature, the display and the striving for glory, characteristic of public and university disputations. At the same time as recognizing the *de facto* status of disputation and suggesting ways of improving it, he proposes alongside them a conception of internal disputation based loosely on Plato, in which the ideas one has formulated must be tested logically and compared with other solutions to the problem. Only by argument and criticism can ideas (one's own or those of others) be improved, but all such criticism must take place in the awareness that the critic will be criticized and that human learning is a gradual, collaborative project. Everything Vives writes is explicitly grounded in a view of the whole range of human history (and an approach to human nature), starting with God's gift of a mind to an otherwise not especially well-protected or adaptable animal. This long view reminds him of what mankind has achieved but also of how many challenges remain. His understanding of the connection between body and mind leads him to emphasize both the tentative basis of knowledge derived from the senses and the pleasure which motivates curiosity and intellectual endeavour. His understanding of human history and of the mind form the basis of his theology and his social interventions as well as of his rhetoric and dialectic.

Vives is less of an innovator in dialectic than in rhetoric. He follows the humanist line of simplifying Aristotelian logic and rewriting it in neo-classical Latin. He rejects most of the medieval accretions to logic but follows Rudolph Agricola's approach to definition and the topics of invention. His thorough-going antipathy to some of the foundational distinctions of classical rhetoric obliged him to be more original. In place of the three genres of classical rhetoric he provided analysis and instructions for composing twelve genres practised by sixteenth-century writers. Since he could no longer allow rhetoric to rely on the assumptions about audience and context which went with the genres he needed to describe the principles upon which a writer could analyse his role in relation to any audience. Rejecting the five skills of the orator compelled him to reorganise rhetoric around style, which he treated as the distinguishing feature of the subject. Topical invention still had the role of devising arguments and dialectical judgement was needed to test and arrange arguments but they performed that task

under the aegis of dialectic, which always had to be combined with rhetoric. Style depended on the appropriate management of all aspects of language, from sound patterns to sentence structure, and not simply on the tropes and figures, which were, if anything, rather neglected in his books. The doctrine of the three levels of style was too restricted and arbitrary to be useful so Vives replaced it with a large group of characteristics of style which he distinguishes by their effects and by the formal features of their construction. But style must always be adapted to suit speaker, audience, subject, time and place, and Vives points the way to the method of achieving this with his substantial discussion of the principles of decorum. He also finds that since emotional manipulation belongs to the whole work rather than just to the peroration, it requires analysis on the basis of logical principles, like those presented by Aristotle and Agricola.

Novelty is always a double-edged sword for the writer of textbooks. There must be some claim of novelty in order to justify the replacement of the traditional texts, yet the divisions of time within educational institutions encourage writers to cover the expected syllabus. Authors of books or collections of books which cross or dispute established subject boundaries need to mount publicity campaigns or secure positions of power if they are to see their works widely adopted. It is no accident that the most successful of Vives's educational publications (the letter-writing manual and Latin dialogues for schools) were those which corresponded most closely to existing school textbooks. Yet even in the case of letter-writing Charles Fantazzi has observed that Vives's book works best when it is read alongside the established work in the field, Erasmus's *De conscribendis epistolis*. And indeed Vives's work was much more often published with other letter-writing manuals than on its own. A similar point could be made about the *De ratione dicendi* and the *De censura veri*. You probably need a traditional treatment of (for example) the tropes and figures and the syllogism alongside these works in order to derive the most benefit from them. It may be that what caused Vives's lack of contemporary success was partly the divergence from the expectations of an established textbook function and partly their actual dependence on prior knowledge of such textbooks. Vives's lack of experience of teaching, his encyclopaedism and his failure to provide adequate directions for the use of his texts and sufficient practical examples may also have been factors. But his textbooks' lack of success in their own day should not blind us to their many innovations

and to the wealth of reading, perceptive insights and practical thinking which they contain. It is a pity that Vives's rhetorical and dialectical works did not in general make a strong historical contribution to the collective improvement of human learning which Vives believed in so strongly.

A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE ON THE SOUL:  
*DE ANIMA ET VITA* IN THE CONTEXT OF VIVES'S OPUS\*

Valerio Del Nero

1. *De anima et vita in the Context of Vives's Opus*

The publication of the *De anima et vita* in Basel in 1538 seems to mark the philosophical highpoint of an intellectual life that was on the whole rather brief in duration but at the same time immensely productive.<sup>1</sup> An upright but difficult life both from the viewpoint of health and finances, which finds an invaluable point of reference and concrete assistance in the figure of the noblewoman Mencía de Mendoza in Breda beginning in 1537. Vives fulfills the function of cultural guide in Mencía's regard, who in her youth had passed some time in Valencia. As was his custom, the humanist, dutifully, does not abandon her in the tragic occurrence of the death of her husband, Count Henry III of Nassau, which took place in September of 1538. It was a strong bond, conditioned but not interrupted by the subsequent return of the woman to Spain, where she would contract a new marriage with Fernando de Aragona, duke of Calabria and viceroy of Valencia, a bond confirmed by the help that she will continue to bestow on Margherita Valldaura, Vives's widow, who found herself in difficult economic straits after her husband's death.<sup>2</sup> The last ten years of Vives's output is, from a quantitative standpoint, as fertile as the preceding ten years. There is no doubt, however, that from a qualitative point of view, beginning with *De disciplinis* of 1531, the texts published reveal in their totality a more dense conceptual maturity and give proof of some features of elaboration of his philosophical thought such as to offer a relatively unified and organic framework of the ultimate phase of his speculative development. I am thinking in particular of the centers of interest that

---

\* Translated into English by Charles Fantazzi.

<sup>1</sup> *Vives. Edicions Princeps*, eds. Enrique González González, Salvador Albiñana, Victor Gutiérrez Rodríguez (Valencia, 1992).

<sup>2</sup> Jan Karel Steppe, *Les relations de Mencía de Mendoza avec Jean-Louis Vivès*, in *Scrinium Erasmianum* 2, ed. Joseph Coppens (Leiden, 1969), pp. 485–506.

concern language, education and religion. These themes were already present in the preceding ten-year period, when an enormous quantity of research material had been accumulated which would soon be distilled in voluminous and exemplary treatises. It is not without reason that some aspects of linguistic and educational reflections, one of the most innovative components of the Spanish philosopher's thought, are elaborated in several writings in the 1530s, namely, from the *De disciplinis* of 1531 to the *De anima et vita* and the *Colloquia*<sup>3</sup> of 1538, after receiving a rhetorical and philosophical treatment in the *De ratione dicendi* of 1532 and the *De conscribendis epistolis* of 1534.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, texts touching on specific religious subjects like the *De animi excitatione in Deum commentatiunculae* or the *De communione rerum ad germanos inferiores* are precious repositories for understanding developments and critical stances of Vives concerning religious questions and experiences, so broadly and subtly diffused in the first half of the sixteenth century, but also important regarding particularly radical dimensions of the Protestant Reformation. Likewise the *De veritate fidei Christianae*, an apologetic work published posthumously in 1543, undoubtedly finds its original inspiration in his reflections during the last ten years of his life,<sup>5</sup> and its elaboration is necessarily interwoven with that of the *De anima et vita*. A typical example of this is the insertion in the *De veritate* of the chapter on the immortality of the soul from the *De anima et vita*.

An intertextual approach which on the level of content may explain questions raised and solutions adopted by Vives in his vast output and explore authors and texts cited or suggested by him can prove to be very fruitful in the analysis of his thought. Conceptual themes or linguistic choices can reciprocally illuminate the interpretation of his works which appeared over a period of several years. And in this regard it will be useful to keep an attentive eye on those texts which in his total output seem to perform the function of a philosophical "laboratory", beginning with his fundamental commentary on Augustine's *De civitate Dei* of 1522,<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> On the extraordinary success of this work see Enrique González González – Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Los Diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1538–1994)* (Valencia, 1999).

<sup>4</sup> Juan Luis Vives, *De conscribendis epistolis*, ed. Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 1989).

<sup>5</sup> Noteworthy reflections on the later success of Vives are to be found in the essay of Enrique González González, "La recepción de la obra de Vives durante el antiguo régimen," *Rinascimento* 38 (1998), 455–514.

<sup>6</sup> Aurelii Augustini *De civitate Dei*, Joannes Lodovicus Vives, *Commentarii in XXII libros de civitate Dei* (Basel, 1522).

up to the *De anima et vita*. The figuration of the other interests of our philosopher (religious, social, political) which is gradually substantiated in a rich production of writings, makes the originality of Vives's thought stand out all the more, a quality that is literally incomprehensible if it is abstracted from the context of European humanism. Indeed the impressive grasp of pagan and Christian culture that he exhibits is all filtered through humanistic culture, concerning which, moreover, the Valencian appears to be singularly informed and *aggiornato*. Even his evaluation (not always negative) of medieval culture is not comprehensible divorced from a humanistic mode of interpretation. Critics who have undervalued this dimension have only rarely and only in part given us an accurate description of this philosopher.<sup>7</sup>

If we return now for a moment to the environment of Breda, which probably proved to some degree intellectually stimulating for Vives, it is necessary to emphasize that it was precisely there that he penned the following writings: *In Bucolica Vergilii interpretatio...allegorica*, which was published in Basel in 1539,<sup>8</sup> the previously mentioned *Colloquia*, which saw the light of publication in the same year, and the *De anima et vita*, which appeared in Basel from the editor Robert Winter in September 1538. If we take into account that in this same year of 1538 his *De Aristotelis operibus censura* (a synthetic but stimulating analysis of the texts of the Stagirite) appeared in the works of Aristotle, published, again in Basel, by the editor Oporinus,<sup>9</sup> we can form a sufficiently clear idea of the philosophical orientation of the late Vives. Nor should it be forgotten that some important works of previous years were re-issued at the end of the 1530s, after being revised and augmented: this is the case, for example, of the *De institutione feminae Christianae* and the *De officio mariti*.

In conclusion the fundamental methodological presupposition to be borne in mind when approaching a "compact" book like the *De anima et vita* is that of mentally freeing oneself of any theory of its "being ahead of its time," which in truth has become so harmful in the field of the history of ideas. It is necessary to discern the profound vein-like

<sup>7</sup> An excellent antidote to this historiographical model is offered by the work of Enrique González González, *Juan Lluís Vives. De la escolástica al humanismo* (Valencia, 1987).

<sup>8</sup> On this work cf. Jozef IJsewijn, "Vivès et Virgile," in *Présence de Virgile*, ed. Raymond Chevallier (Paris, 1978), pp. 313–21.

<sup>9</sup> Aristoteles, *Opera*/Joannes Lodovicus Vives, *De Aristotelis operibus censura* (Basel, 1538) 2 tomes.



structure of biblical and classical origin; to take into account how this question of the soul was a central issue in the Middle Ages; but above all, to insert this text into the humanistic fabric in order to highlight, as far as possible, both the levels of dependence and those of originality.

## 2. *The Structure of De anima et vita*

The *De anima et vita* is composed of three books, each of which is divided into chapters or paragraphs distinguished by a title. At the beginning of each of these three books a chapter or paragraph without title serves as a proemium to each book.

The first book treats of the faculty of growth, generation, the senses singly and compositely, interior consciousness, and rational life, and attempts to answer the question concerning the essence of the soul. The second book treats of simple and compound intelligence, memory and recall, reason, judgment, *ingenium*, language, the act of learning, cognition and awareness, contemplation, will, the mind, sleep, dreams, habit, old age, death, and finally, the immortality of the soul. The third book is dedicated to the passions of the soul and concerns, in this order: love, desires, fondness, veneration or reverence, compassion and sympathy, happiness and joy, pleasure, laughter, offense, contempt, anger and resentment, hatred, envy, jealousy, indignation, revenge and cruelty, sadness, tears, fear, hope, shame, pride.<sup>10</sup> Certain internal quantitative differences stand out immediately, which denote in all probability the particular attention the Spanish thinker intended to reserve for some

---

<sup>10</sup> Ioannis Lodovici Vivis Valentini, *De anima et vita* (Basel, 1538); Ioannis Lodovici Vivis Valentini *De anima et vita libri III*, in Ioannis Lodovici Vivis, *Opera* (Basel, 1555), vol. 2, fols. 497–594; Juan Luis Vives, *Opera omnia*, 8 vols. ed. Gregorio Mayans y Siscar (Valencia, 1782–90), vol. 3, pp. 300–514; Ioannis Lodovici Vivis, *De anima et vita*, Latin text and Italian translation by Mario Sancipriano (Padua, 1974), pp. 88–721, not a critical edition. All citations in the text, both from *De anima et vita* and other works, unless stated otherwise, will be cited from the Mayans edition, indicated by Majansius, the Latin name of Mayans, volume number and pages. In 1543 this treatise appears together with the *De anima et vita* of Melanchthon, again in Basel in 1553. There is also added a work on the same subject by Veit Amerbach. In an edition of 1563 in Zürich the *De anima et vita* of Conrad Gesner is added. Vives and Amerbach were then reprinted in Lyons in 1555, 1596 and 1621. Cf. Enrique González González, “La recepción de la obra,” p. 486. These editions of Catholics and Protestants are naturally of interest. But apart from the fact that the relations between Vives and the Reform must be explored in all their complexity, the reception of Vives in the modern age varies according to individual works, depending on Catholic or reformed circles.

problems. This is the case, for example, in the discussion *Quid sit anima* (What is the soul) in the first book, the chapters on memory and recall, *ingenium*, the manner of learning and the immortality of the soul in the second book, and finally on love in the chapter *De utroque amore mistim* (on both loves combined) in Book III. In any case a general glance gives the reader the impression of an organic work, which never loses sight of its biblical and classical sources on the question of the soul, and is not without frequent practical observations derived from personal experience and the use of good sense and felicitous intuitions.

The whole work is preceded by a preface, a dedication to Francisco, Duke of Béjar, which offers some suggestions and a possible interpretive approach to the text. In Vives's opinion the object of research, the soul, is of absolute importance to man, and no knowledge can be better or more joyful than this because its aim is the greatest of blessings, one's salvation. If the soul is the center of man, man is the center of the universe, for which reason he has justly been called a microcosm.<sup>11</sup> The centrality and excellence of the soul stand out not only with respect to the things that have been created on earth, but even in relation to the heavens. Neither the earth nor the heavens, in fact, concentrate so much variety, harmony and beauty in themselves. It is a marvelous inventor and creator, so much so that it cannot be contemplated without admiration. Since it is the well-spring of all our blessings and all our ills, nothing is more advantageous for us than to know it well. If we will be able to cleanse this source, the rivulets of our actions will flow limpid and pure<sup>12</sup> (Vives utilizes this image of the source also to indicate the relation that exists between the mind and language). Only he who analyses himself will be able to govern his own mind effectively and consequently act well.<sup>13</sup> The motif of the centrality of the soul proceeds from an obvious primary foundation both in the sacred scriptures and in Plato and Neoplatonism,<sup>14</sup> besides the Socratic reference to self-knowledge, but in this case we can also suppose the mediation of Ficino. Vives's clear reference to the intermediate position of the soul

<sup>11</sup> "Nec immerito illud fere placuit, hominem parvum quondam mundum appellari..." Majansius, 8, p. 335.

<sup>12</sup> Ioannis Ludovici Vivis *De ratione dicendi*, Majansius, 2, p. 93.

<sup>13</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 298.

<sup>14</sup> Jean-Claude Margolin, "Vivès, lecteur et critique de Platon et d'Aristote," in *Classical Influences on European Culture A.D. 1500-1700*, ed. Robert Ralph Bolgar (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 245-58. But the relations between Vives and classical sources must be further explored.

between heaven and earth recalls on the one hand a celebrated passage in Plotinus<sup>15</sup> and on the other a fundamental theme of the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. The whole thought of the Tuscan Neoplatonic philosopher revolves around two motifs, God and the soul. The *gnōthi sauton* (know thyself) of Socrates is the foundation of a metaphysical apologetics in which, without repudiating Thomas Aquinas, but rather in close dialogue with him, Platonic thought must replace Aristotelianism in the project of a renewed relationship between theology and philosophy, in which the place and function of the soul in the universe stand out as absolutely decisive in the relation to the divinity and immortality of the soul and in relation to the love of God.<sup>16</sup> It is well known that in Ficino the ascending scale of substances rises from the body to arrive at the divinity, through *quality*,<sup>17</sup> the soul and angels, a hierarchy in which the soul finds itself in an absolutely central position, between eternal and temporal things.<sup>18</sup> This is not the only allusion to Ficino, however implicit it may be, but precisely in this regard, it is necessary to conduct a search, as it were, for the purpose of enriching our understanding of this text of Vives. Otherwise, if we confine ourselves to the explicit quotations of Ficino in this treatise, they are quite disappointing since they are very scarce and not always exact.

In a word, Vives insists, the ancient saying at Delphi must be taken literally both in the sense of the consciousness of our most concealed interior labyrinths and our own physical constitution. And here he forcefully asserts the importance of the choice of confronting the question of the soul, because recent thinkers have shown little concern for it, content with the knowledge that antiquity has left to us on this matter. Quite the reverse, they have abandoned themselves to futile and useless questions, emphasizing the tendency of ancient authors to become entangled in huge absurdities. Although it is true that this was not the case only with the soul (with a veiled reference to other disciplines, as

<sup>15</sup> Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.8.7 (the soul occupies an intermediate stage among beings, a motif which plays an important role also in Ficino).

<sup>16</sup> *Introduction à Marsile Ficin, Théologie platonicienne de l'immortalité des âmes*, ed. Raymond Marcel, 3 vols. (Paris, 1964–70), pp. 9–16.

<sup>17</sup> Quality plays an important role in the philosophy of Ficino. It is understood as a spatial extension which, joining itself to matter, determines it, establishing in this way the basic difference between a body (specific) and matter (generic). In addition, in the metaphysical hierarchy of substances, which modifies that of Plotinus, Ficino places quality, in relation to the body, in the lower half of the universe, as a necessary structural element in it.

<sup>18</sup> Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino* (Florence, 1953).

was evident in the concise critical analysis of the *De causis corruptarum artium*), nonetheless one may discover analogies with the process of the corruption of dialectic and language, which Vives had begun to analyse in an extraordinary manner in the *In pseudodialecticos* of 1519. And at this point, unexpectedly, a polemical impulse is released against those who after expressing inane reflections on what can be apprehended by the senses, wind up in a blind alley and formulate incorrect theories about the soul, whose structure does not correspond to any corporeal sense. In this case Vives explicitly contrasts the Stoics, who reduced everything to absurd cavillations, to Aristotle, who was more prudent and clever.<sup>19</sup> With an express reference to the already published *De causis corruptarum artium* and to the contemporary *De veritate fidei Christianae*, he confesses that he wishes to confront this arduous problem without following the rule of the “*lumen naturale*” (natural understanding), but on the contrary according to the criterion of truth which both on the natural and the supernatural level is single and not twofold. He thus avoids at the same time the pitfall of the discussions of the innumerable opinions about the soul, which had become labored and thorny. In particular, it is difficult to adapt traditional language to a reality like that of the soul, which demands an analysis of wider and richer scope. It is hardly necessary to mention that the problem of language accompanied Vives throughout the whole span of his philosophical speculations. The reference, however general, is still important because the Spaniard seems to wish to erect a sturdy protective barrier against the discussions about the metaphysical structure of the soul. These had originated with the interpretations of complex and controversial passages of the Aristotelian *De anima*, relative to the relation between the potential and the active intellects and to the question of the immortality or not of the individual soul, which had favored at least two interpretations (the Alexandrian and the Averroist). Beginning with those famous commentators on the Stagirite, these questions had recently re-emerged in some centers of study in the Italian peninsula, especially at the University of Padova. The same polemic against the supporters of the double truth, an imprecise and historically unsatisfactory expression, which had arisen with reference to the diffusion of Averroistic doctrines and associated with the condemnation of

---

<sup>19</sup> “Stoici molestissima loquacitate infinita deblaterarunt, dum omnia cupiunt definire, et ad subtiles redigere captiunculas. Aristoteles more suo tectus est et vafer.” Majansius, 8, pp. 298–99.

numerous theological and philosophical propositions by Bishop Tempier in 1277, seems to be related to the contemporary debate, especially to the figure of Pietro Pomponazzi. His positions on the immortality of the soul, expressed in his *De animae immortalitate* of 1516, had placed him at the center of a lively debate which had been going on for a long time and in which the church had officially intervened when in the Lateran Council of 1512 it had condemned the concept of the unity of the intellect and had upheld as dogma the belief in the immortality of the soul.<sup>20</sup> In the climate of Erasmian Christianity and the institutional crises of the Roman church, when the first radical actions of Luther erupt, the question of the soul involves the official philosophy of the universities and the schools of the religious orders, but it has an impact also on more specifically humanistic terrain. In sum, it is not a question confined to the clerical world. Writing this treatise about twenty-five years removed from those disputes, he seems to assume, in retrospect, a rather detached attitude, avoiding direct involvement in the question but at the same time sending a precise message to the reader. He seems to be saying that those disputes are too similar to the sophistic quibbles that he tried to combat during his whole scholarly existence.<sup>21</sup> Hence his insistence in the conclusion of the dedication to the Duke of Béjar in the third book dedicated to the passions, on the idea that speculation on the affections is the foundation of all morals, whether private or public; and for that reason a treatise like this is particularly suitable for a prince who must guide a state, revealing in that way a particular but not secondary aspect of the *De anima et vita*. The educational dimension, in this case addressed to a prince, in the wake

---

<sup>20</sup> "...hoc sacro approbante Concilio damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes, animam intellectivam mortalem esse, aut unicam in cunctis hominibus, et haec in dubium vertentes, cum illa non solum vere per se et essentialiter humani corporis forma existat...verum et immortalis, et pro corporum quibus infunditur multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis, et multiplicata, et multiplicanda sit...": *Enchiridion Symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, eds. Henricus Denzinger et Adolphus Schönmetzer (Barcelona, Rome, 1976), pp. 353–54.

<sup>21</sup> Katharine Park and Eckhard Kessler, "The concept of psychology," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, eds. Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, Jill Kraye (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 455–63; Katharine Park, "The intellectual soul," *ibid.*, pp. 485–534; Étienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi. Problématique de l'immortalité de l'âme en Italie au début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* (1961), 163–279; Eugenio Garin, *Storia della filosofia italiana*, 2 (Turin, 1966), pp. 499–580; Paul Oskar Kristeller, "L'immortalità dell'anima," in *idem, Concetti rinascimentali dell'uomo e altri saggi* (Florence, 1978), pp. 29–53; Pietro Pomponazzi, *Trattato sull'immortalità*, a cura di Vittoria Perrone Compagni (Florence, 1999).

of Erasmus' *Institutio principis christiani*, reveals itself as a fundamental feature of Vives's works.<sup>22</sup>

### 3. *The Analysis of the Soul between Tradition and Innovation*

The prologue to the first book of the *De anima et vita* acts as a synthetic point of departure of the discourse. The basic sections of the book are three, and they concern respectively the soul of brute animals, the rational soul and the affections. We can distinguish four levels among living things: those that have had as their lot the *facultas altrix* and *nutriens*; those that have a sensitive or sentient life; those that have a certain kind of psychic life confined to the memory and the imagination; finally those that have rational life.<sup>23</sup> The soul is therefore closely connected with life, to the extent that the two terms become interchangeable. The allusion to the Greek world is evident; it is sufficient to mention Aristotle's conception, according to which the soul is a substance inasmuch as it is the form of a natural body which has life in potency, and it is the cause and principle of the living body itself.<sup>24</sup> But perhaps even the Hebrew conception of the Old Testament, although distant from the Greek concept of *psyche*, indicates in the term soul a profound consonance with that of life, which passes over into the New Testament. To give a single example, in Acts 27:10 to lose one's *psyche* means to lose one's life.<sup>25</sup> Naturally in the context of the New Testament there is added and opposed to this a more theological meaning of *psyche* as the seat of the supernatural life and object of supernatural salvation, which will accompany the history of Christianity for centuries.

In Vives the vitalistic aspect of the soul is marked by the presence both of heat, the principle instrument of life, and a liquid element, humor, which regulates and equilibrates the heat. In their turn heat and humor calibrate the *appetitus*, which is inherent in living beings for the purpose of preservation, fleeing that which is harmful and seeking that which is beneficial. Accepting an idea originating long ago

<sup>22</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 299.

<sup>23</sup> "Vita rationalis seu humana summa est inter vitas, media inter spirituales naturas et corporales, qua solus est donatus homo; quo autem nomine insignitur vita, eodem et anima, ut sit in alijs anima alens, in alijs sentiens, in alijs cogitans, in homine rationabilis." Majansius, 8, pp. 300–01.

<sup>24</sup> Aristoteles, *De anima* (2.1.412a and 2.4.415b).

<sup>25</sup> Werner H. Schmidt, *Wörterbuch zur Bibel* (Hamburg, 1971), s.v.

with Empedocles and adopted by Aristotle, the Spanish philosopher maintains also that natural bodies are composed of fire, air, water and earth.<sup>26</sup> Nutritive activity in the organism then articulates itself in various faculties (retentive, purgative, distributive, assimilative), which constitute a harmonious and equilibrated vital complex.<sup>27</sup> Such faculties, finally, have no determinate seat in the animate organism, but are diffused in every part and organ of the body and are manifested particularly in the digestive and assimilative operations (*concoctio*).

We have before us, in general terms, a rather traditional image of the vital functions, to which are now added those of growth and generation. With regard to the creation of things by God and their subsequent production by nature, which can be represented as the path and duration of things in a throw (*iactus quidam*), the author makes an explicit reference to *De prima philosophia*, i.e., to the third part of the *De disciplinis* (1531), as he had already done regarding the external growth or diminution of things themselves.<sup>28</sup> A justifiable cross-reference, if one considers that the *De prima philosophia* is the most “metaphysical” and “physical” (in the traditional sense of the term) of his output, where it is his intention to analyse the *opificium* (literally, workshop), the fabrication, the structure of the world.<sup>29</sup> On these themes the humanist seems to depend much on Aristotle, who is explicitly cited in regard to the vegetative soul<sup>30</sup> and the difference between the sexes, as illustrated in the famous image of the female as an imperfect male.<sup>31</sup> What should be emphasized is Vives’s narrative technique, which occasionally alternates the objective and severe description of the soul with observations from daily life and various geographical locations with which he had direct or indirect experience. This is the case with the deformation

<sup>26</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 302–03.

<sup>27</sup> “... tanta est inter illas conventio, et cuncto corpore divinitus temperata proportio, quae facile nos in admirationem duxerit tanti Artificis, cuius opus tale est, ut non dico imitari (id enim nulla potest alia vel vis, vel sapientia) sed vel mente et ratione obsequi, magnum et pulcherrimum sit.” Majansius, 8, p. 304.

<sup>28</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 300. References to *De prima philosophia* are from Ioannes Lodovicus Vives, *Opera*, 1 (Basel, 1555), p. 543.

<sup>29</sup> Vives, *De prima philosophia*, p. 528: “De intimo naturae opificio, hoc est quibus ex causis, qua ratione atque actione oriantur singula, crescant, existant, intereant, disserendum est nobis hoc opere.”

<sup>30</sup> Aristoteles, *De anima* 2.4.415a–416b. but also Aristoteles *De generatione animalium* 2.2.4.740b–741a.

<sup>31</sup> Aristoteles, *De generatione animalium* 2.4.737b–741a. “Differentia autem inter sexus parva est; nihil enim aliud est foemina, quam mas imperfectus: nempe cui iusta deficit caloris mensura, itaque ex inopia videtur nasci foemina.” Majansius, 8, p. 310.

of the generative process which can produce an animal of a different species in place of the child as, according to Vives, is to be attested frequently in Naples and Flanders, supposedly on account of certain specific foods like cabbage and beer. The direct reference to the land in which he lived is more understandable while the reference to the South of Italy is more general. But the method of digression, probably intended to relax the attention of the reader for a moment, is quite common in Vives.<sup>32</sup>

The treatment that follows concerns the senses and is not distinguished by a particular independence or originality with respect to Aristotle.<sup>33</sup> Thus the sensitive life is common to plants and animals: while with plants it is all directed inwards, in animals it is open to the exterior via knowledge, sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch.<sup>34</sup> Concerning sight the close connection to light is emphasized,<sup>35</sup> as is the connection between smell and taste. As for the sense of smell, a stimulating digression is used to illustrate its utility and pleasantness. Vives relates that what was once appreciated for its good natural odor is now linked up with and often substituted by new perfumes, both natural and artificial. This is one instance in which education and habit have violently altered nature.<sup>36</sup>

So far Vives has objectively described each sense individually. Now, taking up the problem of the senses again in general in a rather lengthy chapter, he elaborates some critical observations. In the first place he demonstrates the close connection that binds together the four elements and the five senses,<sup>37</sup> then the role of memory in the context of sensitivity, because that which the interior faculty derives from the senses does not regard them directly, but is potently filtered

---

<sup>32</sup> "...et in monstris animantium, et in muliere, quum pro puero edit beluam non unius formae; quod frequens est Neapoli Italiae, et in Flandria Belgica: in quarum mulierum locis gignuntur beluae multiformes, saepe solae, alias cum infante, interdum puero a belua vel semeso, vel exucto. Crassissimo videlicet, maximeque putri humore eiusmodi mulieres abundant, ex alimentis brassicarum et cervisiarum potu." Majansius, 3, p. 309. Cf. in general Ottavia Niccoli, "'Menstruum quasi monstrum': parti mostuosi e tabù mestruali nel '500,'" *Quaderni storici* 15 (1980), 402–28.

<sup>33</sup> Aristoteles, *De anima* 2. 6. 418a and ff.

<sup>34</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 311ff. (as regards the senses).

<sup>35</sup> "Spacium autem oportet esse aliquod, et quasi intervallum, inter colorem et oculum; oculus enim nihil cernit primum et per se, nisi lucem." Majansius, 3, p. 314.

<sup>36</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 320–21.

<sup>37</sup> In general the entire text of Aristotle's *Parva naturalia* may serve as a reference for this subject of Vives's *De anima et vita*.



by the memory, which recalls to us, for example, the sensation of the taste of an apple from the past or that of the heat of a fire to which we drew near.<sup>38</sup> In a word, the memory seems to perform a significant “economic” function analogous to linguistic habit. Sight and hearing play a decisive role in the invention and constitution of the arts (sight) and in the transmission of the disciplines (hearing is here defined as the sense of discipline).

To the description of the function of the various senses Vives adds a brief discussion of their potentiality to deceive, an old problem already raised by the Stoics, Epicureans and Academics.<sup>39</sup> In this regard he states that the senses cannot deceive: true and false in fact are connected to judgment, in composition and division, characteristics of *cogitatio* (thought) since knowledge remains a mere reception or impression of the imagination.<sup>40</sup> Since an eye or an ear is only an imperfect instrument, a distant and confused object, a hazy or at any rate not transparent medium conditions knowledge itself.

As the analysis enters into the internal functions, like the imagination, memory, fantasy, and judgment, to which correspond *instrumenta et officinae* in the various parts of the brain, Vives shows himself more and more interested in getting to the heart of the problem “*anima*” in its functionality and gnoseological phenomenology. In this direction the concept of mind is a kind of joint between the inferior functions (symbolized by the fantasy) and the superior ones, which evolves into a kind of battle recalling the mythical Platonic tension between the ascendant and the degrading tendencies of the soul. Brute creation is concerned neither with the memory of the past nor with conjecture about the future, nor with any criterion of truth or falsity,<sup>41</sup> nor finally does it possess language, which emanates from the mind and separates it from *animalia muta*. This consideration is one more indication of the

---

<sup>38</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 322.

<sup>39</sup> For the Stoics see, for example, the testimony of Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 8.10: “The Stoics say that some sensitive things and some intelligible things are true; the sensitive things not absolutely, but in relation to the intelligible things which correspond to them.” For Epicureanism see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.31–32, who says that criteria of truth are based on sensation; nothing can confute them, and all reason depends on the senses; for Epicurus, *Epistula ad Herodotum* 50–51, deceit and error arise from that which we add in our judgment of the representation of the senses. For a Ciceronian passage in which the senses are criticized see *Academica* 2.32.101.

<sup>40</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 325.

<sup>41</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 329–30.

truly extraordinary importance given to the problem of language in the output of this humanist.<sup>42</sup>

The interest in the manifestation and operations of the soul cannot avoid altogether a tradition going back to the Greek world intent on probing the intimate structure of the soul. Hence the attention and even concordance with some positions of Plato and Aristotle on the soul. But it is also true, in this regard, that Vives seems to experience an authentic uneasiness, which results in a clear rejection of the long and exhausting discussion about the intellect that had been rekindled between the 15th and 16th centuries.<sup>43</sup> It is as if he wished to reassert with regard to this question that the thought of the Stagirite is one thing, that of the Aristotelians another. Without a doubt the lapidary and often quoted affirmation of Vives which defends the primacy of the knowledge of the operations of the soul over its essence,<sup>44</sup> is to be situated in a process of reorganization of the metaphysical aspects of the *psyche* to the advantage of a reading of this subject that is more fluid, educational in a wide sense and pedagogical in a more specific sense, which does not weaken its traditionally religious dimension and certainly reinforces its ethical tension. Moreover, *usus* and *experientia*, no matter how semantically linked with antiquity and the Renaissance world, and therefore far removed from experimental results characteristic of the future scientific revolution, form part of a vocabulary frequently to be found in the texts of the Valencian, and they indicate the need of a practical, systematic culture, which now even at the level of the soul, demanded new and more fruitful approaches to this huge theoretical problem.

The inclusion of specific trends of ancient medicine can be traced in large measure to the theory of the humors and the spirits, which goes back to a conceptual framework of Hippocrates and Galen. The doctor of Pergamum, especially, in his attempt to explain and justify the physiological equilibrium of the organism, went back to Aristotelian teleology on the one hand and to the theory of the vital spirits (probably inspired by the Stoic Posidonius) on the other, which from the heart and the liver set in motion the blood in the veins and arteries. Here is

---

<sup>42</sup> On the difference between man and beast there is a famous passage in Cicero, *De officiis* 1.4.

<sup>43</sup> Bruno Nardi, *Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI* (Padua, 1958).

<sup>44</sup> "Anima quid sit, nihil interest nostra scire: qualis autem et quae eius opera, per-multum." Majansius, 8, p. 332.

inserted the conception, with origins in Hippocrates, of the temperaments, where the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) are rooted in the organism of man as blood, phlegm, yellow and black bile. From this relationship there can arise a situation of equilibrium or one in which one humor prevails over another, giving origin to the classic temperaments of sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric and melancholic. Vives adapts some aspects of this theory to his own analysis of the soul. Thus the irroration of the body by the blood contributes to the diffusion of the spirits, which rise like salutary breezes from rivers or springs.<sup>45</sup> The harmony of the vital functions is, however, reabsorbed in a teleological perspective, which is clearly Aristotelian, when the humanist reasserts that all the organs are arranged (*sunt parata*) as by an architect, and for this reason the soul is the perfection and completion of a human body, an authentic entelechy.<sup>46</sup> The soul is, therefore, unquestionably unique in individual living beings; it is divided only in its powers and functions,<sup>47</sup> and is localized in the entire body.

#### 4. *A Fruitful Intertextual Glance*

The unity of the soul and its functions (or faculties, or powers, or tasks, or services, or potencies, as the author specifies in a vast lexical gamut of synonyms, bordering on redundancy) are reasserted decisively at the beginning of the second, important book of the *De anima et vita*, which concerns itself with the interrelation between will, intelligence and memory.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 336–37.

<sup>46</sup> Mario Sancipriano, “La pensée anthropologique de J.L. Vivès: L’entéléchie,” in *Juan Luis Vives*, ed. August Buck (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 63–70.

<sup>47</sup> Defined in Aristotelian philosophy as the actualization of potentiality or of essence, Majansius, 8, p. 339.

<sup>48</sup> To set the *De anima et vita* into a general framework, especially the sections on the intellective faculties and the passions, it is necessary first of all to refer to general monographs on Vives which contain specific chapters on this work or at least significant information about it, and then, of course, to studies expressly dedicated to the close examination of this text. Cf. Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, *Luis Vives y la filosofía del Renacimiento* (Madrid, 1903); Enrique González González, *Juan Luis Vives de la escolástica al humanismo*; Carlos G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives* (The Hague, 1970); idem, *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1989); idem, *The passions of the Soul. The Third Book of “De anima et vita”* (Lewiston, 1990); José A. Fernández Santamaría, *Juan Luis Vives. Escepticismo y prudencia en el Renacimiento* (Salamanca, 1990); Valerio Del Nero, “Memoria, ingegno e volontà nel *De anima et vita* di Juan Luis Vives,” in *Ragione e*

In the first place, in these three fundamental functions, which are generally identified with the mind, the image of the divine Trinity shines forth.<sup>49</sup> In addition, they constitute an almost insuperable obstacle to any thorough analysis by a higher power in the same way as they are able to examine the inferior parts, i.e., the sensitive and the vegetative. But we would need, Vives acutely observes, a kind of powerful “super-mind” (or “meta-mind”) for the mind to be studied adequately. This is a message to the reader, containing a slight vein of skepticism, which serves also as a preliminary request for comprehension in truly delicate and elusive material, revisited at an historical moment in which novelties appear to prevail over a traditionally more static vision of these issues.<sup>50</sup>

The intelligence has two aspects, one of which coincides, broadly speaking, with the mind, the other manifests itself instead as a particular function which encloses things that have been understood in a container (*in capsulam quandam*). It is immediately placed in a dialectical relation with the will, a central problem in the Western philosophic tradition beginning with Socrates and Plato. Here Vives is very clear: the will is not bound, but intervenes only on the basis of judgment. In other words, it follows or avoids that which judgment, on the basis of reason, has estimated to be good or evil.<sup>51</sup> This is a conceptual complexity to be found also in other texts of the humanist. For example, in the *De prima philosophia* of 1531, which constitutes the third part of the *De disciplinis*, the hierarchy of beings is reasserted, in this case exemplified by the stone, the plant and the living being, culminating in man, who is distinguished from brute creation specifically because he understands, reasons and judges. Will, reason and the faculties reflect in

---

“*Civilitas*”. *Figure del vivere associato nella cultura del '500 europeo*, ed. Davide Bigalli (Milan, 1986), pp. 237–52; idem, “Pedagogia e psicologia nel pensiero di Vives,” in *Ioannis Loderici Vives Valentini Opera omnia* 1. *Volumen introductorio*, ed. Antonio Mestre (Valencia, 1992), pp. 179–216, Lorenzo Casini, *Cognitive and Moral Psychology in Renaissance Philosophy: A Study of Juan Luis Vives's “De anima et vita”* (Uppsala, 2006).

<sup>49</sup> Vives makes frequent reference to the church fathers. In this case he has Augustine in mind, in particular, *De trinitate* 10.11 and *Confessions* 13.11. His first important work was his extensive commentary on *De civitate Dei*, first published by Joannes Froben in 1522.

<sup>50</sup> “Quae sint harum facultatum actiones; quot, quales, qui earum ortus, progressus, incrementa, decrementa, occasus, perscrutari longe arduissimum ac difficillimum, plenissimumque intricatae obscuritatis; propterea quod supra mentem hanc non habemus aliam, quae inferiorem possit spectare ac censere; quemadmodum mens ipsa de sensibus et parte vegetabili facile iudicat, nempe inferioribus.” Majansius, 8, pp. 341–42.

<sup>51</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 342–43.

man the image of God and in this complex dynamic relation the will emerges as sovereign, the reason as counselor, the faculties as faithful executors. Naturally will and reason (or *consilium*) play an active and decisional role which is not at all conceded to the other faculties.<sup>52</sup> Here the question of the primacy of the will seems to be posited in a more clear-cut manner than in the *De anima et vita*. In another passage of this “metaphysical” work in the context of a discussion on “ends”, Vives touches on the distinction between that which is done in view of an end and that which happens by chance, that is, without reasoning and without judgment; it is for this reason that man was granted not only the will but also mind and reason. Similarly we human beings attribute to God a provident and wise will which acts in view of more remote ends.<sup>53</sup> Finally, in a third brief passage, after mentioning that two indispensable factors, will and capacity, result from an action, he emphasizes the liberty of the will in those realities that are provided by reason and judgment.<sup>54</sup>

It must be emphasized that Vives’s thought continues to evolve in diverse works and over a long period of time, and also through small thematic blocks, which at a certain point coagulate into a more dense

---

<sup>52</sup> “Habet ergo homo ad Dei quandam imaginem voluntatem, consilium sive rationem, et vires: ut consilium suadeat, aut dissuadeat voluntati, quae est imperatura: voluntas imperet viribus, ut se exerant ad opus, vires capessant iussa. Voluntas ergo domina est, ratio consultrix, vires mancipium. Facultates hae quidem naturales sunt a Deo inditae homini, quum naturam statueret, et hae naturale habent aliquid, quo nutu ferantur suo, vel a quo abhorreant, ac discedant: dico voluntatem et consilium, nam vires ut mancipium, nec ad iubendum admittuntur, nec ad consulendum, sed tanquam corpus sunt brutum, parens semper imperio, numquam imperans. Vergit ergo ratio in verum, aversatur falsum, fertur voluntas in bonum, malum devitat: utique quod tale censuerit ratio, an fallatur, nihil interest, bonum certe aut verum existimari sufficit.” Juan Luis Vives, *De prima philosophia*, ed. cit., p. 548.

<sup>53</sup> “Nam quid dicitur fieri temere, nisi quod sine consilio, sine iudicio, sine ratione: quae omnia scopum semper prospiciunt, eventui creditur incerto. Quapropter homini non sola tributa est voluntas, ut quid velit agere, sed mens et ratio, quae consultant agendum ne sit, et quomodo quod cupit, consequetur. Similiter Deo attribuimus sapientem et providam voluntatem, quae sunt propter finem: quippe providentia finem spectat, adeo ut quam quisque sit providentissimus, tam intueatur fines longiores.” Juan Luis Vives, *De prima philosophia*, ed. cit., p. 554.

<sup>54</sup> “Quocirca duo sunt in actionem necessaria, velle et posse: hoc est virium, illud finis. Voluntas in ijs, quae mente, iudicio, consilio sunt praedita, libera est: nanque hac gratia attributi sunt ei illi velut consultores, ut quid factu videatur optimum, cum eis consultet, ac deliberet: reliqua tantum habent instigationem quandam, et tacitum naturae calcar, quo sine deliberatione agitantur, atque impelluntur...” Juan Luis Vives, *De prima philosophia*, ed. cit., p. 565. A discussion on the soul-body relation can be read also in *De prima philosophia*, ed. cit., p. 563.

and compact text, which assumes the consistency of a definitive synthesis. This is exactly the case with the *De anima et vita* and in particular with certain of its conceptual nuclei, such as memory, reason, *ingenium* and language, which constitute the object of a long cultivated interest in the passions which in practice he never relinquished until his death. These concepts are conspicuously present in the *De disciplinis* of 1531 as well as in other texts, and the insistence and development of them at the core of the psychological work of 1538 is certainly striking. Vives's thought in its entirety is a mixture of vital centers of interest (peace, poverty, contemporary religious struggles, the vision of an authentically evangelistic church, the criticism and reform of knowledge), nourished also by the reading of and relation with the greatest humanists of the time (Erasmus of Rotterdam, Guillaume Budé, Thomas More). But in my opinion the educational and pedagogical theme is not only one of the most essential within the corpus of his writings but is also one of the major interpretive keys of his thought, from the preliminary ideas of the commentary on Augustine to the immensely successful *Colloquia*.<sup>55</sup>

Let us now investigate memory and recollection (chapter 2 of the second book of *De anima et vita*). After defining memory as the "*facultas animi*"<sup>56</sup> (faculty of the mind) by which the knowledge acquired with the internal and external senses is preserved in the mind, he distinguishes between memory, recollection and reminiscence and posits a precise connection between memory and native ability, with explicit reference to Quintilian, supporter of the idea that the teacher will examine the native ability and the nature of the child entrusted to him and will pay special attention to the memory, a sign of intelligence, which enjoys the double characteristic of "*facile percipere et fideliter continere*" (easily perceive and faithfully retain).<sup>57</sup>

In the analysis of memory one can discern a constant in the method of work of our humanist, a tendency to exemplify with a huge gamut of cases the qualitatively most important manifestations of a particular psychic faculty, with an emphasis on the physical and physiological

<sup>55</sup> For the reception of this work see Dirk Sacré, "Exercitatio linguae Latinae (1538–1539). Les colloques scolaires de Vives," in *Il sapere delle parole. Studi sul dialogo latino e italiano del Rinascimento*, ed. Walter Geerts et al. (Rome, 2001), pp. 7–22.

<sup>56</sup> Vives removes the natural faculty of memory from the rhetorical context to which it was traditionally connected. Cf. Cesare Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo. "Invenzione" e "metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo* (Milan, 1968), pp. 242–44.

<sup>57</sup> Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 1.3.1. For the relation between memory and reminiscence see Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, 453 a.

bases of a determined behavior.<sup>58</sup> Another analogous, classic case is that of natural ability. This is indubitably one of the consequences of the Valencian's choice to concern himself with the operations of the mind rather than its gnoseological and metaphysical structure. In this he is probably also responding to a social question that became more and more widespread in the 16 century, which gives central importance to the dimensions of education, public and private behavior, a religiosity that is personalized to a certain extent (not only among the reformed but also within Catholicism, if we but call to mind the great success the model of Ignatius' *Spiritual Exercises* will have in a not too distant future). Vives stresses the importance of giving attention to the memory, pointing out, for example, how notions learned with attention and care remain more solidly anchored in it. The affections themselves, which will be analysed by the author in Book 3 of this same work, can have influence on the capacity of the memory: for example, that which has entered into the mind accompanied by joy or sorrow remains deeply impressed in the memory.<sup>59</sup>

On the other hand the matter of the retaining of information was always a problem of such magnitude that both on an individual and collective level, it had aroused a strong interest from ancient times. In the absence of technological supports, remarkable memory techniques had been developed, which humanistic culture, revisiting and refining them as had never been done in antiquity, had revived. Even in this case, the invention of printing using moveable type had opened extraordinary horizons and possibilities.<sup>60</sup>

Though we obviously cannot expect a continual and total originality from Vives, it is necessary, nevertheless, to appreciate his capacity to link up and offer to the reader those traces of memory that went back to antiquity and medieval tradition and which the humanists had been reinterpreting for some time from an anthropological viewpoint, in which a new educational dimension was gaining more ground.<sup>61</sup> This explains the Spanish humanist's frequent observations about the strengthening of memory through regular exercise and meditation, and on the facility of remembering what has been recorded with orderliness

<sup>58</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 347–48.

<sup>59</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 348.

<sup>60</sup> Frances A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London, 1966); Paolo Rossi, *Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz* (Bologna, 1983).

<sup>61</sup> Eugenio Garin, *L'educazione in Europa 1400/1600* (Bari, 1957).

or was previously committed to writing (as occurs in the teaching of mathematics) or is communicated in verse. Thus if disorder and casualness disorient and weaken the memory, orderliness of information, on the contrary, strengthen it. Therefore teachers of the art of memory have always insisted on learning by memory "*quaedam loca*" and "*sedes illae*," which by concatenation make us remember other images, persons, etc., a concatenation consisting of the passage from a minor thing to a major one, i.e., something that is better, more excellent, rarer, more precious, more cherished. The examples that are given, as often happens with Vives, have a clear autobiographical character: thus every time he sees a certain house in Brussels opposite the royal palace he is immediately reminded of his friend Idiaqueus, who lived there and with whom he engaged in pleasant conversation there. The reverse is not always true, in the sense that every time he thinks of Idiaqueus the house comes to mind, even if in his mind the friend is more important than the house. Also, since as a boy he had eaten cherries in Valencia when he had a fever, which considerably altered the taste of the fruit, so many years later eating cherries not only reminded him of the fever, but he seemed to still have it.<sup>62</sup>

All of Vives's literary production (and the *De anima et vita* is no exception) is marked by progressively concentric returns to determinate questions: this is the case with reason, which is essentially discourse (*discursus*), connected with the will. Therefore, after not many pages the discussion turns again to the will and the rational part of the soul. Reason, the humanist affirms explicitly, was given to man to seek after the good, so that the will would embrace it.<sup>63</sup> Contrary to beasts, whose faculty of judgment tends solely to good and evil, man's faculty refers to the true and the false, so that speculative reason has truth as its end whereas practical reason has good as its end and passes over into the will. These two aspects of reason do not abstractly condition people, however, since they make reference to them with individual nuances which give rise to a copious history of individual cases, analogous to that which results from the analysis of the potentiality of the intellect. In a word, one notes always in Vives a profound sense of the individuality of

<sup>62</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 348–50. On the characteristics of memory in their pedagogical implications see Valerio Del Nero, "Memoria, ingegno e volontà nel "De anima et vita" di Juan Luis Vives," (see note 47).

<sup>63</sup> "Ratio data est homini ad inquirendum bonum, ut id voluntas amplectatur." Majansius, 8, p. 355.



man, plastically adaptable to the various circumstances of the theoretical and practical use of reason, which open up the road to prudence, art, learning and practice. The reference to art is significant, moreover, because with this concept, closely correlated to that of learning; we are at the heart of Vives's conception of culture, of its historical crisis and of its renewal, as delineated in the great encyclopedic work, *De disciplinis*. But also there is not lacking here a brief reference to the dual concept, theoretical knowledge and moral life: the goal of reason in contemplation is truth, in action it is, instead, the good.<sup>64</sup> Like the beasts man too received from God inclinations and almost rules in view of his own good, and sin notwithstanding, we retain the vestiges of original goodness which the fathers of the church defined as "*synteresis*"<sup>65</sup> or conscience, the natural power to judge, the light of our mind. Some philosophers have called this anticipation or natural information. This light of our mind is directed towards the true and the good; it makes us appreciate virtue and reprehend vices, it is the foundation of man's moral conscience, distinguishing him from brute creation.<sup>66</sup> At this point the Spanish humanist reveals an anti-Platonic trait denying that our mind possesses knowledge before and independently of the body. At the moment of formation it receives solely inclinations to truth rather than falsity, i.e., rules and formulas, legitimately identifiable with the seeds of all the disciplines, analogous to those which God has put into the earth. And as these latter grow better if they are cared for by man, so in the mind of each of us the seeds are the source of the arts and sciences. We are born adaptable to everything, but the first foundation of knowledge is perfectible, in the same way as the plants cultivated by a skillful peasant grow better than those that grow spontaneously.<sup>67</sup> So much as far as natural knowledge is concerned. When human talent enters into play, which produces culture (as of a language), then there is need of a teacher or a preceptor, but the discussion essentially does not change. As can be seen, the analysis expands almost imperceptibly from

---

<sup>64</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 356.

<sup>65</sup> The word is first used by Saint Jerome in his commentary on Ezechiel (1.10) to mean the spark of conscience that is represented by the eagle, one of the four living creatures. Scholastic philosophers, notably Thomas Aquinas, distinguish between *synteresis* as a habit of mind, conscience as directive of one's actions, and *conscientia* as a single act of judgement.

<sup>66</sup> Majansius, 8, for example, p. 356.

<sup>67</sup> It is a topic developed by Ficino. Cf. for example Marsile Ficin, *Théologie platonicienne de l'immortalité des âmes*, ed. cit., 2, pp. 130–31.

the faculty of the soul to its practical articulations and almost automatically the discussion tends to capture and highlight all the educational implications possible, as in this last case just discussed. The educational and pedagogical aspect manifests itself as a tenacious vocation which even in the long and difficult journey through the soul and life, appears from time to time as an essential anchor of salvation.

There is no deviation from this interpretive model in the discussion of natural ability either, which is the subject of a separate chapter, after an inviting discourse on the differences between man and beast.<sup>68</sup> *Ingenium* is defined as the comprehensive power of the mind, which has an influence on the fundamental doctrine of the spirits and the humors, to which we have already referred. Thus the organs of the rational functions, which are located in the brain, are certainly very subtle and very bright spirits, emitted by the blood of the heart.<sup>69</sup> Diversified mental operations derive from them. The blood and the spirits follow the nature of the four principal qualities and the various humors prevail according to their mixture. The good mixture of heat and the humors produces the sharpness and health of native ability.<sup>70</sup> From the good mixture of these humors and spirits arises not only the variety of natural abilities, but also as much difference among them as can be found in people's countenances. And here there is an explicit reference to the *De disciplinis*, with its stimulating and creative case history of natural abilities interpreted from a typically pedagogical perspective, which on the one hand reasserts the functionality of an intertextual reading of some fundamental themes,<sup>71</sup> and on the other opens to a page aimed at demonstrating to the reader not only the variety of natural abilities but also the influence exercised on them by various factors, including the passions.

God wished to distribute this very broad range of gifts to men. To boast that you have received all of them or, on the contrary, to say that

<sup>68</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 357–61.

<sup>69</sup> "Sed functionis rationalis organa sunt in cerebro, spiritus quidam tenuissimi et lucidissimi, quos illuc exhalat sanguis cordis; ij sunt organa intima cognitionum omnium." Majansius, 8, p. 365.

<sup>70</sup> "Calor et humores temperati, faciunt ad acumen et sanitatem ingenij." Majansius, 8, p. 366.

<sup>71</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 367–69. The theme of natural ability is dealt with by Vives, in particular, in the *De causis corruptarum artium* and in *De tradendis disciplinis* of 1531. Cf. Emilio Hidalgo-Serna, "Ingenium" and Rhetoric in the Work of Vives," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 16 (1983), 228–41.

you have not received any is an enormous stupidity. The educational, pedagogic parenthesis at the center of *De anima et vita* continues immediately with two subsequent chapters on language and the method of learning, an obvious sign of the importance attached by our humanist to these subjects. Concerning language he repeats the concept that it originates in the mind, like water from a spring, that it needs cultivation and exercise, that the memory aids its fluidity of expression. In a few dense pages he sums up some basic ideas about language, already extensively analysed in the *De disciplinis*, in confirmation of the absolute centrality of *sermo* (speech) in the philosophy of Vives.<sup>72</sup> The discourse on the method of learning is based instead on the definitions of learning and discipline, science and art, whose seeds have been placed in our minds by nature on the analogy of the seeds in plants, establishing a precise parallelism between the teacher and the sun.<sup>73</sup> The path then winds its way from the senses to the imagination and from there to the mind, from what is simple to what is complex, from the particular to the universal. And if it is not sufficient that the teacher knows what he is teaching, or if he is not capable of explaining well and competently, those who learn are aided by attention and interior reflection on the subject matter learned<sup>74</sup> by the use of memory, whose power varies with the passage of time, by the fruitful habit of correcting errors, and by the skillful use of the hand, which compensates for the lack of words. Sometimes the analytic procedure of Vives assumes almost a spiral form, tending to return to some definitions and certain problematic matters, analysing them more profoundly, highlighting details that were not adequately focalized or simply mentioning them again as if wishing to underline their importance. These are significant pages, from which

---

<sup>72</sup> Majansius, 8, 370–71. Cf. Eugenio Coseriu, “Zur Sprachphilosophie von J.L. Vives,” in *Aus der französischen Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte*, ed. Werner Dierlamm und Wolfgang Drost (Heidelberg, 1971), pp. 234–55; Emilio Hidalgo-Serna, *Linguaggio e pensiero originario. L’umanesimo di J.L. Vives* (Milan, 1992); Valerio Del Nero, *Linguaggio e filosofia in Vives. L’organizzazione del sapere nel “De disciplinis” (1531)* (Bologna, 1991).

<sup>73</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 372.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 318. In these and other educational considerations of Vives there is apparent not only the Aristotelian idea, filtered through scholasticism and reaching as far as Luther, that “signum scientis est posse docere” (the sign of a learned man is the ability to teach) (*Tischreden* 4.4419), but also a rich series of theoretical and practical observations of a philosophic, educational, didactic, and psychological nature which profoundly relate the *De anima et vita* to such a great part of Vives’s writings. In Vives the educational discourse is founded on philosophy. Cf. Valerio Del Nero, *Pedagogia e psicologia nel pensiero di Vives*.

emerges a recurrent attention to the value of method, of the best road to attain well-defined results. In this specific case the emphasis is on the slow and laborious path to scholarship,<sup>75</sup> which is for the mind what light is for the eye.

Ultimately, the choice of privileging the operations of the soul over its metaphysical structure leads to an exploratory survey of an educational nature, where one can perceive the influence of humanistic treatments and Erasmian pedagogical texts, such as *De pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis* or *De civilitate morum puerilium*, which are not lacking in "psychological" observations. In Vives, however, the relationship becomes organic and profound and his acute observations about the process of learning and the method of the transmission of knowledge are not merely an extemporaneous digression inserted at the heart of the analysis of the faculties of the rational soul, but on the contrary they represent a structural clarification which is of fundamental importance.

The significance of chapter XI on the will consists above all in the opportunity given to the reader of finding concentrated in a few pages themes scattered here and there in this and other works, beginning with some clear definitions: the will is the faculty of the spirit through which we seek good and oppose evil under the guidance of reason. Certainly the will is the master and emperor of all things, but of itself it possesses no light. It is, in fact, illuminated by the mind, that is, by reason and judgment, which function as counselor and guide.<sup>76</sup> If there is not a "*praemonstratio*" of reason, the will does not move, no matter how free this relationship is (reason acts as a teacher and instructor of the will, not as a master). It is useful to linger for a moment on this concept of the freedom of the will because it clarifies various aspects of our humanist's position:

The freedom of the will is a great gift of God, by which he established us as his sons, not his slaves, and gave us the power to fashion ourselves as we wished with the aid of his favor and grace. Otherwise there would be nothing pertaining to the excellence of virtue that would differentiate

---

<sup>75</sup> "Et cursus eruditionis lentus est, tardoque ad metam gradu pervenitur:" Majansius, 8, p. 377. On method in Vives see Cesare Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo* etc.; Angelo Crescini, *Il problema metodologico alle origini della scienza moderna* (Rome, 1972).

<sup>76</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 382.

us from brute creation if the same necessary and inevitable power of nature directed all things in us as in wild beasts.<sup>77</sup>

This is a significant passage, which on first impact reveals the adhesion to a theological argument widely accepted by the medieval church. But one cannot in the least exclude also an indirect stance against Luther and in favor of Erasmus in their memorable dispute on free will fifteen years earlier.

The preference for the Erasmian position two years after the death of the Rotterdam humanist, would testify once again to the profound sympathy for the great master of humanistic studies, which not even the incidental disputes resulting from the unfortunate publishing and commercial vicissitudes of Vives's commentary on Augustine's *City of God* succeeded in dampening.<sup>78</sup> It is hardly necessary to mention that the problem of man's freedom in the eyes of God remained central in Renaissance culture, as may be noted in these words, which testify to an unbridgeable distance from any form of Pelagianism. It is difficult not to hear in these words an echo of Pico's *Oratio* with regard to the theme of the liberty that allows man to escape the necessary and inevitable power of nature (to repeat Vives's words), guaranteeing at the same time the excellence of human virtue above that of other living beings and implicitly confirming the religious foundation of the moral life.<sup>79</sup> Pomponazzi's conception of virtue as an end in itself tended, not unintentionally, to resurface frequently and at any rate to establish itself as a bulwark of a naturalistic ethic.

The harsh anti-astrological debate that follows immediately on these considerations is thus made more understandable. He who completely

---

<sup>77</sup> "Grande Dei munus est libertas voluntatis, qua ille nos filios suos constituit, non servos; et in nostra posuit manu quales nos vellemus effingere opitulante illius favore ac gratia; alioqui nihil quod ad excellentiam virtutis attinet inter nos et beluas distaret, si tam omnia in nobis ageret potentia quaedam naturae necessaria atque inevitabilis, quam in brutis." Majansius, 8, p. 385.

<sup>78</sup> Martin Luther, *A Discussion of Free Will, De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio*, trans. Peter Macardle, and *A Warrior Shielding a Discussion of Free Will Against the Enslaved Will by Martin Luther, Hyperaspistes*, trans. Clarence Miller, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 76 (Toronto, 1999); *The Discourse on Free Will/Erasmus and Luther*, trans. Ernst Winter (London, 2005); Fiorella De Michelis Pintacuda, *Tra Erasmo e Lutero* (Rome, 2001); Roberto Torzini, *I labirinti del libero arbitrio. La discussione tra Erasmo e Lutero* (Florence, 2000).

<sup>79</sup> Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, trans. Charles Glenn Wallis (Indianapolis, 1998); *Discorso sulla dignità dell'uomo*, a cura di Giuseppe Tognon (Brescia, 1987); Alfonso Ingegno, *Filosofia e religione nel Cinquecento italiano* (Florence, 1977).

submits the human will to the heaven and the stars, which drive, compel, warn and incite us, does so because he has thrown himself headlong like a dead weight into an art that promotes fame, profit and power. As a matter of fact, however, the inanimate heavens can only move us through that which is similar to it, i.e., the makeup of our body. We see that the human will freely chooses between two alternatives while a natural action like that of the heavens produces a sole effect out of necessity. And we know that there is nothing more extraneous to liberty than necessity. Therefore since necessity reigns among the stars and liberty is characteristic of the will, it follows that the heavens and human will are completely different and incompatible.<sup>80</sup> This clear attack against astrology is coherent with the polemics that Vives directed against the occult sciences in general, which had gained wide circulation in the Renaissance. Probably Augustine is one of the sources of this attitude of refusal, and there is no lack of passages in the commentary on *De civitate Dei* (e.g., at 10.9.119), in which particular critical attention is reserved for the concepts of “*goetia*” (necromancy), “*theurgia*” (theurgy), “*magia*” (white magic) “*daemones*” (demons). But astrology had had and continued to have a tenacious ability to penetrate even into broad sectors of the Christian world, contrary to demonic magic and demonology itself, which for that matter had themselves experienced a true and proper revival ever since the block of Neoplatonic writings had begun again to be in wide circulation as a result of the translations of Ficino. Astrology, however, was a discipline or a fad unto itself, which exercised a fascination which few could resist. The case of Marsilio Ficino is emblematic, whose position in this regard appears complex for several reasons and which certainly cannot be classified either as a contrary attitude or as a disposition that was entirely favorable to astrology.<sup>81</sup> The critical position of Vives seems to have as its point of reference the *Disputationes in astrologiam divinatricem* of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, printed in 1496, in which the humanist contends harshly against the belief in astrology which, pretending to be based on a naturalistic determinism, in reality renders man insecure, denying him his liberty. He distinguished mathematical astrology, whose epistemological status was by that time becoming assimilated with astronomy as a

---

<sup>80</sup> Majansius, 8, 385.

<sup>81</sup> Marsilio Ficino, *De vita*, a cura di Albano Biondi e Giuliano Pisani (Pordenone, 1991); idem, *Scritti sull'astrologia*, a cura di Ornella Pompeo Faracovi (Milan, 1999).

science of the movement of the stars, from astrology as vision of the influence of the stars on the life of man, in the same way as natural magic was separating itself from black magic.<sup>82</sup> The radical position of Pico is prominent in the proemium to the *Disputationes*, where he exposes the uselessness and deceit embodied in astrology, which corrupts philosophy and medicine, weakens religion, destroys prudence, renders men restless and transforms them from free men into slaves.<sup>83</sup> The influence of the heavens on the sublunary world was undoubtedly verifiable, but human events (both of individuals and of entire peoples) did not depend on this universal randomness, but on proximate causes, typical of the sublunary world. On the contrary, Pico specifies, they have undervalued proximate causes and have imputed their own sufferings and guilt to the stars.

It must be remembered that the brief but terse observations of Vives are inserted in a context in which the question of man's liberty in relation to his will is analysed. The discussion then turns promptly to divine foresight and providence, central to the Christian doctrinal tradition but revived in Reform circles and soon to be further developed. Luther was mentioned earlier, but two years before the publication of *De anima et vita* the first edition of Calvin's *Institutio christianae religionis* had been published, which would have radicalized the dispute on the relation between human freedom and divine foreknowledge. Vives maintains that the foresight of God does not take away man's liberty to make judgments anymore than a person watching us do something deprives us of liberty of action. The provident mind of God in turn sovereignly established that angelic and human wills would be free, with the result that our freedom is founded on the divine will. But God, contrary to man, does not act in temporality but in an omnipresent eternity.<sup>84</sup>

The last argument of the second book that merits attention is the long discussion on the immortality of the human soul, a problem reconsid-

---

<sup>82</sup> Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem libri I–V*, ed. Eugenio Garin (Florence, 1946), p. 41. Cf. Miguel A. Granada, "Giovanni Pico e il mito della 'Concordia'. La riflessione di Pico dopo il 1488 e la sua polemica antiastrologica," in Cesare Vasoli, *Le filosofie del Rinascimento*, a cura di Paolo Costantino Pissavino (Milan, 2002), pp. 242–43.

<sup>83</sup> Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Disputationes* etc., ed. cit., p. 45.

<sup>84</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 386. At the end of the passage a general concept of freedom is reasserted. "Quod si voluntas imperatrix est humanorum actuum, penes ipsam est bene aut male facere, virtus et viciū, laus et vituperatio, praemium et poena." Majansius, 8, 387.

ered in a very personalized manner by our author, somewhat removed from the traditional debate but nonetheless something that he took to heart, seeing that this digression is reproduced with the title *De spirituum immortalitate* in the *De veritate fidei Christianae*.<sup>85</sup> This is not to say that in the intermediate pages important questions are lacking (on mind and spirit, on sleep and the phenomenology of dreams, on habit, to give a few examples), but they are treated in a less brilliant and less original manner. The choice of dedicating several pages to the immortality of the soul is certainly significant, as is the preferred apologetical format, which explains, as mentioned above, the insertion of this chapter in the *De veritate*, the only posthumous work of our humanist.

The survival of the soul after death is an intricate question, as is deducible from the investigation of the ancient philosophers, complicated by the malice and malignancy of some who measured everything by the corporeal senses, and others who, immersed in pleasures, would have wished that everything was contemporaneous with them and that there was no judge to demand of us an account of our earthly behavior.<sup>86</sup> Vives rebels with all his strength against this reduction, demonstrating the faith and even the passion of a Christian when he affirms, without for the moment being able to justify it, that the exclusive trust in the senses is strongly extraneous to every judgment of the human mind. In first resort it may be supposed that Epicurus is one of the targets of this attack against sensation.<sup>87</sup> It would suffice to think of the general role sensation plays in his gnoseology and physics, but also of the Greek philosopher's assertion in relation to the problem of death, which is, first of all, privation of sensation. This attitude of Vives is not a momentary reaction because in other passages in his works he argues against the Epicurean position.<sup>88</sup>

The road taken by the Spanish humanist is that which points out the difference between man and the other animals, which do not have *ingenium*, mind or language. It is the mind that differentiates man from beast, who are otherwise united by the fact of having to die. Mind and immortality are bound together, because the first attests to its heavenly

<sup>85</sup> Ioannes Lodovicus Vives, *De veritate fidei Christianae*, in Majansius, 8, p. 93ff.

<sup>86</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 404.

<sup>87</sup> Epicurus, *Epistula ad Herodotum* 124.

<sup>88</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 410. Here Epicurus is defined as a "*signifer impietatis*", (a standard-bearer of impiety). But see also *De causis corruptarum artium*, in *De disciplinis* (Antwerp, 1531), fol. 9v.



and divine origin.<sup>89</sup> Other testimonies, no matter how passionately they are invoked, do not diminish the general weakness of an approach which often assumes the aspect of a *petitio principii*. Frequently he represents the declaration that the senses are incomplete, incapable of themselves to capture any spiritual reality, which, on the contrary, the mind can attain. Indeed the mind, which understands spiritual realities (*spiritalia*), is itself a spirit and is immortal because it apprehends their immortality,<sup>90</sup> raising itself above the heavens, the stars, and angelic natures, as far as God Himself. Inverting the direction, from God to the mind, some quotations from the book of Genesis reinforce this vision, which more than naturalistic, remains essentially religious,<sup>91</sup> even if the author states precisely that the soul is created by God naturally, that is to say, according to a law ordained by Himself. In short, every time God creates a human being, he does not perform a new miracle, even if the famous expression attributed to Hermes Trismegistos, here explicitly quoted, seems to have Vives's approval,<sup>92</sup> another proof of the wide circulation of Ficino's translation of the hermetic texts. Man therefore owes the better part of himself not to nature, but to God, to whom the mind, unlike the body, belongs exclusively.<sup>93</sup> Everything is directed to a divine ordinance, as is shown even by our erect posture, the face raised to God, rebirth after death (with an explicit reference to what he will explain in the *De veritate fidei Christianae*, proving a parallel genesis of the two works).<sup>94</sup> Religion, providence and the immortality of the soul are bound together so closely in an indissoluble union for the Spanish humanist that whoever would cause any one of them to fall would make the whole edifice collapse. The end of the entire argumentation is focused on the moral life of man; without immortality there

---

<sup>89</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 406.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., pp. 407–08. The following declaration that eternity already gone by is incomprehensible for us humans but that we can grasp future eternity, is not founded on any demonstration.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 408. For the biblical quotation see Genesis 1:26 and 2:7.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. On the humanistic circulation of the image of man as a *magnum miraculum* see the important observations in Eugenio Garin, *Ermetismo del Rinascimento* (Rome, 1988).

<sup>93</sup> "...mens vero solius est Dei, eamque sibi uni reservari iubet ad foelicitatem nostram; quoniam illius ipse unus est auctor et progenitor." Majansius, 8, pp. 408–09.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 413.

would be no reward or punishment for our good or bad behavior.<sup>95</sup> Moreover, we hear that even the most barbaric peoples possess some form of religion by nature, to which are attached values like gratitude, fairness and mildness. Such qualities testify that we are protected and guided by God, who will reward our virtue, which presupposes that the soul continues to live after death. Besides, the general consensus of mankind, not only the most developed civilizations but also the most barbarous tribes like the Getes and the Scythians and the inhabitants of the New World bear valuable testimony to this fact.<sup>96</sup> Incidentally, it must be pointed out that in the complete corpus of Vives's writings there are many references to the recent geographical discoveries. His date of birth coincides with the discovery of America and these references are a clear sign of a particular attention to contemporary events, one of the facets of the modernity of which he frequently gave proof, for example, with regard to humanistic culture. He who has denied the immortality of the soul has therefore shaken the foundations of religion, providence and divinity itself.<sup>97</sup> Vives's position inclines, on the contrary, towards Plato's *Phaedo*, of which he exalts the Socratic position concerning the desire for knowledge and wisdom.<sup>98</sup> On this problem he is more critical towards Aristotle, one of the great interlocutors of his works, whom he had already criticized in the *De causis corruptarum artium* concerning happiness.<sup>99</sup> The Spaniard grasps perfectly the difficulties of the third book of Aristotle's *De anima* (here the Stagirite is described as *obscurus*), which raised so many intricate historical questions. In the mind-body relationship (these are the terms used by Vives) positions emerge about the immortality or not of the soul which are not easily reconcilable. Nevertheless the position of the Spaniard cannot be considered fideistic,

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 414. In general see Raymond D. Clements, "A sixteenth century psychologist on the immortality of the soul: Juan Louis Vives," *Bibliothèque d'humanisme et de la Renaissance* 28 (1966), 78–88.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp. 414–15.

<sup>97</sup> The observation fits Epicurus perfectly. Cf. Epicurus, *Epistula ad Herodotum* 63–65. Less univocal is the Stoic position on the problem, at least that of Chrysippus, for whom it seems that the soul is corruptible, but that it subsists autonomously for a time. For Chrysippus see *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* 2, ed. Hans von Arnim (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 223. The ensuing polemic of Vives (Majansius, 8, pp. 418–19) against the supporters of the idea that religion originated from fear recalls also a substantially Democritean or Lucretian framework. For the Greek philosopher see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.45 and Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 9.24.

<sup>98</sup> Plato, *Phaedo* 65bff.

<sup>99</sup> *De causis corruptarum artium*, in *De disciplinis*, cit., fols. 67rff.

at least if we are to believe his observation according to which the immortality of the soul, the foundation of morals and religion, was not included among the articles of faith because it can be understood by science (*quod scientia possit comprehendere*).<sup>100</sup> His stance on this question maintains its distance from the Duns Scotus-Ockham line, even if the methodological foundation based on science to which he refers remains uncertain. It is no accident that the question of the immortality of the soul (and the second book of the *De anima et vita*) closes again with a brief attack against those who pretend to be philosophers, admitting the immortality of the soul according to faith, but denying it according to the light of reason. But truth itself, the Valencian reasserts decisively, is single, not double,<sup>101</sup> an implicit allusion to Pomponazzi.

### 5. *A Subject of Prolonged Duration: The Passions*

The third book of *De anima et vita*, dedicated to the emotions, has always generated a particular curiosity among readers, almost to the point of exercising a kind of hegemonic attraction to itself compared to the other two. Perhaps the sections on the *anima brutorum* and the *anima rationalis* were considered too static and conservative compared to the ancient and medieval tradition even if, as we have mentioned above, there are not a few interesting subjects (reason, will, natural abilities, language, method of learning) that show hints of novelty and a good grasp of humanistic debates. Certainly in this preference the importance of the theme of the passions played a fundamental role from ancient times (to which the Christianity of late antiquity and medieval times offered further interpretive incentives), beginning with the anger of Achilles through the multiple considerations of Plato, who was the first to focus on the pathological character of the passions through the scattered observations in the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic* and the *Philebus*, or through the Aristotelian analyses in the *Nicomachean Ethics* or the *Rhetoric*, to arrive at the Stoics who offer notable indications with Chrysippus and the Pseudo-Andronicus, not to forget the invaluable source material of the *Lives* of Diogenes Laertius and the

---

<sup>100</sup> Majansius, 8, 420.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 420.

later discussions of Cicero and Galen.<sup>102</sup> Surely the theme of the emotions and the passions also evokes a special interest for Vives because it constitutes one of the most solid foundations for erecting the edifice of an anthropology which is deeply affected by the political and religious suggestions of the sixteenth century and the medical horizon which had always formed its basis.

A profound confidence in the educational malleability of man is certainly operative in Vives's thought, resonant of the Renaissance, which sees in the tangle of human affections a problematic difficulty which is susceptible to the most diverse solutions. The possibility of the control of the passions is not foreign to him. For that matter, the fact that ethics and politics in the modern age allot so much attention to the analysis of the passions is surely very significant.<sup>103</sup> The framework of the affections and passions of the soul delineated in the *De anima et vita* is one of the most organic in the Renaissance, in certain respects a true and proper compendium of preceding discussions (re-launched by the great humanistic intervention in the interests of all of classical antiquity). Its function as a bridge to modernity is also undeniable,<sup>104</sup> even though much remains to be done concerning its later fortune except for the explicit relevant link to Descartes, who cites Vives in his work on the passions.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>102</sup> A good synthesis in Mario Vegetti, "Passioni antiche: l'io collerico," in *Storia delle passioni*, a cura di Silvia Vegetti Finzi (Rome-Bari, 1995), pp. 39–73.

<sup>103</sup> Remo Bodei, *Geometria delle passioni: paura, speranza, felicità. Filosofia e uso politico* (Milan, 1991).

<sup>104</sup> Carlos G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions*, is a noteworthy introductory text concerning these problems, but excessively inclined to bring out the positions of Descartes and above all of Spinoza, and more neglectful of humanistic subjects; see the review of Jill Kraye, *Renaissance Quarterly* 92 (1992) 846–48. Lorenzo Casini, "Emotions in Renaissance Humanism: Juan Luis Vives's *De anima et vita*," in *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, eds. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht, 2002), pp. 205–28; idem, "Aristotelianism and Anti-Stoicism in Juan Luis Vives's Conception of the Emotions," in *Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity*, eds. Jill Kraye and Risto Saarinen (Springer, Netherlands, 2005); pp. 283–305; Andrea Battistini, "Retorica delle passioni tra Vives e Vico," *Rivista di letterature moderne e comparate* 47 (1994), 197–221. On rhetoric in Vives see the profile of Edward V. George, "Rhetoric in Vives," in *Opera omnia*, 1, *Volumen introductorio*, cit, pp. 113–77.

<sup>105</sup> Geneviève Lewis, "Une source inexplorée du *Traité des passions*," *Revue philosophique* 138 (1948), 330–34.

Rather than give a description of the framework of the passions in the *De anima et vita*, which has been excellently described,<sup>106</sup> we should perhaps dwell briefly on some aspect of this section of the treatise that shows a certain relevance. The third book begins, therefore, with the consideration of the great difficulty represented by the knowledge of the affections, still an open problem, as the humanist stresses, because it was not sufficiently explored by the ancients, was sophistically complicated by the Stoics and Cicero and only partially confronted in the *Rhetoric* by Aristotle.<sup>107</sup> We will describe briefly some of Vives's points of reference although it must be said immediately that the relation with the Stoics appears to be anything but consistent.

In particular the affections (*affectus sive affectiones*) direct us to good or evil. Related to the temperaments in the body, these are excited or repressed, making us cold (this is the case with sadness) or hot (as is the case with happiness).<sup>108</sup> But when the spirit is agitated and no longer master of itself, the affections are changed into emotions and passions.<sup>109</sup> Every movement of the mind has its origin either in good or evil. The structure of the four fundamental passions in this case goes back, as it has been suggested,<sup>110</sup> to the ancient Stoics. The first attraction toward a known good, if confirmed, becomes love. Consequently, a present good generates joy, a future good, desire; a present evil causes sadness, a future evil generates fear. Then follows the constellation of the other *motus animi* (anger, envy, indignation, confidence, audacity, fondness, respect, pity, pleasure, hope, desire).<sup>111</sup> Yet Vives's adherence to the Stoics and Cicero is more descriptive than effective,<sup>112</sup> because the Spaniard identifies himself only partially and momentarily with the position of some current or personage, even though his comparison

---

<sup>106</sup> Mario Sancierpiano, *Il pensiero psicologico e morale di G.L. Vives* (Florence, 1957); Carlos G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions*; Lorenzo Casini, *Cognitive and Moral Psychology in Renaissance Philosophy*.

<sup>107</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 421.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 423.

<sup>109</sup> "...patitur enim animus universus illo velut ictu et agitur: qui quum est violentior, fit confusio." Ibid., p. 424.

<sup>110</sup> Mario Sancierpiano, "G.L. Vives e la descrizione delle passioni," *Atti e memorie della Accademia Petrarca di Lettere, Arti e Scienze* (1981), p. 132.

<sup>111</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 426.

<sup>112</sup> For the Stoics one can consult the positions of Cleanthes and Chrysippus in *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, ed Hans Friedrich von Arnim (Stuttgart, 1964), respectively pp. 253ff. and pp. 1153ff. For Cicero's position see Books 3 and 4 of the *Tusculanae disputationes*.

between the struggle of the passions in the human mind and civil war is decidedly strong. Love, which is discussed in a fair number of pages, is related to beauty, and to the good in an explicit Platonic perspective (it is related to goodness, and is by its very nature *coniunctor et copulator*).<sup>113</sup> Precise references to John and Dionysius the Areopagite regarding the Christian tradition of the love of God are not lacking.<sup>114</sup> Desire, on the other hand, is the appetite for a good to be obtained, if absent, or to be preserved, if present, not without an Augustinian reference to God as the authentic and satisfying object of existential search on the part of man.<sup>115</sup> The following copious considerations about love argue an unusual attention on the part of Vives to this fundamental aspect of human life. Among these I would indicate the relation between will and love, the first directing the life of the spirit, the second as guide of the will itself in the direction of the good, with an interesting appendix on knowledge and love.<sup>116</sup> On this last subject, a few pages later, we read an even clearer observation: the good is known in the measure in which we can know it, because in order to be loved an object has first to be known.<sup>117</sup> Obviously it is not necessary to insist on the descriptive method which Vives continues to follow in speaking of the passions. Observations of concrete cases, references to everyday life, and quotations from ancient philosophers and writers densely adorn the descriptive picture of human passions and constitute not only a precise phenomenology of examples but contribute to relax the attention of the reader concentrated on doctrinal and moral definitions.

Fondness is very close to love in the sense that if it is joined to it, it is more solid and lasting,<sup>118</sup> while veneration is roused by the judgment of a good which will not harm us.<sup>119</sup> Nevertheless, in point of fact, every definition or any window open to an affection or a passion allows Vives to alter his position strategically among various historical approaches. Thus, with regard to compassion and sympathy, he

---

<sup>113</sup> "Adde quod pulchritudo omnis velut radius quidam est, et vestigium immensae illius ac divinae pulchritudinis, eoque pro magno bono accipitur, illamque admiramur, et quemadmodum divina species veros amores elicit, ita imago illius imaginem quoque amorum." Majansius, 8, pp. 430–31.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p. 433.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., pp. 436–37.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., "...ideoque qui non norunt bona, nec ea diligunt, neque ijs adversa mala vel oderunt vel reformidant, ut pueri gladios, aut praecipitia...": p. 440.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p. 448.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 453.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 454.

stresses that without them it is impossible to alleviate the sorrow of others. This leads to an immediate jibe against the Stoics who, with their scholastic quibbles, tried to transform themselves into stones (*saxa*), without success, however.<sup>120</sup> On the contrary, pity, which arises from love, is a very tender sentiment that God has granted to men as a mutual help. With regard to pleasure, he argues against Epicurus: to be in good health does not correspond to pleasure, contrary to what the Greek philosopher thought.<sup>121</sup> There exists a precise hierarchy of pleasure which culminates in the exercise of the activity of the mind and in contemplation, which is the road to eternity.

It must not be forgotten that the theory of the humors remains the basis of the physiology of the passions of the soul and conditions even a function like that of laughter (a subject, as is well known, that will interest Descartes), which is an exclusive characteristic of man.<sup>122</sup>

Among the violent manifestations of man, like insult and contempt, anger seems to be the object of special attention, and not only because of the number of pages dedicated to it. Anger arises from insult and it takes shape in horrible physical effects in man,<sup>123</sup> which are examined with acuteness by Vives, who seems to be interested in offering a rich gamut of cases drawn from the history of culture and from empirical observations from daily life. He does not neglect to offer observations on the phases of cooling and cessation of anger. Among the negative observations about mankind, hatred, (*offensio radicata*) has a place of honor; it is increased by anger and in its turn generates slander. Only the contempt for earthly things and the elevation of the spirit to heavenly and eternal things appears to Vives to be the true way to restrain or dissolve the root of hatred.<sup>124</sup> No less despicable is envy,<sup>125</sup> which, however, extends more to spiritual than to material goods. Also regarding this passion the study of instructive cases presented by our philosopher is extensive, and he is careful to describe the manifestations of attenuation or extinction. Jealousy (*zelotypia*) is a form of envy often related to the concept of beauty, which causes those who experience it to be very disquieted. The expressions of jealousy vary greatly, depending

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p. 461.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., pp. 465–66.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 470.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., pp. 475ff.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., p. 486.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., “Invidia res est abiecta et servilis,” p. 487.

on cultural and geographical diversity so that, for example, those living in the west and south are very jealous about the possible infidelity of their wives, while those in the north are not equally so. Even animals vary in their expression of jealousy.<sup>126</sup> The perturbation opposed to joy is sadness, a constriction of the mind due to a present evil, which particularly affects pessimistic persons and those suffering from meteoropathy.<sup>127</sup> Fear is the imagination of an approaching or impending evil, while hope is a form of desire, i.e., confidence in the future realization of what we desire. It alleviates unpleasant happenings.<sup>128</sup>

The space dedicated to shame is ample and articulated, a subject strongly felt by Vives, which can be traced back to other texts of his, beginning with the *De institutione foeminae Christianae* and the *De officio mariti*.<sup>129</sup> The fundamental classic reference is to Aristotle,<sup>130</sup> but as always the discussion becomes distinctly personal. The sexual instinct, but also offenses to the senses and talking about them, and indeed all vices stimulate a reaction of shame. In this sense some of the author's observations are directed at those who instinctively know the difference between respectable and shameful behavior and fearing embarrassment, sometimes feel shameful without reason, like children and peasants. The next reference to a person who has been reduced by the misfortunes of his own life to desperation and contempt for propriety, like those in need, beggars and the shame-faced, is directly connected to the important and far-ranging considerations developed in the *De subventionem pauperum* of 1526.<sup>131</sup>

While shame, like fear, disturbs the mind, it also exercises a precise educational role in man (*pudor velut paedagogus*), beginning with children and adolescents, who are weak in their decisions. In this way shame induces them to show respect to their superiors. Likewise it is shame that checks unruly passion and educates (*pro educatione est*) women and children. But it also guides adults to comport themselves in a decent

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., "Crescit, et decrescit zelotypia ex personis, locis, temporibus, negotiis," p. 491.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., pp. 498–99.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 508.

<sup>129</sup> Juan Luis Vives, *De institutione feminae Christianae*, eds. Charles Fantazzi and Constant Matheeußen (Leiden, 1996), Juan Luis Vives, *De officio mariti*, ed. Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 2006).

<sup>130</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetorica* 1383 b.

<sup>131</sup> Majansius, 8, p. 511. Cf. Juan Luis Vives, *De subventionem pauperum*, eds. Constant Matheeußen and Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 2002).



manner, especially in community and society with others. These are brief observations, but particularly appropriate since they reflect a general cultural climate in which more and more importance is accorded to a socially acceptable behavior as well as to good manners. There was probably some influence also from the Erasmian example of the *De civilitate morum puerilium* of a few years previously, adapted to the figure of the child but obviously applicable to their future condition of adults living in society.<sup>132</sup> Clear hints of this were present also in Vives's own *Colloquia*.

The *De anima et vita* does not offer any critical conclusions on the part of the author. It concludes, a little abruptly, with the well-structured examination of a complex and negative passion like pride, a kind of swelling of the mind, derived from the conviction of possessing an excellent good, from which arise arrogance<sup>133</sup> and anger (closing the circle, as it were). The rich phenomenology of the proud person, interwoven with biblical and classical quotations, reveals a particular attention which leads to the evaluation of the antidote, par excellence, wisdom, the only quality that indicates to man the road to genuine heavenly blessing, from which he has wandered.

## 6. *Some Tentative Concluding Observations*

Without being able to utilize any conclusive considerations of the author, we must attempt, with prudence, to give our own estimation of this text, one of the most philosophical, without a doubt, of his prodigious output, pondered and probably partially elaborated much before 1538, as is clear from the author's own admission. The subject matter selected may reasonably be considered a classic one of philosophy, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, re-emerging in a humanistic perspective, but marginalizing the most metaphysically controversial questions about the structure of the soul, its immortality, and the function of the intellect, and giving prominence, consequently, to the advantage of a "functional" approach to the whole question,<sup>134</sup> an investigation that takes into reasonable account the results of medical science.

<sup>132</sup> Jean-Claude Margolin, "La 'civilité puérile' selon Érasme et Mathurin Cordier," in *Ragione e "Civilitas"*, cit., pp. 19–45; idem, *Érasme précepteur de l'Europe* (Paris, 1995).

<sup>133</sup> Majansius, 8, pp. 514–15.

<sup>134</sup> Katharine Park, "The Organic Soul," p. 480.

The ancient and medieval sources used by Vives constitute a second historiographical problem, and although we now have access to illuminating studies in this regard, there remain many aspects that require further investigation.<sup>135</sup> The *De anima et vita* must be read and interpreted in the light of the rest of Vives's writings and without privileging any of the three books that compose it. In other words, it cannot be reduced to a study of the passions despite the fact that part of the success of this text is owed to the undeniable relationship with Descartes and possibly Spinoza. But ideas comparable to this work and to other writings of our humanist can be found everywhere in the thought of the modern age. It suffices to think of the theme of *ingenium* in the baroque age or the role played by the passions in the formation of an original political reflection and the elaboration of decisive strategies of social behavior.<sup>136</sup> But we must do away with any theory about Vives being a precursor, and if need be, turn the relationship around and examine carefully the influence of Vives.

At least three stages of the most recent historiography can in some way help us to form a less imprecise picture. We must be grateful in the first place to the courageous studies of Mario Sancipriano, who confronted this complex text head on, translating it into Italian. Likewise we cannot prescind from the innovative and valuable studies of Carlos Noreña, in spite of some limitations already pointed out,<sup>137</sup> which can be summed up in the excessive attention paid to some ancient sources and some modern philosophers, like Descartes and Spinoza, and to an insufficient consideration of contemporary humanistic culture. Finally we must take into account the results recently achieved by Lorenzo Casini, which have brought to light a different and more intense relationship between Vives and the medieval sources and the presence and importance of ancient sources like Nemesius' *De natura hominis* or Plutarch's *De virtute morali*, not duly appreciated in previous studies.

When we will have more in-depth studies on the *fortuna* of the *De anima et vita* at our disposal, we will possess one more precious piece to estimate the global significance of this book. Research into the fortunes

---

<sup>135</sup> Lorenzo Casini, "Aristotelianism and Anti-Stoicism,"; "Juan Luis Vives's Conception of Freedom of the Will and Its Scholastic Background," *Vivarium* 44 (2006), 396–417.

<sup>136</sup> Remo Bodei, *Geometria delle passioni*.

<sup>137</sup> Carlos G. Noreña, *Vives and the Emotions*. These criticisms were cited by Jill Kraye in her review.

of Vives's psychological work is an arduous task, because it will have to neglect for a moment the relationship with the Descartes-Spinoza pair to penetrate into rather intricate meanders in which Paolo Cherchi, a few years ago, made some beginning, illustrating how Benedetto Varchi had dedicated a short treatise to the analysis of jealousy in which he recast the Italian translation of the relative chapter of the *De anima et vita*, shortly after Vives's death, in a skillful operation of *intarsio*.<sup>138</sup> But it was a silent operation. How many similar procedures may have been executed?

In conclusion, even in connection with an intertextual reading of some of the concepts expressed in the *De anima et vita*,<sup>139</sup> it would be useful to demonstrate the centrality of the soul and the passions in the educational project of the Spanish thinker, perhaps the "project" par excellence, capable of unifying the multiple and creative suggestions of this singular intellectual of sixteenth century Europe.

---

<sup>138</sup> Paolo Cherchi, "Due lezioni di Benedetto Varchi ispirate da J.L. Vives," *Lettere italiane* (1988), 387–99.

<sup>139</sup> The Commentary on Augustine already contains ideas about body soul, intellect, will and memory, on the "*mens*" and the "*semina*" implanted in us by God, subjects that he developed in the 1538 text. In the *De disciplinis* of 1531, especially in the *De prima philosophia*, precise references to the subject "will-mind-reason" are to be found. In the *De ratione dicendi* of 1532 there are recurrent references to the passions and in particular to the relation language-passions. It is in this last-mentioned text, moreover, that Vives makes mention of the future *De anima et vita*. Cf. Juan Luis Vives, *De ratione dicendi. La retorica*, ed. Emilio Mattioli, introduzione di Emilio Hidalgo-Serna (Naples, 2002), pp. 165–90.

AUTHOR, ADVERSARY, AND READER: A VIEW OF THE  
*DE VERITATE FIDEI CHRISTIANAE*

Edward V. George

The five-book treatise *On the Truth of the Christian Faith* (*De veritate fidei Christianae: DVFC*), published three years posthumously in 1543, was still in progress when Vives died, wracked by gout, stones, and fever. His deepest excursion into a branch of theology, it is a defense of the Christian and not specifically the Catholic faith.<sup>1</sup> It generally avoids theological issues that divide Christendom, while devoting a book each to refutation of Judaism and Islam. It distinguishes itself by resorting to reason rather than revelation as the starting point for its exposition, in order to establish initial common ground with unbelievers, although the unfolding of his arguments is not exclusively rational. It raises questions regarding the motivation for, and the manner of his employment of dialogue in the anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic books. And some see it as Vives's program for reform of theology alongside his earlier critical analyses of other disciplines.

Scholarship on the *DVFC* is remarkably sparse in proportion to its length and significance, leaving many areas ripe for study.<sup>2</sup> Among them

---

<sup>1</sup> I acknowledge the many corrections and recommendations made by Charles Fantazzi and the assistance of Imam Mohamed El-Moctar, Dr. Thomas Burman, and the Texas Tech University Library Interlibrary Loan Department. My wife Cecilia in frequent conversations assisted in formulating my thoughts. References to Vives's works are by volume and page number of Juan Luis Vives, *Ioannis Ludovici Vitis Valentini Opera omnia*, ed. Gregorius Majansius (= Gregorio Mayans y Siscar: Valencia, 1782–1790; repr. London, 1964), 8vols, abbreviated as Majansius. Punctuation is adapted. Translations of Vives's works are my own unless otherwise specified. I acknowledge the editors of the *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook*, for permission to include here excerpts from my essay, "Rules of Engagement: The Humanist Apologetics of Vives's *De veritate fidei Christianae*," vol. 27 (2007), pp. 1–36.

<sup>2</sup> Francisco Calero and Daniel Sala (*Bibliografía sobre Luis Vives*, Valencia, 1999, pp. 308–10) list a mere ten items. The only independent book-length study remains Pablo Graf, *Luis Vives como apologeta*, trans. José Millas Vallicrosa (Madrid, 1943), originally Paul Graf, *Ludwig Vives als Apologet: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Apologetik* (Freiburg, 1932). Among important recent studies three stand out: Karl Kohut, "Anmerkungen zu 'De veritate fidei christianae,'" in *Juan Luis Vives: Sein Werk und seine Bedeutung für Spanien und Deutschland*, ed. Christoph Stroetzki (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), pp. 122–34; on *DVFC* Book Three, Klaus Reinhardt, "Vives's Auseinandersetzung mit der jüdischen

is the role played by style and rhetoric in the development of intentions and content. I propose to examine aspects of this role by looking at the programmatic, self-reflective comments by Vives on what he sees himself doing in the treatise. In these comments he not only lets us know who his selected theological rivals are and, by omission, whom he declines to challenge. He also identifies the readers for whom he writes, disclosing that the ones he anticipates are not necessarily the ones he prefers. He discourses on the appropriate language needed for the apologetic task which he undertakes, and offers parallel views on how scriptural language is divinely adapted to the capabilities of its readers, whether Hebrew or Christian.

I will first explore these self-reflective remarks in Books One and Two, where they are prominent in laying the groundwork for Vives's overall project. I will then proceed to observe their presence in Books 3–5. Finally, I will examine the remarkably frank revelation of the dying Vives's final thoughts on old age and death that occurs late in the last Book. This passage allows the reader an exceptionally intimate glimpse into the fears of this scholar who could ordinarily show such skill in guarding his innermost thoughts. Here he allows the reader to see his anxieties momentarily overtaking firm faith and sober logic. I will add occasional notice of instances when his use of apostrophe and prosopopeia reveal intensification of feeling.<sup>3</sup>

---

Auslegung des Alten Testamentes," in Strosetzki, op. cit., pp. 9–21; and on Book Four, Vicente Cantarino, "La polémica de Luis Vives contra el Islam," *Boletín de la Biblioteca de Menéndez Pelayo* 67 (1991), pp. 5–34. Cantarino's valuable study came to my attention late in my work on this essay. José María Belarte Forment, "Aproximación al estudio de la teología humanista de Juan Luis Vives," in *Ioannis Lodovici Vitis Valentini Opera omnia*, coord., Antonio Mestre, 1 (Valencia, 1992), pp. 317–408, though it addresses the *DVFC* only briefly, places the latter in the context of a pattern of theological exploration found by Belarte in Vives's writings generally.

<sup>3</sup> While there is some overlap between the present essay and my article, "Rules of Engagement" (see n. 1 above), that essay focuses on the use of dialogue in Books Three and Four rather than attending to the entire *DVFC* broadly, as I am doing here. There, *inter alia*, I have described the miscasting of the Jew, who despite Vives's promise fails either as a rational discussant or a staunch defender of his faith. I have added remarks on how Vives's personal acquaintance with Judaism and Islam is closer than that evinced by Erasmus, and suggested that Vives's portrayal of a Jew and a Muslim in dialogue, something Erasmus never undertook, is indicative of the difference between them. I have explicated Vives's adaptation in *DVFC* 4 of selected passages from the *Doctrina Mahumet*, the Islamic source whose contents he treats as fundamental Muslim belief (see below, p. 338). And I have discussed in more detail how the background of Iberian Islam helps explain Vives's relatively milder treatment of Muslims in the *DVFC*. My emphasis here, by contrast, is to consider Books Three and Four only as

*Vives and Theology*

Vives had traditionally avoided theology, fearing the pitfalls that would await him in that field. He wrote confidentially to his close friend Franz van Cranevelt in December 1520, "Theologians explicate their matter in such narrow straits, constrained to navigate among such threatening crags, that for one who exercises a little independence, it is an achievement if he escape shipwreck. This reality frightens me from embarking on that path."<sup>4</sup> Thereafter, save for the *DVFC*, none of his works explicitly adopts formal theology as its focus, although Belarte Forment examines theological activity in the general framework of Vives's reform of the disciplines.<sup>5</sup> Vives did not include a section on theology in the *De disciplinis* (1531), his broad-ranging discipline-by-discipline analysis of academic fields and his program for reform. But toward the end of that complex of treatises he announced a plan to deal with theology at a later time. Belarte Forment, like Foster Watson, considers the *DVFC* the fulfillment of that intention.<sup>6</sup>

Vives had had this opus on his mind for several years before his death, as attested in a letter dated 1535: "I am lavishing care on a work now in process on the truth of the faith, but the topic is so rich that it is growing under my very hand, and when I think I sight the harbor I

---

part of my pursuit of the thread of author—reader—adversary relationships in the *DVFC* as a whole.

<sup>4</sup> "Theologi in tantas angustias deducunt suam rem, ac inter tot scopulos coguntur [ms.; cogunt *edd.*] enavigare, ut difficile sit homini paulo liberiori non facere naufragium. Quae res me... ab incunda via illa... absterret." (Jozef IJsewijn and Gilbert Tournoy, "Litterae ad Craneveldium Balduiniana. A Preliminary Edition. Part 1," *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 41 (1992), 55. Ep. 41, Vives to Cranevelt, lines 17–22.

<sup>5</sup> Belarte Forment, "Aproximación," interprets Vives's proposals for revamping the disciplines in general as his program for renewing theology. Cf. e.g. p. 343. Belarte also covers the themes of "the option for the well-being of mankind" and the "homo Christianus" in his definition of Vives's "humanist theology."

<sup>6</sup> "He who is endowed by God with a greater power of intellect, and does not let himself be kept back by worldly cares, but is stirred to concern himself in intercourse with heavenly subjects, happy and dear is that man to the powers above! Such an one will soar up to the study of Theosophy and Theology. Concerning this blessed and wonderful subject we must not speak whilst treating of other topics, especially as we are now fatigued at the end of so long a course. These subjects demand a special treatment to themselves. Sometime we will speak on them, if God will, at leisure, with fresh spirit, and stirred by the Muses to a greater ardor. For this theme is more comprehensive and more noble than men ordinarily think." Majansius 6:415, trans. Foster Watson in *Vives On Education: A Translation of the De Tradendis Disciplinis of Juan Luis Vives* (1913; repr. Totowa, NJ, 1971), p. 271.

become swamped.”<sup>7</sup> Vives was still composing the treatise at his death in 1540. Afterward, his longtime friend Francis Cranevelt saw the *DVFC* through the press of Johannes Oporinus, in cooperation with Vives’s widow Margaret Valdaura. Margaret kept her promise to her husband to see the work dedicated to the reigning Pope Paul III.<sup>8</sup>

To describe the contents of the *DVFC* with oversimplified brevity: Book One covers the true end of humanity, the nature of mankind and God, the universe, divine providence, and the soul’s immortality, arriving at most of its conclusions from reason and resorting to revelation mainly toward the end.<sup>9</sup> Book Two takes up revealed sources, discussing the life of Christ, the trinity, the origins of the New Testament, the history of the church, the end of the world, and the day of judgment. The next two books shift suddenly from expository discourse to dialogue, in which a Christian engages a Jew in Book Three and a Muslim in Book Four. Book Five reverts to ordinary explication, recapitulating the superiority of Christianity over Judaism, Islam, or any other persuasion.

Apologetics implies engagement with alternative voices, a process which Vives goes out of his way to foreground in the two dialogue books. In fact, careful reading of these dialogues discloses that the persona of the Christian in each instance is actually Vives himself.<sup>10</sup> But in addition, in Books One, Two, and Five, a coherent third class of unbelievers, namely ancient pagan philosophers and poets, emerges in multiple allusions.<sup>11</sup> Thus Vives arranges to have his readers observing him in conversation, explicit or implicit, with various interlocutors. Among all the opposing voices employed to define the author’s case,

---

<sup>7</sup> “muchta diligentia pongo en vna obra que tengo entre manos de veritate fidei, pero es tã faecunda que la materia me cresce entre las manos y quando pienso ver puerto mengolfo.” Vives to Don Juan de Borja, a nephew of Pope Alexander VI, dated September, 1535, remarkably mixing Spanish and Latin. Text in Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, *Luis Vives y la filosofía del Renacimiento*, 1 (Madrid, 1929), pp. 132–33.

<sup>8</sup> “Margareta Valdaura, Ludovici Vivis conjux, mariti votum solvit, utens stilo et calamo Francisci Craneveldii, dicans [the *DVFC*] Paulo III. Pont. Max.” (Mayans y Siscar in Majansius 1, *Vita*, p. 168.)

<sup>9</sup> Chapter 15, “Of the Sin of Angel and Man” (Majansius 8:113–23), is an exceptional example of how Vives even derives presumably revealed (or at least believed) events from reason and secular authorities.

<sup>10</sup> Edward V. George, “Múltiples voces en busca de supervivencia: Juan Luis Vives y el diálogo,” in *La Universitat de València i l’Humanisme: Studia Humanitatis i renovació cultural a Europa i al Nou Món*, ed. Ferran Grau Codina, Xavier Gómez Font, et al. (Valencia, 2003), p. 102 and notes 24 and 25.

<sup>11</sup> See Graf, *Luis Vives como apologeta*, p. 41 and passim on the frequent classical references, in particular to Aristotle and Cicero, as rivals or corroborators of Vives’s propositions.

Vives explicitly confronts no theologically dissident Christians, thus marginalizing the Catholic—Protestant quarrels of the era. As Karl Kohut puts it, Vives was seeking to explicate what unites, not divides, Christians.<sup>12</sup> Vives's primary objective is to strengthen the faith of his believing readers. The rhetorical, rather than heuristic, quality of the *DVFC* is frankly acknowledged, even by Belarte, who considers the treatise as Vives's proposal for revamping theology.<sup>13</sup> Thus the character of his interaction with his anticipated readers acquires importance, and invites our curiosity.

*Books One and Two: Readers, Adversaries, and the Role and  
Limits of Reason*

The adversaries against whom Vives disputes are not necessarily included among the readers for whom the *DVFC* is written. In Books One and Two, the "adversaries" consist heavily of deceased ancient classical authorities. However, a remarkable passage early in Book Three, in the voice of the Christian speaking to the Jew, signals the importance of these opponents:

You [pl.] are blind and deaf to everything except the pursuit of money. Controversy with a pagan would be easier and less burdensome. For to disputation these people [i.e. pagans] bring native wit, judgment, wide-ranging knowledge, familiarity with the whole of ancient memory, attention of mind, and moderation; while all you have to offer is obstinate pertinacity, ignorance of the world, and a frenzied passion for condemning everything.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Kohut, "Anmerkungen," p. 132. Juan Bautista Gomis, "Vives, Pro Concilio (de Trento)," *Verdad y vida: revista de las ciencias del espíritu*, 3.9 (1945), 199, fails to substantiate his claim that the *DVFC*, along with Vives's *De anima*, provides inspiration for the Council of Trent with disputation "contra las innovaciones protestantes." Perhaps Vives's treatment of the Real Presence in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper (Majansius 8:214–17) constitutes an example; but generally, intra-Christian controversies are not his priority.

<sup>13</sup> Belarte, "Aproximación," esp. p. 405. The *DVFC* exemplifies the rhetorical treatment of theology in the hands of humanists, which is traced back to the beginnings of Italian humanism in Charles Trinkaus, "Italian Humanism and Scholastic Theology," in *Renaissance Humanism: Foundations Forms, and Legacy*, 3, ed. Albert Rabil, Jr. (Philadelphia, 1988), pp. 327–48, and John F. D'Amico, "Humanism and Pre-Reformation Theology," in Rabil, op. cit., pp. 349–79.

<sup>14</sup> "Ad omnia estis caeci et surdi, praeterquam ad quaestum pecuniae. Levior mihi et expeditior esset cum gentili concertatio: adferunt hi ad disceptationem ingenium,



To Vives, then, contending with a pagan is more comfortable than with a Jew. In the context, the hypothetical pagan in the clause “Leuior mihi et expeditior esset cum gentili concertatio” could just as easily allude to the dead classical authorities themselves, in elegant humanistic style, as to any partisan of pagan philosophy from Vives’s day.

So much, then, for the pagan adversaries encountered in Books One and Two. The next question is whether in Books Three and Four the adversaries are as distinct from the anticipated readers as they are in the first two books; in other words, whether or not Vives envisions Jews and Muslims among those who are invited to read his dialogue books.

At the outset, Vives has stated the following:

We write . . . to strengthen our co-religionists, and also to draw those outside the fold into a share of this great good. We know not how successfully we have done this, but it is certain that we have done it with highest hopes and alacrity of spirit. And yet let us observe that in our day the issue is dealt with rather by emotions, as with parties and factions in states, rather than by reason and judgment. Thus the Jew clings relentlessly to his sect, likewise the Saracens and the rest, since that is what they inherited from their forebears. Nor do they inquire whither their minds and their reason would ultimately lead them, if these resources were used properly in their deliberations. (Majansius 8:4)

Believers and nonbelievers appear to be the intended readers, but with the qualification that Jews and Muslims will be hard put to lay prejudice aside. The theme of anticipated conflict between reason and passion is thus introduced. Who “those outside the fold” (*exteros*) beside Jews and Muslims might be is not specified. Further, as one would expect of a humanist, Vives undertakes to escape the inadequacies he observes in the work of the late medieval scholastics by privileging lucidity and readability. This is the means by which he hopes to deal with the struggle which he acknowledges he is assuming: between the exercise of *ratio* and *judicium* on the one hand, and on the other the baleful influence of *affectus*, emotions, to which Jews and Muslims are specified as particularly liable.<sup>15</sup>

---

judicium, cognitionem rerum variarum, omnisque memoriae antiquitatis notitiam, attentionem animi, ac moderationem; vos nihil nisi obstinatam pertinaciam, ignorantiam universorum, et rabiem cuncta damnandi.” (Majansius 8:255.)

<sup>15</sup> Majansius 8:4. On the expectation of honest rational inquiry in his disputation, see Kohut, “Anmerkungen,” pp. 124–25, who observes that more than two decades after the 1519 *In pseudodialecticos*, Vives’s classic diatribe against decadent scholasticism, he was still just as hostile to the misuse of logic, but now added the positive mission of

This struggle, surfacing in the dialogic exchanges of Books Three and Four (as will become clear), manifests itself early on in another passage where Vives specifies who it is that he desires, and anticipates, as his readers:

I hope everything that can be understood by anyone who is paying attention will be manageable and lucid, and, insofar as it will be within my power to expound, efficacious as well. Furthermore, I wish that none but the learned and intelligent man would serve as my reader; for that is the one from whom I would harbor hope of winning assent and belief in my arguments. With inexperienced and dull-witted people, I anticipate much trouble; to be blunt, it is hard to believe things which one does not understand.<sup>16</sup>

Vives uses subjunctives when hoping for his “learned and intelligent reader”, but the indicative when worriedly foreseeing the more ignorant. He hopes for educated humanist nonspecialists, then acknowledges ruefully that the type of exclusive control he prefers to exercise in choosing his readers is impossible.

A later passage points once again to who it is that he hopes will read the *DVFC*. Vives acknowledges that he has lifted, verbatim, practically all of *DVFC* Book One, Ch. 12, on the immortality of the soul, from his treatise *De anima*, Book Two, Chapter 19.<sup>17</sup> This may be taken as testimony that he is addressing the level of readers who would be drawn to his philosophical works.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, Vives reinforces the problem of the less aware masses in an exceptional addition to *De anima* 2:19. The issue is the human propensity to assess by sense alone what we know. When little boys see their father armed, then observe

---

filling the theological gap left by the scholastics. However, Cantarino, “La polémica de Luis Vives contra el Islam,” 33, observes how Vives “frequently [employed] defective and sophistic dialectic” in *DVFC* 4, and argues that Vives must have known what he was doing.

<sup>16</sup> “Omnia erunt, ut spero, facilia et dilucida, quae intelligi a quovis animadvertente queant, quantumque a me utique praestari poterit, efficacia. Atque utinam operis hujus non nisi doctus atque ingeniosus lector contingeret; citius enim et promptius speraverim me ab hujusmodi impetraturum argumentis meis assensionem et fidem. Cum imperitiis et crassis hominibus plurimum mihi prospicio futurum negotii: videlicet creduntur aegre quae non satis intelliguntur.” (Majansius 8:25)

<sup>17</sup> *DVFC* Book One, Ch. 12; Majansius 8:93–109. *De anima*, Book Two, Ch. 19; Majansius 3:404–20.

<sup>18</sup> Likewise, as at Majansius 8:54 and 59, he repeatedly advises his reader to consult his own *De prima philosophia*, a part of the *De disciplinis*, his series of treatises on educational reform published in 1531.

his armor on a post, they think the latter is their father.<sup>19</sup> When it fails to talk back they are by turns surprised, terrified, and indignant, then break down weeping. Likewise, they think that artistically portrayed beasts are real. This much is copied from Vives's *De anima*; but in the *DVFC* he adds for emphasis:

This common manner of speaking deceives others also in these matters; for since the populace is the arbiter of discourse, and is influenced more by the senses than by mental judgment, the result is that we speak according to the direction of the senses. Thus we call a picture or a corpse of a person the person; and now, there are many who call the garments which cover a person's whole body the person himself, and [say] that he is lying there when it is just the clothing lying there.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, in passing from the heuristic *De anima* to the rhetorical *DVFC*, Vives exhibits intensified awareness of the need to alert his educated reader to the problems entailed in passing this knowledge to a less learned circle.<sup>21</sup>

Vives's readers, then, must exercise reason, which will inevitably lead to conclusions that harmonize with revelation, since reason and revelation issue from the same divine source. Some would-be philosophers say the soul is immortal in the faith of piety, but mortal in the light of nature. How fatuous! responds Vives. As if we were disputing about what seems (*quid videatur*) rather than what is (*quid sit*). We are not examining the light of nature or faith, but the truth, which is not double, but single.<sup>22</sup> He opposes the view of Pietro Pomponazzi and

<sup>19</sup> Majansius 8:94.

<sup>20</sup> "Alios quoque fallit circa haec communis loquendi formula, nam ut populus est sermonis dominus, et ducitur magis sensibus quam iudicio mentis, fit ut ex praescripto sensuum loquamur. Itaque picturam hominis, et cadaver hominis, hominem dicimus; et jam multi eum vestitum qui totum corpus amiciat, eum ipsum vocant qui vestitur, et jacere illum quum jacet vestitus." (Majansius 8:94).

<sup>21</sup> Occasions when Vives asserts the reverse, i.e. that his discourse in the *DVFC* will be more accessible and less abstruse in some passages than in others, are much rarer. On the nature of God, for example, Vives asserts, "I shall explain more simply and accessibly in this place; I note that that previous disputation was framed for the ears of the learned, but right now [I write] for the general public. ('Agemus hoc loco simplicius et apertius, quippe disputatio illa doctorum erat accommodata auribus, haec vero etiam vulgi.' Majansius 8:54.) Likewise, see Majansius 8:93, where he regrets that the ignorance and malice of potential readers will frustrate his arguments on the immortality of spirits.

<sup>22</sup> Majansius 8:108–09.

others that there are two bodies of truth, spiritual and material, not necessarily reconcilable.<sup>23</sup>

Reason provides a vehicle for bypassing emotion, which often distorts the pursuit of truth. Vives adds that emotion is tolerable elsewhere but fatal to religious discourse:

In other disputations, at least—about nature, or great achievements, or the art of oratory, or the knowledge of letters—one may allow contentions and human emotions, because any damage inflicted by controversy is slight; but in matters of religion these influences should be avoided entirely because they are very harmful. (Majansius 8:22.)

At the same time, reason is subject to limitations other than human emotion. Although Vives emphasizes the clarity of the New Testament, along with the insistence that anyone who makes use of God-given reason is bound to arrive at some definite conclusion, he cautions that the obscurity of the Old Testament requires careful interpretation.<sup>24</sup> Too, the clouded nature of the human intellect often interferes. Arguments arise from essences, which may be too profound to comprehend, or from accidents, whose details are not always clear; hence it is often necessary to be satisfied with probability, and absurd to insist on absolutely irrefutable proof.<sup>25</sup> Authorities will be respected, but only for confirmation.<sup>26</sup> Vives even acknowledges his own fallibility.<sup>27</sup>

Divine inscrutability constitutes a third restriction on the power of reason. On the non-eternity of the divinely created world, for example, in opposition to the Stoics' eternal cycles of conflagration and reconstitution, Vives's ultimate answer is his overarching principle that

It is wrong for man to delve into the causes and reasons why the will of God is, so to speak, drawn to act, for 'he that is a searcher of majesty'

---

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Sem Dresden, *Humanism in the Renaissance*, trans. Margaret King (N.Y., 1968), pp. 26–27, 36.

<sup>24</sup> See Majansius 8:162: The Old Testament contains history, law, prophecy, and moral precepts, but “these books are difficult to understand because of the ambiguity of the Hebrew language and figures rendered obscure by the passage of time.” The idea is elaborated in *DVFC* Book Three (Majansius 8:264). See Reinhardt, “Vives's Auseinandersetzung,” pp. 11–12.

<sup>25</sup> Majansius 8:22–24. See Book Four, Ch. 2, of *De tradendis disciplinis*, titled “De prima philosophia,” Majansius 6:351–53.

<sup>26</sup> Majansius 8:26.

<sup>27</sup> Majansius 8:29–30.

as the Sage says, 'shall be overwhelmed by glory;' but [rather one should] desire, and obey, and adore whatever that [divine will] commands.<sup>28</sup>

And further on,

if we understand poorly or not at all what was created by him, how will we comprehend the reasoning that underlay his will prior to his act of creation? But now we tangle ourselves in matters that are unworthy of the eternity of God. (Majansius 8:80)

*Books One and Two: The language of Apologetic  
Persuasion and of Scripture*

In profiling Vives's readers and adversaries, and exploring the role and the limits assigned to the employment of reason, I now turn to Vives's self-reflective, programmatic remarks on the appropriate discourse for dealing with his readers. Here he identifies felicitous parallels between his own language and that of Scripture, and offers literary criticism that applies simultaneously to the sacred texts and to the effective apologist's way of treating these texts. For himself, he adopts the standards of simplicity and clarity as the way to persuasiveness. He rejects Lactantius's desire for Ciceronian eloquence in treating divine matters, countering that if Cicero had been faced with the challenge of expounding on the most high God, he would have realized what a comparatively simple task it was to speak in the Roman lawcourt and Forum.<sup>29</sup> Excessive embellishment is not merely out of place; it is counterproductive. On occasion Vives rephrases his argument so as to be crystal clear. For example, against the notion of plurality in the divine nature, he observes, "these matters need to be expounded in different words, so that they will be understood more easily," and goes on to re-express himself.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> "Non est fas homini causas et rationes scrutari, quibus Dei voluntas velut adducitur ad agendum; nam 'scrutator majestatis,' ut inquit Sapiens, 'opprimetur a gloria;' sed velle, et parere, et adorare quicquid illa jusserit." (Majansius 8:79, quoting Prov. 25:27, here rendered in the Douay-Rheims version.) This is Vives's answer to the hostile question why the eternally existing God declined to create the world far sooner or far later. On the Stoics see Majansius 8:75–78.

<sup>29</sup> Majansius 8:4.

<sup>30</sup> Majansius 8:55. Elsewhere, on the fulfillment of mankind's purpose only after death: "I shall say this more plainly and explicitly, so that it can be understood by everyone, if only they use their minds and pay attention." (Majansius 8:45.)

Historically, Vives is hostile to the dry, mechanical nominalisms of late Scholastic philosophy on one side, and unnecessary embellishment by self-indulgent humanists on the other. Yet, save for the brief citation noted above, in the *DVFC* he offers explicit criticisms of the latter failing only.<sup>31</sup> One must resort to documents such as the *In pseudodialecticos* to find his anti-Scholastic sentiment elaborated. Perhaps Vives feels that overt disputation on this matter is now unnecessary, and that he is satisfied to allow his rhetorical mode of discourse to do the anti-Scholastic polemicizing for him.<sup>32</sup>

A useful excerpt for observing this issue as related to Scripture is the three-chapter sequence discussing the Old Testament, the Gospels, and the excellence of the latter.<sup>33</sup> In a theme to be picked up in *DVFC* 3 Vives emphasizes that the Hebrew language—ambiguous, laced with ancient obscurities, and treating of God in plain terms, suitable for consumption by crass mortals—presents interpretive trouble, not susceptible to what he sees as simplistic Jewish insistence on literal understanding. He then launches into an extended discussion of scriptural language, accompanied by comments on how one should explicate the Christian faith: in both cases, one must expect or adopt language which accommodates to the capabilities of the audience.

Owing to Old Testament linguistic obscurity, Dionysius the Areopagite, in *The Celestial Hierarchy*, justifiably (says Vives) claims that it is fitting to interpret divine matters under the cloak of metaphors of corporeal and everyday realities.<sup>34</sup> In this way human sensation (*sensus*) is more easily liberated from error. It is natural, Vives holds, that the style of Scripture is simple; it thus avoids excessive appeal to only a single palate. Would we expect God to use subtle argumentation to arouse faith? Nor should one dismiss the Hebrew narratives on the grounds that the characters are humble people; after all, pastoral and rustic themes, whether human or mythological, are quite welcome in classical literature. Which tale do you prefer, Vives asks: the hunting

<sup>31</sup> See Majansius 8:4.

<sup>32</sup> Andres's observation of Vives's and other humanists' reproach of the uselessness and even harm of neo-Scholastic theology is thus documentable in other works, but not the *DVFC*. (Melquiades Andres, *La teología española en el siglo XVI*, Madrid, 1976, 1:257.) Belarte's assessment of Vives's "reform" (Belarte, "Aproximación," pp. 405–08) coincides with the conclusion that here Vives is past quarreling with the neo-scholastics.

<sup>33</sup> Majansius 8:159–84 = *DVFC* Book Two, Chs. 7–9.

<sup>34</sup> Majansius 8:162.

of the Calydonian boar or the story of Joseph and his brothers.<sup>35</sup> Vives's eye for a good story occurs here; it acquires added importance later when he delves with malicious gusto into the Islamic folk tales of *DVFC* Book Four. Furthermore, metaphors that might have carried impact for an ancient audience can now fall flat owing to cultural changes: "they [i.e. the ancients] were farmers and shepherds, but we are warriors, lovers, and litigants; just as the earliest Latin metaphors were rustic, but later military or political."<sup>36</sup> Critics who expect God to speak to humanity "subtly and disputatiously" ("*subtiliter et argumentose*", Majansius 8:163) like a Senecan declaimer, and not "as master to slave, father to son, prince to subject, or teacher to pupil", are misguided.<sup>37</sup> In this passage Vives merges comments on scriptural discourse with views of appropriate language for a modern exegete. Vives takes issue with secular-minded Italian humanists. He cites invidiously Domizio Calderino (1447–78), commentator on Valerius Flaccus and other authors; the Florentine Angelo Poliziano (1454–94); and Giulio Pomponio Leto (1428–97), luminary of the Roman Academy. Such savants discount the tales of the patriarchs as undignified since they deal with "shepherds and private individuals", forgetting that Apollo, Paris, and Pan were shepherds, and Theocritus and Vergil composed pastoral poetry. Vives saves a special lampoon for Pomponio Leto, the Calabrian who decided that his birth name Petrus was not good enough. "Lucky you, O Vergil," Vives apostrophizes sarcastically, "for not needing to write about a Peter or a Paul. What childish lunatics! Paulus, Marius, and Maria are Roman names, aren't they?"<sup>38</sup> In effect, Vives regards these Italians as decadent latter-day epigones of the ancient pagans. It bears noting that the ground on which he chooses to engage near-

<sup>35</sup> Majansius 8:163.

<sup>36</sup> "erant enim fere agricolae et pastores, nos autem bellatores, amatores, litigantes; sicut antiquissimae translationes Latinae rusticae erant, postea castrenses aut forenses." (Majansius 8:162.) Even allowing the point Vives wishes to make, the choice of categories distinguishing moderns is odd: warmaking, loving, and intracommunal conflict are not peculiarly modern.

<sup>37</sup> "Non sic par est deum loqui homini, sed ut dominum servo, ut patrem filio, ut principem subdito, ut magistrum discipulo." (Majansius 8:163). Compare the Christian's rebuke of the Jew in *DVFC* 3, discussed below, p. 333: "*Chr.* Quid tu censes esse hominem? *Jud.* Id quod vides. *Chr.* Facilius ac melius tu respondebis mihi docenti, quam simpliciter roganti." (Majansius 8:249.)

<sup>38</sup> "O te felicem, P.Maro, cui non fuerit in carmine Petrus aut Paulus inserendus. O homines pueriliter delirantes! An non Paulus nomen est Romanum, et Marius, et Maria?" (Majansius 8:164.). Vives either overlooks that "Maria" is ordinarily a Hebrew name, or may have in mind the *gens Maria* in Roman nomenclature.

contemporary adversaries head on, by name, is literary criticism, not theological controversy. The irrelevance of this line of disputation to his complaint of inadequate Jewish treatment of Scripture corroborates the idea, which I will pursue later in more detail, that Jews are not among the principally intended readers of the *DVFC*.

How, continues Vives, can one prefer reading about the cruelty of Nero or the brutality of Caligula over David's gentleness or Solomon's insight?<sup>39</sup>

Look, in those [Biblical] narratives you find simple, true, sincere affections, which for that reason are all the more captivating. Nor do you want for diverse, sudden, surprising, lofty, or admirable happenings, in a word, all the things that ordinarily engross the attention of readers of great deeds.<sup>40</sup>

This passage is remarkable for two reasons. It exposes Vives's interest in engaging narrative, which will surface again in *DVFC* Book Four. It addresses a topic that has little to do with theology directly, but rather with the power of narrative in holy writ to engage an educated reader. Vives notes further that scriptural poetry employs far-fetched compliments and metaphors, unrivaled for depicting a soul which, stirred and inflamed with love, scours the universe to bring from afar something to bestow on the beloved. Observers of that kind of discourse extol its charm, grace, and propriety, and they commend its gravity, majesty, and presentation of profound mysteries as well.<sup>41</sup>

Nonetheless, fastidious critics abhor scripture as would a gourmet who cannot abide even the healthiest meal if it is not properly seasoned. They prefer elegant fables to the simple truth. But in accepting only those stylistic felicities to which they are accustomed, they overlook others, numerous and impressive. Sacred scripture, like Homer, contains every type of those natural figures and tropes which never lose the quality of freshness in any era.<sup>42</sup> Vives reproves humanists whose over-refined sensibilities render them antipathetic or apathetic to the Bible.

But while commending the engaging features of Old Testament narrative style, he is at the same time obliged to assert that the language of the Law is simplified to suit the needs of the ancient Hebrews: "Sacred

---

<sup>39</sup> Majansius 8:164.

<sup>40</sup> Majansius 8:164.

<sup>41</sup> Majansius 8:162.

<sup>42</sup> Majansius 8:162–63.



Scripture speaks to humans in human letters and manner, especially when speaking to the general run of the Hebrew nation (“*vulgo gentis Hebraeae*”), a slow audience at understanding the higher mysteries.”<sup>43</sup> Vives argues that the Jewish Law was a law for children, couched in childish language below divine dignity but suitable for the mentality of the Hebrews. He uses this notion to explain the low esteem with which some regard the Mosaic Law:

There are people who find those legal prescriptions in the old law offensive because they say it is unworthy of the majesty of God. I am not surprised that to some this is surprising; for the law of the Jews is puerile, like material suitable for transmission to children, in a guise which Jews of that time would recognize, and which even today is the only form they can endure to perceive; and hence it is obviously unworthy of God. In fact, if Christ had not confirmed its divine origin, multitudes from among the nations could not have been persuaded to believe it.<sup>44</sup>

That the Jewish Law is but a shadow of the true law, and that the Old Testament is full of prefigurations of Christ, Vives promises to explicate more fully in *DVFC* Book Three.<sup>45</sup> Likewise, he will elaborate on the proposition that in reading the Bible the Jew consumes the juiceless bark (“*corticem*”) and misses the substance of the text.<sup>46</sup> The more heated language of the dialogue to come in *DVFC* 3 will contrast noticeably with the relatively sedate academic third person discourse found here.

Vives then takes up the Evangelists; the secular and sacred writers who testified to them; the reason Christ himself left no writings (so as to entrust to believers the responsibility of bearing the message); and the Gospels’ canonization by ecclesiastical authority, guided by consensus and inspiration. The fact that the apostles and the other early Christians had everything to lose by following Jesus confirms the authenticity of the message of the Gospels.<sup>47</sup> The New Testament writers are simple, intelligible, and persuasive, easier to read than philosophers or orators; but, in line with a fundamental rhetorical principle, awareness of the character of the recipients is critical to their success:

Reasonings and arguments are not always efficacious by their own force alone, but depend on the nature of the people to whom they are directed,

<sup>43</sup> Majansius 8:131. See also 8:182.

<sup>44</sup> Majansius 8:165–66. See Reinhardt, “Vives’s Auseinandersetzung,” p. 12.

<sup>45</sup> Majansius 8:166.

<sup>46</sup> Majansius 8:167.

<sup>47</sup> Majansius 8:167–174.

like seed cast on ground. To some persons, utterly compelling reason is suspect. *There are people who accept the probable for the absolutely certain and uncontestable. But the teaching of God was presented with such facility that it was accessible to people of every character, easily comprehensible by all;* to wit, in simple narrative, with examples and similes drawn from the most everyday matters. But what a depth of mysteries is concealed in this very simplicity!<sup>48</sup>

Vives suggests in effect that since the Gospels suit those for whom mere probability will suffice, they are ultimately (as *DVFC* Book Five will disclose) accessible to a larger audience even than the desired readership of his own *De veritate*.

The Gospels' stylistic assets include narrative constancy, complete continuity, gravity, and severity, but pointedly *not* anything at all humorous or ridiculous ("*nihil . . . prorsus jocosum aut ridiculum*") or showy, inane or otiose.<sup>49</sup> As they embody divine counsel, "it will be less surprising that there is nothing obscene or shameful as in the Qur'an of Muhammad or the pagan poets; no old wives' talk, ravings, or blasphemies as in the Talmud of the Jews or the majority of the philosophers."<sup>50</sup> By contrast, "In the Old [Testament] the language and the sentences are proper to boys, but in the New to men, although on occasion Christ spoke to his disciples, who were still Jews, in Jewish wording and custom."<sup>51</sup> Thus Vives is satisfied that he has established the credibility and stylistic felicity of the Gospels.

To sum up, in addressing both his critique of sacred scripture and his own task, Vives asserts that it is preferable for divine matters to be explicated under cover of metaphors that are corporeal and lowly rather than lofty. Vives offers these four arguments: Old Testament narratives are stylistically appealing, engaging, and edifying; Old Testament Law is childish and framed for a childish audience; the Old Testament requires meticulous interpretation owing to difficulties of language and style; and the New Testament puts truths simply, accessibly, and decorously. It is

---

<sup>48</sup> "rationes enim et argumenta non semper ex vi sua efficiunt, sed prout est ingenium in quod inciderunt, ut semen in terram. Aliis ratio fortissima suspecta est; *sunt qui verisimilem pro certissima atque indubitabili recipiunt: proposita est autem Dei disciplina ea facilitate, quae apta esset omnium ingenii, quam omnes facile caperent*, simplici videlicet narratione, exemplisque, et similitudinibus sumptis de rebus notissimis; at in hac ipsa . . . simplicitate . . . quanta occultatur altitudo mysteriorum." (Majansius 8:177; emphasis added.)

<sup>49</sup> Majansius 8:178.

<sup>50</sup> "minus erit profecto mirandum nihil in eis esse obscenum et turpe, ut in Alcorano Mahumedis, et apud gentium vates; nihil anile, delirum, blasphemum, ut in Thalmud Judaeorum et apud plerosque philosophos." (Majansius 8:178.)

<sup>51</sup> Majansius 8:182. Cf. Majansius 8:165 and 274.

doubtful that the first two of these assertions are completely consistent with each other, that sacred writings are by turns puerile and literarily sophisticated. One wonders if Vives is allowing his persuasive purposes to shape his discourse at the expense of fidelity to the evidence.

### *Book Three*

Since Vives himself is identifiable as the Christian interlocutor in *DVFC* 3 and 4, as noted earlier, any remarks by this Christian on the proper way to conduct the disputation are pertinent to the present inquiry. Further, the rational or contra-rational speech acts performed by the Christian may be analyzed as examples of discourse that Vives himself considers appropriate for his task. At the same time, the evidence is abundant that Vives does not really include Jews or Muslims among his anticipated readers.

In Books Three and Four, the extended presence of alternative voices in their own personae, despite the predictable stage-management of "closed" dialogue, leads to a loosening of the ground rules for legitimate argument.<sup>52</sup> Generally dispassionate discourse gives way to tension between the Christian and the resistant non-believer, and moments occur when the realism of individual-to-individual encounter unbalances the abstract ideal of pure adherence to reason. I have written more amply on this matter elsewhere.<sup>53</sup>

A problem arises when the Christian confesses ignorance of Hebrew.<sup>54</sup> The Jew wants to know how the Christian will understand him, even despite the use of specialists who can compensate for the Christian's lack of basic vocabulary. The Christian, after affirming reliance on qualified translators, finesses the question: he gets the Jew to admit that even among those conversant with Hebrew a multiplicity of opinions is

---

<sup>52</sup> Detailed examination of Vives's predecessors in the tradition of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic dialogues is beyond the scope of this essay. See Reinhardt, "Vives's *Ausinandersetzung*," pp. 9–11, and George, "Múltiples voces," pp. 96–107.

<sup>53</sup> Edward.V. George, "Rules of Engagement" (see n. 1 *supra*).

<sup>54</sup> Such ignorance, by the way, would serve to advertise the distance between the Christian persona, who is Vives himself, and his Jewish interlocutor; Vives's entire life-time corpus testifies to his concern to avoid identity with Jews or *conversos* (i.e. members of Jewish families converted to Christianity) in his writings. This concern will have deepened as he neared the end of his life; we may assume Vives was anxious to avoid leaving a doctrinally troubled legacy for his future widow to deal with.

possible, and darkness can be spread just as well by anger, envy, hatred, arrogance, and stubbornness as by linguistic disability. He and the Jew agree to eliminate these other obstacles and proceed by the light of reason, pretty much forgetting that the issue was the language.<sup>55</sup> The Jew, as rational, thereby distinguishes himself in Vives's eyes from the mass of his fellow believers.<sup>56</sup>

As noted earlier, the Christian interlocutor in Book Three makes it painfully obvious that he is no longer disputing with adversaries who exercise "native wit, judgment, wide-ranging knowledge, familiarity with the whole of ancient memory, attention of mind, and moderation", but now faces the Jews' "obstinate pertinacity, ignorance of the world, and a frenzied passion for condemning everything."<sup>57</sup> The implicit contrast, in the wake of Books One and Two, is between the Jews and Vives's ancient pagan adversaries. The particular agitation he shows in characterizing the Jews can be related to the agonized history of his own family.<sup>58</sup> The decree of 1492 requiring all Jews in the realm of Ferdinand and Isabella to convert or emigrate is well known. From the time of their implication in a clandestine Valencia synagogue in 1500, Vives's extended family endured decades of hounding by the Inquisition. His father was burned at the stake in 1524; the body of his mother, who died in 1508, was dug up and burned two decades later. Siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts suffered variously. Angelina Garcia summarizes:

Of all the great families, those of Vives and March [Juan Luis's maternal line] play leading roles in the Inquisitorial flood that engulfed Ferdinand's Valencia. A tragic fate seems to gravitate toward them and even toward their more distant relatives, afflicting them with *autos-da-fé*, physical punishment in processions, penalties of burning or the galleys, confiscation of property, and loss of life, or exile for anyone who can escape in time.<sup>59</sup>

In Book Three, Christian and Jew agree to a discussion free of rancor and committed to the truth as it manifests itself. The agreement, along with the aforementioned search for ways to overcome obstacles, founders in futility. Although the Jew has no more than twelve per cent of

<sup>55</sup> Majansius 8:271–72.

<sup>56</sup> Majansius 8:273.

<sup>57</sup> Majansius 8:255; quoted earlier, p. XXXX.

<sup>58</sup> See Angelina Garcia, *Els Vives: Una família de jueus Valencians* (Valencia, 1987), pp. 167–211. My translation.

<sup>59</sup> Garcia, *Els Vives*, p. 90.

the lines in the dialogue, there is much evidence for his characterization in the words of the Christian. These include recurrent insults, and repeated imputations that irrational Jewish hatred for Christ and Christians is what drives the Jews' anti-Christian convictions. There are no fewer than eleven occurrences in *DVFC* 3 of the word *odium*, each time bearing on the same point.<sup>60</sup>

A look at the introduction to the dialogue in *DVFC* 3 is immediately revealing.

Now comes the troublesome and perplexing part of this treatise: disputing against the Jews, a race of people affected by the most shameless stubbornness, *exacerbated by their hatred toward us and toward Jesus Christ the Son of God. . . . However, we will dispute in this case in such a way that if there were to be a [Jewish] interlocutor who was not rendered lost and hopeless by his malice and spite like the others, he could be brought around to a better mentality.* And to make our truth more manifest, we shall introduce a Christian along with a Jew who defends his faith as sharply and vigorously as possible, but who refrains from obstinately denying everything including obvious truth and yields to clear reason, arguing man to man in a disputation based sensibly on reason and judgment.<sup>61</sup>

The passage is remarkably self-reflective. Vives declares he will resolve the difficulty by fabricating a Jew who will listen to reason. The syntax suggests that though reasonable Jews might be found, such a discovery is rare or even impossible.

Consonant with the suspicion expressed here, the first words of the dialogue proper amplify the sense of cold reserve on the Christian's part. Unlike the amicable opening of the dialogue in Book Four (to be seen below), here is the beginning of the conversation in Book Three:

*Christianus*: What's that book you have in your hands? *Judaeus*: It is the book of truth, a holy book, our law written in Hebrew. *Chr.* Do you understand what you're reading there? Or is it a book that is closed to you, like that book mentioned in Isaiah...?<sup>62</sup> *Jud.* I am applying myself,

<sup>60</sup> Majansius 8:247 bis; 254; 263; 272; 323; 324; 325; 330; 356; 360.

<sup>61</sup> "Molesta pars huius operis et perplexa sequitur, disputandi adversum Iudaeos, genus hominum impudentissimae perversitatis, *quam odium exacuit contra nos et Iesum Christum Dei Filium. . . . Nos tamen de causa ita disputabimus ut si quis non sit aliorum similis, malitia et malevolentia sua perditus et deploratus, reduci ad mentem meliorem possit*; et quo manifestior fiat nostra veritas, Christianum introducemus, et Iudaeum sectam suam quam fieri poterit acerrime ac fortissime propugnantem. Sic tamen, ne obstinavit animo pernegare omnia etiam veritatis manifestae, sed qui credat apertae rationi, et homo cum homine humana ratione ac iudicio disceptante contendat." (Majansius 8:247–48; emphases added.)

<sup>62</sup> Isaiah 29:11.

and expending all my energy to understand it somewhat. *Chr*: If you reach the point of understanding truly and fittingly, you will at that point be a Christian, and you will seek baptism so that you can unite with the flock of the Catholic Church.<sup>63</sup>

If one needs evidence that Vives is unlikely to regard Jews as among his intended readers, this passage will serve well. The bluntness of the opening lines is startling. The immediate assertion that correct reading of scripture will lead straight to a desire for baptism implies that the Christian feels his arguments will inevitably lead to one conclusion—a rhetorically questionable affirmation at the beginning of an ostensibly persuasive process.

Indeed, the sense of condescension on the part of the Christian becomes more explicit a few lines along, in a passage quoted earlier: “*Christianus*: What do you think man is? *Judaeus*: Just what you see. *Chr*: You will reply more easily and profitably if you regard me as a teacher and not merely an inquirer.”<sup>64</sup> The Jew’s rejoinder sounds flip-pant; hence he needs to be dealt with strictly. The attitude harbored by the Christian toward the Jew in the dialogue as a whole, not just in these introductory passages, is strikingly different from that which he will show toward the Muslim in Book Four.<sup>65</sup> It is signaled even in the lemmata identifying the non-Christians. In Book Three the Jew is simply “*Judaeus*”; in Book Four the Muslim is “*Alfaquinus*”, from an Arabic word meaning “jurist” or “community leader”, thus one deserving special respect, rather than merely “*Mahometanus*” or “*Agarenius*” (“descendant of Hagar”).

The Christian quickly utters the two main points of his whole argument against Judaism. First, the Jews’ conception of God fails to do justice to his true nature and transcendence.<sup>66</sup> Secondly, Vives complains

<sup>63</sup> “*Chr*. Quisnam est liber iste, quem habes in manibus? *Jud*. Est liber veritatis, liber sanctus, lex nostra Hebraice scripta. *Chr*. Intelligisne quae isthic legis? An est liber tibi clausus, quemadmodum ille apud Isaiam...? *Jud*. Navo certe operam, et id quanto possum studio laboro ut aliqua intelligam. *Chr*. Si eo usque perveneris ut vere, et quemadmodum decet, intelligas, illico eris Christianus, et baptismum petes, ut sis de grege Ecclesiae catholicae.” (Majansius 8:248).

<sup>64</sup> “*Chr*. Quid tu censes esse hominem? *Jud*. Id quod vides. *Chr*. Facilius ac melius tu respondebis mihi docenti, quam simpliciter roganti.” (Majansius 8:249.) Compare Majansius 8:163 (in *DVFC* Book Two), quoted earlier (n. 37) “Non sic par est deum loqui homini, sed ut dominum servo, ut patrem filio, ut principem subdito, ut magistrum discipulo.”

<sup>65</sup> Noted also in Cantarino, “La polémica de Luis Vives,” p. 12.

<sup>66</sup> Majansius 8:250.

that in their insistence on literal understanding of scripture, rejecting any resort to reason or “human interpretation”, Jews deny themselves access to the true meaning of holy writ and the awareness of Jesus’s messiahship.<sup>67</sup> To support this claim Vives needs to account for the wealth of Talmudic commentary, which in general he dismisses as childish, although at one point he puts it this way: in the Talmud,

Each one insists on his own path, and those who are a little more sensible lean toward Christianity. Well then: do the sacred writings allow explication based on the judgment of sages among yourselves, but not in relation to us [Christians]? Don’t you realize that you are speaking out of personal caprice, and not from reason?<sup>68</sup>

The Jew then admits that the passage “Let us make man according to our own image and likeness” must be taken metaphorically; the Christian takes this as a hopeful sign.<sup>69</sup> He presses: Cannot “pork” stand for “uncleanness”? The Jew bristles, but admits his mentors employ “reason, judgment, learning.” The Christian replies: “You are gradually converging with me... We have no path or norm for understanding save our own mind,” though one must stop short of measuring divine reason by human reason.<sup>70</sup> The Christian gradually brings the Jew around by interpreting passages.<sup>71</sup>

But if wise man or a chaste woman says something unimportant, or inept, or off-color, in short anything beneath his or her dignity, we think we are doing wrong to them unless we transfer the remark to a sounder, loftier sentiment. You do this with the Canticle of Solomon, as is fitting. How much more appropriate is it to treat the words of God himself the same way? Because the Greeks esteemed their beloved Homer so highly, they brought him over from fables and frivolous preoccupations to thoughts of the utmost gravity;... but you deny equal veneration to the divine word, in treating which you accept literally and simply things uttered as metaphors, and even drag them through the mud. (Majansius 8:270.)

---

<sup>67</sup> Majansius 8:264; cf. pp. 247–50.

<sup>68</sup> “Quisque via sua insistit, et qui inter eos sunt paulo saniores christianizant: ergo inter vos sacrae litterae admittunt ex iudicio sapientum enarrationem, ad nos non admittunt? Num non sentitis loqui vos ex animi libidine, non ex ratione?” (Majansius 8:264.)

<sup>69</sup> Majansius 8:264–5.

<sup>70</sup> “Sensim ad me deflectis... non habemus aliam seu intelligendi viam seu normam quam mentem nostram.” (Majansius 8:265.)

<sup>71</sup> Majansius 8:266.

The Jews are inferior even to the Greeks, who surpassed them in seeing beyond the letter of a text. Thus ends Book Three, Chapter Two, “On Understanding Sacred Scripture”, which covers dialogically the same ground as found in the seventh chapter of *DVFC* 2, “On the Old Testament”, discussed above (p. 325 and n. 33 *supra*).<sup>72</sup>

On the text of the Old Testament, as I have noted, Vives is drawn to diverse lines of argument. He asserts that the tales contained there are worth the attention of the educated despite their humility; however, he also claims that the Law is cloaked in language suitable for the psychologically and spiritually undeveloped audience to which God, like an effective humanistic persuader, adapted it. Here, the Christian fails to show the obstinate Jew how passages considered messianically prophetic by the Christian point to Jesus and no one else.<sup>73</sup> Curiously, the Jew commends the Christian’s rationality and adds that his rabbis, wary of reason, have warned him he would find the Christians employing it:

*Jud.* You offer weighty reasoning; it squares with the advice of our rabbis that all your (arguments) rest upon reason and come from clever people, of whom you have had a great number. *Chr.* What a malicious calumny, that when the facts themselves strike your vision in the bright light of midday, you accuse the light itself!... Is reason not something that you and we all accept equally, always affording more vigor and clarity in the interest of the truth? (Majansius 8:300.)

At this late point in the dialogue, the Christian still needs to defend the theoretical premise of the entire conversation, i.e. the rejection of all emotion in favor of reason on which the interlocutors had presumably agreed at the outset, against rabbinical suspicion.

The Christian argues that since the Jews are seeking the wrong kind of messiah, an armed liberator, and since prophets are inscrutable except by careful analysis (“*nisi ex acri iudicio adhibeatur recta intelligentia*”), the Jews are vulnerable to the claims of any impostors who come along.<sup>74</sup> The prophecy recorded by Josephus and alluded to by Suetonius could only have referred to Jesus, who was the first to claim messiahship.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Majansius 8:263–71; in *DVFC* Book Two, see Majansius 8:160–67.

<sup>73</sup> Majansius 8:296–99.

<sup>74</sup> Majansius 8:305.

<sup>75</sup> Majansius 8:328. Josephus (*The Jewish War*, 6.312–14) cites a prophecy that a world ruler will come from Judea, and says it refers to Vespasian. Separately, Suetonius (*Vespasian* 5.6) records that Josephus predicted Vespasian’s ascent to the emperorship. These



Many impostors came later, including one executed by Charles V in Italy three years ago.<sup>76</sup>

With the arrival of the Holy Spirit after Christ's ascension, advises the Christian, the era when people served as each other's "authority, guide, and master in matters of piety, as among the pagan philosophers" is at an end. People now still teach one another, but under the tutelage of divine doctrine, and with the true ultimate end of humanity in mind, "which practically no one among the pagans, and among your [Jewish] population very, very few, knew."<sup>77</sup>

Nor was the Lord going to teach his followers what were the qualities or combinations of elements, or tropes or rhetorical figures, finally not some discipline for action or some manual art to be put into practice, but rather what is loftiest, what is the essential thing, without which we cannot be saved, unknown to the pagan sages whose summit of erudition took them to the ends of goods and evils. (Majansius 8:358.)

Divine inspiration will transcend the learning laboriously gathered through the liberal arts. "The ends of goods and evils" evokes Cicero's *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, one of Vives's ancient sources. In concluding Book Three the Christian traces the course of the Church through the centuries, arrives at a warning regarding the last judgment, and finally utters a plea that if anyone cannot accept Jesus without having it spelled out in black and white amid the complexities of the scriptures, "let him accept inference about the more obscure passages from the ones that are clear by use of the light of reason and judgment."<sup>78</sup>

Vives's *DVFC* Book Three is nowhere near as venomous as other briefs of the era like Martin Luther's notorious *On the Jews and their Lies*, which like the *DVFC* appeared in 1543.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, if judged by Vives's own rather high standards, the departure from strict adherence to reason, the animus toward the Jewish interlocutor and Jews in general, and the repeated reminders of Jews' hatred of Christians mitigate the Christian interlocutor's success in orchestrating a discussion

---

passages have a history of being united, and taken to mean that Josephus saw Vespasian as the messiah. See Tessa Rajak, *Josephus: The Historian and His Society* (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 191–92. On Jesus as the first messianic claimant, see Majansius 8:330.

<sup>76</sup> Majansius 8:330.

<sup>77</sup> Majansius 8:358.

<sup>78</sup> "ex manifestis sumat de obscurioribus conjecturam rationis luce ac iudicii adhibita." (Majansius 8:363.)

<sup>79</sup> Trans. Martin H. Bertram. In Franklin Sherman, ed. *Luther's Works: Volume 47, The Christian in Society IV* (Philadelphia, 1971), pp. 121–306.

free of emotional distortion. The occasional citation of classical views takes the reader back to what Vives views as a more rational encounter with the ancient pagan thinkers. I have analyzed elsewhere in greater detail the heated nature of Vives's presentation of his case against Judaism.<sup>80</sup> Further, Cantarino cites instances when Vives is deliberately misusing "rational argument".<sup>81</sup>

### *Book Four*

The Fourth Book starts thus:

Such a great part of the human race has been enslaved to the nonsense of Islamic fantasies that, to one who considers the phenomenon carefully, there is nothing more pathetic or worthy of astonishment and more truly pitiable. They have embraced beliefs which are refutable by the mere recitation. That recitation alone constitutes a self-attack, and causes its own destruction. So I do not so much fight with it as it fights with itself. I only wish it were as easy for them to give ear as it is to rebut them. (Majansius 8:364.)

Here, unlike the opening of Book Three, neither does Vives self-consciously express any tension over his task, nor does he ascribe any moral or ethical failings to Muslims other than rank stupidity. At the same time, he evinces no need to pre-fabricate a Muslim for purposes of rational discourse, as he did a Jewish character in Book Three. Meticulous interpretation of text is no longer necessary; in Vives's mind, there is a wealth of absurd Islamic doctrine that needs only to be quoted in order to be debunked.

Programmatic remarks on the envisioned readers, the adversary, and the author's relationship to them are less necessary in Book Four than in the Christian—Jew dialogue of Book Three, where the Christian was of course constrained to honor and reinterpret the Jew's sacred writings. But the principle holds that in observing the conduct of the Christian interlocutor, who is actually Vives himself, we are witnessing Vives's ideas for task-appropriate discourse in action. Also, we again find plenty of evidence that Muslims are not among Vives's envisioned readers.

---

<sup>80</sup> George, "Rules of Engagement," p. 31.

<sup>81</sup> Cantarino, "La polémica," pp. 29, 33.

Alongside Qur'anic passages, Vives focuses extensively on more bizarre and folk-tale-like writings of Islam which, following Christian scholars of his time, he implicitly takes to be essential to Islamic faith.<sup>82</sup> Simultaneously, the field is open for slurs of every kind against Muhammad, and by association the followers of Muhammad's era. But, curiously, this focus on Muhammad's failings results in more narrowly defined aspersions toward the Muslims of Vives's own day. Two inferences may be drawn: that Vives means to communicate and foster a more visceral hostility to the Judaic than to the Muslim audience; and that there is less risk in exhibiting friendship toward Muslims than toward Jews.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to notice an important related publication: Theodor Bibliander's controversial Islamic encyclopedia, *The Doctrine and Qur'an of Muhammad*, which appeared in the same year and under the same publisher's imprint as the *De veritate*.<sup>83</sup> This is a three-volume collection of Islamic sources and Christian critiques that came to press after a controversy over whether Christian eyes should be exposed to the Muslims' own texts, a controversy which Martin Luther was instrumental in settling. Luther, like Vives, was confident that letting the Muslims' writings speak for themselves would facilitate their condemnation.<sup>84</sup>

Items in Bibliander's anthology include Robert of Ketton's landmark 12th century Latin translation of the Qur'an;<sup>85</sup> the *De generatione Mahumet, & nutritia eius* (*On the Birth and Upbringing of Muhammad*) and *Chronica mendosa & ridiculosa Saracenorum, de uita Mahumetis & successorum eius* (*Lying and Laughable Chronicles of the Saracens on the Lives of Muhammad and His Successors*); and the *Doctrina Mahumet* (*The Teaching of Muhammad*; here abbreviated as *DM*), all the last three translated from Arabic sources into Latin by Herman of Dalmatia, a 12th century priest who spent time in Spain.<sup>86</sup> Herman considers the *DM* authoritative for Muslim

<sup>82</sup> Noted in Cantarino, "La polémica," p. 17.

<sup>83</sup> *Machumetis Saracenorum principis, eiusque successorum vitae, doctrina, ac ipse Alcoran*, etc., 3 vols. (ed. Theodorus Bibliander, Basel, Oporinus, 1543). I have used those contents of the 1550 edition which duplicate the 1543 version.

<sup>84</sup> James Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam* (Princeton, 1964), p. viii.

<sup>85</sup> "The first, complete translation of the Qur'an into any Western language." Thomas Burman, "Tafsir and Translation: Traditional Arabic Qur'an Exegesis and the Latin Qur'ans of Robert of Ketton and Mark of Toledo," *Speculum* 73 (1998), 704.

<sup>86</sup> For extensive background on Bibliander's publication see Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable*, and Hartmut Bobzin, *Der Koran im Zeitalter der Reformation: Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Arabistik und Islamkunde in Europa* (Beirut, 1995).

believers, but James Kritzeck rejects Herman's claim as an exaggeration and adds: "Bibliander's gloss to the effect that it was written by 'another prophet of the same spirit [as Muhammad's]' and 'accepted among the authentic books' is, of course, quite false."<sup>87</sup> Nonetheless, Vives treats the *DM* with the weight accorded to it by Herman and Bibliander, thus exposing a variety of Islamic folk literature to lampoon under the assumption that it serves as serious Islamic doctrine. The *DM* is itself an imaginary conversation between Muhammad and Abdallāh ibn-Salām, one of a delegation of Jews who have come to inquire regarding Muhammad's message.<sup>88</sup> The interview covers assorted topics: the authenticity of Muhammad's mission, the creation of the universe and of mankind, the symbolic meaning of the numbers one to 100, a number of riddles, descriptions of paradise and hell, and so on.

The dialogue in *DVFC* Book Four opens in an atmosphere of friendship. The elegant, polite first exchanges contrast immediately with the opening of the Jewish encounter in *DVFC* 3 cited above.

*Christianus*: Didn't you find these little walks pleasant, like the charming murmur of this brook gently gliding among the pebbles? *Alfaquinus*: I have never been so refreshed by any sight. What an impressive display of the sky: what striking colors of the land! *Chr*. Surely the handiwork of an impressive creator. *Alf*. Yes, of course. *Chr*. How much greater do you think he is than the excellence of his creation? *Alf*. Beyond anyone's imagining. . . . *Chr*. Well then, he must be infinite, in both essence and potency. *Alf*. He certainly must. *Chr*. And supremely good, wise, and happy, and everything else one could think of. *Alf*. He is indeed all these things. Tell me: do you not think the same of him? *Chr*. In fact I think I am convinced of nothing more truly or definitely. But I have wished to hear what you believe: come now, recount it, hold to it as we converse, and do not stray from it in any way at all. (Majansius 8:364–65.)

<sup>87</sup> Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable*, p. 90. Bibliander's gloss: see *DM*, in Bibliander, ed. *Machumetis Saracenorum principis*, p. 189.

<sup>88</sup> See Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable*, pp. 89–96. My article "Rules of Engagement" includes detailed examination of Vives's ways of adapting episodes from the *DM*. Imam Mohamed El-Moctar of the Islamic Mosque in Lubbock, to whom I am indebted for many hours of consultation on *DVFC* Book 4, refers to traditions of interaction between Muhammad and Jews, sometimes friendly and sometimes hostile, and cites Abdallāh ibn-Salām as one of Muhammad's traditionally accepted Jewish conversants. Cf. A.J. Wensinck, *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition* (Leiden, 1971/1927), p. 3, s.v. 'ABD ALLĀH b. SALĀM. I assume all responsibility for comments made by me with Mr El-Moctar's assistance.

The rush to get on with disputation in Book Three is replaced in Book Four by an amiable litany of theological convictions shared by the Christian and the Muslim. Brusque inquiries initiating Book Three give way to the Christian's express desire in Book Four to hear the Muslim's faith explicated. The conversants agree on a range of matters: the dual nature of man, the primacy of the will, the importance of intelligence and memory, human immortality, fulfillment of human destiny by obedience to divine law.<sup>89</sup> Of his preceptor, however, the Muslim affirms:

He endorsed the Islamic law, and he followed Muhammad's directions in forbidding us to dispute or investigate about it at all. He commanded us rather to hold firmly to the traditions of our ancestors, and not to deviate from them by as much as a hair's breadth.<sup>90</sup>

How, then, does the author orchestrate a conversation with a nonbeliever who is presumed forbidden in principle to dispute?

*Chr*: All right, then, I do not want to dispute with you now about your sect, since (as you declare) that is so explicitly and ominously forbidden by your lawgiver. All I ask of you is that we join in investigating the reason why he has so diligently forbidden all disputation; for it cannot be that he did this without a motive. *Alf*: To be sure, he did not. *Chr*: Tell me then, what might we reckon that this motive was? *Alf*: Because among the populace there are very many, the majority of whom are unlearned, slow-witted, unintelligent, who if you asked them the explanation of matters so sublime, would get upset. Doubts would be sown among them, and they would incur a loss of faith. Don't you also forbid disputation about your faith? (Majansius 8:367)

The Christian even agrees that "there is danger when uneducated and ignorant people expound on the mysteries of religion," but this does not apply to the wise and learned, who are even obligated to engage

---

<sup>89</sup> Majansius 8:365–6.

<sup>90</sup> Majansius 8:366. See Sura 29:46: "And dispute ye not with the People of the Book except with means better (than mere disputation), unless it be with those of them who inflict wrong (and injury)." Translations of the Qur'an are from *The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an*, ed. and trans. 'Abdullah Yūsuf 'Alī (Beltsville, MD, 2001). Cf. Johannes Ehmann, ed. *Ricoldus de Montecrucis Confutatio Alcorani (1300): Martin Luther, Verlegung des Alcoran (1542)* (Corpus Islamo-Christianum, Series Latina 6, Würzburg, 1999), p. 116 and Ehmann's notes on Ricoldus's report of Muslim scholars' reluctance to dispute with him. Mr El-Moctar notes the distinction between *jidāl*, positive discussion aimed at securing the truth, which is acceptable; and *mira'a*, a negative concept, argumentation for the sole purpose of winning, which is rejected.

in such inquiry.<sup>91</sup> Despite the inscrutability of the divine mind, “When one pursues the rationale behind religion, it is not utterly absolute certainty that is being sought, but only whatever human genius is capable of attaining.”<sup>92</sup> Thus disputation is nothing to be afraid of, because the possible outcomes are not restricted to attainment or non-attainment of absolute certainty; the humanistic acceptance of probability makes its appearance. Diligent exercise of human reason can sometimes bring truth from obscurity. In addition, the Christian accuses Muhammad of grievous and habitual inconstancy, “since elsewhere he says: ‘Always converse with everyone except those who are malicious, disputing in honest language.’ Therefore he does not entirely reject disputation.”<sup>93</sup> Past events please memory; the truth pleases reason; but, asserts the Christian, Islam’s “princes and leading scholars” decline to examine past events or exercise reason. In Christianity, by contrast, “the most religious people are the most learned.”<sup>94</sup>

By now the Muslim’s affirmed obligation to avoid disputation is forgotten. But an ascent to the realm of pure reason is not thereby achieved, nor does the author pretend that this has happened. The Christian’s rejection of the Islamic claim that the Paraclete of the Gospels refers to the coming of Muhammad contains an extraordinary passing admission:

I observe an intense, vicious hatred between your people and ours. Those on one side abandon all human feeling and treat those on the other side like dogs, not human beings. Is it not the same between us and the Jews, and between the Jews and you?<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup> Majansius 8:367.

<sup>92</sup> Majansius 8:368.

<sup>93</sup> Majansius 8:370. See n. 90 above.

<sup>94</sup> Majansius 8:370–71. The criticism concerning arts and culture can only be leveled in disregard of many phenomena, for example the periods of Islamic cultural achievement in the Iberian peninsula itself. Cf. the Aristotelian commentator Ibn Rushd (Averroes), 1126–1198, of whose thought María Rosa Menocal says: “Neither faith nor reason was to have precedence (this would necessarily lead to tyranny of one over the other), but rather each was to have a generous and uncompromised place at a table where both could share in the banquet of truth.” María Rosa Menocal, *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Boston, 2002), p. 209. On the other hand see Vives’s harsh criticism of Averroes in the *De causis corruptarum artium* (Majansius 6:191–98).

<sup>95</sup> Majansius 8:378–79.

Again, feelings (*affectus*) on *all* sides among the People of the Book are acknowledged, and implicitly compromise the adherence to rational discourse.

Any doubt over whether Muslims are envisioned among Vives's expected readers is intensified by Vives's sarcastic focus on folktale-like stories gleaned from the *Doctrina Mahumet* and other non-Qur'anic writings which, if taken as material for deep Muslim belief, are vulnerable to ridicule. Here I offer just a few examples.<sup>96</sup> Miracles attributed by Islam to Muhammad, but not in the Qur'an, are "silly", "absurd", and "obviously fabricated;" such as his experience with a fragment of the moon, or the talking camel.<sup>97</sup> "Could anyone listen to this and not laugh?" jokes the Christian.<sup>98</sup> The Christian decries what he calls the Muslims' corporeal concept of God, borne by angels on a chair,<sup>99</sup> or touching Muhammad with his hand.<sup>100</sup> I have discussed elsewhere how in his chapter "On the Natural World" (Majansius 8:395–400) Vives takes engaging tales from the *Doctrina Mahumet* (miraculous doings on the ark; marvels of cosmic geography; the evil creatures spying on Allah's plans in heaven), treats them as sacred Islamic doctrine, and immerses himself in what one may only call perverse delight at the

<sup>96</sup> More details may be found in George, "Rules of Engagement," pp. 20–26.

<sup>97</sup> Majansius 8:380.

<sup>98</sup> The moon story: apparently a folk tale with a Qur'anic source. Cf. Sura 54:1: "The hour (of Judgement) is nigh, and the moon is cleft asunder." 'Abdullah Yūsuf 'Alī, trans., *The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an*, ad loc., describes three interpretations of the passage: 1) "that the moon once appeared cleft asunder" before Muhammad; 2) that the cleaving of the moon will be a sign of approaching judgment; 3) "the phrase is metaphorical, meaning that the matter has become as clear as the moon." Mr El-Moctar alludes to such a metaphorical reference in current Arabic discourse. Cf. Ehmann, *Ricoldus de Montecrucis*, p. 60 and note a. On the talking camel: see briefly Ehmann, p. 168, with a possible connection to an animal that spoke to Muhammad on his celebrated night journey (Ehmann, p. 144 and notes).

<sup>99</sup> Sura 69:16–17: "And the sky will be rent asunder, for it will that Day be flimsy, and the Angels will be on its sides, and eight will, that Day, bear the throne of thy Lord." See 'Abdullah's comment ad loc.: "The whole picture is painted in graphic poetical images, to indicate that which cannot be adequately described in words." Sura 51:47 refers to the "hands" of Allah in creating the firmament. In Sura 48:10 the hand of Allah is over the hands of believers. Cf. Ehmann, p. 190. Anthropomorphic portrayals of God "were later the object of exegetical and theological dispute." Louis Gardet in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, ed. Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb et al. (Leiden, 1969), 1:409. "The picture of Allah in the Qur'an employs distinctly anthropomorphic language (referring, for example, to the divine eyes, hands, and face), which, virtually all commentators have long agreed, are to be taken figuratively." Daniel Peterson in *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, ed. Richard C. Martin (N.Y., 2004), 1:40. Mr. El-Moctar notes that to a Muslim, ascribing a body to God would be blasphemy.

<sup>100</sup> Majansius 8:387.

potential for humor latent in these tales, even betraying in the process his own pleasure in clever and absorbing narratives.<sup>101</sup> Likewise, the Christian dismisses the extended, sensational, explicitly detailed passages from the *Doctrina Mahumet* on the Day of Judgment, and derides Islamic ideas of the afterlife as excessively material rather than intellectual and spiritual.<sup>102</sup>

Vives's Christian speculates on the reasons, none of them necessarily rational, for the vast size of the Muslim following. Monotheism was better than idolatry; some Christians' faith was too shallow to withstand the new religion; or, "No one is more tenacious in following Islam than the blind and the deaf, who don't wish to hear or see anything at all."<sup>103</sup> Finally, and extraordinarily, luck has been on Muhammad's side:

For that era, along with the one that followed after him, has been permeated by ignorance; all the light of literature is extinguished, and the armies of the Christians are either under attack and entangled in desperate combat, or completely at rest and lulled to sleep, as in Spain, where owing to prolonged peace and inactivity, Muhammad gained strength and encountered no intellectual or physical resistance.<sup>104</sup>

One notes Vives's drastic telescoping and confusion of the sequence of events, his combination of cultural and martial reasons, and his disregard for the tradition of learning in Islamic history, of which we know he was aware from his allusions to Averroes and Avicenna. Capricious use of tenses again clouds understanding of the passage.<sup>105</sup> It appears that we are observing Vives's reaction to the situation in Spain described by Cardaillac, in whose analysis the Muslims were

---

<sup>101</sup> George, "Rules of Engagement," p. 25.

<sup>102</sup> Majansius 8:413–18.

<sup>103</sup> Majansius 8:402.

<sup>104</sup> "erat aetas illa, et fuit deinceps post illum, plena inscitiae, extincta luce omni litterarum, Christianorum armis afflictis et implicatis bello gravissimo, aut prorsus quiescentibus et consopitis, ut in Hispania ex longa pace ac desuetudine, invaluit ille sine repugnantia ingeniorum et lacertorum." (Majansius 8:402.)

<sup>105</sup> The language of lament over cultural decadence echoes the discourse generally of Vives's *De causis corruptarum artium*, a part of the *De disciplinis* of 1531. We may assume that the first part of the either—or statement refers to the Turkish threat; Suleyman was on the threshold of conquering Hungary at the time of Bibliander's publication and the appearance of the *DVFC* (Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable*, p. vii). Note Vives's picture of the uncultured Turk in his *De conditione vitae Christianorum sub Turca* (Majansius 5.458).



anything but run out of the country, especially in Aragon, where the nobles were for leaving them unconverted.<sup>106</sup>

Book Four ends with a brief catalogue of the constraints which Vives claims were created by Muhammad to minimize defections, in lieu of a believable doctrine: “the execution of those who contradicted the Qur’an;” prohibitions against meeting in disputation with people of other sects or trusting anyone but other Muslims; and complete separation from outsiders with the affirmation, “My law for me, your law for you; you are under no obligation arising from what I do, and I in turn am free from constraint by any of your practices. With these defenses,” Vives concludes, “any provision authored by any idler, procurer, or tyrant will be safe.”<sup>107</sup>

As with the Jew in *DVFC* Book Three, all thought of the Muslim interlocutor is quite forgotten in this abrupt, dismissive conclusion. The perceptions of Muhammad as degraded and the Qur’an and other Islamic writings as silly are sufficient, in the Christian’s mind, to finish off the claims of Islam. The likelihood that Vives envisioned the Islamic audience among his readers, despite the relatively kinder treatment given Islam than Judaism, is seriously compromised by the relentless blackening of Muhammad’s character and conduct.

### *Why the Use of Dialogue?*

At this juncture, we are in a position to cast further light on the question why Vives switched so abruptly to dialogue at all when launching into Books Three and Four. It is necessary to appraise the view implied by Francis Cranevelt, Vives’s longtime friend and the editor of the posthumous *DVFC*, when he remarked on the end of Book Two, where Vives was discussing theodicy. The immediate question at that point is what becomes of those who lived before Christ or never heard the Gospel. Vives simply advises: “Do not explore things that are too deep; be

<sup>106</sup> Louis Cardaillac, *Moriscos y cristianos: Un enfrentamiento polémico (1492–1640)* (Madrid, 1979), pp. 43–44. See my discussion in George, “Rules of Engagement”, pp. 26–30, of the position of Muslims in Spain, especially the region of Valencia.

<sup>107</sup> Majansius 8:427. “Being largely a reflection of the post-Prophetic experience, hadith—the reports that are believed to document the words of the Prophet—stipulate, at variance with the Qur’ān, that the apostate should be punished by death.” Wael Hallaq in *Encyclopedia of the Qur’ān*, ed. Jane D. McAuliffe (Leiden, 2001), 1:120, s.v. “Apostasy.”

content to think upon the commands God has given you.”<sup>108</sup> Regarding predestination, “All these matters are shrouded in ignorance.”<sup>109</sup> “It is sufficient to worship the divine plan without investigating it; hence Paul, considering the darkness and frailty of our understanding, . . . sternly rejects those who pry into that question, and concludes, ‘O the depth of the riches!’”<sup>110</sup> Here Book Two ends. Cranevelt thereupon implicitly attributes the sudden appearance of dialogue in the following book to Vives’s rhapsodic helplessness before the profundity of his topic:

Owing to the untimely loss of this great man, we have this “portrait of Venus”, as it were, in a not entirely finished form. [An allusion to Apelles, the ancient painter, follows.] . . . *We see the second book breaking off suddenly, deterring [Vives] at the precipice from proceeding further*, as if he were penetrating too far into the inquiry of divine matters, seeing that they are too deep for the grasp of human mind and intelligence.<sup>111</sup>

We know, at least, something about the literary model to which Vives appealed. Gregorio Mayans y Siscar, Vives’s great 18th century editor, asserts:

It will not be out of place for the reader to be acquainted with the reason why Vives wrote Books Three and Four of the *De veritate fidei Christianae*, against the Jews and the Mohammedans, in dialogue form. Beyond a doubt, [Vives] imitated Luis Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón, Canon of Gandía, who in 1535 had brought out the “Christian Dialogues against the Mohammedan Sect and the Obstinacy of the Jews,” a work singular for its rarity and learning. Vives transformed it into his own vital essence, and employing his abundant erudition and judgment, recast it into a more elegant treatise.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Majansius 8:244, quoting Eccles. 3:22.

<sup>109</sup> Majansius 8:244. See Majansius 8:129–30, and discussion above, pp. 323–24.

<sup>110</sup> “O altitudo divitiarum!” Majansius 8:244; cf. Rom. 11:33.

<sup>111</sup> “Sed immatura tanti viri mors effecit ut hanc Venerem non penitus absolutam habeamus . . . *Videmus finem libri secundi in abruptum quiddam desinentem, et praecipitio deterentem ab ulteriore* ceu nimia rerum divinarum investigatione, quando supra captum sunt humanae mentis atque ingenii.” (Majansius 8 init., unnumbered p. 3, from Cranevelt’s Prefatory Epistle. Emphasis added.)

<sup>112</sup> “Non ingratum erit lectori noscere causam, ob quam Vives scripserit dialogisticè tertium et quartum librum operis, *De veritate Fidei Christianae*, adversus Judaeos et Muhammedanos; nimirum imitatus fuit Ludovicum Bernardum Perez de Chinchon, Canonicum Gandiensem, qui anno 1535 ediderat Valentiae sermone Hispano Dialogos Christianos contra sectam Muhammedanam et pertinaciam Judaeorum; opus raritate, et doctrina praestans, quod Vives in succum et sanguinem proprium convertit, et eruditione et judicio quo pollebat in concinniore methodum redegit.” (Majansius 1, Mayans y Siscar’s *Vita Vives*, p. 167.)

Mayans refers to Pérez de Chinchón's *Diálogos cristianos contra la secta mahometa y contra la pertinacia de los judíos*.<sup>113</sup> These dialogues, whose relatively irenic tone resembles and even surpasses that of *DVFC* 3 and 4, appeared in print the same year as Vives's previously mentioned 1535 letter to Don Juan de Borja. Unsurprisingly, Pérez de Chinchón was a cleric in the service of Borja.<sup>114</sup>

In light of the observations I have offered, it is possible to see the switch to dialogue fitting into the thematic trajectory of the *DVFC*, which may be summarized as follows:

PRAEFATIO: Purpose outlined.

BOOK ONE: The groundwork for the author's case is initially laid purely in reason, appealing frequently to ancient pagan opponents and corroborators, progressing gradually to inclusion of revelation as a resource. Probability is sometimes the only attainable standard.

BOOK TWO: Vives applies rational analysis to the revealed and historical sources for the life of Christ and to the arduous but successful history of the Church.

BOOK THREE: Vives descends to the "troublesome" ("*molesta . . . et perplexa*", Majansius 8:247) portion of the author's task, namely confronting Judaism. The adoption of dialogue vividly embodies the anticipated reason—emotion struggle. Rational exchange is clouded not only by Jewish stubbornness, puerility, and deceit, but also by the Christian's own prejudicial assumption of ethical misconduct on the part of Jews as a critical motive behind Jewish anti-Christian belief. The book ends with no person-to-person resolution between the interlocutors. The reason—emotion struggle is unresolved.

BOOK FOUR: Still on the fundamental level of direct engagement comes dialogue with a Muslim, representing the other population previously identified as particularly susceptible to emotion. However, this dialogue is conducted with more respect for the adversary. Further, while Muslims are taxed with stupidity for swallowing the message of Islam and its purportedly reprehensible founder, nonetheless they are

<sup>113</sup> Valencia, 1535. Cf. Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano: bibliografía general española e hispano-americana*, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1948–1977) 13: 43.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. n. 7 above. For further background on Pérez de Chinchón see Valentín Moreno Gallego, *Juan Luis Vives en la España moderna: Fama y fortuna de su figura intelectual* (Valencia, 2006), pp. 345–50; Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón, *Antialcorano: Diálogos Cristianos*, ed. Francisco Pons Fuster (Alicante, 2000), Introduction, pp. 7–60; and on his connection to the Borja family, Erasmo, *Preparación y aparejo para bien morir*, trans. Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón, ed. Joaquín Parellada (Madrid, 2000), Intro., pp. 50–53.

not counted guilty of the broad range of ethical failures with which Jews were charged in the previous book. This book, like Book Three, ends with neither person-to-person resolution between the interlocutors nor a disposal of the reason—emotion struggle.

BOOK FIVE (as I will note): Re-ascending from the polemic tension of dialogue, the author recapitulates his case. He now claims certainty regarding the essentials, and in the process returns frequently to ancient Greco-Roman sources, which were cited more rarely in Books Three and Four. Having based his exposition on both reason and revelation, Vives now feels free to assert categorically the superiority of the Christian faith. Probability as the achievable standard has been surpassed.

In other words, the dialogues in Books Three and Four are emotionally suitable to the manner of explicating the themes of the *DVFC* as a whole.

Further, if the *DVFC* overall was actually intended for Christian readers, there is yet another way in which the resort to dialogue has a practical value. One may view the *DVFC* broadly as a combination of *praecepta* for disputing with nonbelievers (Books One, Two, and Five) alongside *exempla* (Books Three and Four) in the form of model exchanges to which a Christian might resort for use in conversation with Jews or Muslims. In 1538 Vives published a revised version of his 1520 *Declamationes Sullanae*, a series of rhetorical compositions dramatizing the Roman Republican dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla's abdication. In the dedicatory epistle to the 1538 revision, after listing political, not merely rhetorical, lessons to be learned from the declamations by Vives's young protégé, Cardinal William Croy, Vives observes: "I allude to all these things in the following declamations. What is communicated in other works by precept is presented here by examples."<sup>115</sup> In *DVFC* 3 and 4 the exposition by dramatic exemplar occurs once again.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>115</sup> "Haec omnia in his declamationibus adumbrantur; et quae alibi praeceptis traduntur, hic exemplis." (J.L. Vives, *Declamationes Sullanae: Part One*, ed. Edward V. George (Leiden, 1989), pp. 16–19.) See also Edward V. George, "The *Declamationes Sullanae* of Juan Luis Vives: Sources and Departures," *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 38 (1989), 144–45.

<sup>116</sup> Vives's late interest in dialogue is also attested by the appearance in 1539 of his celebrated *Exercitationes Linguae Latinae*, the oft-published dialogues for learning Latin.

*Book Five*

Book Five is subtitled “On the Preeminence of Christian Doctrine,” rehearsing the case against the three adversarial audiences, pagan, Jewish, and Muslim, while implicitly acknowledging that the drama of the dialogues in Books Three and Four has not ended in unbelievers’ simple capitulation.<sup>117</sup> The ancient pagan voices, pro and con, resume the prominence they enjoyed in Books One and Two.<sup>118</sup> Self-reflective comments as found in the earlier books are now rare; the work of establishing discursive premises has by and large been completed by this point. What does occur is a series of affirmations early in the book indicating that in view of the arguments already provided, satisfaction with probability is no longer necessary. Vives implies that revelation, presented to an audience that is grounded in employment of reason and committed to following scripture and logic attentively, has triumphed.<sup>119</sup>

Vives is now out of patience with those who conclude in frustration that Moses, Jesus and Muhammad are all lying impostors, and that the only way to master a population is with the *appearance* of religion, promoted by ancients like Minos, Lycurgus, Sertorius, and even Scipio the Elder.<sup>120</sup> An “impious” skeptic, appearing in a brief prosopopoeia, concludes that only the facade of religion can keep the masses under control, and that Jewish, Muslim, and Christian claims are all unconvincing. To which Vives replies in an apostrophe of his own:

If your mind could stand a modest exertion of thought and consideration, this question would not be so hard for you. How would you act if you were sitting in judgment between an accuser and a defendant?

---

<sup>117</sup> The evidence does not support Cantarino’s view (“La polémica,” 11) that the focus of *DVFC* 5 is on heresies.

<sup>118</sup> See, for example, Vives’s extended admonishment in Book 5 (Majansius 8:432) of Pliny the Elder’s atheism, embodied in Pliny’s assertion “For mortal to help mortal, that is God.” (*Historia naturalis* 2.18.)

<sup>119</sup> On the role of reason in perceiving the divine word see Reinhardt, “Vives’s Auseinandersetzung,” pp. 13–16.

<sup>120</sup> Majansius 8:428. Minos, ruler of Crete, was reputed to be the son of Zeus: Homer, *Iliad* 13.449–50. Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver, claimed that the Delphic oracle declared him a god: Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 5.4. Sertorius, in his breakaway Spanish regime, acquired a white fawn which he claimed was a gift of Diana, who allegedly imparted secrets to him: Plutarch, *Sertorius* 11.2. An entire legend credited Scipio Africanus with divine or godlike status. Cf. Henry Hayes Scullard, *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician* (Ithaca, NY, 1970), pp. 18–23.

Would you withhold judgment simply on the ground that the prosecutor was affirming and the defendant denying? ... You nitwit! Listen, consider, compare, weigh the arguments on each side; then you will easily attain the truth and the ability of judging correctly. [If you do the same with the assertions of the three faiths,] it will be no trouble at all to discover what is closest to the truth; for I am confident that I have easily done well by the Christian claim in the previous books. (Majansius 8:430.)

In the wake of Vives's apologetics, probability is forgotten; Christianity, unlike ancient pagan persuasions, is not mere manipulation; reason and attention having been deployed, and full revelation having arrived, the choice of the right religion is now easy. Knowledge of the nature of God has been instilled at birth; union with him is possible for mankind through love, as enabled by the incarnation of Christ, which takes humanity beyond the faith of the Jews.<sup>121</sup> Here Vives cites Aeneas of Gaza, a late fifth century Platonist converted to Christianity, for making a division between pre- and post-Jesus Platonists; Vives says Aeneas credited the latter with reinterpreting classical poets on a loftier moral plane (Majansius 8:434).<sup>122</sup> The new assurance of truth has further effects. Ever since the enlightenment bestowed by Christ, poetry has become loftier, as even Jews and "gentiles" now agree. Even women ("*mulierculae*") of our era now can claim better understanding than philosophers of old. Others teach practical matters like astronomy, botany, medicine, etc.; Christ, "master of heavenly wisdom", teaches what is ultimately necessary.<sup>123</sup> Christianity has elevated literature. Again Vives's animosity toward the paganizing Italian humanists lurks implicitly.

Having compared Christian and non-Christian views of divine power, Vives affirms continuity between secular and sacred knowledge. Others reject various disciplines, he continues: the Epicureans spurn dialectic, the Muslims prohibit disputation about their beliefs; but to Christians, who fear no clash between faith and reason, all sciences are open.<sup>124</sup> Since all of reason's achievements as reflected in any of the sciences and disciplines inevitably harmonize with the fruits of Christian revelation, reason provides the gateway to apologetic discourse.

<sup>121</sup> Majansius 8:431.

<sup>122</sup> *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Arthur Hilary Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967), p. 484, n. 3, cites *Theophrastus, or, On the Immortality of the Soul and the Resurrection of the Body* (J.-P. Migne, ed., *Patrologia Graeca*, 85:965–1004) as Aeneas' only surviving work other than 25 short letters.

<sup>123</sup> Majansius 8:435.

<sup>124</sup> Majansius 8:435.

Christian piety, which infuses God's love in human hearts, is the remedy for all emotions. The unutterable tranquility called *euthumia* by Aristotle belongs to one for whom God alone is beloved. That *euthumia*, which the ancient philosophers named rather than manifested, can only arise from love. The associated desire for wisdom is realistic not just for men but also boys and even women.<sup>125</sup> Vives's confidence here that even children and females now have access to deep truths harmonizes poorly with his previous worry that entrusting theological exposition to ordinary people is reckless, and belies his cautious earlier preference for learned readers.<sup>126</sup> In my view, the inconsistency indicates apologetic progress through the *DVFC* itself from hopeful exposition for a mixed audience early in Book One to exuberant, doubt-free reveling in the fruits of a doctrine decisively proven for all honest people by Book Five.

There remains, however, a paradox, observed when one compares Vives's portrayal of Old Testament language, modified by Yahweh for presumably obtuse and immature Hebrews, with his presentation of New Testament revelation that speaks even to dull-witted populations all the way down to women and children. Adapted divine communication is condescending in the first instance; why not in the latter? It is not clear that Vives has worked out the inconsistency. This is a matter that deserves further exploration.

### *A Dying Humanist's Fears*

Despite the advertised arrival at theological certainty, Vives's interaction with his readers and his choice of language strategy undergo a brief crisis at one point toward the close of the *DVFC*, when he examines how Christians surpass people of the other three persuasions—Jewish, Muslim, pagan—in dealing with riches, prosperity and adversity, and death.<sup>127</sup> Old age is not identified as a main topic, but it assumes a focal status in the discussion. Here occurs a new emphasis on the author's personal intuitions, possibly growing out of the issues that faced him as he contended with terminal illnesses. One will not be

<sup>125</sup> Majansius 8:437.

<sup>126</sup> See Majansius 8:25 (he worries about getting dull-witted readers) and Majansius 8:367 (his Christian interlocutor agrees with the Muslim that it is dangerous for unlettered and ignorant people to expound on divine mysteries).

<sup>127</sup> Majansius 8:439–49; Chapters 7 and 8, *De prosperis et adversis* and *De morte*.

surprised at intimations that the threat of imminent death affected his work. The readers envisioned by Vives remain the same, but darker, more personal broodings emerge, even to the point of lost clarity and occasional inconsistency. If Carlos Noreña is correct that the *DVFC* is “the most important document left to us for appreciating the religious life of the Jewish convert when the end of his earthly existence was well in sight”, this self-revelatory interlude in turn may be the most valuable part of the document for gaining this appreciation.<sup>128</sup> It also invites us to consider how, or whether, it is consistent with the way of communicating that Vives recommends for the style of apologetics adopted in the *DVFC*. Along with this now more personal level of discourse, Vives falls back on his lifelong familiarity with humanistic literature, finding both adversaries and supporters among classical witnesses.

Pagan philosophers spurn riches; Jews and Muslims are materialistic; but we detached Christians, boasts Vives, know we are pilgrims on earth. Paul recognizes the brevity of life. Cicero has Cato conclude commendably, “I depart this life as if leaving a roadside inn.”<sup>129</sup> Prosperity is like the sirens’ song to Odysseus, dragging us off track. For adversity the ancients had no answer. Cicero offers cold reassurance, counseling “that it is unmanly to groan or torture oneself when in agony—as if our soul could rest in the comfort of public office or honor when the bitter clusters of pain close in upon the body.”<sup>130</sup> And Vives claims that Christians excel in handling death, whereby they escape the ills of this life and revolting old age.<sup>131</sup> Socrates’ assertion that death is either a sweet sleep or great felicity is dismissed as a mere shot in the dark. Vives forgets, or lays aside, his earlier conflicting use of Socrates’ argument found in Plato’s *Phaedo* that man’s desire for knowledge and wisdom is unfulfillable in this life, hence there must be an afterlife.<sup>132</sup> Here begin several pages of somber musings on both old age and death.

<sup>128</sup> Carlos Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives* (The Hague, 1970), p. 118. Noreña’s statement is perceptive even if not completely accurate; Vives was not personally a convert.

<sup>129</sup> Majansius 8:438. Vives quotes Paul at 1 Cor. 7:29. In attributing to Cicero the statement by Cato “Ego sic exeo e vita tanquam e diversorio,” Vives adapts Cicero, *De senectute* 84: “ex vita ita discedo tanquam ex hospitio, non tanquam e domo. Commorandi enim natura deversorium nobis, non habitandi dedit.” (“Thus I depart from life as from a temporary sojourn, not from home. For Nature has given us a roadside inn for a brief stay, not for permanent habitation.”)

<sup>130</sup> Majansius 8:439. Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 2.31.

<sup>131</sup> Majansius 8:441.

<sup>132</sup> Majansius 8:104. Plato, *Phaedo* 66.d–e.



People ask: when dying, what should we fear: that which precedes death or that which follows? If extinction ensues like a dreamless sleep, then we will have left behind all the torments of life and we won't be unhappy.<sup>133</sup> But if the soul is immortal, then great felicity awaits us, toward which we should hurry at full speed. The pagan philosophers inculcated, emphasized, and embellished this felicity. But they were merely speculating. Vives proposes to examine their view point by point.

Facing the claim that one should not shrink from death, seeing that it ends pain, Vives asks: what of someone who is young and healthy? Vives allows such a man to state his own case in a prosopopoeia: "Let me live as long as my strength holds out. When it fails, I will leave gladly. If old age approaches and is as bad as you say, I will be happy to trade it in for death."<sup>134</sup> Vives then moves from the young to the aged. Why fear old age, he asks, when we see so many vigorous old people? One need not even appeal to the long-lived ancients Isocrates, Gorgias, Cato, etc.; one may find plenty of common citizens in their eighties in our own cities and towns, as strong as people in their twenties.<sup>135</sup> Vives quotes Gorgias: "I have no quarrel with old age."<sup>136</sup> He directs the reader to Cicero's *On Old Age*, so rich a treatise that the Greeks saw fit to translate it into Greek.<sup>137</sup> Cicero has pleaded the cause of old age so eloquently that Vives declares himself freed of the need to do so.<sup>138</sup> While the endorsement framed in the first person makes this an unambiguous remark, it is hard to reconcile with the earlier assertion that Christian ready acceptance of death facilitates the bypassing of the "sickness" of old age.<sup>139</sup>

Anxiety follows over the passage from this life.<sup>140</sup> Even the Epicureans are moderately commended for their freedom from fear of death.<sup>141</sup> Victims of ruined old age like Priam, Cyrus, Pompey and Crassus may be balanced by the contrary examples of Marius, Sulla, Augustus,

<sup>133</sup> Majansius 8:441–42.

<sup>134</sup> Majansius 8:442.

<sup>135</sup> Vives cites the ancients named in Cicero, *De senectute* 22–23.

<sup>136</sup> Majansius 8:442–43. Cicero, *De senectute* 13.

<sup>137</sup> Majansius 8:443. See Theodorus Gaza, *M. Tullii Ciceronis Liber de senectute in graecum translatus*, ed. Ioannes Salanito (Leipzig, 1987), first printed in 1517.

<sup>138</sup> Majansius 8:443.

<sup>139</sup> "morbus;" see Majansius 8:441, cited above.

<sup>140</sup> Majansius 8:443–46.

<sup>141</sup> Majansius 8:444.

Claudius, and Tiberius, who surmounted misfortunes later in life.<sup>142</sup> The mixed moral reputations of the latter group, however, make them a rather wry selection. Caution is advised against elation in prosperity or depression in disaster, following Seneca.<sup>143</sup>

“To your exhortations toward death” (*“istis tuis ad mortem exhortationibus”*, Majansius 8:444–45) Vives opposes the voice of the “fortunate” man, in a prosopopoeia that reads like a fragment of a speech, cataloguing reasons against abandoning attachment to the pleasures of life. In alluding to “your exhortations” Vives appears to treat the reader, rather suddenly, as a counselor who must deal with the following thoughts of the hypothetical lucky fellow:

The goods I have now I see, feel, and enjoy, and I hope for greater ones to come. I definitely believe that I will preserve them. Those evils which you hold up to me are doubtful. Why do you bid me let go of what is certain and present out of fear over uncertainties, which may never come to pass?<sup>144</sup>

The fortunate speaker counters Vives’s frequent theme that one who relies ultimately on secular, material goods will ultimately be betrayed.

Is there a third possibility alongside immortality and extinction, asks Vives, namely that the soul stays a while after the body and is subject to eventual death? The Stoics held that a person who died pure would inhabit heaven, but otherwise, unable to fly up, would then suffer punishment and die. “It is this second death that I fear,” admits Vives, in a striking use of the first person singular that reinforces the sense that his own experiences are weighing on him.<sup>145</sup> As for non-sensation after life, perhaps that would satisfy those who live only for the body, but not for me, Vives affirms. The passage deserves extensive quotation, for the way in which it fuses his theological ponderings with a sense of anxiety about what awaits him at the end of his life and in the grip of his final trials:

Before I was born, I had no awareness of life. Now, having been born, I have experienced not only life, but those things than which you assert

<sup>142</sup> Majansius 8:444.

<sup>143</sup> Majansius 8:444; Seneca, *Thyestes* 615–18.

<sup>144</sup> “Quae nunc habeo bona video, sentio, fruor, et majora spero; certe puto haec me conservaturum. Illa quae tu ostendis mihi mala, in incerto. Cur jubes me certa et praesentia deserere metu incertorum, et fortassis quae non contingent?” (Majansius 8:445.)

<sup>145</sup> Majansius 8:446.

there is nothing greater or more valuable: I have contemplated sensation, mind, reason, judgment, this lovely variety and beauty of the world. I have seen and touched this stupendous theater of nature; I have comprehended, and continue to comprehend, many things by mind and reason. For me, to be deprived of those wonderful goods indeed strikes me as so monstrous an evil that I can find no consolation. For a child or a lunatic, in short for any who grasp fleshly life alone and live in slavery to pleasure, perhaps it would be no sacrifice to arrive after death at the place where they were before birth. But for me, who live in reliance upon my reason and judgment, intolerable: not because, willy nilly, I would be in a different condition after death if I have no sensation; but because right now, as I think about it, there is no solace at hand except the hope that, for the time that is allotted to me to remain alive, I may at least enjoy as long as possible that blessing which is so similar to the divine nature. Or do you not know that poverty is harder for someone who was once rich? ... I ponder what that future may be like when I sense nothing. It strikes me as a horrifying void; I fail to grasp, my soul is terrified, it shrinks and trembles at the very thought, which it cannot endure; how much worse the actuality?<sup>146</sup>

The slide into horrified declarative assertions (“*Chaos videtur...horribile, non assequor, terretur animus, ...nec pati potest*”) startles the reader, as if in his disquiet Vives has forgotten that the expectation of non-sensation after life is the very prospect against whose possibility he has so insistently argued. Momentarily, his universe, in which the present is but a dismal prelude to fulfillment after death, is turned upside down. Momentarily, the present, the brilliance of this theater of nature, is all. Five books of applied reason and response to revelation, not always untainted by *affectus*, are for an instant rent as the author gives way to his visceral abhorrence before a vision of oblivion.

---

<sup>146</sup> Antequam nascerer, nullum habebam vitae sensum; nunc posteaquam sum natus, expertus sum non solum vitam, sed ea quibus vos ipsi affirmatis nihil esse majus aut praestabilius: sensus, mentem, rationem, iudicium, hanc mundi varietatem et pulchritudinem sum contemplatus, hoc admirandum naturae theatrum vidi, tetigi, mente et ratione multa sum consecutus et consequor. Istis me orbari tantis bonis, hoc vero ita mihi videtur malum, ut nullam inveniam consolationem. Puero vel dementi, iis denique qui vita solum corporea usurpant, et voluptatibus dediti vivunt, fortassis non molestum fuerit eodem esse loco post mortem quo ante vitam fuerint. Mihi vero, qui ratione, qui iudicio innixus vivo, intolerabile; non quod tum post mortem, velim nolim, si nullus est sensus, alia futurus sim conditione, sed quod nunc mihi reputanti nullum potest solatium adhiberi, nisi saltem in vita manere quamdiu licet, et bono isto tam simili divinae naturae quam diutissime perfrui. An nescitis duriores esse egestatem ei qui aliquando fuerit dives? ... cogito quid tandem illud futurum sit quum nihil sentiam; Chaos videtur mihi esse horribile, non assequor, terretur animus, vel solam cogitationem refugit, nec pati potest; quanto magis aditum? (Majansius 8:446.)

Recovering, Vives agrees with Cicero on belief in an alert immortality and with Socrates insofar as the latter proposed his “dreamless sleep” to the carnal public, but another vision to his disciples.<sup>147</sup> No one, says Cicero, would want Endymion’s fate.<sup>148</sup>

But what of the prospect of punishment for the wicked, which a just afterlife would require? That tradition came in the form of fabled sinners in poetry (Ixion, Sisyphus, Theseus, Phlegyas) which the philosophers rejected and derided. The babbling of Plato and certain other philosophers about punishment alongside reward did not gain credence.<sup>149</sup> Even those who retailed these ideas did not believe in them. Otherwise, asks Vives, why did Cicero not include the passage about immortality from the *Dream of Scipio* among his “consolations”?<sup>150</sup>

The great declaimers of Seneca’s era pondered whether Cicero should beg for his life from Antony; they always advised against it, and held out the prospect of a martyr’s glory.<sup>151</sup> But, “What did that man have to do with glory who wrote two books about, or rather against, glory?”<sup>152</sup> Why do those orators light on glory as the persuasive argument, while declining to urge contempt for earthly life and desire for immortality in the next world, following Cicero’s own words in the *Dream of Scipio*?<sup>153</sup> In other words, Vives apparently thinks Cicero’s hypothetical declamatory pagan counselors gave the right advice (to welcome death) for the wrong reason (to gain glory). Vives adds disdain for any afterlife economy that leaves the wicked unpunished, despite his earlier mockery of the ancients’ fanciful visions of tortured sinners.<sup>154</sup> Desire for union with God is the ultimate consolation in want, exile, prison, sickness, or torments, or “in the body’s deterioration through age”.<sup>155</sup>

<sup>147</sup> Majansius 8:446–47.

<sup>148</sup> Majansius 8:447. Cf. Cicero, *De finibus* 5.55. The moon goddess Selene cast the mythical youth Endymion into an eternal sleep so she could kiss him endlessly. (Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.92.)

<sup>149</sup> Majansius 8:447.

<sup>150</sup> Majansius 8:447.25–28; cf. Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis* 13 and Juan Luis Vives, *Somnium et Vigilia in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. and trans. Edward V. George (Greenwood, SC, 1989), pp. 72, 123.

<sup>151</sup> See Seneca, *Suasoriae* 6.7, and Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 3.8.46.

<sup>152</sup> Majansius 8:447. Petrarch lamented the loss of Cicero’s two books *De gloria*. See Pierre Nollac, *Pétrarque et l’humanisme*, 1 (Paris, 1965), pp. 260–68. Vives implies that Cicero disparaged glory. But see Cicero, *Pro Archia* 26.

<sup>153</sup> Majansius 8:447.

<sup>154</sup> Majansius 8:448.

<sup>155</sup> “ingravescente per senium corpore,” Majansius 8:449.

In sum, the discussion of “death” is embroidered with ponderings and literary recollections on old age, and colored by the author’s own unease. In the process, Vives’s train of thought becomes hard to follow, by turns evincing attitudes of abhorrence and attachment toward earthly life, senescent or otherwise, and hesitating over whether we should resist or welcome death. One senses, especially seeing the irruption of the first person singular, that Vives’s own situation has intruded. At the end of his life *ratio* and *iudicium* run afoul of intense personal anxiety. If one wished to find an unfinished part of the *DVFC*, these remarks on old age and death would be the place to look.

The last chapter forms a *peroratio*.<sup>156</sup> The goodness of God, without which humanity is hopeless, anchors the recapitulation. Without Christ every person is utter vanity. A brief apostrophe to “you blind and demented people” laments the rejection of the goodness, wisdom, peace of soul, protection from the devil, and recompense for our sins that God offers. Pleas for assent and fidelity follow, marked by a stream of imperative gerunds and gerundives (*confugiendum*, *rogandum*, *implorandum*, *perpendendae*, *considerandae*, *elicienda*).<sup>157</sup> Vives reminds the reader that his treatise has relied heavily on *rationes*, and that those who do not accept his arguments are either prevented by habit, or stupid and dull, or perverted by vice, in any case dominated by the brute animal part of their nature. Emotion is the enemy of reason.<sup>158</sup> Notwithstanding his expectation of resistant adversaries and readers, Vives closes with a prayer to Jesus to open the eyes of the blind.

By couching his train of argument in the form of response to three adversary audiences—pagan, Jewish, and Muslim—Vives found a framework for his apologetics that generally sidestepped the burning theological issues that were tearing Europe apart.<sup>159</sup> Except for his rejection of the notion of two separate truths, rational and revealed, the closest he came to chastising contemporary or near-contemporary Christians was in his explicit and implicit rejection of decadence in the predilections of some of the Italian humanists; but even these castigations are peripheral, and may be taken as supplementary to his

<sup>156</sup> Majansius 8:454–58.

<sup>157</sup> Majansius 8:456–57.

<sup>158</sup> Majansius 8:457: “invisam habet rationem affectus.”

<sup>159</sup> Moreno Gallego, *La recepción hispana*, 492, finds the *DVFC*, like others of his works, “ambivalent between Catholic and Protestant spirituality.” Moreno Gallego, p. 500, counts Vives’s adversaries as pagans in Books 1 and 2, Jews and Muslims in Books 3 and 4, and heretics in Book 5. Again, I fail to see a focus on heresies in the last Book.

criticisms of ancient pagan failings, which the Italians are faulted for keeping alive. At the same time the evidence is compelling that Vives did not frame his apologetic in such a way as to envision Jewish or Muslim adversaries among his readers. There are impulses of personal animus, notably his criticism of the Jews for malevolence and lack of integrity; his unrelenting derision of Muslim writings, to the limits of hilarious joking; and his concluding descent into gloomy deliberations over old age and death. The very choice of dialogue in Books Three and Four represents his boldness in fusing *praecepta* with *exempla* in his distinctive humanist apologetics. He recognizes that adherence to pure “reason and judgment” in religious disputation is a good, even necessary, idea, however poorly he himself measures up to it; but he does not hesitate to illustrate how, when it is put into practice in the real world, some degree of failure is inevitable.<sup>160</sup>

---

<sup>160</sup> To the list of important studies of the *DVFC* must now be added Marcia L. Colish’s bibliographically rich article, “The *De veritate fidei christianae* of Juan Luis Vives,” in *Christian Humanism: Essays Offered to Arjo Vanderjagt on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. Alasdair A. MacDonald, Zweder von Martels, and Jan R. Veenstra (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 1–25, for which the author has generously shared the proofs with me. Dr. Colish broadens the rhetorical—stylistic approach of my own essay with further theological and historical analyses to which this short notice cannot do justice. She perceives in the *DVFC* a desire “to accent so far as possible the positive aspects of Judaism” (p. 18). In this connection she cites Vives’s recommendation of Philo as a guide for Jews (Majansius 8:270) “in place of the grandstanding, over-subtle, and fraudulent rabbis”. He thus implicitly recommends for Jews “a spiritualised approach to the Old Testament and to ethics alike” (p. 20). Where I have proposed that Vives’s intended audience is actually Christians and not nonbelievers, Dr. Colish goes further, and argues specifically that *conversos* and Moriscos are the principal Christians whose faith he means to strengthen (p. 3). The evidence amply supports her view. She sees that Vives’s willingness to encourage “*converso* assimilation” and “concern with Morisco conversion” is “rather at odds with sixteenth-century Spanish attitudes” (p. 5) which endeavor to perpetuate Old Christians’ superiority over New Christians. Dr. Colish also called to my attention Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2008). Meserve analyzes how Renaissance historians crafted differing narratives of Turkish origins, picking and choosing sources for varying rhetorical or propagandistic purposes. While I do not embrace the issue of the Turks in the focus of this chapter, humanist historiographers’ habits as explicated by Meserve bring to mind Vives’s inclusions and exclusions when selecting or bypassing material from the Islamic tradition to suit his invidious portrayal.



## FAME AND OBLIVION\*

Enrique González González

During the first two thirds of the sixteenth century the writings of Juan Luis Vives (Valencia, 1492/3—Bruges, 1540) enjoyed exceptional prestige, both in the Catholic world and among the reformed. His books circulated also in the Spanish and English colonies of America, and the Jesuits brought him with them as far as Goa in India. It may be said without fear of error that the Valencian was, after Erasmus, the most read humanist of the sixteenth century. Nonetheless his publishing success plummeted rapidly beginning in the third quarter of that century until it fell into almost total oblivion by the second half of the seventeenth century. His works were published much more than a thousand times, more than 250 times in France, slightly less in Germany, and they had an enormous diffusion in the presses of Italy, the Low Countries and England. They were also printed, but much less frequently, in Spain. In addition, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries they were translated into English, Spanish, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Czech, Polish, Russian and Hungarian. Nevertheless, even today, many specialists in the Renaissance and humanism continue to have a very vague idea of what his name and his writings signified for a long period of time. Such ignorance is owed, in great measure, to the almost complete lack of studies about his diffusion in various regions.<sup>1</sup>

How can one explain the contrast between a century-long oblivion, which in many cases extends to the present day, and the popularity he enjoyed in his own day? This question requires various answers. In the present study I focus on one of them, proposing a general overview, a sort of geographical map of the vast propagation of his works in print. At first I will approach the vast extent of the diffusion of his works,

---

\* Translated into English by Charles Fantazzi.

<sup>1</sup> For a general synopsis see Enrique González González, with the collaboration of Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Una república de lectores. Difusión y recepción de la obra de Juan Luis Vives* (Mexico City, 2007). The present study resumes some themes treated there with greater amplitude and documentation, (cited henceforth as *Una república de lectores*). Concerning the Spanish reception of Vives we now have the exhaustive study of Valentín Moreno Gallego, *La recepción hispana de Juan Luis Vives* (Valencia, 2006).



giving an account of the individual fortune of each of his writings. Then I will make reference to the decline in the diffusion of his works in print in almost all of Europe beginning in the last third of the sixteenth century, and I intend to explain such a fall in popularity in relation to the religious and political upheavals that took place as a result of the Reformation. Since I focus on the diffusion of his works in print, I will only touch on the usual complement to this: the phenomenon of the reception of his writings among readers of very different categories. These were, on the one hand, men and women of the street, ignorant of Latin, who resorted to translations; students also read him when they had recourse to their manuals, especially of grammar; lastly, his writings of a learned character were studied by a restricted minority of professional scholars: philologists, men of learning, doctors, jurists and theologians. For reasons of space, I shall not examine this aspect in depth, nor another fundamental matter that related to the gradual rejection of the figure of Vives in consequence of his twofold condition of being a Catholic and a Spaniard, in an atmosphere dominated by the struggles between papists and Protestants, and between supporters and enemies of Spanish hegemony in Europe.

### *The Rise to Celebrity*

During his life, which lasted less than half a century, Vives published some sixty titles of very different dimensions, some consisting of a mere proemial epistle, printed on one page while others were voluminous treatises. The near totality of his works was compiled in Basel, in 1555, in two folio volumes which comprise almost 1,732 pages. To this are to be added almost 200 folio pages of the *Commentary on the City of God* of St. Augustine, which was not included in the Basel edition.<sup>2</sup> The twenty-six years that intervene between his first known printed work (1514) and his death reveals an enormous work discipline to bring such a copious volume of writing to fruition. The necessity to publish his works and the effort to avail himself of competent printers and booksellers brought him into constant contact with this small world. In the

---

<sup>2</sup> For a description of the first editions and principal collections and studies see *Edicions princeps*, eds. Enrique González González, Salvador Albiñana y Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez (Valencia, 1992). In subsequent citations *Edicions* and catalogue number.

long run these efforts proved decisive in guaranteeing the vast diffusion attained by his works.

Vives abandoned his native country at the age of 16 or 17, too young to publish. His first printed works appeared at the end of his stay at the University of Paris, between 1509 and 1514.<sup>3</sup> The symposium, *Jesu Christi triumphus*, and the sum total of prefaces and declamatory pieces entitled, with a certain presumptuousness, *Opera*, both from the year 1514, were destined for his students and barely transcended the scholastic ambience for which they were intended. They consisted of youthful works in which he did not even demonstrate—a capital sin for a humanist—an ample mastery of Latin.<sup>4</sup>

In 1519, while he was residing in the university city of Louvain, Vives published a compilation of fifteen *Opuscula varia*,<sup>5</sup> a compendium of his literary production from his Paris sojourn until then. Together with writings about Cicero and Virgil there were several declamations, a very brief history of philosophy (still very much appreciated in the eighteenth century) and above all, the invective, *In pseudodialecticos*, which was turned into a sharp weapon against the scholastic professors in the universities, just when the pressure exerted by the humanists was requiring the introduction of academic reform in Germany and simultaneously there was great agitation in England, Paris and Louvain. The short work was reprinted, in that same year of 1519, in Séléstat in the booming publishing firm of the Erasmian printer, Lazare Schürer.<sup>6</sup> Today exemplars of this edition are found in almost a dozen libraries, from Uppsala to Seville, an unmistakable sign of a circulation throughout Europe.

At the beginning of 1520, in Antwerp, Vives published two new titles with clear polemical overtones. One was the *Declamationes Syllanae* (Sullan Declamations),<sup>7</sup> in which he restored eloquence as an alternative

<sup>3</sup> Described in *Edicions*, nos. 1–5. Now to be added is Marcus de Schepper, “April in Paris (1514): J.L. Vives editing Baptista Guarinus. A New Vives ‘Princeps’, a New Early Vives Letter and the First Poem in Praise of Vives,” *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 16 (2000), 195–205. Critical editions of almost all of these early works have been published in J.L. Vives, *Early Writings* 1 and 2, eds. Constant Matheussen, Charles Fantazzi, Edward George and Jozef IJsewijn (Leiden, 1987 and 1991).

<sup>4</sup> On this early literary production see *Edicions*, pp. 31–37. Jozef IJsewijn comments on these early attempts at Latin by Vives in his introduction to *Early Writings* 2 (Leiden, 1991), pp. 16–17.

<sup>5</sup> *Edicions*, no. 7.

<sup>6</sup> *Edicions*, no. 8.

<sup>7</sup> *Edicions*, no. 14. Edward George edited the first two of these (Leiden, 1989).

to the dialectic of the university “sophists”. On the back of the title page Erasmus praised Vives in hyperbolic terms: he had deserted the sophist camp to hoist the banner of the followers of more peaceful Muses; sharp-witted, a man of tenacious memory, such was his eloquence, joined with erudition and philosophical profundity, that one day he would eclipse the name of the Rotterdamer—such was Erasmus’ eulogy. Vives republished them in Basel, in 1538, in a miscellaneous volume, *Declamationes sex*.<sup>8</sup>

The second title of 1520 was a double commentary on Cicero’s *Dream of Scipio*, entitled *Somnium et Vigilia in Somnium Scipionis* (A Dream and a Vigil upon the Dream of Scipio).<sup>9</sup> It consisted, first of all, of a satire, “A Dream upon a Dream”, in which the author, transported to the land of the somnolent, saw the Scholastic philosophers embracing shadows and chimeras until they dissolved into them. The other piece, “A Vigil Upon a Dream”, commented, in a serious tone, on the philosophical implication of Cicero’s *Somnium*. Thanks to Erasmus, the book reappeared in Basel in 1521, from Froben, which resulted in its vast diffusion, evidenced by the fact that today at least fifty copies of it exist in numerous libraries. It came out again in Basel in 1544, and in the following year in Venice. In 1555 it was included in the *Opera omnia*. In 1630 Joannes Fridericus fused his commentary with those of Vives and Heinrich Wolff, according to the notice on the title page. It reappeared in Linköping, Sweden, in 1708, proof that it was still being read.

Vives was not yet thirty years old when these writings launched him into literary fame with the support of the enthusiastic praise of his master, Erasmus, Thomas More and Guillaume Budé, the most famous of the French humanists. The encomiums appeared in the popular epistles of Erasmus and Budé, which were frequently reprinted. Vives was mentioned with high praise but he also appeared as a correspondent in these epistles and as an effective mediator in the quarrels between the Frenchman and the Dutchman.

<sup>8</sup> *Edicions*, no. 15.

<sup>9</sup> *Edicions*, no. 11. Jean Thibault published it in Antwerp but his printing contained so many errors that Erasmus had him reprint it in Basel in 1521 (*Edicions*, 12). Edward George published a critical edition of the work, *The Dream of Scipio* (Greenwood, 1989).

In such favorable circumstances the young man was invited by Erasmus to join his vast publishing enterprise. Erasmus had published the New Testament and various fathers of the church according to the philological canons of humanism. He entrusted Vives to edit and comment on Augustine's *City of God*, a vast encyclopedia of Roman history and mythology. Dominican and Franciscan authors had annotated the book, employing the scientific resources available to them, with inevitable errors. Vives emended the text of Augustine, collating various manuscripts, and elaborated an impressive critical apparatus of variants, difficult passages, names, places and works cited. This vademecum of the classical world was newly brought up to date. It was not a theological commentary, but it could not avoid the great debates of the moment, which were treated here and there. *En passant*, he caustically criticized the previous commentators, all of them ignorant, like good friars. The polemical proclivity put in its appearance once again.

In 1522 Froben published the annotated edition, in Basel, in luxurious format.<sup>10</sup> Its great bulk and price—as both Froben and Erasmus affirmed—made it difficult to sell. The relation of both men with Vives soured<sup>11</sup> and until the master's death the disciple was excluded from the influential presses of Basel, something which he much regretted. In 1529 Erasmus published the *Opera omnia* of Augustine in ten tomes. In the fifth he included the text of the *City of God* prepared by Vives (with some modifications), but without the notes. The Valencian had recourse to Paris and in 1531 Claude Chevallon reproduced the Augustine of Erasmus, but unlike the latter, in tome 5 he published the *City of God* with Vives's commentaries, revised by the author.<sup>12</sup>

From 1531 on, with rare exceptions, the editions of Augustine all over Europe reproduced Chevallon, including the edition of Froben's sons in Basel, from 1541 to 1543. Thus, the corrected and annotated text of Vives was during a century and half the new *vulgata*, since it survived Catholic censorship, save for a few cuts. In Venice, the Erasmian edition of Augustine of 1554 (*Signum spei*), included the commentaries eliminated in the reprints of 1570 and 1584, which did not mention

<sup>10</sup> *Edicions*, no. 16.

<sup>11</sup> The best synopsis of this conflict is given in *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, eds. Percy S. Allen, Helen M. Allen, Heathcote W. Garrod (Oxford, 1906–1947), introduction and notes to Ep. 1309.

<sup>12</sup> *Edicions*, no. 17.

the names of Erasmus and Vives, but preserved the texts edited by both of them.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the Louvain theologians expurgated the *Opera* of Augustine, made no mention of the name of Erasmus and added a censored version of the commentaries.<sup>14</sup>

In diverse formats the editions of the *Civitas Dei* annotated by Vives numbered almost twenty-five during the sixteenth century and reached eighteen in the following century. Since publishing Augustine was a costly venture, various booksellers in Paris and Lyons joined forces to put out a cooperative edition and prorated the copies. Later each partner advertised himself with his own title page, hence the numerous variants in the same printing. Such a complicated publishing history makes it difficult to classify the editions, but it also bears witness to the demand for the work. Together with Augustines's text Vives's notes passed into many languages. They appeared five times in French, in Paris, between 1570 and 1610; twice in English (London, 1610 and 1620); three times in Dutch, although in this case there was only a selection from the notes, as anonymous comments (Delft-Leiden, 1621; Amsterdam 1646 and 1660).

The readers of volume five went from the text of the saint to the notes of the commentator, as can be seen in such different readers as Fray Alonso de la Veracruz (c. 1507–1584), first professor of biblical studies in the University of Mexico, the famous Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474–1566),<sup>15</sup> and Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), who cite and gloss the *City of God* in their writings. In one passage of the *Essais* (I, 21) Vives is named as a *glossateur*, and occasionally the information quoted comes only from the annotations.<sup>16</sup>

The version delivered to Chevallon in 1531 introduced changes to the 1522 edition. Vives expanded some glosses, eliminated or shortened others, and corrected errors. The changes do not indicate any self-censorship; on the contrary he confirmed what he said on thorny

<sup>13</sup> This was a blow against Erasmus, general editor of the *Opera*. The general characteristics of the edition, which were unrivalled at the time, were preserved, but not the names of the editors.

<sup>14</sup> *Edicions*, no. 18.

<sup>15</sup> *The Writings of Alonso de la Vera Cruz*, ed. Ernest J. Burrus (Rome, 1968), p. 95. Enrique González González, *Joan Lluís Vives. De la escolástica al humanismo* (Valencia, 1987). Prólogo de Mariano Peset, p. 58.

<sup>16</sup> I follow the Gallimard edition of the *Oeuvres complètes*, eds. Albert Thibaudet et Maurice Rat (Paris, 1964), p. 101. The influence of Vives is noted also at II, 5, p. 349, where there is a discussion of torture, and at II, 12, pp. 537, 556. See Andrée Comparot, *Amour et vérité. Sebon, Vivès et Michel de Montaigne* (Paris, 1983) with bibliography.

questions. At 19.6 Augustine repudiated the judicial use of torture, saying that whoever suffers such pain gives proof that he is lying. Vives commented passionately on this passage, branding torture as a practice of tyrants, alien to all humanity and unworthy of Christian meekness. With clear allusion to the Inquisition he denied that it was a most religious (*religiosissima*) practice. The passage appeared in 1522 and 1531. In the intervening period between these two editions, Vives's father was consigned to the flames, in 1524, for confessing to be a heretic by means of torture. Despite the risk Vives stood by what he said.<sup>17</sup> The author of the *Essais* condemned torture, using arguments from Augustine and Vives (2.15) without giving the source. Montesquieu and Voltaire, heirs to the French aversion for Vives, approved the words of Montaigne. The Inquisition did not dare to censure Augustine, but it did censure Vives.

The prestige of the humanist was not confined to learned circles. In 1524 he presented himself to the general public and to students with two writings: the *Institutio feminae Christianae* (Antwerp, Hillen) and the *Introductio ad sapientiam* (Louvain, Martens).<sup>18</sup> The first work and its counterpart, *De officio mariti* (On the Duties of the Husband) reached a total of about 56 editions. Medieval writers on the education of women, like Francesc Eiximenis spoke about the young unmarried girl, the married woman, the widow and the nun. Vives passed over the last option in silence, since he assigned a completely secular role to women, in the bosom of the family, with no option for the convent. In 1529 Vives agreed to write *De officio mariti* also, and in 1538, from Basel Thomas Winter disseminated the Latin text of both treatises, revised by the author,<sup>19</sup> throughout Europe, at first each separately, but already in 1540 and again around 1541 both treatises in a single volume, with the addition of two letters for the instruction of young boys and girls, which gave the ensemble the tone of a handbook for the education of the whole family.

Unlike the other writings of Vives, the treatises on the woman and the husband circulated more in the vernacular than in Latin, undoubtedly

---

<sup>17</sup> Enrique González González, "Vives: un humanista judeoconverso en el exilio de Flandes," in *The Expulsion of the Jews and their Emigration to the Southern Low Countries (15th–16th c.)*, eds. Luc Dequeker and Werner Verbeke (Louvain, 1998), pp. 35–81.

<sup>18</sup> *Edicions*, no. 21. No critical edition exists.

<sup>19</sup> *Edicions*, nos. 22 and 31. Critical editions of both works exist, ed. Fantazzi and Mathecuessen (Leiden, 1996–1998) and ed. Fantazzi (Leiden, 2006).

because they were addressed to lay persons. We have knowledge of some fifty editions in various languages in comparison with six in Latin. Except for the case of the English (c. 1527) and the Spanish (1528) versions, there are no studies that establish the fidelity and the originality of the translations into each language. There were three distinct French versions of the treatise on women, which totaled some 25 editions between 1542 and 1587. The one by Pierre de Changy was the basis for a re-translation into Dutch (Antwerp, 1554). In Germany both treatises appeared in Augsburg (1544) and in Frankfurt (1566). Italian versions were printed in Venice and Milan. After such great popularity they ceased to be printed almost at the same time: in Italian in 1561, in Spanish in 1584, in English in 1592, in French in 1587. The reasons for this sudden oblivion are still to be explained.

Under the title *Introductio ad sapientiam* Vives grouped four short works—he soon added a fifth—destined for the moral and grammatical education of children. The first, the *Introductio ad sapientiam* itself, was a short “path to virtue”, with sententious and concise phrases (their number oscillated between 595 and 603) that were easy to remember. It opened with the affirmation that the beginning of wisdom is to know oneself and concluded with the saying that the goal of wisdom is to know God. As a companion piece, in an even more epigrammatic style, the volume included the *Satellitium animae* (the Escort of the Soul) a collection of apophthegms or moral emblems dedicated to the Royal Princess, Mary Tudor. The third and fourth pieces presented a very different character. They were a pair of epistles designed as an initiation to grammar. But for Vives and the majority of humanists the literary formation of youth was inseparable from their moral formation, the goal of the first two works.

Undoubtedly to fill a blank page, in the re-edition of 1526 he added a fifth piece, the *Addita in Suetonium*, a philological exercise reconstructing the initial page of the biography of Julius Caesar, which according to Vives came down to us “acephalous”. This last very brief piece, a bit foreign to the quartet we have described, had an enormous success when it was edited with the text of Suetonius itself. In Paris Simon de Colines added the little essay of Vives to his 1527 edition of the *Lives of the Caesars*. From then until the beginning of the seventeenth century more than fifty printings of the *Lives* in Paris, Lyons, Cologne, Basel, Antwerp, Frankfurt and Leiden included it. It was translated into French (Lyons, 1556, 1569; Paris, 1570), English (London, 1606), Dutch (Amsterdam, 1617), and Italian in the eighteenth century (Venice, 1738).

Much of the success of the *Introductio* resulted from the versatility of texts that were so accessible to the average reader of Latin. It was viewed equally as a scholastic manual for grammatical exercises and good morals and as a mirror of princes, or as a method for the suitable presentation of a program of studies, and even as a book of meditation and prayers. Guillaume Paradin, one of the French translators of the *Introductio*, entitled it *Divine philosophie*, combining the human and the divine.<sup>20</sup>

In its multiple forms of presentation the collection found immediate acceptance. From its first appearance in 1524 there were about 115 editions and translations of it during the sixteenth century. But it was a success with a clear geographic and perhaps religious orientation. Of these editions 49 are from German-speaking areas, 10 are from London, in English, one from Prague (Czech and Latin), another from Copenhagen. Likewise there are 22 from the Low Countries (18 in Antwerp). On the other hand there are 26 French editions, 4 Spanish (two in the Romance tongue), and only one Italian. The imbalance was accentuated with time: of 37 editions in the seventeenth century 22 were German; in the eighteenth century we know of six German, two Swedish, in that language, two from Moscow, in Russian, and one in Hungarian, from Pest. Moreover, Dublin and Wrocław each contributed one, in Latin, while there were none in France and Italy, but Spain produced five editions, beginning in 1765, all in Castilian in the context of a renewed interest in the humanist.

Although this short work was translated into various languages, with the exception of London and Paris, Latin editions predominated, undoubtedly because publishers and readers were aware of its scholastic purpose. However, it was not introduced in equal measure in all European schools, perhaps because these little works of personal morality and interior religiousness were more compatible with Protestant sensitivity than with Counter-reformist attitudes. To give one example among many: in 1540 Fridolin Brunner from Glarus (his Latin name was Fonteius Glareanus) wrote to Heinrich Bullinger, head of the reformed church in Zurich, successor to Zwingli, asking him to check his translation of the *Introductio* into German. Glareanus believed that the book would be of profit both to those who knew Latin and to

---

<sup>20</sup> It appeared in Lyons in 1550. Nine or ten printings followed there, in Paris and in Antwerp.



the uninstructed (*rudibus*), since in such brief compass it contained a method and compendium of true theology and wisdom (*verae theologiae ac sapientiae ratio seu compendium*). He comments that it would be hard to find a better manual of piety (*methodus ad pietatem*) in so few words and with such pleasant brevity (*grata brevitatem*).<sup>21</sup> We know nothing of the fate of this translation, but the enthusiasm of the translator shows very clearly the religious potential of the little book, which was also perceived by a professor of grammar who wrote a prologue to it in Wittenberg in 1574.

The 1524 volume contained, besides the *Introductio* and the *Satellitum*, two letters, one of which was destined, according to Leticia López Serratos,<sup>22</sup> to set out the rudiments of a grammatical education, the other to suggest a canon of readings to consolidate the first aim. One was dedicated to Mary Tudor, when she was just a child, the other to a young nobleman. They were re-baptized as letters for the instruction of young girls and young boys. Included dozens of times with the other two short works, they were also published as a supplement to the treatises on the education of the husband and the wife (Basel, 1540, c. 1541; Venice, 1546, Milan 1561, Hannover, 1614). In addition, the letter for the education of young girls had a career of its own. In 1533 the Scottish humanist George Buchanan (1506–1582) translated into English the *Rudimenta grammatices* written by Thomas Linacre (1460–1524) for Mary Tudor. Buchanan, with the excuse that the Valencian and the Englishman had each dedicated a grammatical work to the young princess, combined them in one volume under the title of *Rudimenta grammatices*, and it exceeded thirty editions in Paris, Lyons, Antwerp and Basel, between 1533 and 1559.

During the second quarter of the sixteenth century, the writings of Vives abandoned the festive and polemical tone of the first years and no longer presaged a new golden age. The premature death of Cardinal Guillaume de Croy (1521), his protector, left him destitute. He was informed of the imprisonment and death of his father at the

<sup>21</sup> The letter, dated 23 August, is unedited. The Zentral Bibliothek of Zurich possesses a machine transcription of the original, signature AX 1200. It seems that the translation was never printed.

<sup>22</sup> *Los clásicos en el Renacimiento. La Labor educativa de Juan Luis Vives* (México, 2007).

stake (1522–24). He thought he had a promising future at the English court, as royal counselor, but the plan failed in 1528, when Henry VIII left the imperial camp to ally himself with France. His divorce from Queen Catherine, aunt of Charles V, made Vives's situation on the island untenable. Being her subject, he took the part of the Queen. In addition to all of this, the European situation darkened.

The rebellion of Luther and the other reformers, far from being discussed in a council, caused divisions and conflicts in all of Christendom. The almost ten-year truce between Francis I and Charles V came to an end in 1524 and there was hardly any peace for the rest of Vives's life. For him the advance of the Turks in the East over lands of the Empire, with the consent of France, added gravity and danger to the internal and external battles of individual European states. The peasant wars of 1524 and the Anabaptist rebellion of 1529, with its fierce repression, cooled the optimism of those who were predicting years of prosperity once peace was achieved between princes and all Christians.

Vives launched desperate calls for peace, collected together in *De Europae dissidiis et republica* (Bruges, 1526),<sup>23</sup> with a letter to the now deceased Adrian VI, others to the King of England, and a dialogue on the subject of the Turks. These short works were reprinted in Basel, in 1538, together with the *Declamationes sex*,<sup>24</sup> and some of them were translated into German, in Strasbourg in 1540. In 1529 he returned to this subject, with a long pacifist discourse: *De concordia et discordia*,<sup>25</sup> concluding with a new work on the Ottoman threat, translated into German by Caspar Hedio, in Strasbourg in 1532. The *De concordia*, with its appendices, reappeared in Lyons, in 1532, with a very high print run. Shortly afterwards, the entire collection was translated into German, in Strasbourg in 1536. There was still another German version in 1578 by Georg Lauterbeck, in Frankfurt. Several of the anti-Turkish short works were disseminated repeatedly as propaganda.

Vives was also concerned with the problem of poverty, which was aggravated by internal crises in the cities and by the war, which displaced fleeing multitudes of people, often afflicted with the plague. In

<sup>23</sup> *Edicions*, no. 29.

<sup>24</sup> *Edicions*, no. 15.

<sup>25</sup> *Edicions*, no. 32.

*De subventionem pauperum* (Bruges, 1526)<sup>26</sup> he proposed to prohibit begging. In its place each city would centralize and manage the revenues and assets of hospitals, charitable institutions and private donations. With these public funds the maintenance of the disabled poor would be guaranteed, employment would be provided for the others, and scholastic education and job training would be given to children. His daring *secularizing* proposal, already in force in some reformed cities, put Vives in danger of being brought before the Inquisition. Nevertheless, it was well received, and subsequently went through six printings in Latin, from 1526 to 1627. It came out three times in German (Strasbourg, 1533 and 1534, and Durlach, 1627), twice in Dutch (Antwerp, 1533 and 1566), once in Italian (Venice, 1545) and once in France (Lyons, 1583). Finally, not until 1781, a Spanish version was published in Valencia from a manuscript of the sixteenth century. Some passages were translated into Czech in the last pages of a *Traktat do patrování Churdy'ch* (Prague, 1592). The radicalism of the Anabaptist revolt in Münster and its ruthless repression gave rise to *De communione rerum* (Antwerp<sup>27</sup> and twice in Cologne, in 1535; a German version in Strasbourg, 1536), a somber work, in which Vives reveals a disillusioned scepticism with respect to the prospects of human coexistence in a system free of egoism, in which the common sharing of possessions was the rule.

Beginning in 1528, his hopes of gaining a permanent position at the English court frustrated, Vives settled down in Bruges, the native city of his wife, Margarita Valldaura, where he spent the rest of his life, except for a temporary stay in Breda, dedicated to study and to writing his principal works. What he lost in honors he gained in independence, in that *libertas philosophandi* which Pierre Gassendi was to praise so highly a century later. This retreat enabled him to elaborate a meditated and complex plan of writings. In this mercantile city he survived by his pen, some commercial dealings, a modest imperial pension and the sporadic and modest generosity of some rich patrons. These are also years of the rapid deterioration of his health until he died, at about the age of 48, in 1540, afflicted with gout and kidney disorders.

From his Bruges retreat Vives published, first, an incidental piece, the *Sacrum diurnum de sudore Jesu Christi*,<sup>28</sup> a liturgical office of rogations

<sup>26</sup> *Edicions*, nos. 27 and 28. There is a recent critical edition: J.L.Vives, *De subventionem pauperum sive De humanis necessitatibus. Libri II*, eds. Constant Matheussen and Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 2002).

<sup>27</sup> *Edicions*, no. 33.

<sup>28</sup> *Edicions*, no. 45.

to ward off the plague, and a sermon based on a devotion to Christ's agony in the garden. It received the approval of the ecclesiastical authorities of Bruges, despite the fact that the humanist was a layman and married. Published in that city in 1529, it was one of the tomes reprinted by the Trechsel brothers in Lyons in 1532. We do not know of later editions, except for the *Opera omnia*.

In July of 1531 Vives published, in Antwerp, *De disciplinis*,<sup>29</sup> his most valuable contribution to the scientific and educational debate of the time, a detailed, encyclopedic reflection on the state of European culture and its future prospects. It is divided into three parts: in the first part he explored the causes for the decadence of the various branches of knowledge, as they were imparted by schools and universities; in the second he put forward alternatives for the promotion and teaching of the various disciplines, recommending appropriate authors in each field of learning (in this section the epistemologist and the pedagogue went hand in hand); in the third section he developed single treatises on primary philosophy, logic, the art of disputation, etc. Directed to a learned audience rather than to the general public, the work circulated in Latin. The first translations appeared at the end of the nineteenth century. The work won great recognition as well as harsh insults for daring to be critical of Aulus Gellius and others. Many readers used it as a critical dictionary of antiquity, citing Vives's judgment about a particular author at the beginning of their own books. Others noted their disagreement with certain of his evaluations in the margin of their works.

Destined for scholars, its diffusion was instantaneous. In June of 1531 Hillen published it in Antwerp, and in November Gymnicus in Cologne, again in the following January, and also in 1536. In Lyons it came out in 1551; in Basel, in the *Opera omnia*, in 1555. After that only the first two parts were published: in London in 1612, in Leiden in 1636, edited by Jean Maire (who in the following year edited Descartes' *Discours de la méthode*); in Naples, in 1764, and in the Valencia *Opera omnia* (1782–91).

A critical edition of this work which can succeed in establishing its multiple sources is indispensable, and studies concerning its vast influence are required with great urgency. I shall mention but a few aspects. One of the treatises in the third part was an art of disputing in a controlled manner: *De disputatione*. At the University of Marburg

---

<sup>29</sup> *Edicions*, no. 34.

a professor of logic, Caspar Rudolph, a disciple of Melanchthon, elaborated a *Dialectica Ioannis Caesarii per questiones in compendium redacta*. In the dedicatory epistle he affirmed his independence of judgment in relation to three great logicians, Caesarius, Melanchthon and Vives. In addition, by way of an appendix, he included the *De disputatione*, barely three years after the *editio princeps*. Rudolph's manual, always with the inclusion of the text of Vives, appeared also in the university cities of Strasbourg, Leipzig, Ingolstadt, Frankfurt, Marburg and Cracow, at least twenty-five times, until 1569.

Lexicographers also made good use of it. In Strasbourg, in 1536, Peter Dasypodius published the first Latin-German, German-Latin dictionary. In the preface he justified his procedure. He mentions that he had come upon the *De disciplinis*, where Vives proposed the production of two types of lexicon in all languages: one to explain in the vulgar tongue the meaning of each Latin word, with examples from the approved authors, the other with the words in the vulgar tongue and their equivalents in Latin, as in the dictionaries written by Nebrija, *nostro sermone*, i.e., Spanish. Dasypodius adopted the two-way dictionary and included the quotation from Vives as an epigraph. This passage remained in the dozens of re-editions of the book. Later, a professor of Polish in Gdansk, Nicholas Volckmar, wrote a *Dictionarium trilingue tripartitum ad discendam linguam latinam, polonicam et germanicam accommodatum* (1596). He stated that he had followed Dasypodius, and on the second page reprinted the passage from Vives. The same professor wrote a *Compendium linguae polonicae* (Gdansk 1594 and 1612), and a compilation of dialogues of Vives and Joachim Camerarius in Latin, German and Polish (1594 and 1613). Vives was not a chance name for Volckmar, but an esteemed author.

The ambitious project of the physician and botanist Conrad Gesner to create and classify a *Bibliotheca universalis* (1540) used the *De disciplinis* as one of his sources. In more than fifty articles he incorporated the judgments of Vives on a corresponding number of authors. In his entry on Vives Gesner wrote the first bibliography of the humanist, which is almost complete, proof of his interest in him.<sup>30</sup> The *Opera omnia* had not yet appeared.

The influence of Vives's major work is noticed also in mid-century treatises which propose to reestablish particular sciences or disciplines.

---

<sup>30</sup> *Edicions*, no. 79 and pp. 15–19.

In 1550, in Antwerp, Martín Cueva, from Carmona, published *De corrupto docendae grammaticae latinae genere et de ratione eiusdem breviter tradendae*. Not only did he cite Vives, but he also attacked people like Lax, Dullaert, and Espinosa, names of sophists forgotten by the presses, but who persisted in the memory of Europe because of the scathing notoriety the Valencian had given them.<sup>31</sup> A compatriot, Pedro Juan Núñez, wrote treatises and commentaries on rhetoric, dialectic and on the logical writings of Aristotle. In all of them the name and topics of Vives appear. In law and theology there are analogous echoes; suffice it to name the *Topica legalis* of Claudius Cantiuncula, father of the so-called *mos gallicus*, for the study of law (Basel, 1545), and the *De locis theologicis* of the Spaniard Melchor Cano. The latter, together with harsh criticisms of Vives, lifted entire passages from him. Needless to say, it wasn't all praise.

Vives said that Aulus Gellius (c. 130–c. 180), more than writing a digest of authors, was genuinely indigestible himself (*De disciplinis*, 2.3). Henri Estienne (1528–1598) did not pardon him for this remark. He belonged to the third generation of humanist printers who were famous for their critical rigor and good presentation of the classical authors. His father, Robert, fled to Geneva in 1550, and both took a very active part in the diffusion of Calvinism. When Estienne, editor and commentator of Gellius, heard of the bad things the *famosus* Vives said about the Roman author, he attacked the Spaniard in an invective called *Noctes Parisinae*, placed at the end of the *Noctes Atticae* (Paris, 1585). For Estienne the criticism of Vives, *tam maledica quam malevola* (as slanderous as it was malevolent) was a reprisal for the bad opinion Gellius had of the Spaniard, Seneca. Vives had placed *amor patriae* over *amor veritatis*.<sup>32</sup> The “judicious” Vives was caught *in flagrante* in an impassioned opinion because of his condition as a Spaniard. It must be stressed that rather than vitriolic arguments these were visceral reactions to Vives's opinion, once they were found out. Up to that time Estienne had loved Vives, a very learned man, as he called him, and Spain, “at least as much as a true Frenchman can love her,” he declared with the sincerity of a Huguenot in the midst of the eighth

<sup>31</sup> Francisco Rico, *Nebrija frente a los bárbaros. El canon de los gramáticos nefandos en las polémicas del siglo XVI* (Salamanca, 1978).

<sup>32</sup> *Noctes Parisinae, prima nox*, p. 30.

war of religion. "Now," he said, "I hate both."<sup>33</sup> The condition of Vives as a Spaniard became indistinguishable, for many authors, from their anti-Spanish phobia. Little by little the humanist ceased to be a Valencian and became a Spaniard, with a strong pejorative connotation. Estienne's attack had great repercussions, and influential French authors cited him during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a touchstone for the condemnation of the humanist.

In 1533 Vives published *De ratione dicendi* (Louvain).<sup>34</sup> While *De disciplinis* contained various treatises of dialectic, the new book treated the subject of rhetoric. Both writings were part of the same plan, designed to propose new foundations of learning, but for reasons of size this work came out separately. Before becoming part of the *Opera omnia* it was reprinted in Basel (1537–1538) and in Cologne (1537). We know little about the reception of the book among its contemporaries aside from the fact that it was in moderate demand. In the eighteenth century it was the object of two opposed judgments. While Balthasar Gilbert was not sparing in his insults against the author, Gregorio Mayans wrote a rhetoric following his countryman to the letter.<sup>35</sup>

The art of epistolary writing, known in the Middle Ages as *dictamen*, was one of the parts of rhetoric but it was treated independently. In some universities it was part of the training for future secretaries and notaries.<sup>36</sup> The medieval *artes* provided only alternative formulas for drafting each part of the letter. The humanists tried to adapt them to classical models and to teach the student to write good prose on any subject.<sup>37</sup> These manuals abounded; Erasmus wrote three of them. As soon as *De ratione dicendi* was out, Vives published his own *De epistolis*

---

<sup>33</sup> "Amabam Hispaniam (quatenus et quantum a vero Gallo amari Hispania potest) vel eo nomine quod Ludovicum Vivem dedisset, nunc odio eandem eo etiam ipso nomine prosequor." General preface to the *Noctes Atticae*, Aiiij.

<sup>34</sup> *Edicions*, no. 35. There is a critical edition by José Manuel Rodríguez Peregrina (Granada, 2000).

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Una república de lectores*, II, 2.

<sup>36</sup> For an engaging panorama of the Italian academic situation see Paul F. Grendler, *The Universities of the Italian Renaissance* (Baltimore, 2002).

<sup>37</sup> A useful composite picture is available in John Monfasani, "Humanism and Rhetoric," in *Renaissance Humanism. Foundations, Forms, and Legacy*, ed. Albert Rabil, Jr. (Philadelphia, 1991), vol. 3, pp. 171–235. Also the introduction to J.L. Vives, *De conscribendis epistolis*, ed. Charles Fantazzi (Leiden, 1989). Fantazzi provides an interesting exposition in "Vives versus Erasmus on the Art of Letter-Writing," in *Self-Presentation and Social Identification*, eds. Toon Van Houdt, Jan Papy, Gilbert Tournoy and Constant Matheuccussen (Louvain, 2002), pp. 39–56.

*conscribendis*,<sup>38</sup> which was often reprinted. It had two lives, first in the German university world (1536–c. 1579), and then, in Counterreformation Italy (c. 1573–1730), where Erasmus was expelled from the schools and when printers in Germany had forgotten him.

Perhaps the important thing about Vives's book, more than its originality, was the fact that by forming part of a genre it corresponded to the canons in vogue at the time. Hence the Basel printers quickly offered it for sale together with other celebrities: Erasmus and the German humanists Christoph Hegendorff (1500–1540) and Conrad Celtis (1459–1513), among others. The prospective purchaser, desirous, not to choose the best, but to acquire a *copia verborum et rerum*, was presented with a meaty miscellany. If the *editio princeps* had 100 spacious pages, its reprintings with the various *artes scribendi* reached 400, plus the index. The readers did not try to choose among Vives or Erasmus or any of the others. They merely wanted to write better, using all the options Vives and Erasmus and the others had to offer them.

It came out in Antwerp in 1534 and reappeared in Paris in the same year, but its true fortunes began in Basel, with Platter and Lasius, who published it together with Erasmus in March of 1536. The two together reappeared in Wittenberg, Leipzig, Cologne, Venice and in Basel itself. In this city it was reprinted in September, this time together with Erasmus, Celtis and Hegendorff. At times other authors were added. Excluding Italy there were at least 32 editions in university cities of the German world between 1536 and 1587: Basel (14), Cologne (11), Mainz (3), Frankfurt, Leipzig, Wittenberg and Zurich (1). To this notable figure are added a single Lyons printing (1542), four Parisian (1534, 1542, two in 1547) and another in Antwerp (1565). It was a manual for German schools and others as well in the north.

In Italy the book was printed in Venice, in 1537, together with Erasmus. It reappeared, now without the companion volume, around 1573, when the work was gradually being forgotten in Germany. Vives's manual was added to his *Dialogues*, very popular in Italy at the time, which insured a long continuity. The presence of Erasmus and the Protestant Hegendorff, prohibited in the Catholic domain, made its propagation difficult. Since his traveling companions were banned, Vives would have remained in Italy as the only name admissible to fulfill

---

<sup>38</sup> *Edicions*, no. 37. For the critical edition see the previous note.



the need of a manual, hence perhaps its late success. It was published at least 57 times.

Paradoxical as it may seem, during his years of seclusion in Bruges the European prestige of Vives grew. If he resided in Flanders, it was natural that his *editiones principes* from 1519 to 1535 should be published in Antwerp, Louvain or Bruges. Immediately afterwards, they reappeared in Paris, rarely in Antwerp, which was usually reserved for the first editions. From Paris the printer Simon de Colines in 1527, in a large print run, made accessible the *Introductio ad sapientiam* and the tiny popular essay on Suetonius. In Lyons the Trechsel brothers published four titles in 1532:<sup>39</sup> the *Introductio ad sapientiam*, *De subventionem pauperum*, *De concordia et discordia*, and the *Sacrum diurnum de sudore Jesu Christi*. So many were the copies that today there are exemplars of these books in dozens of European and American libraries. In Cologne the printer Johannes Gymnich disseminated Vives. He republished *De disciplinis* in November of 1531, a few months after it came out in Antwerp. From then on he and the members of his dynasty published Vives more than twenty-five times. On their part the Italian publishers waited until 1537 to welcome him. Venice reprinted the *Dialogues* for more than two centuries, even after this book had been forgotten in the other major cities. In the meantime, for domestic consumption, at the beginning of the 30s England and Spain disseminated the *De institutione feminae Christianae*.

Officially Catholic, Venice, Paris, Lyons, Cologne and Antwerp provided free markets for cities obedient to Rome and for the reformed cities. At the same time, the great book center of Protestant Basel invaded equally the rebellious North and the Catholic South. Political and religious frontiers did not yet have a full effect on the publication of books. Shortly before dying, Vives's name was spread through more than half of Europe, and he himself was partly aware of it. It may be provisionally calculated that during the quarter of a century from 1535 to 1560 at least 367 publications contained one or more of his writings, an average of almost fifteen a year.

Vives always complained about Flemish printers. He declared to his young friend Simon Grynaeus in Basel that they were mean and petty.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> On the Trechsel brothers see Henri-Louis Baudrier – Julien Baudrier, *Bibliographie Lyonnaise*, 12 vols. (Lyons, 1895–1921), vol. 12, pp. 230–50.

<sup>40</sup> After the death of Joannes Froben (1527) Vives asked his son Hieronymus in vain to renew his relationships with Basel (Allen, Ep. 2661). Later, taking advantage

He aspired to return to the thriving publishing capital of Basel but, seemingly, Erasmus' veto carried weight. Finally, in 1536, the year of Erasmus' death, the association formed by Balthasar Lasius, Thomas Plattter, Robert Winter and Johannes Oporinus opened a decisive period in the diffusion of Vives by their promotion of a massive and systematic circulation of his works. While he remained in their hands, suffering from the maladies that would soon carry him to the grave, he finally succeeded in obtaining excellent conditions for the dissemination of his last works and revised versions of others. Except for Winter the other partners were humanists of exceptional learning, skilled in Latin and Greek, if not also in Hebrew, and had great financial resources. His publications, serious and carefully printed, usually contained *indices locorum et rerum*, which increased their value as instruments of study. Moreover, Oporinus was generous with his authors. From then on, and despite the death of Vives in 1540, for thirty years Basel stood at the head of a systematic diffusion of his works, printed—singly or in groups of short works—more than seventy times. It was here that the compilation of his *Opera omnia* was made in the magnificent edition published by Joannes Episcopus, in 1555,<sup>41</sup> a monument of the printer's art which signaled the publishing consecration of the humanist.

---

of his friendship with the Basel humanist Simon Grynaeus, which began in June 1531 (Allen, Ep. 2502), Vives suggested some solution: "Utinam hic aliquem haberemus ex vestris typographis; nostri enim omnes tenues sunt et miseri, animis etiam tenuiores quam re. Vellem profuissem istis vestris, quantum his sordidis, cum quibus aliquid agere, aut contrahere, odiosissimum est." (Would that we could have access to one of your printers here; ours are all poor and miserable, poorer in spirit than in substance. I wish I could have been of some use to your printers since it is most unpleasant to have to deal with these paltry individuals) (Simon Grynaeus, *In librum octavum Topicorum Aristotelis... Selectiores aliquot... epistolae*, Basel, 1556, p. 157; *Edicions*, 64, and facsimile on p. 268). The letter, undated, would have to be prior to 1536, when Vives began to be published again. See the fundamental work, Carlos Gilly, *Spanien und der basler Buchdruck bis 1600* (Basel, 1985), pp. 178–79. Also Peter Bietenholz, "Édition et Réforme à Bâle 1517–1565," in *La Réforme et le livre*, ed. Jean François Gilmont (Paris, 1990), pp. 239–68, especially p. 28.

<sup>41</sup> *Edicions*, no. 47. The compilation is surprisingly complete and accurate, and it continued to be the most authoritative version of Vives as long as it was readily available. But it left out some prologues and the early writings of Paris (1514), which were unknown, and its collection of Vives's letters leaves much to be desired, but it does include the irreplaceable private correspondence with Erasmus, which was unpublished and would otherwise have been lost. The criticism that it does not include the Commentaries on Augustine is senseless. The publishers themselves give notice on the cover that they could be found in the edition of their associates, the Frobens, who republished them that very year with the text of Augustine, without which they have no meaning.

Without any attempt to be exhaustive, it is possible to locate almost one hundred and fifty copies of this work.

Also to be considered together with the great number of exemplars that they printed and the rapidity with which they were reprinted is the fact that his books went twice a year to the book fairs of Frankfurt and Lyons, the true mercantile agents of that Europe. From there booksellers brought copies to their cities for sale and perhaps to reprint. This chain diffusion is best illustrated in the case of the *Dialogues* since in the very year 1539, date of the first edition of the manual, the work reappeared in Basel, Milan, Antwerp, Paris and Lyons, where perhaps it was issued twice. Lastly, there remains the ambivalent fact that Basel adopted the Reformation in 1529. Vives's books, although he was a Catholic, circulating with the typographical seal of that city, were received with less suspicion in Protestant milieux than if they came from papal enclaves like Paris, Lyons or Venice. These are still years of a certain mutual tolerance.

Once in Basel the presence of Vives increased in 1538. In March of that year, the *Declamationes sex*, the definitive version of the five *Declamationes Syllanae*, appeared. The sixth was written at the request of Thomas More, in 1523, as a reply to one of the declamations of the Pseudo-Quintilian. The volume contained, additionally, the *Diversa opuscula*,<sup>42</sup> printed in 1526 with the title *De Europae statu ac tumultibus*. In 1538 the revised versions of the *De officio mariti* and the *De institutione feminae Christianae* also appeared.<sup>43</sup> In addition, a miscellany on the Turkish question was compiled, headed by the *De bello turcis inferendo* of Jacopo Sadoletto, which included Vives's *De conditione vitae christianorum sub Turca*. Two new works were also published. One was a preface to the Latin translation of some works of Aristotle by his friend, Grynaeus.<sup>44</sup> Despite its brevity, the echo of *In Aristotelis operibus censura* is still heard in Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), who in his first work, the *Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos* (Grenoble, 1624) expressed his dissatisfaction with the Peripatetics and noted that the reading of Vives had inspired him to put it in writing. Far from being a temporary influence

---

<sup>42</sup> *Edicions*, no. 15. The subtitle *Diversa opuscula* led bibliographers of the *ancien régime* to give it a separate existence as an independent work. At the end of the last century the late Professor Jozef IJsewijn inquired about the location of an exemplar in academic circles with a view to publishing a critical edition. In my prologue to *Edicions* I hope I have cleared up this matter.

<sup>43</sup> *Edicions*, nos. 15 and 31.

<sup>44</sup> *Edicions*, no. 42.

both the *Censura* and the *De disciplinis* appear in various passages of the sensualist philosopher and mathematician. In his *Syntagma philosophicum* he dedicated the first book to logic, where, after praising Valla and Vives, affirms that both the *Aristoteleae animadversiones* (Paris, 1543) and the *Dialectique* (Paris, 1553) of Pierre de la Ramée, or Ramus (1515–1572), were heavily indebted to both thinkers.<sup>45</sup>

The *Censura* had a surprising complicated publishing history. It served as a prologue to three editions of Aristotle in two folio tomes published in Basel (1538, 1542 and 1548), plus seven editions in Lyons from 1549 to 1583. It also circulated in smaller formats, in whole or in part. Christian Wechsel published it as a separate work in Paris (1539). Shortly afterwards, in 1541, the Venetian Girolamo Scoto published a fragment of the *Censura* as a prologue to his edition of the *Organon*, without naming its author, which was reprinted, in Venice itself at least nine times from 1552 to 1594; in Lyons, also anonymously, in 1560, 1579 and 1580, and again in Geneva, in 1608. Other fragments of the prologue were used in Basel, Cologne, Frankfurt, and Strasbourg. The brevity of the preface did not stand in the way, as was seen in the case of the *Addita in Suetonium* with its widespread reception.

The second new work was *De anima et vita*,<sup>46</sup> a study of the functions of the intellect, published by Winter in August of 1538. Perhaps its relative novelty and distance from Aristotle is owed to the fact that the purpose was not to define the essence of the soul, but to explain the manner in which it operates in thinking, remembering, associating, speaking and—a subject to which he dedicates much space—to feeling and having passions. Once its intellectual and volitive activity was known, it would be possible to put it at the service of learning and virtue. Planned jointly with *De disciplinis* and *De ratione dicendi*, it contains reciprocal internal references. The treatise reappeared in the same city, in 1543, together with the *De anima* of Melanchthon. Around 1553 there was added an analogous title of Veit Amerbach. In 1536, in Zurich, the previously mentioned naturalist Gesner reprinted the collection, adding his own essay. What was it in Vives's book that attracted him to add his own discussion to it? With various authors from among those

<sup>45</sup> Sylvia Murr, "Pierre Gassendi: Lecteur de Juan Luis Vivès et promoteur de sa définition de la philosophie," in *Exilios filosóficos de España. Actas del VII Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía Española e Iberoamericana*, ed. Antonio Heredia Soriano (Salamanca, 1992), pp. 203–27.

<sup>46</sup> *Edicions*, no. 36.

cited it was published also in Lyons (1555 and 1596). Once again we are presented with the phenomenon that, except for the *editio princeps*, the treatise appeared in subsequent editions with analogous studies by other authors which were considered to be related to Vives's work.

As was customary in compilations originating in Basel, Vives headed the list on the title pages. Such select company, but all Protestant, made its circulation on the Catholic side difficult; nevertheless, there is an abundance of exemplars in Italian libraries. We have no data concerning its unquestionably favorable reception in the German academic world of the time. As for France, it is known only that Descartes cited it in his *Traité des passions*.<sup>47</sup> We also do not know the status of Vives, defender of the immortality of the soul, in whatever way you look at it, in the debates of the sixteenth century, especially faced with the critical stances of many Italian professors.

In March 1539 two more new works of Vives appeared, again in Basel. One, the *Linguae latinae exercitatio*,<sup>48</sup> was a collection of 25 dialogues—hence its common name—aimed at enriching the language of students with vocabulary having to do with various everyday activities: getting up, dressing, in school, food, study, games, etc. The exceptionally complex diffusion of this most popular of Vives's writings has been studied elsewhere<sup>49</sup> and resists any effort at reducing it to a few paragraphs. Suffice it to say that at the present moment some 620 editions have been identified. Its diffusion was so explosive that in the first five years there were no less than 23 editions in seven cities. After 15 years the number had risen to 70 in 18 places, including Mexico. At the end of the century there were no less than 240. After a hundred years there were more than 80 French editions, principally in Lyons and Paris. Although its presence in the German world and in the north of Europe was noteworthy, its greatest success was in Italy, with more than 222 editions in four centuries, in 26 cities. In Spain also the work kept publishers busy continually, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century. There were bilingual printings,

<sup>47</sup> Geneviève Lewis, "Une source inexplorée du *Traité des passions*," in *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* 138 (1948), 330–34.

<sup>48</sup> The date of the *editio princeps* is discussed in Enrique González González and Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Los diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1539–1994)* (Valencia, 1999), pp. 67 and 435–36. (Hereafter to be cited as *Fortuna*). *Edicions*, no. 38; *Fortuna*, no. 4. There is a critical edition by Pilar García Ruiz (Pamplona, 2005).

<sup>49</sup> *Fortuna*, introductory study; brought up to date, *República de lectores*, Section III.

trilingual and even one in four languages. Translations into French (3), Italian (3), Spanish (2), German, Polish, English and Flemish also circulated. It was accompanied by glossaries in various languages and was the object of commentaries in Spain—the most famous being that of Pedro Mota—and in Germany the commentary of Thomas Freige had extensive circulation.

The second original work of 1539 was *In Bucolica Vergilii interpretatio potissimum allegorica*,<sup>50</sup> an exegetical essay on the possible correlation between the Virgilian poems and the so-called Sibylline oracles, whose prophetic authority was then admitted without reserve by believers, including scholars. The work was in circulation since March and in July it returned to the Basel presses to be printed with the *Dialogues*.<sup>51</sup> In that same year of 1539 it came out in Milan and during the next two decades it appeared another ten times in Basel, Augsburg, Antwerp and Paris. In addition, the work survived into the seventeenth century to expand the list of Virgilian commentators collected in the luxurious illustrated and annotated editions of the Virgilian corpus. Girolamo Scoto, in Venice, incorporated it as early as 1544 in the voluminous *Universum poema*. This model reappeared in Venice at least fourteen more times, until 1610. With a format akin to the Venetian one, and undoubtedly in order to compete in the German market the Henricpetri of Basel also included Vives in seven editions of Virgil between 1547 and 1613. Lastly, the essay was included in the English version of the *Eclogues* in London in 1628.

Towards the end of his life Vives published two works of a clearly religious character. First, the *Excitationes animi in Deum* (Antwerp, 1535),<sup>52</sup> a collection of prayers organized to correspond to specific daily actions, with the aim of sanctifying mundane activities instead of reducing prayer to an action performed only in church. The volume included a lengthy meditation on the *Pater noster*, whose affinities and differences with that of Erasmus have not yet been studied. Once more we are confronted with a work whose diffusion seems inexhaustible in Catholic and reformed milieux. It had no sooner come off the presses in Antwerp (1535, 1543) than Gymnich brought it to Cologne (1537, 1539 and 1543). In 1540 it reached publishers in Basel, who conceived the idea

---

<sup>50</sup> *Edicions*, no. 43.

<sup>51</sup> *Fortuna*, no. 37.

<sup>52</sup> *Edicions*, no. 44.

of joining the *Excitationes* with the *Introductio ad sapientiam*. In this way the latter work from being a school manual was tinged with a certain aura of religious writing. This new publishing initiative reappeared three times in Basel (1543, 1546, 1548), again inspiring emulation. We know of eight editions in Lyons between 1543 and 1565, one in Paris (1551) and another in Cologne (1562).

Translations were not long in coming: into Spanish by Diego Ortega, who was from Burgos (Antwerp, 1537; Burgos, 1539) and three different French versions (Avignon, 1552, Paris, 1570 and Antwerp-Mons, 1553). Of these three versions we know only the last, thanks to two exemplars. The rest disappeared in the hands of devout readers. A sizeable fragment of the *Pater noster* was translated into Italian in Cremona, in 1564.<sup>53</sup> In German we know of one partial version added at the end of the *De concordia et discordia* (Frankfurt, 1578),<sup>54</sup> and a manuscript version from the middle of the seventeenth century. Lastly, a fragment of the manual was included in a multi-colored prayer book (Amsterdam, 1661). The date is somewhat late, but it is proof that the book continued to excite some interest.

In addition, partial editions are inexhaustible. In Wrocław Andreas Winkler (printer and professor whom the city, upon adopting the Reformation, commissioned to reorganize the municipal school) published some *Precationes selectiores* of Vives with the *Soliloquia* of Augustine, in 1541.<sup>55</sup> Also passages of the work were printed in Dillingen (1550, 1551) and in Ghent (1556). Moreover, many prayer books, in Latin, in the vulgar tongue and a mixture of both, included one or two selections of Vives. Occasionally, his name is announced on a title page or in an index, but at times the only way to detect the author is by the marginal note *Lud. Vives* on some page or other of a voluminous book of prayers. In London Richard Day compiled, in 1573, *A booke of Christian prayers collected out of the ancient writers and best learned in our tyme*, with selections

<sup>53</sup> I am grateful for this information and a microfilm to the Director of the Biblioteca Statale di Cremona, Dottoressa Emilia Bricchi Piccioni.

<sup>54</sup> I owe this information to Dietrich Briesemeister, "Vives in deutschen Übersetzungen (16–18 Jahrhundert)," in *Juan Luis Vives*, ed. Christoph Strosetzki (Frankfurt, 1995), pp. 229–46; 236–37.

<sup>55</sup> The printer took a passage from *De disciplinis* to recommend his edition of Pomponio Leto in 1539. We know of some 68 titles from 1539 to 1553, many of Greek and Latin authors and grammars of both languages, a lot of Melanchthon. Of Vives he also published, in 1551, *De ratione studii puerilis*. See Marta Burbianka, "Winkler Andrzej" in *Roczniki Biblioteczne organ naukowy Bibliotek szkół wyższych*, 4 (Wrocław, 1960), pp. 329–445, with synopsis in French and German.

from Vives which were perhaps already present in an edition of 1569, dedicated to the queen, hence its name, *Queen Elizabeth's prayer book*. These compilations would probably have gone through various re-editions, but the investigation would lead to a bottomless barrel.<sup>56</sup> At the same time (an indication of the analogous reception of Vives), English Catholics who took refuge in the Lowlands published an English translation in Antwerp, in 1576, of various treatises and prayers of Thomas More under the title of *A brief forme of confession*. Towards the end of the book they included *Certaine prayers* of Vives, in Latin.<sup>57</sup> In similar fashion, in Prague, the Neo-Latin poet and printer Thomas Mitis (1523–1591) published *Hymni ecclesiastici in noctium et dierum tempora distribuiti* in 1564, with the *Preces diurnae* of Vives. The first known edition of the *Dialogues* in Prague (1567) contains a Latin poem of Mitis: *In aureum L. Vivis opusculum*.<sup>58</sup> His case illustrates, once again, that the cultivated readers of Vives knew and esteemed him for more than one work.<sup>59</sup>

At the death of the humanist, in 1540, his widow, Margarita Valladaura, and a mutual friend, the jurist, Frans van Cranevelt (1485–1564), prepared *De veritate fidei Christianae* (1543) for the printing press of Oporinus.<sup>60</sup> It was believed at the time that theology was the queen of the sciences. In *De disciplinis* Vives avoided dealing with it, out of caution, but at the end of a life of study, as a married man and without a theological degree, he treated this subject matter as well, to help to solder together the division between Catholics and Reformists. It is not an apology for the Catholic faith but of the Christian faith, as the title states. It does not proceed by questions and answers, in the manner of the scholastic theologians, but in good humanist fashion it avails itself of eloquence to present persuasive reasoning.

---

<sup>56</sup> See *Short-title Catalogue of Books Printed in England, Scotland & Ireland and of English Books Printed Abroad 1475–1640*. First compiled by Alfred William Pollard & Gilbert Richard Redgrave (London, 1976–1991), 3 vols, nos. 6428ff. Hereafter *STC*. The first among Vives scholars to give notice of this was Foster Watson in *Vives: On Education. A Translation of the De tradendis disciplinis of Juan Luis Vives together with an introduction* (Cambridge, 1913), pp. xcv–xcvi. From here this information passed on to Joan Estelrich in *Vivès Exposition organisée à la Bibliothèque Nationale. Paris Janvier-Mars 1941* (Dijon, 1942), but he stated, incorrectly, that Vives's prayers passed into the *Common Prayer Book* of Edward VI, p. 37. In reality they would have been included in private prayer books. This is one of those innumerable bibliographical labyrinths that remain to be clarified.

<sup>57</sup> Perhaps it may have been reprinted in Rouen, Georges L'Oyselet, 1583 and 1590. And perhaps by clandestine presses in 1599 and 1605. *STC*, nos. 24627ff.

<sup>58</sup> *Fortuna*, no. 494. Also in later editions.

<sup>59</sup> For other examples I refer to *Una república de lectores*, passim.

<sup>60</sup> *Edicions*, no. 46.



A year later Oporinus published it in octavo in order to make such a profitable work available to more readers at a lesser price. The reflections of a Catholic on the faith, dedicated to the pope, aroused interest among Protestants, like its publisher. The sixteenth-century printers of this work, except perhaps for Cologne (1568), were Protestants, like Frellon (Lyons, 1551) and the editors of the *Opera* (1555). In the seventeenth century, the previously mentioned publisher, Jean Maire, a Calvinist, gave it his seal of approval in Leiden (1639). The same publisher, three years prior to that, had put *De disciplinis* into circulation again. In Basel, the doctor and historian, Heinrich Pantaleon in 1571 put out a German version of the entire *De veritate fidei Christianae* in a luxurious folio format.

Other indications suggest that the book found better reception among Protestants. The only exemplar whose circulation in Spain can be documented in the sixteenth century was confiscated by the Inquisition from Dr. Constantino Ponce, condemned as a Lutheran in the famous trial in Seville in 1560.<sup>61</sup> In Geneva an exemplar was bound together with the *Institutio Christianae religionis* of Calvin. Joannes Knechtenhofner annotated both of them around 1555; in Vives's work he commented on subjects like the corruption of human nature.<sup>62</sup> Another exemplar in Geneva belonged to a certain Bonivard, identifiable, it seems, with the chronicler of the Reformation who made these annotations in the copy: "*Mens est lux animi, o Vives, Vives aeterno tempore vives. 1563* (The mind is the light of the soul, O Vives; Vives, you will live for time eternal). And in another place: "*Nunquam moriturus, Vives, deo et proximo*" (Vives, never to die, for God and neighbor).<sup>63</sup>

The division that the Reformation brought with it, far from becoming unified at the Council of Trent (1545–1563), as Vives and so many others hoped, was completed as the century drew to a close. In

---

<sup>61</sup> I shall not discuss here whether or not Ponce was a Lutheran. The book-owner was condemned as such by someone; cf. Klaus Wagner, *El Doctor Constantino de la Fuente. El hombre y su biblioteca* (Seville, 1979), no. 422, p. 73. The inventory includes two exemplars of the *Dialogues*, no. 140 and 205. In the extensive theological library of Don Juan de Ribera, Viceroy-Archbishop of Valencia, there is a copy of *De disciplinis*, *Edicions*, 34, but not this treatise nor the *Opera*, cf. Vicente Cárcel Ortiz, "Obras impresas del siglo XVI en la biblioteca de Don Juan de Ribera," in *Anales del Seminario de Valencia* 6 (1966), 113–383, especially no. 1846.

<sup>62</sup> It is the editio princeps of Vives, in folio; the book of Calvin, of the same year 1543, was printed by Wendelin Rihelius in Augsburg; Geneva, Bibliothèque universitaire, M. H. R., A12.

<sup>63</sup> Exemplar of the re-edition of 1544, collection M. H. R.

the matter of a very few years it would become inconceivable that a Catholic writer would direct himself to a Protestant printer to publish a treatise on apologetics and, much less, dedicate it to the pope; or that a printer, besides issuing it once, in folio (1543), should republish it in a more accessible format, with a commendatory letter to a Catholic friend (1544); or that in the same city another Protestant, Heinrich Pantaleon, should translate it into German together with the letter to the pope. The world of intellectual liberty, of audacious deeds and relative tolerance, in which the existence of an author like Vives can be explained, was not going to last much longer than he himself. The diffusion of his works, which flowed hundreds of times through so many and such unforeseen communicating vessels, came to a halt together with the breakup of the republic of letters.

### *The Decline*

The death of the printer Oporinus in 1568 symbolizes the end of the golden age of printing in Basel, a crisis that was not exclusive to that city. Owing to the political and religious conflicts of every type which darkened the last third of the sixteenth century, the book market, too, was distinctly divided into two halves, the Catholic and that (or those) of the several reformed confessions. At the middle of the century, before the definitive breakup took place, six cities stood out for their total printing production and their presence in the international market: Venice, Paris, Lyons, Cologne, Antwerp, and Basel. All of them, except for the last, remained on the Catholic side. Basel went under while the other five passed through a period of crisis and reconversion, which was translated into an ideological purification in favor of Catholic orthodoxy, in the reduction of the geographical extent of circulation of its publications and frequently also in less production or in decadence. In the new scenario German Protestant cities like Frankfurt and Leipzig, the Dutch city of Leiden and the Swiss Geneva took the place of Basel and even of the Protestant cities which had distinguished themselves at the beginning of the century, like Strasbourg and Wittenberg.<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>64</sup> For a very synthetic vision of the breakdown of the leading centers up till the second third of the 16th century and the emergence of the new printing capitals see Henri-Jean Martin, "Classement et conjonctures," in *L'Histoire de l'édition française*, eds.

Vives's works were printed dozens of times in each of the six cities mentioned above. Nevertheless, the series of political, religious and commercial collapses and re-accommodations affected his presence in the printing houses, which initiated an irreversible descent beginning in the last third of the sixteenth century, in part because the printers who in the middle of the century had showed a clear interest in publishing the humanist were becoming extinct. Their successors, if there were any, forgot about the author or tended to disseminate his school manuals exclusively, while they were still in demand. Apart from that, Vives became an inconvenient author in a world of factions that were more and more radical. Among the Protestants, who looked upon Philip II as their arch-enemy, a Catholic and Spanish author did not attract much sympathy. For the Catholics his closeness with the reviled Erasmus was suspicious in the extreme, as were his unquestionable ties with Protestant Basel, and the fact that his writings were published in the company of consummate heretics like Melanchthon, Gesner or Hegendorff. A summary review of what happened in the various cities will give a better idea of this process.

In the area of the German tongue three Protestant cities stood out for the activity of their presses during the first half of the sixteenth century, and all of them went into decline in the second half of the century: Basel, Strasbourg and Wittenberg. If Vives had any presence in them, this was significant only in the first two. In addition, no city suffered such a decline as Basel. It depended on the external market because its 12,000 inhabitants could not absorb the enormous book production. From the middle of the century the onslaught of indexes of forbidden books from the Catholic universities, Rome and the Spanish Inquisition destroyed the distribution chains of its publications. In 1559 the Roman *Index* went to the extent of forbidding, in addition to titles, all the works produced or in press in the printing workshops of certain printers. Fifteen of those condemned—including Oporinus—were from Basel.<sup>65</sup> The condemnation alone would not have been enough in itself to ruin the city, but it was pronounced during a time of complete upheaval in the Low Countries and in the midst of the

---

Henri-Jean Martin, Roger Chartier and Jean-Pierre Vivet (Paris, 1982), tome 1, pp. 429–447, especially the map on p. 443.

<sup>65</sup> There is an excellent synthesis for the 16th century in Peter Bietenholz, *Édition et Réforme à Bâle*, p. 265. In the previous year the Index of Louvain (1558) condemned 74 Latin titles: 41 from Basel, 26 of Oporinus.

French wars of religion, without counting other conflicts inside and outside Germany. As the century advanced, the city lost any external presence. It was not only the presses with few resources that ceased operation. At the death of Oporinus, his widow maintained the house until 1600, when it closed. The Frobens, famous for the diffusion of Erasmus and his editions of the fathers of the church and ancient and modern authors, left the publishing world around 1587. The house of Episcopius went out of business in 1599. Except for the Henricpetri, who lasted until 1627, there were no important publishers to pass on the tradition.<sup>66</sup> Of a total of 76 publications of Vives, only eight are later than 1568.

The parallel rise of Frankfurt—which from being a great center for the book market through its biennial book fairs now became a publishing capital—Leipzig and Nuremberg, already without access to the Catholic world, did not signify a new publishing increase for Vives, but neither did it signify his abandonment, since he continued to be published in them (at least the *Introductio ad sapientiam* and the *Dialogues*) until well into the eighteenth century. Moreover, his books appeared occasionally in cities like Hamburg, Bremen, Wolfenbüttel, Königsberg or Tübingen, and more to the north and east, he was published in Wrocław, Copenhagen, Strengnäs, Uppsala, Linköping or Narva, in present-day Estonia, besides the aforementioned editions of Gdansk, Moscow and Pest.

As far as the Calvinist world is concerned, the enormous publishing prestige of Leiden derived from the university founded by William the Silent in 1575 even before the independence of the Low Countries was affirmed. The institution was created to combat religious fundamentalism, for which reason it awarded its chairs to humanists of the stature of Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), Joseph-Juste Scaliger (1540–1609), and Gerardus Joannes Vossius (1577–1649), who gave great prominence to Latin, Greek and Hebrew philology. Jurists like Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) also came from there. Christ-offel Raphelengius, Plantin's son-in-law, established the *Officina Plantiniana* for the service of the academy. There were also the famous Elzeviers and the Maire family.<sup>67</sup> The rigor and meticulous care of their academic

<sup>66</sup> See Josef Benzig, *Die Buchdrucker des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts im Deutschen Sprachgebiet* (Wiesbaden, 1982), the chapter on Basel, pp. 29ff. and the map cited above, note 63.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. the compilation of studies, *Leiden University in the Seventeenth Century. An Exchange of Learning*, ed. Thomas Lunsingh Scheurleer et al. (Leiden, 1975).

editions opened up for them a special place in the Frankfurt fairs. From the beginning Vives held a respectable position in the academy and the presses. He was one of the authors included in the first library of the University, whose catalogue was published in 1595.<sup>68</sup> In addition, Scaliger, Vossius and Grotius knew and quoted him. With regard to printing, it is sufficient to recall the re-edition of *De disciplinis* (1637) and *De veritate fidei Christianae* (1639). In 1644, the printer, David López de Haro, perhaps a sephardic Jew, brought out the *Introductio ad sapientiam*. He placed at the front of the book the note of Andreas Schott in his *Hispaniae Bibliotheca* (Frankfurt, 1608), where Vives was declared one of the triumvirs of the republic of letters together with Erasmus and Budé. López also wrote a very commendatory preface about the importance of the humanist and how he lay in oblivion, in contrast to his former renown. In a certain manner this was the epitaph to Vives in the presses of the Low Countries.

Francophone Geneva from the second half of the sixteenth century produced huge print runs of Greco-Latin classics, fathers of the church and humanists,<sup>69</sup> thanks to the fact that it became the refuge of Huguenot booksellers, printers and men of literature. Vives was published there in an even more discreet manner than in Leiden. The *Dialogues* came out in 1560, when the gymnasium was created and they continued to be reprinted until 1657. The Commentaries on Augustine, fragments of other works, and little more were published.

For the quantity of print runs Lyons was the most important dif-fuser of Vives.<sup>70</sup> The city maintained close contact with Basel and like it entered into crisis in the last third of the sixteenth century. Situated on the border of France, without a university or parliament, control over the orthodoxy of its publications was scarce, which allowed it great liberty. If by the middle of the century it was the third European city in the number of imprints, as religious repression increased, important booksellers fled to Geneva, where primary materials and labor were less costly. Lyons could not resist the two-fold religious and economic

---

<sup>68</sup> See Elfriede Hulshoff Pol, "The Library," in *Leiden University*, pp. 395–459, especially pp. 404–05. There is a facsimile edition of the Leiden 1595 catalogue of the Leiden University Library, together with an Index of Authors in *Petrus Bertius, Nomenclator. The first printed catalogue of Leiden University Library, 1595*, ed. Ronald Breugelmans (Leiden, 1995).

<sup>69</sup> Henri-Jean Martin, *Livres, pouvoirs et société à Paris au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Geneva, 1999), 2 vols; see also the article cited above at note 64.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 30–32.

pressure and went into decline. At the end of the century it sent 200 titles to the German fairs but it soon failed to fulfill this function.<sup>71</sup> Here too, Vives's fortune runs parallel with that of his publishers. Up to now we know of 140 editions. Using 1572, year of the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacre, as a cut-off date, when repression became widespread throughout the kingdom, not counting the early edition of 1514, there are 107 editions in the four decades from 1532 to the year of the sanctions, compared to 23 for the remainder of the century: it went from an average of 2.67 annually to 0.82. In the following century we know of only nine editions, the last being in 1664. From that point on, complete oblivion.

Paris was second only to Venice in book production and market, but the situation changed in the last third of the sixteenth century. Political instability resulting from the wars of religion brought the activity of the presses to a standstill.<sup>72</sup> Starting with St. Bartholomew's Day there was no other alternative left for Parisian booksellers and publishers but prison, exile or orthodoxy, according to Henri-Jean Martin.<sup>73</sup> Many of them emigrated to Geneva. The rest abandoned their trade or subjected themselves to the new regulations, under close observation. Nevertheless, the accession to power of Henry IV in 1589, his conversion to Catholicism, and the edict of tolerance created conditions for a slow recuperation, which raised its book industry to the first rank in all of Europe during the reign of Louis XIV. In this situation Vives was affected by the crisis without deriving any benefit from the subsequent recuperation. If we estimate the number of Parisian editions containing at least one of his writings, which have been identified as 120, 95 of them came out before 1572, only 17 during the rest of the century, and barely eight in the seventeenth century.

In Antwerp, despite the dramatic politico-religious conflicts that had raged there almost without interruption from the end of the 1550's, book production increased unceasingly from the second third of the century until the sack of the city in 1576, with a tremendous slaughter of citizens by the Spanish troops.<sup>74</sup> Three years later the separation

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., pp. 30–32 and 1081.

<sup>72</sup> For a very synthetic view of the political and religious map of Europe in those years see John H. Elliott, *Europe Divided. 1559–1598* (Oxford, 2000), and also Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis. 1598–1648* (Oxford, 2001).

<sup>73</sup> Martin, *Livres, pouvoirs et société*, p. 47.

<sup>74</sup> A useful summary of such involved conflicts is to be found in Henri Peyre, *Les monarchies européennes. Les relations internationales* (Paris, 1967).

of the provinces north of the Scheldt became an irreversible fact. As the seventeenth century advanced, the commercial boom moved to Amsterdam and the printing industry of the old metropolis was changing into little more than a factory of missals for Spain and the West Indies. The mediocre presence of Vives in the city was out of proportion with the volume of publications that were being produced in it and still less during the exceptionally prosperous years of Plantin. There was a certain increase in the 40s and 50s, driven by the competition with Basel and Lyons, followed by a gradual decadence. Of 67 publications that can be identified 56 were previous to the sack, 8 came out in the last quarter of the century and barely three at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

The electoral city of Cologne, governed by the bishop prince, became the German typographical capital of the Counterreformation beginning in the middle of the century. According to Benzing's information,<sup>75</sup> in the first decade of the sixteenth century there were some seventeen printers active in the city; the number rose to 28 in the 30s, dropping to 22 in the following ten years. The recuperation begins in the 70s, with 36 printers or publishers working at the same time in the city, a figure that rose to 45 at the close of the century. A sign of the gradual alignment with the Counterreformation is that many editors, like the Gymnich and Birckmann firms, published Erasmus profusely in the first half of the century, whereas their descendants propagated the decrees of Trent and the corresponding liturgical and dogmatic literature. The Cologne editions of Vives maintained a certain stability from the 30s to the 60s of the century with an average of eleven per decade; in the next two decades, the average fell to 8.5, to drop to only 3 in the 90s, and one final edition in 1616, the expurgated version of the Commentaries on Augustine. The works of Vives were published in the years when there was a publishing interlude and ceased to attract interest as the presses gradually overcame difficulties and aligned themselves with Trent.

During the sixteenth century the commercial importance of Venice lost ground to Atlantic Europe. From the time of Luther's insurrection its typographical industry, the most powerful in Europe, held its own in the face of numerous internal and external factors with relative success. A great number of measures affected the free development of the printing industry and modified its markets. Beginning in the 20s

---

<sup>75</sup> Benzing, *Die Buchdrucker*, pp. 232–58.

a pre-publication censorship for new books was introduced. In addition, in 1540 a vigilant inquisitorial tribunal was formed and indexes of forbidden books began to appear, in which Erasmus stood out. As the Council of Trent proceeded, the rigor of the indices increased, in particular, the previously mentioned one of 1559, but also the Tridentine Index of 1564. As if that were not enough, in the 70s and 80s, just when the city was reaching the peak of its production, it plummeted by half because of a plague, and its recuperation was slow and partial. Around 1600 it barely produced half the number of titles as Paris, which at that time was in full process of reconstruction.<sup>76</sup>

The booksellers preferred not to waste time and money seeking permission for questionable works, which introduced self-censorship as well. They opted for books of religious character of unquestionable orthodoxy. If the average of permission granted between 1551 and 1555 comprised a total of 15.6% of pious books, between 1590 and 1595 the percentage rose to 35.7%. Parallel to this, around 1555 there were 18.6% of classical and humanistic authors, by 1595 the percentage was 3.7. This meant that even if they succeeded in maintaining a high production they had to accommodate the internal market of the book, renouncing their traditional pre-eminence in the transalpine region, at least on the Protestant side, where books of Catholic piety or in the Romance tongue were not of interest. Besides, Paris, Antwerp, Frankfurt, Leiden and Geneva began to produce books on classics and humanities demanded by its vast public readership. These publications very soon were cheaper and of superior quality to the Venetian ones, owing to the vigor of printers like Plantin and thanks to the labor of numerous humanists in the north of Europe who were dedicated to textual criticism.

Vives arrived in Italy through the help of Erasmus and Basel, which made him doubly suspicious. While in other Catholic places publishers limited themselves to erasing him from their list, in Italy they stripped him of inconvenient companions and reduced Vives's presence almost exclusively to two school manuals, the *Dialogues* and *De conscribendis epistolis*. This work reached a total of 57 editions accompanying the *Dialogues* while these came to at least 222; 94 came out in Venice and they were

---

<sup>76</sup> For a very thorough general view I utilized the indispensable Paul F. Grendler, *The Roman Inquisition and the Venetian Press, 1540–1605* (Princeton, 1977), especially chapters II, III and VIII., as well as Paul Richardson, *Print Culture in Renaissance Italy: The Editorial and the Vernacular Text, 1470–1600* (Cambridge, 1994).



sooner or later reprinted in dozens of cities of the peninsula. Likewise five of his treatises were translated into Italian, without counting three versions of the *Dialogues*. Vives survived in Italy until the beginning of the twentieth century because he had been transformed into a local author for internal consumption and not for export. Proof of this is the fact that the *Dialogues* were issued with a Latin-Italian vocabulary.

The case of Great Britain is exceptional. For centuries it lacked a printing press capable of competing with the great European firms with the result that it depended for its academic books on the Low Countries, Germany and France. In fact, present-day libraries preserve very rich, continental collections of Vives. Besides, England was separated from Rome since 1532, a circumstance that saved Erasmus and the Protestant companions of Vives from censorship, who would have remained free of suspicion. In any case, after his early introduction into England around 1527, he continued in the presses, for internal consumption, until the last third of the eighteenth century. From around 1527 to 1593 the treatises on the education of the woman and the one on the husband, and the *Introductio ad sapientiam* circulated abundantly in English in at least 18 editions. The Commentaries on Augustine were also translated (1610 and 1620), and the allegorical study on the *Eclogues* (1628), all in London. In Latin *De conscribendis epistolis*—with all the authors proscribed by Rome—was published in 1573, and it is clear that the *Dialogues* were already printed in 1610, perhaps much earlier. We know of eight editions in London (1610–1684) and two in Cambridge (1633, 1635). In Scotland there were at least two in Aberdeen (1622, 1639) and six in Edinburgh (1620–61, 1717). In addition, eight partial editions have been identified. Subsequent to that various dialogues were included in the collection of *Familiaria colloquia*, between 1649 and 1727. The *Introductio ad sapientiam*, in Latin, came out in Cambridge in 1643, in Aberdeen in 1623 and as late as 1730 in Dublin. Lastly, the first twelve books of the *De disciplinis* were printed [in London] in 1612 with copious anonymous notes that merit study. As is evident, it enjoyed a substantial reception which the ups and downs of the Reformation did not alter, but it was dying out almost to the point of extinction during the century of the Enlightenment.

In Spain, the humanist's native land, printers did not compete in the international market either. The early and frequent publishing of Vives's writings: the *Mujer cristiana* in Spanish (seven times between 1528 and 1555 and a final edition in 1584), the *Introductio*, in Latin and in translation, the *Excitationes*, in Spanish, and the repeated publication

of the *Dialogues*, with at least five distinct commentaries, speak of a successful early reception, parallel to that of Erasmus. During the 30s, however, and more so in the following two decades the “staff officers” of Erasmism were the object of fierce persecution. Not only were writings that smacked of Lutheranism condemned, but also those of the Dutch master and his followers, real or apparent. Fear took hold of many humanists and the very promising increase in publications of Vives was cut short from the beginning of the 50s, contrary to what was happening in the rest of Europe and in particular in the Protestant world. From then on and for more than two centuries, just as it happened in Italy, the *Dialogues* were the only work of the humanist printed in the Spanish world and for a public that made use of the Latin-Spanish vocabularies.

As I hope to have demonstrated, the circulation of the works of Vives clearly benefited until the second third of the sixteenth century from the partial mutual tolerance between Catholics and Protestants with the consequent fluidity of the market. By the same token, as doctrinal rigidity introduced new conditions, the fame of the humanist suffered the consequences. In neither of the two camps that had recently been created did an exceptional interest emerge in continuing to diffuse his works, although the process of abandoning him was not uniform. On one side the Protestant cities of Frankfurt, Leipzig, Leiden, Geneva and even Nuremberg continued to propagate the writings of the humanist during the seventeenth century and at times in the eighteenth but never showed the enthusiasm of a Lasius, Platter or Oporinus during the height of his career in Basel. On the Catholic side, the profound crisis of the capitals that had promoted the diffusion of Vives ended up dragging him along as well, since the number of editions suffered a drastic reduction. Lyons, Paris, Cologne and Antwerp erased him almost totally from their inventories from the beginning of the last third of the sixteenth century, an earlier oblivion than on the Protestant side, where his school manuals were kept in the presses until the eighteenth century. Italy and Spanish kingdoms also kept printing him, but limited themselves to only one of his writings, the *Dialogues*.

Now that the geographic extension and the main lines of chronology of the diffusion of Vives's works have been presented in this compressed synthesis, a fundamental aspect remains unresolved which, for reason of space, will not be developed on this occasion. I refer, in part, to the complex problem of reception which entails the systematic study of those readers who, at any time, left written testimony of the reading

of Vives in each location of the vast geography that extends to both shores of the Atlantic. In the course of this study I have occasionally made reference to this phenomenon but it remains almost entirely yet to be studied. In that regard one may speak of three forms of reception which we could consider paradigmatic. In the first place there are those readers who assimilated the work of Vives and who were not afraid of citing him favorably; such was the case, for example, of Pierre Gassendi. In the second place we have those readers, very difficult to identify, who made use of the Valencian for their own work, but made no mention of his name. The *De veritate religionis Christianae* (Antwerp, 1581) of the polemicist and French Protestant political figure in the time of the wars of religion, Philippe Du Plessis-Mornay (1549?–1623), “is no more than a more or less paraphrased version of the Spanish author”. The scholar Paul Graf proved the proximity between the two authors, comparing analogous passages of Vives and the French writer, who never mentioned the Spaniard.<sup>77</sup> The third type of readers are those who read his works—and occasionally made use of them—but cited him with scorn and condemned him. We have already mentioned the case of Henri Estienne, who denounced both Vives and his country. From that moment on a tradition came about, cultivated principally in France, which strove to debase the figure of the humanist. For that reason the philosophers of the Enlightenment not only had little knowledge of a Vives who was almost completely forgotten, but also were steeped in this tradition of contempt for the *Spanish* author. It is no accident that the *Encyclopédie* buried the humanist under this tombstone inscription: “Il a beaucoup écrit, et avec peu d'utilité pour le public.”

### *The Historiographical Recovery. The 19th and 20th Centuries*

At the outbreak of the French Revolution and the liberal revolution in Europe and the American continent, Vives became an author of the past, sunken in oblivion, if not in discredit. Only in Spain did his name continue to be pronounced with some frequency. Throughout the nineteenth century and during part of the twentieth, he again became the object of attention of scholars and other professional writers. It was not

<sup>77</sup> Paul Graf, *Luis Vives como apologeta. Contribución a la Historia de la Apologética*, trans. José María Millás Vallicrosa (Madrid, 1943), pp. 144–47.

a matter of a homogeneous and generalized process, and it is possible to detect at least three centers of dissemination. The most influential of all developed in Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century, but its influence spread to the greater part of Europe and numerous countries of America. According to this point of view Vives was, above all, a pedagogue, and consequently a psychologist. As a pioneer of modern pedagogy and psychology his writings had repercussions on countless authors of very diverse climes. In Spain, throughout the whole nineteenth century liberals, moderates and conservatives claimed Vives as their own. Then, from the third to the seventh decade of the twentieth century he became once again the exclusive patrimony of an extreme ultra-nationalistic and belligerent right. By the same token, if we except the noteworthy work of Adolfo Bonilla,<sup>78</sup> the Spanish Vives was closer to a polemical ideology than a scholarly study of his intellectual legacy. As a result, the copious bibliography produced during those years was primarily for internal consumption, with little influence outside the peninsula. A third type of approximation to Vives evolved in Belgium, from the middle of the nineteenth century. Initially it was an antiquarian interest to document the "life and works" of the humanist, with the help of his own writings and archival documents. Later, in the new century, Professor Henry de Vocht, followed by his disciples, applied the philological method to the analysis of the writings of Vives and other humanists with notable success.

*Germany. Pedagogue and Psychologist*

The interest awakened in Vives during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century is chiefly due to the fact that he was seen as a pedagogue and therefore as a psychologist. It is not by chance that this focus took rise in Germany, the cradle both of empirical psychology and the first systematic efforts to create a pedagogy founded on the "natural history" of the mind. Both disciplines, as we know, were consolidated during the first half of the 19th century.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>78</sup> *Luis Vives y la filosofía del Renacimiento* (Madrid, 1903, repr. 1929).

<sup>79</sup> The new pedagogy was based on the work of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1794–1841), whose ideas reached England, the United States and France at the end of the 19th century. In Spain they were diffused by Krausist intellectuals, leading spirits of the *Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza* and its collection, *La lectura*. It is no accident that the *krausistas* also disseminated original studies on Vives and his principal pedagogical and psychological ideas, as we shall see shortly.

According to Foster Watson, the great propagator of Vives the pedagogue in England and Spain, it was Karl von Raumer who first called attention in Germany to the educational ideas of Vives in his *Geschichte der Pädagogik* (1842–43).<sup>80</sup> In any case it was the Neo-Kantian professor Friedrich Albert Lange (1828–75) who dedicated the first “modern” essay to him, that is, a study permeated with the new philosophical and scientific anxieties of positivism. It appeared as an article in *Die Enzyklopädie des gesamten Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen*, first published in Gotha (1859–78), reprinted in Leipzig in 1877 and widely disseminated both within and outside Germany. The work, which inspired numerous continuators, centered on the analysis of the pedagogical aspects present in *De disciplinis* and in other writings which from that time on were viewed from this perspective.

Afterwards, and until the outbreak of the World War I, three huge volumes were published containing *De tradendis disciplinis* and other educational treatises, in separate German versions (1881, 1883 and 1896). Parts of the *De institutione feminae Christianae*, the *Introductio ad sapientiam* (1912) and the *Dialogues* (1897) were translated. Major theorists like Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) and Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) looked favorably upon the hitherto forgotten Valencian and assigned him a prominent position among Transalpine humanists.

The initiative began in universities of Protestant tradition, but interest seemed to cool with the coming of the World War. From then on studies on the Catholic side predominated. By this time the image of the pedagogue was so established that both confessions subscribed to the view that Vives had been the *Begründer* of modern pedagogy, and from this focal point his psychology and his relations with other pedagogues were examined. In no case, as far as can be ascertained, was the comparative method, which contrasted Vives’s writings with those of other authors, applied to the humanist’s opus to explore the evolution of his thought in the course of his lifetime. There was no attempt to organize the historical context in which the writings of the pedagogue arose, except for some biographical generalities, and the printing history of his works aroused little interest. Vives was reduced by his publishers to a great pedagogical text, a static and immovable body of *idées fixes*, and from it were extracted pertinent passages for every occasion.

Once this focus and method were defined, the study of Vives crossed the border into Finland, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Influ-

---

<sup>80</sup> Foster Watson, *On Education* (Cambridge, 1912), p. xix.

enced by German pedagogues, the Welshman Foster Watson (died 1929) resolved to diffuse his name in Great Britain. And although he was animated by an almost apostolic fervor and published various books and articles, he did not succeed in arousing great interest among his countrymen, but was happy with his enthusiastic reception in Spain. In 1908 he published, in London, a partial version of the *Dialogues* with the rather strange title of *Tudor Schoolboy Life*, and in 1912 *Vives and the Renaissance Education of Women* with English excerpts from the treatise on female education, the *Satellitium*, and other works both of Vives and of Richard Hyrde and Sir Thomas Elyot. He also translated the *De tradendis disciplinis* with the not at all disinterested title of *On Education* (Cambridge, 1913). In addition he wrote what was for many decades the only monograph in English on the Spaniard, *Luis Vives. El gran valenciano* (Oxford, 1922). By reason of his great acclaim in Spain Watson published several works only in Catalan or Spanish. With him the tendency to reduce Vives to the role of an 'educator' reaches its climax.

In France a moderate interest in Vives was manifested by historians of pedagogy. Gabriel Compayré in his *Histoire critique des doctrines de l'éducation en France depuis le seizième siècle* mentions that the Valencian pedagogue *mériterait une étude spéciale dans une histoire universelle de la pédagogie*. Similar comments are made by Paul Rousset in his *Histoire de l'éducation des femmes en France* (Paris, 1883) vol. 1, pp. 121–39. Other analogous cases only corroborate a very tangential interest. Unlike what happened in other countries there were no anthologies of translations of his principal texts into French and indeed the author continues to be an unknown in that language. Only in 1972 did Alain Guy publish his *Vivès ou l'humanisme engagé*, 152 pages of commentary and 54 passages taken from diverse works. On the other hand, outside the pedagogical perspective there were studies of a learned character, some of them fully valid, on Vives and his relations with Rabelais, Montaigne, Descartes and Gassendi, or works on his place in the humanist movement, like those of the Erasmist Jean-Claude Margolin, and especially the indispensable studies of Marcel Bataillon, not only his monumental *Erasmus et l'Espagne* but also his studies on the relief of the poor.

In Italy the history of the pedagogue is repeated. A. Piazzzi wrote an article on Vives as pedagogist of the Renaissance, which was then included in the *Dizionario illustrato di pedagogia* (1895). The echo of this essay would only resound decades later in *La sapienza psicologica e pedagogica di Giovanni Ludovico Vives da Valenza* (Bologna, 1922) by the physician, Enrico Rivari, a lengthy monograph of 519 pages in contrast to the

first essay of only 42 pages. In the first part one notes the curiosity of a scientist who glosses the psychological texts of the Spaniard, which he knows in detail; the second part of the book pays tribute to German studies on pedagogy. Beginning in 1950 and continuing until 1986 Mario Sancipriano dedicated at least eight articles to the investigation of Vives's concept of psychology, comparing it more to anthropology than to pedagogy. In 1959 he wrote the prologue to a facsimile reprint of the original edition of the *De anima et vita* (Turin, Bottega d'Erasmus), and in 1974 published a bilingual edition of the same treatise, in which he registered variants between the *editio princeps*, the Basel *Opera omnia* and the Mayans edition without justifying his own readings. He also added some notes, but not an *apparatus fontium*.

In conclusion, the perspective of Vives as a psychologist and pedagogue, a *precursor* of countless pedagogues of different countries, was centered on a very limited aspect of his intellectual activity, but it put his name in circulation again from the second half of the nineteenth century through the first decades of the twentieth. The theme, which has greatly declined in the last half-century, is far from being forgotten. Entrenched in historical dictionaries and encyclopedias, it is still a standard description, and undoubtedly will remain so for a long time—like every good commonplace—in numerous locations in Europe and America.

#### *Spain. From Liberalism to Ultra-nationalism*

Unlike the rest of Europe a late interest in Vives arose in the final years of the *ancien régime*. This explains the re-edition of his *Opera omnia* (Valencia, 1782–1790), preceded by the *Vita Vivis* of Gregorio Mayans, an intense vogue of the *Dialogues* in bilingual editions, and the circulation in the last third of the 18th century of old Spanish versions of the *Introducción a la sabiduría*, the *Instrucción de la muger Cristiana* and the *Tratado del socorro de los pobres*. The peninsular Vives vogue of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th was nurtured, above all, by these three Spanish versions, which continued to be reprinted, as well as by the frequent consultation of the Mayans edition. With few exceptions, for a century and half an authentic scholarly interest in exploring the life and works of the humanist was conspicuous by its absence. It sufficed to claim him as the champion of a particular political and ideological party.

Indeed, the presence of the name of Vives, thanks to the circulation of some of his works, plus the fact of his Spanish origin translated

itself into a very appreciable number of publications. Thus, between the middle of the 19th century and the middle of the 20th a greater number of books and articles about Vives were generated in Spain than the sum total of all writings about him in the rest of Europe and America to the present day. The study of such a prolific amount of writing holds an undoubted interest, but it is more related to the history of ideas in Spain than with the work of the humanist himself, whose name became the banner of many different causes, quite foreign to his ideas. Vives appealed to many writers thanks to the new regime of freedom of the press, which favored the existence of journals with multiple tendencies, in whose pages this theme and all other imaginable topics aroused the most lively debates, a discussion that passed from the printed to the spoken word in cafes, classrooms, universities, congresses, and revolutionary and counterrevolutionary proclamations. For on every occasion Vives was linked to the political circumstances of the moment. For this reason successive points of view, sometimes exclusive by their very nature, ended up by extinguishing each other. They were more the children of political debate than of rigorous analysis. Therefore, unlike peaceful scholars of Vives the pedagogue and his influence on native authors, the Spanish Vives scholars, above all else, engaged in controversy.

A first manifestation of this was in liberal guise. With the death of King Fernando VII in 1833 absolutism was at an end and a constitutional monarchy arose. Among the reforms that were introduced was educational reform. The new programs of study excluded scholastic manuals of public education. Vives then emerged as the champion of the fight against the schools and the precursor of modern philosophy. Ricardo González Múzquiz in an early monograph on the author, *Vindicación del ilustre filósofo español Juan Luis Vives, primer reformador de la Filosofía en la Europa moderna* (Valladolid, 1839), proclaimed that in him there already existed “la verdad fundamental [...] de la filosofía positiva y es que todas las ideas nos vienen por los sentidos, que sólo por inducción podemos establecer reglas generales.”<sup>81</sup> He also associated the backwardness of Spanish learning with the Inquisition and the dominance of scholasticism, described as an “apoyo de la ignorancia [...] y un obstáculo casi invencible a la introducción de la verdadera filosofía.” (p. 104). He therefore vindicated one “cuyo principal título de Gloria

---

<sup>81</sup> In a footnote he defends the thesis of the ideologues against “los filósofos reaccionarios de nuestros días”.



es [...] la guerra a muerte [...] a los escolásticos.” (p. 105). To explain that Vives had been the first reformer of philosophy in modern Europe, he made use of a simile that obtained wide currency: “If Bacon laid the foundations of true science, it was the Spanish philosopher who cleared the ground, dug the ditches and laid the first stones.”<sup>82</sup>

With the victory of the moderate party in 1844 Vives’s sympathizers invaded the political and cultural scene and initiated the reign of eclectic manuals. What went by the name of eclecticism at the time was the philosophical school founded by Victor Cousin (1792–1867), minister of moderate France during the Bourbon restoration. In his view all through history various great systems appeared. The eclectic picked the best of each. Neither scholasticism, proper to mysticism, had been so ruinous nor did Bacon possess the greatness claimed for him by his followers. Various Spanish eclectics became interested in the Scottish philosophy of Thomas Reid (1710–1796), Douglas Stewart (1753–1828) and the latest of them, William Hamilton (1788–1856).<sup>83</sup> Enrique Gil (1815–1846) published a “Luis Vives,”<sup>84</sup> in which he branded the Valencian as an eclectic in this sense. Faithful to eclectic canons, Gil blurred the edges: he admitted the anti-scholasticism of Vives, but he saw in him prudence and good sense, a description taken up by later traditionalists. Rather than a belligerent author, he became a model of reflection.

In a third moment the peninsular boom of the ideas of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832) opened new intellectual and political perspectives in Spain beginning in the 1860s. The *krausistas* gave impetus to university reform and the creation of parallel institutions and thus introduce, very gradually, the positive sciences and scientific research. Its adherents had an important role in the propagation of positivism, Darwinism and liberal Christianity, in brief, European rationalist culture. They called for the deliverance of Spain from its longstanding cultural and scientific backwardness. In the political sphere they sought to stifle the democratization of the country and in some cases to confront social questions. From the fall of Isabel II (1868) until the

<sup>82</sup> “Bacon echó los cimientos de las verdaderas ciencias, fue el filósofo español quien *desmontó* el terreno, abrió las zanjas y puso las primeras piedras. (pp. 87, 69–75).

<sup>83</sup> They were never translated nor did they inspire monographs in Castilian or Catalan. According to Joan Estelrich they came to Spain via French versions (*Vivès. Exposition organisée à la Bibliothèque Nationale*, Paris, 1941), pp. 164–65.

<sup>84</sup> Enrique Gil, *Pensamiento in Obras en prosa*, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1883).

first republic (1873–1874) they had enormous political influence. They were also interested in the new pedagogical and psychological currents in Germany and from the '80s on they infiltrated Vives the pedagogue into Spain. Through the *Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza* (active from 1877 to 1936) they disseminated translations of important English and French articles about Vives. Moreover, by the 20th century, the publishing series, *La Lectura*, published for the first time in Spanish new writings of the humanist, this time of a scholarly nature: *De tradendis disciplinis* with the title *Tratado de Enseñanza* (1923) and *De anima* (1916, 1923), both with a preface by Foster Watson. Another avant-garde journal, *La España moderna*, disseminated the encyclopedic article of Friedrich Lange, "Luis Vives".

For conservatives of various persuasions *krausismo* aided in the dissolution of traditional patriotic values, especially the union of altar and throne, in pursuit of an exotic fashion—German, revolutionary and impious. The restoration of the monarchs in 1874 led to the exile of prominent *krausistas* and their expulsion from the university. Deprived of political notoriety, they turned to activities of an intellectual and educational nature. In this new alliance they were the object of fiercer attacks. In the face of German heterodoxy it was necessary to defend the native Catholic element, in a word, indigenous traditions. This expressed itself in two ways: the first in the romantic and anti-liberal movement of eclectic Catalanists of the so-called *Renaixença*, in the middle of the 19th century, who adopted the Valencian humanist as an historical link to a Catalan tradition. According to the defenders of this thesis,<sup>85</sup> all philosophy to be legitimate had to be the product of its own people without foreign influences (read German). The Catalans had created for themselves an indigenous and centuries-old philosophical tradition which stemmed from Ramón Lull in the Middle Ages, continued through Vives in the Renaissance and was recovered in the 19th century thanks to Professor Martí d'Eixalá (1808–1857), who entertained sympathies for the Scottish School. The principal feature of this tradition was its program to avoid abstruse speculation in order to concentrate on practical values, based on common sense. In *De anima* Vives had anticipated the philosophy of common sense,

---

<sup>85</sup> I dare to summarize in a single paragraph a cabalistic process that took decades to develop. Its theorists were Francisco Xavier Llorens i Barba (1829–1872) through his lectures at the University of Barcelona, and his disciple, Josep Torres i Bages (1846–1916).

which transformed him into an indispensable link to this native and national tradition.

The second focus of attack on *krausismo*, with relation to Vives, which had widespread repercussions, was centered in Madrid, and its most conspicuous protagonist was Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo (1856–1912). It was now asserted that although modern philosophy had arisen from English and French authors like Bacon and Descartes, they owed their ideas to the Spaniard, Vives. By the same token everything produced after him in the fields of philosophy and science was owed to Spain. One of the krausistas exiled from Spain at the fall of the republic, Gumer-sindo de Azcárate (1840–1917), defended the parliamentary regime from his place of exile. He uttered a famous phrase that unleashed one of the most famous of the polemics concerning Spanish learning: “The energy of a people will be manifested only if the State supports the freedom of learning.” And the converse: “It may even happen that its activity will be almost suffocated altogether, as happened in Spain for three centuries.”<sup>86</sup>

Encouraged by his friends Menéndez Pelayo answered him, initiating a polemic whose dominate features were the affirmation of the superiority of the Spanish over foreign tradition and the labeling of his rivals as anti-Spanish because of their lack of an historical sense. The debate may be summarized as a clash between two contradictory views of history. The liberal view was that Spain was sunk into an unquestionable backwardness and isolation, which was to be attributed to political absolutism, religious intolerance and a mixture of the two. They affirmed that the history of Spanish learning and philosophy was inexplicable if it was isolated from the great European currents that were imported, diversified or adapted in the peninsula in various epochs of its history. In the opposite camp Menéndez Pelayo wanted to resolve the problem through a historical revaluation of native authors, of a glorious autochthonous tradition.

In the trading of accusations the name of Vives was brandished by both parties, but especially by Menéndez Pelayo, who made of the

---

<sup>86</sup> The principal texts are in Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, *La ciencia española* (Madrid, 1933), 2 vols. Ernesto and Enrique García Camarero in *La polémica de la ciencia española* (Madrid, 1970) publish some texts of the rivals of don Marcelino not included in his book. The most recent account of the debate, with rich bibliography, is José Luis Abellán, *Historia crítica del pensamiento español* (Madrid, 1988), vol. 5.

Valencian the center-piece of his argument in favor of the Spanish tradition. Here is how, in part, he exalted Vives to the point of delirium:

Que Vives es la más elevada personificación de la España científica [...] el más prodigioso de los artífices del Renacimiento [...] que renovó el método antes de Bacon y Descartes [...] que de él procede la filosofía escocesa [...] que el espíritu de la doctrina de Vives informa a toda nuestra civilización [...] que a él debemos lo poco o mucho que hemos trabajado en ciencias naturales; que de él arranca una reforma de la enseñanza de la teología y del derecho; que nuestra crítica histórica [...] es una aplicación del *vivismo* [...] que Vives tiene todas las cualidades buenas del Renacimiento y ninguna de sus exageraciones; que no es un fanático enemigo de la Edad Media [...] que toda restauración total o parcial de los estudios en España ha sido *restauracion vivista* [...].<sup>87</sup>

Menéndez Pelayo never wrote the promised treatise in which he would demonstrate these assertions called for by his rivals. Nevertheless, and this is fundamental for understanding *vivismo* in the first half of the 20th century, everything he said about the Valencian including his most exalted polemical flourishes, was taken literally by his followers, for whom all that proceeded from that illustrious pen was incontrovertible truth.

In 1895 Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín (1875–1926), a young student of Menéndez Pelayo, was encouraged by his teacher to elaborate a large work on Vives. From this came *Luis Vives y la filosofía del Renacimiento* (1903), which remained the most solid general work on the subject for many decades to come. Bonilla made use of the chronology elaborated by Gregorio Mayans in his *Vita Vivis* (1782) but enriched his model with new documentary information. He drew advantage from the Vives-Erasmus correspondence (which Mayans could not draw upon, owing to censorship) and a group of unpublished letters of Spanish humanists which Bonilla himself published in 1901.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, he profited by information about the traces of Vives in the Low Countries collected in the writings of two Belgian scholars in the 19th century, Alexandre-Joseph Namèche and Émile van den Bussche.<sup>89</sup> Around this data and

<sup>87</sup> *La ciencia española*, I, p. 135.

<sup>88</sup> "Clarorum Hispaniensium epistolae ineditae," *Revue hispanique* 8 (1901), 181–308.

<sup>89</sup> Alexandre-Joseph Namèche, *Mémoire sur la vie et les écrits de Jean-Louis Vivès* (Brussels, 1841); Émile van den Bussche, *Jean-Louis Vivès. Éclaircissements et rectifications biographiques. Notes sur son séjour à Bruges. Ses oeuvres*. (Bruges, 1871); "Luis Vives, célèbre philosophe du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle, notes biographiques," *La Flandre* 8 (1876), 291–328.

supported by his precocious erudition Bonilla fashioned an historic literary and philosophical fresco. The exasperating superabundance of material, combined with rich documentation make this work today a book that is both outdated and irreplaceable. At every step it offers new things or interesting clues. He shared his master's ideas of Vives being a precursor of various thinkers, and disdained the *krausistas* and their continuators. Following this same rationale he refrained from speaking of Vives as a pedagogue as was the general practice at the time. He preferred to apply to him the more traditional name of philosopher. In other respects, the general tone of the book is measured, without sharp words and emotional outbursts of his teacher.

The study was well received outside of Spain but in his native country the author's independence of judgment was not appreciated nor the fact that he looked favorably upon heterodox doctrines.<sup>90</sup> Though very conservative in politics, Bonilla was far from being prudish and he did not conceal his sympathy for Erasmus, among others. Some praised him in exaggerated terms, as did his teacher, who qualified the book as "la mayor monografía que tengamos, hasta ahora, sobre ningún filósofo español."<sup>91</sup> Approved or rejected, no other comparable work was produced.

While Bonilla maintained a measured tone in his book from his chair of the history of philosophy in Madrid, he inculcated animosity in his students against the *krausistas* and sympathy for the ideas of Menéndez Pelayo. Several of them went as far as to form a kind of inseparable intellectual confraternity around a student review, *Filosofía y Letras* (1915–1920), which displayed the figure of Vives on the cover. It was the nucleus of the ultraconservative *vivismo* of the 20th century. In their *Presentación*, the editors declared:

We neither seek to Europeanize the Spanish University nor Germanize it but to Hispanicize it [...] we are fed up with the pedantry of the Europeanizers who come from Germany, bloated with wind and contempt for all that is Spanish, who instead of showing the native worth of the race did nothing more than despise and vilify us.<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> Julio Puyol, "Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín. Su vida y sus obras," *Revista de ciencias jurídicas y sociales* (1926), 443–44.

<sup>91</sup> Puyol, 446.

<sup>92</sup> Alicia Alted, *La revista "Filosofía y Letras"* (Madrid, 1981), p. 90.

For those young spokesmen of the Spanish “race” Vives was a devotion, an implicit sympathy, not based on any research. Here the exalted pen of Menéndez Pelayo contributed an arsenal of sonorous declarations, capable of dragging the name of Vives into any matter related to the convulsive political life of those years.

From 1923, when in a military coup General Miguel Primo de Rivera (1870–1930) abrogated the constitution and set up a dictatorship tinged with fascism until the death of Franco in 1975, Vives was appropriated by the most exalted extremists of the right and his name was used and abused for propagandistic purposes. He was described as a bulwark of *Hispanidad* and as the greatest representative of a pretended “*raza hispánica*”. I have calculated at 507 the titles produced in Spain between 1901 and the death of Franco. The dictatorship established a Luis Vives chair in Valencia, occupied almost without exception by sympathizers of the regime, former disciples of Bonilla with a more or less open fascist affiliation. The almost exact coinciding of the end of the war with the fourth centenary of Vives’s death (1940) allowed the new authorities to promote official homage to him throughout the length and breadth of the country, to which the *Vivistas* of the previous dictatorship gladly contributed. During the first five years of the new regime, the number of pieces dedicated to the *blasón de España* was around 175. It fell off sharply after that.

Such a copious production was the work of more than 200 authors, 130 of whom wrote on Vives only once. The number itself would seem to confirm that much of these writings was the work of improvisers and was below the minimum level of serious scholarship. It was more of a militant *vivismo*, vociferous and of little or no academic value. One example would suffice. Wenceslao González Oliveros, disciple of Bonilla and professor at Salamanca, wrote *Humanismo frente a comunismo. La primera monografía anti-comunista publicada en el mundo, obra de un pensador español, el universalmente célebre humanista, Juan Luis Vives, que nació bajo el signo imperial del Yugo y las Flechas* [the Yoke and the Arrows, insignia of the Falange, editor’s note], *el mismo año en que España descubrió el Nuevo Mundo* (Valladolid, 1937. Triumphant year II). One must be attentive to discover that the book is actually a translation of the *De communione rerum*, a short work of Vives, whose 35 pages are buried beneath 157 pages of a feverish discourse in which traditional clichés about Vives stand out, especially his being a Spaniard. To these were added the new

commonplaces: the Empire, the symbols of the Falange. On page 8 we read: "Luis Vives, in whose vast and brilliant production can be found, in germ, flower and fruit, all that the traditionalist Falange Española and the J.O.N.S. [Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista] longed for, and more. ¡Franco! ¡Franco! ¡Franco! ¡¡¡Arriba España!!!"

When spirits were somewhat calmed, more serene works were produced, but not always of better scholarly quality. Perhaps the outstanding work of this period was the translation into Spanish of the *Obras completas* by Lorenzo Riber, in 1947–48. Furthermore, once the *krausistas* had departed from the scene, through death, prison or exile, the Franco intellectuals took up Vives the pedagogue again, at a moment when this facet of the humanist was being abandoned outside the peninsula. Much was written and reiterated on this subject.<sup>93</sup> In 1964 the publication of the *Procesos inquisitoriales contra la familia judía de Luis Vives* by José María Palacio signaled the death blow of the peninsular *vivismo* founded on an exacerbated and bellicose nationalism. With the *judeoconverso* origins of the humanist now revealed, the great epigone of the Hispanic Race was "mancillado con esa tacha ancestral" (dishonored with this ancestral strain), whose mere evocation merited "una repulsa instintiva" to *vivisti* like Riber.<sup>94</sup> The death of Franco in 1975 coincided with a gradual opening of Spanish Vives scholars to international academic canons.

### *Belgium. Philology*

One of the merits of Bonilla's *Luis Vives* consists in the fact that he did not limit himself, as the German pedagogues did, to the analysis of the writings of the Valencian in order to extract his doctrines and ideas from them. On the contrary, he resolved to reconstruct the life of the author and situate it in its historical, cultural, political and religious context. For this purpose, as I have indicated, he availed himself of the available bibliography and documents and letter collections which allowed him to place Vives in relation with other personalities of his time, among whom were various Spaniards. After the publication of the book neither Bonilla nor his numerous disciples consulted archives and

<sup>93</sup> It is sufficient to mention the voluminous study of Fermín de Urmeneta, *La doctrina psicológica y pedagógica de Luis Vives* (Barcelona, 1949).

<sup>94</sup> Lorenzo Riber, "Ensayo bibliográfico," *Obras completas* (Madrid, 1946), vol. 1, p. 15.

other documentation again for new contributions to his life and works. On the other hand, in Belgium from the middle of the 19th century a tradition was formed which gave special emphasis to the relations of the humanist with the former Low Countries, in whose cities he passed the greater and more relevant part of his life. In the first place there is the *Mémoire sur la vie et les écrits de Jean-Louis Vivès* (Brussels, 1844) of Alexandre-Joseph Namèche. The author continues and in part modernizes the learned line of bibliographers in the Low Countries that goes from Andreas Schott and Valerius Andreas to Jean Noël Paquot. He revises and orders the materials unearthed during three centuries. Using the *Vita Vivis* of Mayans as a starting point, he supplements the work of his predecessors with data, especially archival material, having to do directly with the years spent in Louvain. His essay had so much influence that for a long time biographers tended to attribute all the intellectual formation of Vives to the Brabant University, leaving Valencia and Paris in the shadow.

In a similar way, Émile van den Bussche, an archivist of Bruges, published in that city some *Éclaircissements et rectifications biographiques* (1871). Using Namèche as a reference, he claimed to clarify and rectify some aspects of the life of Vives using statements of Vives himself and historical documents.<sup>95</sup> As an archivist he contributed some choice morsels. Contrary to what he promised in the title, however, his leaflet abounds with confusion and information difficult to verify.<sup>96</sup>

One can mention several others Belgian and Dutch scholars who contributed to our knowledge of Vives<sup>97</sup> but most important was the support given by the University of Louvain to the history of humanism. The impetus for this long process was owed to the persistent activity of Professor Henry de Vocht (1878–1962).<sup>98</sup> In 1906 he initiated his lectures at the University. In 1914 he began to prepare a critical edition of the letters which the principal Nordic humanists of the time, including Vives, sent to the Flemish jurist, Frans van Cranevelt (1485–1564).

---

<sup>95</sup> He thought that Namèche was more intent on glorifying the University of Louvain than producing a biography of Vives. *Éclaircissements*, p. 293.

<sup>96</sup> On p. 13 he affirms that Vives assisted as a witness to two judicial proceedings, in November and December of 1514 in Bruges. A very interesting bit of information, but it gives as a reference the Archive of Saint Donatian, "Documents isolés."

<sup>97</sup> For a list of these authors see the bibliography of González González, *Una república de lectores*, Section IV.

<sup>98</sup> A complete biography and likeness of this professor are given in *Charisterium H. de Vocht* (Louvain, 1979), esp. pp. 3–42.



The task led de Vocht to intense archive research which enabled him to rescue primary material for the study of humanism in the former Low Countries. To provide a vehicle of publication for these texts and studies he created the series *Humanistica Lovaniensia*, the first issue of which contained the letters addressed to Cranevelt (1928).<sup>99</sup> The volume was a paragon of critical rigor and a repository of learned notes, comparable to its model, the Correspondence of Erasmus, by Percy Allen, then in course of publication. At his death in 1962 the collection had reached volume 16. In addition, he created the chair of the History of Humanism, and even after retiring he continued to give lectures at his home. In this way he had given life to a center for the teaching of humanism, a publication which would welcome the results of these investigations and several generations of disciples trained in a method based on the critical study of Neo-Latin texts.

Among the letters addressed to Cranevelt there were 48 from Vives, all unknown, save for one. Since they were private letters, not intended for publication, they made possible a hitherto unknown access to his private and intimate life, to which the opportune notations of the publisher contributed no small amount. Thanks to his knowledge of English culture of that period, de Vocht also provided a study which has not been superseded on Vives's stay in England, on his ties with the student John Heylar and even with one of the sons of the Cardinal—Inquisitor Manrique.<sup>100</sup> Of equal and even greater interest, the studies of de Vocht and his disciples, as they appeared in *Humanistica Lovaniensia*, brought to light the strife-ridden academic atmosphere of Louvain and the Low Countries in the culminating years of the careers of Erasmus and Luther. Such studies revealed a historical context from which emerged a Vives connected to individuals of flesh and blood, participants in the debates of their times.

Surprising as it may seem, the writings of de Vocht and his first disciples did not find immediate response. As I pointed out, the vein of Vives the pedagogue was exhausted almost everywhere before the Second World War. In contrast to this silence, his name gave rise to

---

<sup>99</sup> *Litterae virorum eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium 1522–1528*. (Louvain, 1928). *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 1.

<sup>100</sup> *Monumenta Humanistica Lovaniensia. Texts and Studies about Lowain Humanists in the First Half of the XVIth Century. Erasmus-Vives-Dorpius-Clenardus-Goes-Moringus* (Louvain, 1934) *HL* 4.

hundreds of publications in Spain, but for many years the vast majority of them were lacking in any kind of scholarly rigor. In that same city of Louvain there is a vacuum of many years, undoubtedly as a result of the grave damages suffered in the war. The silence began to break at the end of the '60s, during a flourishing international revival of studies on humanism and the Renaissance, which continues to our own day. Renewed research in Vives is on the rise in the United States, Belgium, Italy and Germany. Moreover, Spain has slowly begun to discuss Vives from new points of view. Studies of Vives continue to increase to the present day in quantity and quality.

### *Most Recent Progress*

At the end of the second World War the name of Vives had fallen again into oblivion, except in Spain. It is necessary to wait until the end of the '60s for interest to spring up here and there. It was not a matter of chance. For several decades figures with great capacity of intellectual leadership—and with great longevity—encouraged a renewal of studies on humanism and the Renaissance in Europe and the United States, based on the rigorous study of humanist texts and their publication. Suffice it to mention Hans Baron (1900–1988), Paul Oskar Kristeller (1905–1999), Eugenio Garin (1909–2004). At the same time there was an increased interest in disciplines like linguistics, rhetoric and analytical philosophy, which favored the study of medieval theories of language and this led to a revaluation of nominalist logic and later that produced by the humanists in open opposition to scholastic authors. Humanist rhetoric was also the object of study. Little by little the works of Vives awakened the interest of the new scholars. At this juncture the facsimile reprinting of the Mayans edition of the *Opera omnia* (London, 1964) extended the availability of his writings in numerous universities, especially in the United States and Canada.

Similarly, studies of Vives received great stimulus with the opportune appearance, in English, of *Juan Luis Vives* by Carlos Noreña, in 1970.<sup>101</sup> His meritorious general study brought up to date the dated monographs of Bonilla and Foster Watson. As far as the life of the Valencian was concerned, he incorporated the principal studies and

---

<sup>101</sup> (Leiden, 1970). Spanish edition (Madrid, 1978).

documents published up to that time: Allen's edition of the correspondence of Erasmus, the texts and studies of Henry de Vocht, in particular the Vives-Cranevelt correspondence, and the inquisitorial trials, which had just appeared in 1964. His reading of the trials and the letters to Cranevelt from the perspective of Américo Castro<sup>102</sup> led him to paint an image that was perhaps excessively bitter and undoubtedly inexact of the *judeo-español* Vives. Likewise, when it came to analysing the thought of the humanist, he was not able to derive benefit from the most recent studies on dialectic and rhetoric of the 15th and 16th centuries. Be that as it may, Noreña harshly criticized the treatment of Vives in Franco Spain. Moreover, he presented for the first time a personage immersed in the conflicts of his time, forced to overlook the tragedy of his family, a person with doubts, opinions that bordered on heterodoxy, dangerous friendships and great independence of judgment. Nothing could be further from the model of deliberation, equilibrium and "sane" religiosity. For that reason, as soon as it appeared, it was regularly cited both within and outside of Spain.

In the field of bibliography the chapter on Vives in the *Manual del librero hispanoamericano* of Antonio Palau Dulcet (Barcelona-Oxford, 1976, tome XXVII) stands out. While it is extraordinarily rich in references to early editions of Vives, it abounds in errors and inaccuracies. *Vives. Edicions princeps* of 1992, of the present writer, proposed to bring up to date the problematic question of when each work of the humanist was published for the first time. An exhaustive record of the vast diffusion of the *Dialogues* is available in the same writer's study *Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista*.<sup>103</sup> In English there is Noreña's *A Vives Bibliography* (Lewiston, 1990), generally reliable, but not always accurate, in Spain the excellent study of Francisco Calero and Daniel Sala, *Bibliografía sobre Luis Vives* (Valencia, 2000). It contains 2196 entries, arranged thematically.

Among the most notable advances in the last few decades is the increasing number of critical editions, the task of specialists in Neo-Latin literature. Henri de Vocht trained generations of students in Louvain in this field and the teaching and research promoted by him continued

<sup>102</sup> In *A Vives Biography* (Lewiston, 1990) he acknowledged that his book had been "much influenced by Américo Castro", who was a friend of his, just as Castro was by the *Procesos inquisitoriales*, p. xvii.

<sup>103</sup> Enrique González González y Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *Los diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual renacentista (1539-1994)* (Valencia, 1999).

after his death. The demand for scientific rigor in the establishment of the texts was a constant concern in his successor, Jozef IJsewijn (1932–1998),<sup>104</sup> who transformed *Humanistica Lovaniensia* into a yearly publication dedicated to Neo-Latin literature, formed the Seminarium Philologiae Humanisticae at the University of Louvain and was a key figure in the formation of an international *équipe* of specialists focused on publishing the *Selected Works of J.L. Vives*, formerly under the direction of Constant Matheeußen (†2002), former student of IJsewijn, and now directed by Charles Fantazzi. The volumes, which now number eight in all, began to appear in 1987 in Leiden. Each work of Vives is presented with an introductory essay, the Latin text with an *apparatus criticus* and *apparatus fontium*, and an annotated English translation. Already available are almost the totality of his youthful works, published between 1514 and 1520.<sup>105</sup> Of his later works Fantazzi and Matheeußen edited *De institutione feminae Christianae* (1996–1998, 2 vols) and *De subventionem pauperum* (2002). Fantazzi published on his own *De conscribendis epistolis* (1989) and *De officio mariti* (2005). With similar criteria there were published in Spain with Latin text and Spanish translation *De ratione dicendi* (2000) by José Manuel Rodríguez Peregrina and the *Linguae latinae exercitatio* by Pilar García Ruiz (2005).

Previous to this project critical editions of other youthful works of the humanist appeared. Fantazzi began his work in Vives with the *In pseudodialecticos* (Leiden, 1979) while Matheeußen published critical editions of the *Præfatio in Leges Ciceronis* and the *Aedes legum* in the Leipzig Teubner series in 1984.<sup>106</sup> In Valencia in 1992 the project of a new Latin edition of the *Opera omnia* was set in motion under the direction of Jordi Pérez Durà and José María Estellés. An introductory volume

<sup>104</sup> IJsewijn made reference insistently to this question. See “Zu einer kritischen Edition der Werke des J.L. Vives,” in *Juan Luis Vives*, ed. August Buck (Hamburg, 1982), pp. 23–34, and “Lo stato attuale dei testi di J.L. Vives,” published with countless printing errors in *Luis Vives y el humanismo europeo*, eds. Francisco Javier Fernández Nieto, Antonio Bellido Melero y Antonio Mestre Sanchis (Valencia, 1998).

<sup>105</sup> These include the works published in *Early Writings* 1 (1987) and *Early Writings* 2 (1991), edited by Fantazzi, Matheeußen, George, IJsewijn and Angela Fritsen. George also published the *Sullanæ I–II* (1987) in the same series and the *Somnium Scipionis* (1989) following the same criteria with another publisher.

<sup>106</sup> Although not in the form of a critical edition Armando Saitta republished the *editio princeps* of the *De subventionem pauperum* (Bruges, September 1526) with an introductory study (1973). In the following year Luigi Gallinari reprinted the *De communione rerum*, and in 1990 the *De pacificatione*. Mario Sancipriano published the *De anima et vita* in 1974, as mentioned previously.

and four volumes of Vives's commentary on *De civitate Dei*, Books I–XX, have appeared. Because of its lack of rigorous criteria it cannot truly be called a critical edition.

A lack of translations of Vives's works into the vernacular languages has undoubtedly contributed to his marginality in the roster of representative Renaissance authors. In recent years Spanish and English have fared better than other languages. The Spanish translation by Lorenzo Riber, *Juan Luis Vives. Obras completas* (Madrid, 1947–48), reprinted in facsimile in Valencia in 1992, although somewhat antiquated in style and rather free, is still useful. In the same city the *Ayuntamiento* created in 1992 the *Colección J.L. Vives*, directed by Professor Ismael Roca with the purpose of publishing new translations. Ten issues, elegantly produced, have appeared thus far. Francisco Calero, a regular collaborator in the *Colección*, has also published new translations independently.

As English continues to consolidate its position as a new *lingua franca* in the international academic forum, editors of the texts of Vives tend to use it in translating and annotating the original Latin texts. The treatise on women is available in several versions,<sup>107</sup> and a version of the *Introductio ad sapientiam* was done by Sister Alice Tobriner (Chicago, 1971; second edition, Toronto, 1999). Carlos Noreña translated the third part of the *De anima et vita*, *The Passions of the Soul* (Lewiston, 1990). By that time the critical editions with facing English translations, published by Brill, had begun to appear. Nevertheless, translations of his three principal treatises, are still lacking: *De anima et vita* (in its entirety), *De ratione dicendi*, and a new and integral version of the *De disciplinis*, which does not reduce it to a mere pedagogical work, as well as the *De veritate fidei Christianae*.

In other languages, Vives's fortune has been scanty. The few Catalan versions go back, for the most part, to the first third of the 20th century. As for Portuguese, I know only of an *Introdução à sabedoria* and three dialogues, published in Rio de Janeiro in the "Jackson Classics" (1949), in a volume of *Moralistas espanhóis*. In Italy translations have been appearing at a very slow pace since the last quarter of the past century and now

<sup>107</sup> Foster Watson's *Vives and the Renaissance Education of Women*, previously mentioned; *The Instruction of a Christen Woman* (Champaign, 2002), a critical edition of Richard Hyrde's Tudor translation, published by a group of women coordinated by Virginia Walcott Beauchamp. In addition, a slightly revised version of Fantazzi's translation for the critical edition of the treatise was published in 2000 together with a new introduction, but without the Latin text, in *The Other Voice*, a series published by the University of Chicago Press dedicated to texts by and about women in the modern era.

number several of the principal treatises. In 1974 Mario Sancipriano edited and translated *De anima et vita*. In the same year Luigi Gallinari produced the *De communione rerum* (Cassino, 1974) and the *De pacificatione* (Rome, 1990) together with the letter to Adrian VI, also on the subject of peace. Emilio Hidalgo-Serna published an introduction to *De ratione dicendi* (Naples, 2002), with translation and notes by Emilio Mattioli. In all these cases the Latin text was included. In the meantime the old translations of the *Dialogues* and the treatises on the woman and on the husband have not been redone, and there is no translation of the *De disciplinis*. In the German world, after the profuse number of anthologies of “pedagogical” texts in German (Leipzig, 1881; Leipzig-Vienna, 1883; Freiburg, 1886) and of the *Dialogues* (Oldenburg, 1897), we have had to wait a century to see new translations. Hidalgo-Serna prepared a bilingual edition of the first seven books of the *De disciplinis* (Munich, 1990), and of the *De ratione dicendi* (Marburg, 1993). In Hungarian and Polish anthologies of diverse content have been published (Targul, 1935, and Wrocław, 1968). In French there is not even an anthology in the style of writers on pedagogy as those prepared in other languages by historians of the subject. After being the object of at least twelve translations in the 16th century, in the 20th there is available only a selection of extracts prepared by Alain Guy in 1972, which totals 54 pages in small format.<sup>108</sup> Summing up, despite recent progress, the name of Vives continues to remain confined behind the closed doors of the academy in a good number of languages. As far as other aspects and approaches of recent studies are concerned, I hope that this *Companion* has been an eloquent testimony of the renewal and enhancement in the study of the Valencian humanist that is now in progress.

---

<sup>108</sup> *Vivès ou l'humanisme engagé* (Paris, 1972). During the Nazi occupation of Belgium Ricardo Aznar-Casanova translated *De l'assistance aux pauvres* as well as *60 lettres de Vivès* (Brussels, 1943).



## SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

### *Primary Sources*

- Aristotle. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, 1985.
- Budé, Guillaume. *Epistolae Gulielmi Budaei regii secretarii*. Basel, 1520.
- Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum e rebus fidei et morum*. Ed. Henricus Denzinger et Adolfus Schönmetzer. Barcelona, Rome, 1976.
- Erasmus, Desiderius. *Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami opera omnia*. Ed. Jean Leclerc. 11 vols. Leiden, 1703–06, repr. Hildesheim, 1961–62.
- . *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*. Eds. Percy S. Allen, Helen M. Allen and Heathcote W. Garrod. Oxford, 1906–47.
- . *Erasmi opuscula: A Supplement to the Opera omnia*. Ed. Wallace K. Ferguson. The Hague, 1933.
- . *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*. Amsterdam, 1969–.
- . *Collected Works of Erasmus*. Toronto, 1974–.
- Ficino, Marsilio. *Platonic Theology*. Eds. Michael Allen and James Hankins. 6 vols. Cambridge, MA, 2001–07.
- . *Théologie platonicienne de l'immortalité de l'âme*. Ed. Raymond Marcel. Paris, 1964.
- . *De vita*. Ed. Albano Biondi and Giuliano Pisani. Pordenone, 1991.
- Letters and papers foreign and domestic of the reign of Henry VIII*. Ed. John Sherren Brewer. London, 1920.
- Machumetis Saracenorum principis eiusque successorum vitae, doctrina ac ipse Alcoran*. 3 vols. Ed. Theodorus Bibliander. Basel, 1543.
- Mansi, John. Ed. *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*. Paris, 1902.
- Marsilius of Padua. *The Defender of the Peace*. Ed. Annabel Brett. Cambridge, 2005.
- More, Saint Thomas. *The Complete Works of Saint Thomas More*. 15 vols. New Haven, 1963–77.
- Pace, Richard. *Oratio Richardi. Paei in pace nuperrime composita...inter Angliae regem et Francorum regem...in aede divi Pauli Londini habita*. London, 1518.
- Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem libri I–V*. Ed. Eugenio Garin. Florence, 1946.
- Pomponazzi, Pietro. *Trattati sull'immortalità*. Ed. Vittoria Perrone Compagni. Florence, 1999.
- Vives, Juan Luis. *Aurelii Augustini De civitate Dei. Joannes Lodovicus Vives, Commentarii in XXII libros de civitate Dei*. Basel, 1522.
- . *De disciplinis libri XX*. Antwerp, 1531.
- . *Opera*. Basel, 1555.
- . *Joannis Ludovici Vives Valentini opera omnia*. Ed. Gregorio Mayans y Siscar. 8 vols. Valencia, 1782–90, repr. London, 1964.
- . *In pseudodialecticos*. Ed. Charles Fantazzi. Leiden, 1979.
- . *Praefatio in Leges Ciceronis et Aedes legum*. Ed. Constant Matheeußen. Leipzig, 1984.
- . *Early Writings*. Eds. Constant Matheeußen, Charles Fantazzi, Edward George. Leiden, 1987.
- . *Declamationes Sullanae*, 1. Ed. Edward George. Leiden, 1989.
- . *De conscribendis epistolis*. Ed. Charles Fantazzi. Leiden, 1989.



- . *Somnium et Vigilia in Somnium Scipionis*. Ed. Edward George. Greenwood, SC, 1989.
- . *Early Writings 2*. Eds. Jozef IJsewijn and Angela Fritsen with Charles Fantazzi. Leiden, 1991.
- . *Joannis Lodovici Vives Valentini opera omnia*. Vols 1–5. Valencia, 1992–.
- . *Instrucción de la mujer Cristiana*. Trans. Juan Justiniano. Ed. Elizabeth Teresa Howe. Madrid, 1995.
- . *De institutione feminae Christianae*. Eds. Charles Fantazzi and Constant Matheeußen. 2 vols. Leiden. 1996–98.
- . *De ratione dicendi*. Ed. José Manuel Rodríguez Peregrina. Granada, 2000.
- . *De subventionem pauperum*. Eds. Constant Matheeußen and Charles Fantazzi. Leiden, 2002.
- . *The Instruction of a Christen Woman*. Trans. Richard Hyrde. Eds. Virginia Walcott Beauchamp, Elizabeth H. Hageman and Margaret Mikesell. Urbana, 2002.
- . *De officio mariti*. Ed. Charles Fantazzi. Leiden, 2006.
- . *Tratado del socorro de pobres*. Trans. Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón. Ed. Joaquim Parellada. Valencia, 2006.

#### *Secondary Sources*

- Abellán, José Luis. *El pacifismo de Juan Luis Vives*. Valencia, 1997.
- Adams, Robert P. *The Better Part of Valor. More, Erasmus, Colet, and Vives on Humanism, War and Peace, 1496–1535*. Seattle, 1962.
- Ashworth, Elizabeth J. *Language and Logic in the Post-medieval Period*. Dordrecht, 1974.
- Baer, Yitzhak. *Historia de los judíos en la España Cristiana*. Trans. José Luis Locave. Barcelona, 1981.
- Baker-Smith, Dominic. “Juan Luis Vives and the ‘Somnium Scipionis’.” In *Classical Influences on Western Thought A.D. 1650–1870*. Ed. Robert Ralph Bolgar. Cambridge, 1976: 239–244.
- Bataillon, Marcel. “Luis Vives, réformateur de la bienfaisance.” *Bibliothèque d’humanisme et de la Renaissance* 14 (1952): 141–58.
- Batllo, Miquel. “Las obras de Vives en los colegios jesuíticos del siglo XVI.” In *Erasmus in Hispania. Vives in Belgio*. Eds. Jozef IJsewijn and Ángel Losada. Louvain, 1986. 121–45.
- Battistini, Andrea. “Retorica delle passioni fra Vives e Vico.” *Rivista di letteratura moderna e comparata* 47 (1994): 197–221.
- . “Un’enciclopedia senza frontiere: l’ecumenismo culturale di Juan Luis Vives.” *Studi ispanici* 3 (1997–98): 9–19.
- Bonilla y San Martín, Adolfo. “Clarorum hispaniensium epistolae.” *Revue Hispanique* 8 (1901): 181–308.
- . *Luis Vives y la filosofía del Renacimiento*. Madrid, 1903. Repr. Madrid, 1929.
- Breugelmans, Ronald, ed. *Petrus Bertius, Nomenclator. The first printed catalogue of Leiden University Library (1595)*. Leiden, 1995.
- Buck, August. “Juan Luis Vives’ Konzeption des humanistischen Gelehrten.” In *Juan Luis Vives*. ed. August Buck. Hamburg, 1982. 11–21.
- Burns, Jimmy. *The True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Early Modern Scotland*. Oxford, 1996.
- Burns, Jimmy and Thomas Izbicki, eds. *Conciliarism and Papalism*. Cambridge, 1997.
- Bussche, Émile van den. *Jean-Luis Vives. Éclaircissements et rectifications biographiques. Notes sur son séjour à Bruges. Ses œuvres*. Bruges, 1871.
- Calero, Francisco y María José Echarte. J.L. Vives, *De Europae dissidiis et republica*. “Sobre las disensiones de Europa y sobre el Estado”. Valencia, 1992.

- Calero, Francisco y María José Echarte, María Luisa Arribas y María Pilar Usábel, eds. *Juan Luis Vives. Obras políticas y pacifistas*. Madrid, 1999.
- Camporeale, Salvatore. *Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma*. Rome, 2002.
- Cantarino, Vicente. "La polémica de Luis Vives contra el Islam." *Boletín de la Biblioteca de Menéndez Pelayo* 67 (1991): 5–34.
- Casini, Lorenzo. *Cognitive and Moral Psychology in Renaissance Philosophy. A Study of Juan Luis Vives's "De anima et vita."* Uppsala, 2006.
- Castro, Américo. "Lo hispánico y el erasmismo." *Revista de filología hispánica* 2 (1940): 1–34; 4 (1942): 1–66.
- . *The Structure of Spanish History*. Princeton, 1954.
- Codoñer, Carmen. "Gramática y educación en Juan Luis Vives." In *La Universitat de València i l'Humanisme: Studia Humanitatis i renovació cultural a Europa i al Nou Món*. Valencia, 2003. 53–78.
- Colish, Marcia. "The Mime of God: Vives on the Nature of Man." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962): 3–21.
- Condren, Conal. *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England*. Cambridge, 2006.
- Contemporaries of Erasmus*, 3 vols. Eds. Peter G. Bietenholz and Thomas B. Deutsche. Toronto, 1986–87.
- Coppens, Christian. "Une collaboration inconnue entre Caroline Guillard et Hugues de la Porte en 1544: le *De civitate Dei* d'Augustin édité par Juan Luis Vives." *Gutenberg-Jahrbuch* 1988: 126–40.
- Coseriu, Eugenio. "Zur Sprachtheorie von Juan Luis Vives." In *Aus der französischen Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte*. Eds. Werner Dierlamm and Wolfgang Drost. Heidelberg, 1971. 234–55.
- Curtis, Cathy. "Richard Pace." In *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. 42. Oxford, 2004: 298–302.
- . "Cuthbert D. Tunstall," *ODNB*, vol. 55. 551–55.
- . "The Laughing Philosopher: from Thomas More to Robert Burton." In *The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe*. Eds. Conal Condren et al. Cambridge, 2006.
- Daxhelet, Étienne. *Adrien Barlandus humaniste belge, 1486–1538*. Louvain, 1938.
- Del Nero, Valerio. "Memoria, ingegno e volontà nel *De Anima et Vita* de Juan Luis Vives." In *Ragione e "civiltas": Figure del vivere associato nella cultura del '500 europeo*. Ed. Davide Bigalli. Milan, 1986. 237–52.
- . *Linguaggio e filosofia in Vives. L'organizzazione del sapere nel "De Disciplinis" (1531)*. Bologna, 1991.
- . "Pedagogía e psicología nel pensiero di Vives." In J.L. Vives, *Opera omnia*, vol. I. Valencia, 1992. 179–216.
- . "La dedica di Vives a Carlo V del *De concordia et discordia*." In *Studi in onore di Arnaldo d'Addario*, 2. Eds. Luigi Borgia, Franco De Luca et al. Lecce, 1995. 615–24.
- Doran, Susana and Glenn Richardson. *Tudor England and its Neighbours*. Hampshire, 2005.
- Dowling, Maria. *Humanism in the Age of Henry VIII*. London, 1986.
- Dust, Philip C. *Three Renaissance Pacifists: Essays in the Theories of Erasmus, More and Vives*. New York, 1987.
- Esteban Mateo, León y Ramón López Martín. *La escuela de primeras letras según Juan Luis Vives: estudio, iconografía y textos*. Valencia, 1993.
- Estelrich, Juan. *Vives. Exposition organisée à la Bibliothèque Nationale. Paris Janvier-Mars 1941*. Dijon, 1942.
- Fantazzi, Charles, "Vives, More and Erasmus". In *Juan Luis Vives*. Ed. August Buck. Hamburg, 1982. 165–76.
- . J.L. Vives, *The Education of a Christian Woman: a Sixteenth-century Manual*. Chicago, 2000.

- . "Vives versus Erasmus on the Art of Letter-Writing". In *Self-presentation and Social Identification*. Eds. Toon van Houdt, Jan Papy, Gilbert Tournoy, Constant Matheecussen. Louvain, 2002. 39–56.
- . "Vives' Parisian Writings." In *Humanism and Creativity in the Renaissance*. Eds. Christopher Celenza and Kenneth Gouwens. Leiden, 2006. 245–70.
- Farge, James. *Orthodoxy and Reform in Early Reformation France. The Faculty of Theology of Paris, 1500–1543*. Leiden, 1985.
- Fatica, Michele. "Il *De subventionem pauperum* di J.L. Vives: suggestioni luterane o mutamento di una mentalità collettiva?" *Società e storia* 5 (1982): 1–30.
- Fernández Nieto, Francisco J., Antonio Melero y Antonio Mestre, coords. *Luis Vives y el humanismo europeo*. Valencia, 1998.
- Fernández Santamaría, José Antonio. *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516–1559*. Cambridge, 1977.
- . *Juan Luis Vives. Escepticismo y prudencia en el Renacimiento*. Salamanca, 1990.
- . "The Foundations of Vives' Social and Political Thought". In J.L. Vives, *Opera omnia*, 1. Valencia, 1992. 217–62.
- . *The Theater of Man: J.L. Vives on Society*. Philadelphia, 1998.
- Fuster, Joan, "Joan Lluís Vives i València, 1528." In *Llibres y problemes del Renaixement*. Barcelona, 1989. 9–42.
- García, Angelina. "Una familia de judío-conversos: los Vives." In *Erasmus in Hispania. Vives in Belgio*. Eds. J. IJsewijn y Angel Losada. Louvain, 1986.
- . *Els Vives: una família de jueus valencians*. Valencia, 1987.
- García Cárcel, Ricardo. *Las germanías de Valencia*. Barcelona, 1975.
- . *Orígenes de la Inquisición española. El tribunal de Valencia, 1478–1530*. Barcelona, 1976.
- . "La familia de Luis Vives y la Inquisición". In J.L. Vives, *Opera omnia*, 1. Valencia, 1992. 489–519.
- Garin, Eugenio. *L'educazione in Europa 1400–1600*. Bari, 1957.
- . "Lorenzo Valla e l'umanesimo." In *Lorenzo Valla e l'umanesimo italiano*. Eds. Ottavio Besomi and Mariangela Regoliosi. Padua, 1986.
- George, Edward V. "Imitatio in the Somnium Vivis." In *Juan Luis Vives*. Ed. August Buck. Hamburg, 1982. 81–92.
- . "Rhetoric in Vives." In J.L. Vives, *Opera omnia*, 1. Valencia, 1992. 113–77.
- . "Rhetorical Strategies in Vives' Peace Writings: the Letter to Charles V and the De Concordia." In *Ut granum sinapis. Essays on Neo-Latin Literature in Honour of Jozef IJsewijn*. Louvain, 1997. 249–63.
- . "Juan Luis Vives' *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico*: Its Place in the 1526 Ensemble." In *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bariensis*. Eds. Juan Francisco Alcina et al. Temple, AR, 1998. 259–66.
- Gomez-Hortigüela Amillo, Ángel. *Luis Vives, entre líneas. El humanista valenciano en su contexto*. Valencia, 1993.
- González González, Enrique. *Joan Lluís Vives. De la escolástica al humanismo*. Valencia, 1987.
- . "La lectura de Vives, del siglo XIX a nuestros días." In J.L. Vives, *Opera omnia*, 1. Valencia, 1992. 1–76.
- . "Vives: un humanista judeo-converso en el exilio de Flandes." In *The Expulsion of the Jews and their Emigration to the Southern Low Countries (15th–16th C.)*. Eds. Luc Duqueker and Werner Verbeke. Louvain, 1998. 35–81.
- . "La recepción de la obra de Vives durante el antiguo régimen." *Rinascimento* 38 (1998): 455–514.
- . "The encounter of Luis Vives (1492/3–1540) and Hadrianus Barlandus (1486–1538) in Louvain, 1514?–1515." *Lias* 30/2 (2003): 177–212.
- . *Una república de lectores. Difusión y recepción de la obra de Juan Luis Vives*. Mexico City, 2007.

- González González, Enrique, Salvador Albiñana and Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez. *Vives: edicions princeps*. Valencia, 1992.
- González González, Enrique and Víctor Gutiérrez Rodríguez. *Los diálogos de Vives y la imprenta. Fortuna de un manual escolar renacentista (1539–1994)*. Valencia 1999.
- . “Los impresores alemanes y la difusión de la obra de Vives en el siglo XVI.” In *México y Alemania. Percepciones mutuas en imprsos, siglos XVI–XVIII* (México, 2005).
- Graf, Paul. *Luis Vives como apologeta. Contribución a la historia de la apologética*. Trans. José María Millás Vallicrosa. Madrid, 1943.
- Guy, Alain. *Vivès ou l’humanisme engagé*. Paris, 1972.
- Guy, John. *The Tudor Monarchy*. London, 1997.
- Hauf, Albert. *D’Eiximenis a Sor Isabel di Villena. Aportació a l’estudi de la nostra cultura medieval*. Valencia, 1990.
- Henderson, Judith Rice. “Defining the genre of the Letter: Juan Luis Vives’s *De conscribendis epistolis*.” *Renaissance and Reformation* 19 (1983): 89–105.
- Ijsewijn, Jozef and Ángel Losada. *Erasmus in Hispania. Vives in Belgio*. Louvain, 1986.
- Inwood, Brad. “Moral Judgement in Seneca.” In *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations*. Eds. Steven Strange and Jack Zupko. Cambridge, 2004. 76–94.
- Jiménez Delgado, José. *Epistolario de Juan Luis Vives*. Madrid, 1978.
- Kedourie, Elie. Ed. *Spain and the Jews. The Sephardic Experience. 1492 and After*. London, 1992.
- Kohut, Karl. “Anmerkungen zu *De veritate fidei christianae*.” In *Juan Luis Vives*. Ed. Christoph Strosetzki. Frankfurt am Main, 1995. 122–34.
- Kristeller, Paul Oskar. *Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino*. Florence, 1953.
- Kritzcek, James. *Peter the Venerable and Islam*. Princeton, 1964.
- Lowe, Ben. *Imagining Peace: A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas, 1340–1560*. University Park, PA, 1997.
- Lutz, Cora. “Musonius Rufus: the Roman Socrates.” *Yale Classical Studies* 10 (1947): 3–147.
- MacCullough, Diarmaid. Ed. *The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics, Policy and Piety*. London, 2004.
- Mack, Peter. *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic*. Leiden, 1993.
- . “Vives’s *De ratione dicendi*: Structure, Innovations, Problems.” *Rhetorica* 23 (2005): 5–92.
- Martín Baños, Pedro. *El arte epistolar en el Renacimiento europeo 1400–1600*. Bilbao, 2005.
- Martínez Millán, José. *La corte de Carlos V* 5 vols. Madrid, 2000.
- Matheeußen, Constant. “Das rechtsphilosophische Frühwerk des Vives.” In *Juan Luis Vives*. Ed. August Buck. Hamburg, 1982. 93–106.
- . “Quelques remarques sur le *De subventionem pauperum*.” In *Erasmus in Hispania et Vives in Belgio*. Ed. Jozef Ijsewijn and Ángel Losada. Louvain, 1986. 87–97.
- McCully, George Elliot. “A Letter of Juan Luis Vives to Jerome Alexander, December 17, 1522.” *Renaissance Quarterly* 22 (1969): 121–28.
- McManomon, John M. *Funeral Oratory and the Ideals of Italian Humanism*. Chapel Hill, NC, 1989.
- Menocal, María Rosa. *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain*. Boston, 2002.
- Mestre, Sanchis, Antonio. “La espiritualidad de Juan Luis Vives.” In J.L. Vives, *Opera omnia*, I. Valencia, 1992. 409–59.
- Moreau, Brigitte, ed. *Inventaire chronologique des éditions parisiennes du xvi siècle*, 2 vols. Paris, 1972 and 1977.
- Moreno Gallego, Valentín. *La recepción hispana de Juan Luis Vives*. Valencia, 2006.
- Murphy, James J., ed. *Renaissance Rhetoric Short-Title Catalogue 1460–1700*. Aldershot, 2006.

- Nardi, Bruno. *Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI*. Padua, 1958.
- Namèche, Alexandre-Joseph. *Mémoire sur la vie et les écrits de Jean-Louis Vivès*. Brussels, 1841.
- Netanyahu, Benzion. *The Marranos of Spain. From the Late XIVth to the Early XVth Century according to Contemporary Hebrew Sources*. New York, 1966.
- Noreña, Carlos G. *Juan Luis Vives*. The Hague, 1970. Spanish edition: *Juan Luis Vives*. Madrid, 1978.
- . *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions*. Carbondale, 1989.
- . *The Passions of the Soul. The Third Book of De anima et vita*. Lewiston, 1990.
- Norton, Frederick J. *A Descriptive Catalogue of Printing in Spain and Portugal 1501–1520*. Cambridge, 1978.
- O'Malley, John. "The Discovery of America and Reform Thought at the Papal Court in the Early Cinquecento." In *First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old*. Ed. Fred Chiapelli. London, 1976. 185–200.
- Patterson, William Brown. *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom*. Cambridge, 1997.
- Peset, Mario, coord. *Historia de la Universidad de Valencia*, 3 vols. Valencia, 1999.
- Pinta Llorente, Miguel de la y José María de Palacio y de Palacio. *Procesos inquisitoriales contra la familia judía de Juan Luis Vives*. Madrid-Barcelona, 1964.
- Richardson, Glenn. *Renaissance Monarchy: The Reign of Henry VIII, Francis I and Charles V*. Oxford, 2002.
- Roth Cecil. *A History of the Marranos*. London, 1932.
- Rutherford, Donald, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*. Cambridge, 2006.
- Salter, Frank Reyner. *Some Early Tracts on Poor Relief*. London, 1926.
- Sancipriano, Mario. *Il pensiero psicologico e morale di Giovanni L. Vives*. Florence, 1957.
- . Ed. J.L.Vives, *De anima et vita*. Padua, 1974.
- Schepper, Marcus de. "April in Paris (1514): J.L.Vives editing B. Guarinus. A new Vives 'princeps', a new early Vives letter and the first poem in praise of Vives." In *Myrcae. Essays on Neo-latin literature in Memory of J. Ijsewijn*. Eds. Dirk Sacré and Gilbert Tournoy. Louvain, 2000. 195–205.
- Schmitt, Charles B. and Quentin Skinner. *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*. Cambridge, 1988.
- Skinner, Quentin. "Moral Ambiguity and the Renaissance Art of Eloquence." *Essays in Criticism* 44 (1994): 267–92.
- Steppe, Jan Karel. "Les relations de Mencía de Mendoza avec Jean-Louis Vives." In *Scrinium Erasmianum* 2. Ed. Joseph Coppens. Leiden, 1969. 485–506.
- Strosetzki, Christoph. *Juan Luis Vives. Sein Werk und seine Bedeutung für Spanien und Deutschland*. Frankfurt am Main, 1995.
- Vasoli, Cesare. *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo. 'Invenzione' e 'Metodo' nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo*. Milan, 1968.
- Vocht, Henry de. *Litterae virorum eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium 1522–1528*. Louvain, 1928. (*Humanistica Lovaniensia* 1).
- . *Monumenta Humanistica Lovaniensia. Texts and Studies about Louvain Humanists in the First Half of the XVIth Century. Erasmus-Vives-Dorpius-Clenardus-Goes-Moringus*. Louvain, 1934. (*Humanistica Lovaniensia* 4).
- Watson, Foster. *Vives and the Renaissance Education of Women*. London, 1912.
- . *Vives On Education. A Translation of the De tradendis disciplinis of Juan Luis Vives*. Cambridge, 1913, repr. Totowa, NJ, 1971.
- . *Les relations de Joan Lluís Vives amb els anglesos i amb l'Anglaterra*. Barcelona, 1918.
- . *Luis Vives, el gran Valenciano*. Oxford, 1922.

- Woolfson, Jonathan. *Padua and the Tudors: English Students in Italy, 1485–1603*. Cambridge, 1998.
- Zappala, Michael. “Vives’s *De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico*, the Quattrocento Dialogue and ‘open’ Discourse.” In *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Torontonensis*. Eds. Alexander Dalzell, Charles Fantazzi and Richard Schoeck. Binghamton, 1991. 823–30.



## INDEX

- Abdallāh ibn-Salām, 339  
 Adam, 86, 88  
 Aeneas of Gaza, 349  
 Adrian VI, 9, 41–42, 115, 133–35, 164, 369, 413  
 Aeschines, 257  
 Aesop, 213, 216  
 Agricola, Rudolph, 10, 12, 200, 231–35, 247, 259, 254, 256, 274–75; *De inventione dialectica*, 200, 231  
 Agrippa of Nettesheim, Cornelius, *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum*, 181  
 Agrippa, Menenius, 267  
 Albert, Miquel, 30  
 Alberti, Leon Battista, 201  
 Alciato, Andrea, 214  
 Alfaquinius, 233  
 Alfonso V of Aragon, 147  
 Aleandro, Girolamo, 35, 60  
 Allen, Helen Mary, 24  
 Allen, Percy Stafford, 24  
 Almain, Jacques, 125; *Libellus de auctoritate ecclesiae*, 162  
 Ambrose, Saint, 78, 83  
 Amiens, Peace of, 129  
 Amiguet, Jeroni, 30  
 Anabaptists, 104  
 Anacreon, 76  
 Andrelini, Fausto, 30  
 Antonio, Nicolás, 15  
 Apelles, 345  
 Aphthonius, 239, 266, 268; *Progymnasmata*, 235  
 Apollo, 326  
 Aquinas, Thomas, 107, 221, 282  
 Aragon, 20–1, 23, 36, 41–42, 55, 61, 344  
 Arator, 69  
 Aratus, 217  
 Aristophanes, 213  
 Aristotle, 33, 36, 63, 118, 120, 151, 153, 165–66, 171–72, 175, 187, 189, 191, 242, 254, 259, 275, 285–86, 389, 191, 195, 243, 254, 259, 275, 285–86, 289, 312, 350; *De anima*, 283, 305; *History of Animals*, 81; *Politics*, 71; *Rhetoric*, 308  
 Armentières, 102  
 Ascham, Roger, 2  
 Ashworth, Elizabeth J., 17  
 Augustine, Saint, 3, 4, 7, 15, 77–78, 90, 154, 160, 189, 213; *De civitate Dei* (see Vives, *Commentarii*)  
*De sancta virginitate*, 77  
 Augustus, 352  
 Averroes, 343  
 Avicenna, 219, 343  
 Bacon, Roger, 206  
 Baenst, Jozef de, 95  
 Bainbridge, Cardinal Christopher, 118, 148  
 Barlandus, Hadrianus, 39, 40  
 Barnabas, Saint, 100  
 Basel, 43, 45, 48, 59, 60, 62, 69, 185, 277, 279  
 Bataillon, Marcel, 397  
 Bembo, Pietro, 214  
 Barbaro, Ermolao, 214  
 Bejar, Duke of, 63  
 Belarte Forment, José María, 117, 119  
 Benzing, Josef, 390  
 Bérault, Nicole, 35, 38  
 Beroaldo, Filippo, 214, 225  
 Berthelet, Thomas, 93, 171  
 Bibliander, Theodore, 338–39  
 Birckmann, Franz, 68  
 Boccaccio, Giovanni, 205, 211–13; *De claris mulieribus*, 75; *Genealogia deorum gentilium*, 212  
 Bodin, Jean, 175  
 Boethius, 3, 331; *De differentiis topicis*, 231  
 Bogaardenschool, 103  
 Boix, Joan, 30  
 Boleyn, Anne, 132, 144  
 Bonilla y San Martín, Adolfo, 16, 49, 395, 403–4  
 Bosch, Jaume del, 29  
 Brandolini, Aurelio, 241  
 Breda, 47, 61–63, 96, 275, 279  
 Bruges, 15–16, 39–40, 49, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62–63, 68, 93–96, 102, 104, 106, 108–11, 115, 229, 295, 359  
 Bruni, Leonardo, 205, 213, 225



- Brussels, 41–42, 49, 53, 58  
 Buchanan, George, 172, 368  
 Budé, Guillaume, 2, 6, 44, 46, 53, 64, 183, 201, 211, 213, 223, 273, 293;  
*De philologia*, *De asse*, *De transitu Hellenismi ad Christianismum*, 183  
 Bureau, Nicholas de, 106–7  
 Burton, Robert, 10, 114, 175–76;  
*The Anatomy of Melancholy*, 175–76  
 Cajetan, Cardinal, 125  
 Calderini, Domizio, 326  
 Calepino, Ambrogio, 212  
 Calero, Francisco, 410–12  
 Callimachus, 76  
 Calvin, John, *Institutio christianae religionis*, 302  
 Calydonian boar, 326  
 Cambrai, 43–44, 54; Treaty of, 132  
 Cano, Melchor, 373  
 Cantarino, Vicente, 337  
*Canticle of Solomon*, 334  
 Cantiumcula, Claudius, 370  
 Cardaillac, Louis, 343  
 Capella, Onofre, 30  
 Castiglione, Baldassare, *The Courtier*, 81  
 Cassiodorus, 120  
 Castille, 20–23, 42, 81, 107  
 Castro, Álvaro de, 86  
 Castro, Américo, 51, 410  
 Catherine of Aragon, queen of England, 7, 55, 57, 65, 68–69, 71, 87, 131, 167, 169, 229  
 Catiline, 101  
 Cato the Elder, 70, 88, 351–52  
 Celaya, Joan de, 34  
 Celsus, Cornelius, 3, 219  
 Celtis, Conrad, 241  
 Cervantes de Salazar, Francisco, 62  
 Cervent, Clara, 70, 81  
 Changy, Pierre de, 93  
 Charles I, king of England, 173  
 Charles V, emperor, 3, 6, 9, 66, 94–96, 144, 147, 150, 152–53, 159–60, 164, 169, 336  
 Charles VIII, king of France, 147  
 Chelsea, 93  
 Chevallon, Claude, 363  
 Chrysippus, 306  
 Cicero, 28, 34–35, 38, 69, 77, 119–20, 153, 182, 189, 210–11, 234, 269, 308, 324, 351; *De amicitia*, 89; *De finibus*, 232, 236; *De inventione*, 231; *De legibus*, 2; *De officiis*, 119–20, 153; *De oratore*, 265  
 Claudius, emperor, 353  
 Clement VII, pope, 130, 132, 159  
 Cleobulina, 75  
 Clerk, John, 9, 137, 145–46, 148  
 Cognac, League of, 132, 152  
 Columella, 212  
 Collegium Trilingue, 200  
 Comenius, Jan, 2  
 Company of Jesus, 180  
 conciliarism, 119–20, 124–25, 135, 152, 162  
*concordia*, 116, 119, 121, 129, 130, 138, 141–42, 150–59, 163–67; in the *respublica Christiana*, 113–14, 173; among princes, 123–25, 150  
*conversos*, 6, 13, 17, 20, 22–26, 39, 52, 58, 110, 128  
 copia, 234, 257  
 Corinna of Tanagra, 75  
 Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, 73, 76  
 Corpus Christi College, 143, 228  
 Cousin, Victor, 400  
 Cranevelt, Frans van, 1, 2, 39, 50, 59, 68, 108, 317, 344–45, 383, 407  
 Crassus, Marcus Licinius, 352  
 Crinito, Pietro, 181  
*cristianos viejos*, 20  
 Cromwell, Thomas, 110  
 Croock, Herbert de, 114  
 Croy, Guillaume de, 2, 41, 44–46, 53–54, 68, 347, 368  
 crypto-Judaism, 22–23, 53, 315–18, 333–337, 344  
 D'Aguirra, Pedro, 95  
 D'Alembert, 178  
 Dasypodius, Peter, 373  
 David, 327  
 Daxhelet, Étienne, 40  
 Day, Richard, *Queen Elizabeth's prayer book*, 382  
 deliberative oratory, 228–29, 242, 251  
 Delphi, 282  
 Democritus of Abdera, 160, 175  
 Demosthenes, 257, 267  
 Descartes, René, 11, 114, 168, 192, 307, 310, 312  
*devotio moderna*, 197  
 dialectic, 12, 19, 28–29, 34–38, 45, 149, 179, 182, 184, 190, 196–98, 203, 227–29, 240, 249, 257, 274–76, 283, 349, 362, 373, 410

- Diderot, Denis, 178  
 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 396  
 Diogenes Laertius, 306  
 Dionysius the Areopagite, 309; *The Celestial Hierarchy*, 325  
 Dioscorides, 217  
*disciplina*, 192–196  
*discordia*, 113–14, 116, 121, 125, 151, 153, 154, 161; among princes, 143, 146, 148, 155, 162, 165–67; in the Christian republic, 126, 134, 148, 156–57, 159, 170, 175; between religious orders, 149–50, 155–56; academic, 154–56  
 disputation, 230, 235–37, 251  
*Distichs of Cato*, 69  
*Doctrina Mahumet*, 338, 342–43  
 Dolz, Juan, 33–34  
 Donatus, Aelius, 208, 211  
 Dorp, Maarten van, 40, 156  
 Duns Scotus, 306  
 Duplessis-Mornay, Philippe, 394  
 Dullaert, Jan, 16, 32–33, 36–37, 41, 373  
  
 Eiximenis, Francesc, 72; *Lo llibre de les dones*, 73; *Regiment de la cosa publica*, 29  
 Elyot, Sir Thomas, 10, 114, 165, 175, 397; *The Boke named the Governour*, 169–71; *Pasquill the Playne*, 169–71  
 Elzeviers (printers), 387  
 Empedocles, 286  
 encyclopedism, 177–79, 180–81, 217  
 Endymion, 355  
 Epicureans, 288, 353  
 Epicurus, 303, 310  
 Episcopus, Joannes, 377, 387  
 Erasmus, Desiderius, 1, 3, 4, 6–8, 10, 16, 24, 35, 41–46, 49, 51, 53–54, 58, 60–61, 68–69, 79, 81–82, 113, 117–18, 120, 124–27, 130, 135, 140, 145, 154, 168, 180, 184, 186, 198, 225, 239, 271, 273, 293, 300  
   works cited:  
     *Adagia*, 182, 213  
     *Antibarbari*, 182, 186  
     *Brevissima formula (Conficiendarum epistolarum formula)*, 241  
     *Charon*, 124, 130  
     *Ciceronianus*, 200, 212  
     *Colloquia*, 13, 182  
     *De conscribendis epistolis*, 270, 275  
     *De copia*, 212, 257  
     *De civilitate morum puerilium*, 192, 299, 312  
     *De pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis*, 182, 299  
     *De ratione studii de recta latini graecique sermonis pronuntiatione*, 212  
     *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, 117, 120  
     *Ecclesiastes*, 196  
     *Enchiridion militis christiani*, 195  
     *Institutio principis christiani*, 69  
     *Moriae encomium*, 182, 195  
     *Novum Instrumentum*, 197  
     *Paraclesis*, 197  
     *Paraphrasis in Matthaeum*, 125  
     *Querela pacis*, 117, 195  
     *Sileni Alcibiadis*, 120, 198  
 Erinna of Telos, 75  
 Erla, Jaime de, 29  
 Espinosa, Juan de, 373  
 Esteve, Jaime, 30  
 Estienne, Henri, 373, 394  
 Euripides, 213  
 Eve, 86, 88  
 Exupéry, Saint, 103  
  
 Fantazzi, Charles, 359, 411  
 Favorinus, 73  
 Ferdinand II of Aragon, 6, 20, 29, 42, 46, 53, 68, 277, 331  
 Festus Pompeius, 212  
 Ficino, Marsilius, 182, 190, 205, 221, 281–83, 301, 304  
 Fieschi, Stefano, 30  
 Filelfo, Francesco, 35, 37, 89, 156, 214; *Convivia mediolanensia*, 2  
 Fisher, John, 57, 117, 127, 161, 170  
 Flanders, 24, 39, 54, 66, 95–96, 159, 287  
 Fort, Juan, 33–34  
 Francis I, king of France, 122–23, 129, 136–37, 144, 147, 150, 152, 155, 158–59, 162  
 Franco, Francisco, 51, 405–6, 410  
 Freige, Thomas, 381  
 Froben, Joannes, 4, 362–63, 377, 387  
 Fulgentius, 90  
 Fuster, Joan, 92  
  
 Galen, 219, 289, 307  
 Galileo Galilei, 191  
 Gallinari, Luigi, 413  
 García, Angelina, 331  
 García Ruiz, Pilar, 411  
 Garin, Eugenio, 409  
 Garrod, Heathcote W., 24  
 Gassendi, Pierre, 370, 378–79, 394, 397

- Gattinara, Mercurio, 60  
 Gaza, Theodorus, 208, 213–14  
 Gellius, Aulus, 18, 37–38, 73, 218, 371, 373  
 Germana de Foix, 52  
*Germanías*, 21  
 Gesner, Conrad, 3, 379, 386; *Bibliotheca universalis*, 372  
 Gil, Enrique, 400  
 Gilbert, Balthasar, 374  
 Giles of Viterbo, 118–19, 121  
 Glarcanus, Fonticius, 367  
 goetia, 301  
 Gonnell, William, 65  
 González González, Enrique, 62, 359  
 Gourmont, Gilles de, 36, 40  
 Gracchi, 101  
 grammar, 18, 19, 29, 30, 33–36, 40, 56, 154, 184, 191, 196, 198–99  
 Gratian, 71  
 Grotius, Hugo, 114, 169, 387–88  
 Grynaeus, Simon, 59, 63, 376–77  
 Gualbes, Juan Cristóbal, 25–26  
 Guarini, Giovanni Battista, 18, 36, 361  
 Guarino Veronese, 201  
 Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Víctor, 62  
  
 Hagar, 333  
 Halewijn, George, 40  
 Hedio, Caspar, 369  
 Hegendorff, Christoph, 375  
 Henry III, Count of Nassau, 61–62, 277  
 Henricpetri, 381, 387  
 Henry VIII, king of England, 8, 55, 61, 115–18, 122, 127, 132, 135, 144, 147, 150, 158–59, 161–62, 170–71, 229  
 Herman of Dalmatia, 13, 338  
 Hermes Trismegistos, 304  
 Hillen, Michiel, 365, 371  
 Hippocrates, 219, 289–90  
 Hobbes, Thomas, 10, 114, 173–75; *The Elements of Law*, *De cive*, *Leviathan*, *The Historical Narrative concerning Heresy*, 175  
 Homer, 40, 41, 81, 264, 334  
 Hortensia, 75–76  
 Hyrde, Richard, 93–94, 397  
 Horace, 5, 199, 211, 256  
 humanism, 177, 179–80, 191, 195, 226, 279, 363, 397, 407  
 Hundred Years' War, 129  
 Hutten, Ulrich von, 124  
  
 Idiaqueus, Alonso de, 11, 295  
 Ignatius de Loyola, *Spiritual Exercises*, 294  
 IJsewijn, Jozef, 383, 388, 390, 392  
 Inghirami, Tommaso, 119, 125–26  
 invention, 198, 228, 230, 239–42, 246, 250, 256, 274, 288, 294  
 Isabel la Católica, queen of Spain, 20, 331  
 Isaiah, 112, 332  
 Islam, 315–57 passim  
 Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*, 4, 121; *Nicoles*, 3, 352; *De pace*, 121  
*ius gentium*, 107  
  
 James I and VI, king of England and Scotland, 114, 166, 175; *The True Lawe of Free Monarchies*, 171; *Basilikon Doron*, 171–733  
 Jerome, Saint, 74, 86, 167, 259, 376; *Adversus Jovinianum*, 79; *Epistles*, 103  
 John III, king of Portugal, 5, 185, 223, 229  
 John Chrysostom, 83, 91, 103, 213  
 Judaism, 135, 163, 315–57 passim  
 Julius Caesar, 39, 36  
 Julius II, pope, 119, 122, 124–25, 147  
*Julius exclusus*, 123–25, 146–50, 162, 170; authorship, 123–24  
 Justinian, *Institutes*, 3, 101, 103  
 Justiniano, Juan, 92–93  
 Juvenius, 69  
  
 Kees, Thomas, 35–36  
 Knechtenhofer, Joannes, 384  
 Krause, Karl Christian Friedrich, 400  
 Kristeller, Paul Oskar, 50, 409  
  
 Lactantius, 324  
 Lambert, Jean, 36  
 Lambert, Pasquier, 36  
 Landino, Cristoforo, 214  
 Lanuza, Juan de, 42  
 Las Casas, Fray Bartolomé de, 364  
 Lasius, Balthasar, 375, 377, 393  
 Lateran Council, Fifth, 118–19, 124  
 Latro, Porcius, 260  
 Lax, Gaspar, 16, 32–34, 36–38, 40–1, 373  
 Lee, Edward, 43, 58, 156  
 Leo X, pope, 122, 124–25, 133, 147, 155  
 Leonico Tomeo, Niccolò, 118, 120, 130  
 Linacre, Thomas, 117, 211  
 Livy, 211, 265–66

- Longland, John, 115, 135, 144, 164, 171  
 Lucan, 45, 160, 211  
 Lucian, 124, 126, 170, 210, 213  
 Lucretia, 78, 87  
 Lucretius, 210  
 Lupset, Thomas, 71, 130–31  
 Luther, Martin, 37, 54, 96, 133, 137, 205, 284, 336, 338; *On the Jews and their Lies*, 339  
 Lutheranism, 131, 133–34, 137, 148–50, 156, 173  
 Lycurgus, 348  
  
 Macrobius, 181, 213, 225  
 Maire, Jean, 31, 384, 387  
 Mancinelli, Antonio, 211, 226  
 Manilius, 217  
 Manrique de Lara, Alfonso, Grand Inquisitor, 10, 164  
 March, Blanca, 25–27, 82  
 March, Enric, 3  
 Maria of Burgundy, 82  
 Marshall, William, 110  
 Marsilius of Padova, 9; *Defensor pacis*, 113, 120, 152–53  
 Martens, Dirk, 228  
 Martial, 28, 88, 210–11, 263  
 Marullo, Michele, 214  
 Matheecussen, Constant, 411  
 Mayans i Siscar, Gregorio, 15–17, 31–32, 36, 48–49, 51, 53, 64, 110, 185, 374, 398, 403  
 Maximilian I of Burgundy, 82, 155  
 Melanchthon, Philipp, 200–1, 211, 214  
 memory, 11, 153, 174, 202–3, 214, 221, 230, 240, 280, 285–88, 293–95, 298, 340–1  
 Mendoza, Mencía de, 2, 61, 75, 277  
 Mohács, battle of, 146  
 Montaigne, Michel de, 114, 364–65, 397  
 More, Sir Thomas, 3, 4, 6, 10, 46, 53, 55, 57, 64–65, 75, 93–94, 113–14, 117, 214, 223, 293, 362, 378, 383; *Utopia*, 69, 125, 183, 197  
 Moreau, Brigitte, 34  
 Moreno Gallego, Valentín, 60, 110, 359  
*moriscos*, 20  
 Mosaic Law, 328  
 Mota, Pedro, 381  
 Mountjoy, Charles, 64, 71, 117  
 Muhammad, 329, 338–48 passim  
  
 Nebrija, Antonio de, 30, 211, 372–73  
 Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, 313  
 Neoplatonism, 281  
 Netanyahu, Benzion, 22–23, 26  
 Noreña, Carlos, 1, 16–18, 47, 50–53, 131, 313, 351, 409–10, 412  
 Nuñez, Pedro Juan, 373  
 Nuremberg, 66, 96, 241  
  
 Ockham, William of, 306  
 Oporinus, Johannes, 59, 63, 377, 383–88, 393  
 Ovid, 3, 28, 72–73, 76–77, 210–11, 268  
 Oxford, 55, 68, 131, 156, 169, 228, 237  
  
 Pacc, Richard, 9, 117–20, 126–28, 130, 137, 139, 141–48, 156, 159; *Oratio in pace*, 117–24; *De fructu*, 118, 124–25  
 Padilla, Juan, *Vita Christi*, 29  
 Padova, University of, 282  
 Palmireno, Lorenzo, 63  
 Paris, 15–18, 30–40, 43–45, 51, 55, 98, 100, 103  
*parrhesia*, 117, 168, 170, 176  
 pasquinades, 148, 171  
 Paul, Saint, 76, 87–89, 99–102, 221  
 Paul III, pope, 318  
 Paulinus of Nola, 69, 77  
 Pavia, 129, 135–36, 159  
 Pelagianism, 300  
 Peasants' Revolt, 129  
 Pérez, Miquel, 29, 31  
 Pérez de Chinchón, Luis Bernardo, 110, 345–46  
 Perrotti, Niccolò, 211–12  
 Peter of Spain, *Parva logicalia*, 199  
 Petrarch, 205, 213, 223  
 Peurbach, Georg, 216  
 Piccolomini, Enea Silvio, 201, 205  
 philology, 55, 184, 194, 198  
 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, 44, 182, 205, 226, 272–73, 300–2  
 Plato, 28, 69, 77, 188, 281, 288, 290, 312, 351, 355; *Phaedo*, 305–6, 351; *Republic*, 99, 154  
 Platter, Thomas, 375, 377, 393  
 Plautus, 28, 124, 211  
 Pliny the Elder, 28, 160  
 Plotinus, 282  
 Plutarch, 69, 81, 88–89, 201–4, 313  
 Polc, Reginald, 130  
 Polidoro, Virgilio, 181

- Poliziano, Angelo, 35, 156, 181,  
196, 200, 211–12, 272–73, 326;  
*Panepistemon*, 181
- Pomponazzi, Pietro, 300, 306, 322;  
*De animae immortalitate*, 284
- Pomponio Leto, Giulio, 214, 326
- Pomponius Mela, 216
- Pontano, Giovanni, 212, 214
- Praet, Lodwijk van (Louis of Flanders),  
8, 94, 97, 130, 228
- progymnasmata, 238, 263, 268
- Prosper of Aquitaine, 69
- Prudentius, 69, 211
- Pseudo-Andronicus, 306
- Pseudo-Aristotle, *Economics*, 81
- Pythagoras, 160, 167
- Quintilian, 28, 35, 38, 73, 84, 181, 184,  
197, 200, 202, 208–9, 229, 231, 247,  
255, 263, 265, 293
- Qur'an, 329, 338, 342, 344
- Rabelais, François, 201, 397
- Ramée, Pierre de la, 379
- Raphelengius, Christoffel, *Officina  
Plantiana*, 389
- Raumer, Karl von, 1, 396
- Reid, Thomas, 400
- Reuchlin, 156
- Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 237
- Robert of Ketton, 338
- Robles, Juan de, 108
- Roig, Jaume, 28
- Rois de Corella, Joan, 28–29
- Rome, 15, 37, 48, 55, 133, 137, 146–49;  
Sack of Rome, 158
- Rudolph, Caspar, 372
- Sabellico, Antonio, 214
- Sacrobosco, Giovanni, 216
- Sampson, Richard, 9, 117, 136, 146
- San Pedro, Diego de, 76
- Scala, Bartolomeo, 156
- Scholasticism, 16–17, 19, 28, 31, 35–36,  
179, 197, 399
- Schott, Andreas, 1, 388, 407
- Schürer, Lazare, 228, 361
- Scipio Africanus, 146–47, 159, 348
- Selim I, 122
- Seneca, 5, 77, 89, 119, 155, 160–2,  
187, 259, 353; *De beneficiis*, 98–99;  
*De clementia*, 136
- Servius, 208, 270
- Seville, 21, 30
- Silius Italicus, 119, 121
- Sisó, Daniel, 30
- Simancas Archive, 60
- Socrates, 89, 154, 161–62, 282, 290,  
351, 355
- Sorbonne, 67, 96–97, 156
- Soto, Domingo de, *In causa pauperum  
deliberatio*, 107
- Spanish Inquisition, 17, 23, 25–26, 29,  
128, 156, 175
- Spinoza, Baruch, 11, 114, 312
- Stoics, 115, 120, 126, 151, 161, 164,  
172, 283, 288, 306–8, 310, 323, 353
- Strabo, 217
- Sturm, Joannes, 2, 201
- Suetonius, 18, 34–35, 335, 366, 370
- Suleiman, 132
- Sulla, Lucius Cornelius, 347, 352
- Sulpizio da Veroli, 211
- Swift, Jonathan, 66
- Swineshead, Richard, 196
- Tacitus, 211; *Dialogue on Orators*, 211
- Tarsio, Giandomenico, 110
- Talmud, 329, 334
- Tavera, Juan, 107
- Tempier, Bishop, 284
- Terence, 73, 124, 211
- Tertullian, 83, 91
- Themistocles, 267–68
- Theophrastus, 217
- theurgia, 301
- Toledo, 44, 53, 62
- topics, 231, 234–35, 241, 248–52, 256,  
274–75
- Toro, Gabriel de, *Tratado de la misericordia  
divina y humana*, 107
- Torrens, Bernard, 30
- Torroella, Pere, 79
- Tortosa, 41–42
- Toscanella, Orazio, 63
- Tovar, Juan Partenio, 18, 30–31
- Trebizond, George of, 200, 214, 264
- Trent, Council of, 109, 205, 384, 390–91
- Tudor, Mary, 7, 69, 118, 123, 366, 368
- Tunstall, Cuthbert, 9, 117–18, 123, 127,  
130, 132, 138–39, 146, 150, 152,  
175; *In laudem matrimonii oratio*, 118–23
- Turks, 113, 119, 121–22, 125, 132, 134,  
137, 146–48, 157, 159, 163
- Valencia, 15–21, 24–31, 42, 44, 48, 54,  
60–62, 68, 72, 86, 97, 277, 331, 359,  
370–71, 398, 405, 407, 412

- Valdés, Alfonso de, *Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón*, 114
- Valerius Maximus, 87, 89, 211–12, 265
- Valla, Giorgio, 181
- Valla, Lorenzo, 10, 12, 156, 182, 184, 199, 211, 226; *Elegantiae*, 198; *Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae*, 228, 233, 236
- Valldaura, Bernard, 39
- Valldaura, Margarita, 39, 57, 277, 318, 370, 383
- Varchi, Benedetto, 314
- Varro, 212
- Vegio, Maffeo, 201
- Vergara, Juan de, 60
- Vergerio, Paolo, 89
- Vida, Girolamo, 214
- Vienna, siege of, 132
- Villavicencio, Lorenzo de, 109
- Virgil, 18, 35, 41, 264–65, 361, 381
- Viriaplaca, 82
- Virulus, Carolus, 218
- Vitruvius, 211
- Vittorino da Feltre, 201
- Vives, Juan Luis  
works cited:  
*Aedes legum*, 44  
*Anima senis*, 45  
*Christi Iesu Triumphus*, 16, 37, 39, 44  
*Clypei Christi descriptio*, 38, 44  
*Commentarii ad divi Aurelii Augustini De civitate Dei*, 3 4, 7, 15, 68, 77, 126, 142–43, 182, 198, 228, 293, 300–1  
*De anima et vita*, 10, 126, 175, 178, 203, 245, 254, 277–78, 321  
*De animi excitatione in Deum*, 278  
*De Aristotelis operibus censura*, 279  
*De causis corruptarum artium*, 184–85, 188–89, 215, 220, 229, 241–42, 282–83, 305  
*De censura veri*, 232–33, 236, 241–42, 275  
*De communione rerum*, 64, 104, 277–78  
*De concordia et discordia*, 9, 115, 132, 135, 146, 151–63, 175, 178  
*De conditione vitae christianorum sub Turca*, 161  
*De conscribendis epistolis*, 56, 239–42, 247, 272, 278  
*De consultatione*, 167, 228–29, 241–42, 246–47, 249, 251–53  
*De disciplinis*, 10–12, 177–226, 229, 231, 237, 247, 278, 286, 291, 293, 298, 317  
*De disputatione*, 235, 237, 241–42, 249  
*De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico*, 9, 56, 114–15, 123–24, 130–33, 145–51, 163  
*De explanatione cuiusque essentiae*, 185, 231  
*De Franciso Galliae rege a Caesare capto*, 135, 36  
*De initiis, sectis et laudibus philosophiae*, 3, 45  
*De institutione feminae Christianae*, 8, 65–66, 68, 70, 84, 65–86, 102, 167, 279, 311  
*De instrumento probabilitatis*, 184, 233, 241–42, 244, 248–49, 251, 262  
*De officio mariti*, 56, 66, 86–92, 167, 279, 311  
*De pace inter Caesarem et Franciscum Galliarum regem*, 137–43  
*De pacificatione*, 10, 115, 132, 140, 163–64, 167  
*De prima philosophia*, 11, 184, 214–17, 230, 262, 286, 291  
*De ratione dicendi*, 178, 184, 195–96, 203, 229, 237, 239, 241–42, 245, 254, 257  
*De ratione studii puerilis*, 69, 167  
*De subventionem pauperum*, 94–111, 130, 178  
*De tempore quo natus est Christus*, 44  
*De tradendis disciplinis*, 184–85, 188–89, 194–95, 203–4, 215–16, 230, 241–44, 272  
*De veritate fidei christianae*, 315 passim  
*De vita et moribus eruditi*, 220–23  
*Declamationes Sullanae*, 45, 53, 347  
*Genethliacon Iesu Christi*, 44  
*In Bucolica Vergili interpretatio... allegorica*, 279  
*In pseudodialecticos*, 197–98, 228, 230, 241–42, 282  
*In Quartum Rhetoricorum ad Herennium*, 196  
*Introductio ad sapientiam*, 56, 69  
*Linguae latinae exercitatio (Colloquia)*, 12, 13, 127, 178, 190, 203, 278, 312  
*Meditationes in septem psalmos poenitentiae*, 45  
*Nicocles*, 143  
*Opuscula varia*, 44, 53  
*Ovatio virginis*, 39, 44  
*Praelectio in Leges Ciceronis*, 44  
*Praelectio in Convivia Philephi*, 196  
*Sacrum diurnum de sudore Iesu Christi*, 59

(Vives's works cited *cont.*)

*Sapiens*, 38, 44

*Satellitium animi*, 56, 69

*Somnium et Vigilia in Somnium Scipionis*,  
45, 53, 145

*Veritas fucata*, 37, 38, 44

Vives Valeriola, Lluís (father of Vives),  
25, 82

Vocht, Henry de, 50, 54, 395, 407, 410

Volckmar, Nicholas, 372

Volterrano, Raffaele, 213

Vossius, Gerardus Joannes, 387–88

Wakefield, Richard, 144

Watson, Foster, 50–51, 317, 401, 409

Winter, Robert, 279, 365, 377

Wolsey, Cardinal Thomas, 4, 9, 68, 101,  
115, 117–22, 124, 127–29, 136–37,  
142–45, 164

Wyts, Gilles, 108–9

Xenophon, 89, 213; *Oeconomica*, 71

Ypres, 66, 96, 110

Zabata, Angela, 75

Zacchaeus, 100

# Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition

Volumes deal with persons, movements, schools and genres in medieval and early modern Christian life, thought and practice. Written by the foremost specialists in the respective fields, they aim to provide full balanced accounts at an advanced level, as well as synthesis of debate and the state of scholarship in 8-15 substantial chapters. Volumes are in English (contributions from continental scholars are translated). 2-3 volumes of 350-600 pages will be published each year. The series is expected to comprise 20-30 volumes.

1. Schabel, C. (ed.). *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages*. The Thirteenth Century. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 12333 5
2. Cox, V. & J.O. Ward (eds.). *The Rhetoric of Cicero in Its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition*. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 13177 4
3. McGuire, B.P. (ed.). *A Companion to Jean Gerson*. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15009 6
4. Levy, I.C. (ed.). *A Companion to John Wyclif*. Late Medieval Theologian. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15007 2
5. Swanson, R.N. (ed.). *Promissory Notes on the Treasury of Merits*. Indulgences in Late Medieval Europe. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15287 8
6. Stayer, J.M. & J.D. Roth (eds.). *A Companion to Anabaptism and Spiritualism, 1521-1700*. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15402 5
7. Schabel, C. (ed.). *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages*. The Fourteenth Century. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 16288 4
8. Kirby, T. (ed.). *A Companion to Richard Hooker*. With a Foreword by R. Williams. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16534 2
9. Rummel, E. (ed.). *Biblical Humanism and Scholasticism in the Age of Erasmus*. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 14573 3
10. Newton, L.A. (ed.). *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories*. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16752 0
11. Kolb, R. (ed.). *Lutheran Ecclesiastical Culture, 1550-1675*. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16641 7
12. Fantazzi, C. (ed.). *A Companion to Juan Luis Vives*. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16854 1
13. Hammerling, R. (ed.). *A History of Prayer*. The First to the Fifteenth Century. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 17122 0
14. Firey, A. (ed.). *A New History of Penance*. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 12212 3